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Abstract
International cooperation on export controls for technology is based on three
assumptions, that it is possible: to know against whom controls should be di-
rected; to control the international transfer of technology; and to define the
items to be controlled. These assumptions paint a very hierarchical framing
of one of the central problems in export controls: dual-use technology. This
hierarchical framing has been in continual contention with a competitive fram-
ing that views the problem as the marketability of technology. This thesis
analyses historical and contemporary debates between these two framings of
the problem of dual-use technology, focusing on the multilateral Wassenaar
Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods
and Technologies. Using a framework of concepts from Science & Technology
Studies and the theory of sociocultural viability, I analyse the Arrangement as
a classification system, where political, economic, and social debates are codi-
fied in the lists of controlled items, which then structure future debates. How
a technology is (not) defined, I argue, depends as much on the particular set of
social relations in which the technology is enacted as on any tangible aspects
the technology may have.
The hierarchical framing is currently hegemonic within Wassenaar, and I
show how actors that express this framing use several strategies in resolving
anomalies that arise concerning the classification of dual-use technology. These
strategies have had mixed success, and I show how they have adequately re-
solved some cases (e.g. quantum cryptography), while other areas have proved
much more difficult (e.g. focal plane arrays and computers). With the de-
velopment of controls on intangible technology transfers, a third, egalitarian
framing is arising, and I argue that initial steps have already been taken to
incorporate this framing with the discourse on dual-use technology. However,
the rise of this framing also calls into question the fundamental assumption of
export controls that technology is excludable, and therefore definable.
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1
Introduction
On a cool and wet February morning, I made my way down Victoria Street in
London to the old Department of Trade and Industry building for one of the
first interviews I conducted on the Wassenaar Arrangement. Going through the
normal bureaucratic badge-signing and waiting, I was greeted by a member of
the British delegation to the Arrangement and led to a meeting room, where I
met another member of the delegation from the Ministry of Defence. The coffee
was poured and I, a young researcher, was unsure how to proceed, though I had
prepared copious notes and questions. I gave a brief background on my institute
and assured them that I was funding my own way through my doctorate rather
than on some government or corporate payroll. And then they asked a question
that was asked by most of my interviewees when I introduced my topic to them.
With a curious tone in his voice, one of them asked, “So what made you focus
on the Wassenaar Arrangement?”
“Jointly, I think,” laughed the other one, “it was one of our questions.
Why Wassenaar?” The reason for this curiosity was simple. No one studies
the Wassenaar Arrangement. When many people hear ‘export controls’, they
think about arms control, about preventing the proliferation of nuclear bombs
1
2 Introduction
or other weapons of mass destruction. Or perhaps they think about the arms
trade, selling guns to third world countries and thereby possibly propagating
injustices. My research concerns neither of these topics, though I readily admit
that they are areas which deserve—and are receiving—much attention.
The Wassenaar Arrangement is an international arrangement among forty
governments which “contribute[s] to regional and international security and
stability by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of
conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus preventing desta-
bilising accumulations” (Wassenaar Arrangement, 2008c). It does this primar-
ily through maintaining a common list of technology that should be controlled
in international trade because of its perceived potential military use. Partic-
ipating States of the Arrangement also share information about transfers of
controlled items and work towards harmonising their export control systems.
Except in a few instances, Wassenaar does not concern itself with technolo-
gies related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Instead, it focuses on
non-WMD, or ‘conventional’, weapons and related ‘dual-use’ technologies.
The Arrangement is one of the attempts by governments to address the
problem of dual-use technology. The idea is simple. Since technologies can be
used against a country, the government should control who has access to those
technologies. This idea is based on three assumptions: that it is possible to
know from whom a government should keep a technology; that it is possible
to control access to the technology; and that it is possible to know which
technologies to control.
My interest in the Wassenaar Arrangement is based on an analysis of these
assumptions. One does not have to search very far to find arguments that it
is no longer clear from whom militarily significant technologies should be kept.
Many of these arguments draw on the point that most of the apparatus of mod-
ern export control systems is based on having a clearly identified enemy. While
the Wassenaar Arrangement is not directed at any state or group of states,
it takes much of its structure and operating procedures from its predecessor,
3the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), which
controlled the flow of technology from the West to the Communist Bloc during
the Cold War.
Similarly, there are many reviews of the inadequacy of current export con-
trol systems’ ability to control the transfer of technologies. Controls, such
critics claim, are either too cumbersome, too expensive, too time-consuming,
too restrictive, not restrictive enough, or some combination of these and other
factors.
Very little research, however, has so far been conducted on whether it is pos-
sible to know which technologies governments need to control. For instance,
the yearly review of armaments, disarmament, and international security pub-
lished by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) usually
has a page or two on developments within the Wassenaar Arrangement, but
only a few sentences which say, “The WA control lists were amended to take
into account technical and security developments” (Anthony & Bauer, 2007,
p. 647).
On first glance, this seems entirely appropriate. While the SIPRI Yearbook
is a specialist publication for the arms control community, it must cover a sub-
stantial amount of material each year. It is likely that only a very small portion
of its readership would like to know that the Arrangement decided to include
controls, for example, on “non-‘space-qualified’ non-linear (2-dimensional) in-
frared ‘focal plane arrays’ based on ‘microbolometer’ material having individual
elements with an unfiltered response in the wavelength range equal to or ex-
ceeding 8,000 nm but not exceeding 14,000 nm.” Nor would the publication
have the space to discuss (nor the time to research) the other dozens of modi-
fications made each year to the Dual-Use List, each of which likely involves a
substantially different body of expert technical knowledge.
But times, as they say, are changing. Calls for the reform of national ex-
port control systems and the international arrangements of which they are a
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part have been increasing in both their quantity and depth of analysis, partic-
ularly in the United States (US). Export controls, these reports/journal arti-
cles/testimonies claim, are a relic of the Cold War and no longer adequate in a
world of global commerce and cooperation. Moreover, in trying to prevent the
international distribution of militarily sensitive technology, they may actually
be making the country less secure by undermining the competitiveness of com-
panies that rely on a global market to remain at the forefront of research and
development. These calls, however, are rarely connected to an analysis of the
mundane practices within a national system or an international arrangement
such as the Wassenaar Arrangement.
The need for political support for export control reform is recognised both
outside and inside governmental institutions. However, it is my contention
that, even with political support, reform will not happen from the top down in
this system, which is heavily based on the employment of experts to perform
its day-to-day operations. Moreover, by over-politicising the work of export
controls, governments run the significant risk that positions will become too
polarised to achieve any progress. A more useful way to generate the needed
reforms—and indeed to define what reforms are needed—is to begin with an
analysis of the basic practices within an export control system.
This thesis is an analysis of one of those practices: the process through
which modifications are made to the Wassenaar Arrangement Dual-Use List.
The analysis is both grounded in the history of the lists and enmeshed in re-
cent debates within the Arrangement. I take an unconventional approach to
viewing the Arrangement, characterising it not as an international regime try-
ing to solve a clearly defined problem, but rather as an incompletely theorised
agreement that must contend with multiple definitions of the problem to be
solved. Rather than analysing it as primarily a political arrangement among
governments, I view it as a classification system that is maintained by a mix
of technical experts, political and economic motivations, and social and insti-
tutional constraints.
5The value of such a perspective is that it provides a fresh look at a system
that is likely to see significant changes in the next few decades but is at the
moment still trying to escape from its current institutional and intellectual
framing. The thesis is not intended to provide answers for practitioners as to
how to structure an export control system. It is, instead, meant to show some
overlooked benefits of the current system and provide some insight into ways
to foster the emergence of changes to that system.
The thesis is structured around exploring three inter-related questions. The
first is “What is a dual-use technology?” The question does not have a single
answer, nor is the answer ever permanently set. Today’s dual-use technology
may be tomorrow’s mobile phone. The continual re-definition of dual-use tech-
nology should not be taken necessarily as a sign of the ever-advancing and
inescapable development of technology. Nor is it a continual refinement, set
eventually to arrive at an objective list of technology that is inherently dual-
use. Rather, I argue that the definitional process serves much the same purpose
that it serves in language more generally: it codifies particular sets of social
relations, which allow for people to do some things more easily, while making
other things more difficult. Defining dual-use technology is a pragmatic process
where there is no over-arching theory used to objectively identify technology or
parts thereof that are ‘dual-use’. Definitions rest on many contingencies, from
perceived military significance to controllability to the fact that translations of
a definition must work in over a dozen languages.
The second question the thesis explores is “What is the Wassenaar Ar-
rangement trying to do?” Like the first question, the answer to this one is
multiple and contingent. Under the broad heading of preventing destabilising
accumulations, Wassenaar Participating States pursue several, often contradic-
tory, objectives, most notably the objectives of security versus economy. These
objectives are not always contradictory, and the case of intangible transfers of
technology shows how the objectives of both are in alignment. But both of
them, I then point out, may be contradictory to the objectives of openness
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characteristic of the academic world, which relies on intangible transfers for its
livelihood.
The third question is “How is the Wassenaar Arrangement trying to achieve
its goals?” The Arrangement is the current manifestation of a long history of
international collaboration on export controls, and has maintained facets of
its rules, procedures, and lists from that history. As a result, while some
parts of the Arrangement are very up-to-date in addressing the needs of the
contemporary international system, other parts are still based on a system that
was developed over half a century ago. I argue for viewing the Arrangement
as a long series of institutionalised decisions, each of which is a fixed point and
serves as a marker of the balance of the different framings on the problem of
dual-use technology present in the debate at the time. Decisions are reached
when and where they can be, with little thought given to creating a cohesive
overall theory of how the Arrangement works and what it should control.
Thesis overview
To explore these questions, the thesis is divided into three main sections. The
first provides the broad theoretical and historical landscape within which I de-
fine my arguments, as well as the methodology I used to gather and analyse
the data to make those arguments. The second is an in-depth analysis of the
changing structure of the international lists of controlled items from the 17th
Century to the current day. I then analyse a set of changes to the Wassenaar
Arrangement Dual-Use List, through which I explore the ways that Participat-
ing States of the Arrangement use these list changes for multiple purposes. The
third section looks at the addition of controls on intangible aspects of technolo-
gies and the development of controls on the intangible transfers of technology
to show how the Arrangement may be trying to push the bounds of the def-
inition of dual-use technology beyond the realm of acceptability to all of the
different communities of practice to which it is accountable.
7Chapter 2 provides the reader with an overview of the theoretical landscape
in which the thesis sits. It begins with a discussion of different ways to un-
derstand what technology is, and what is the role of technology in society. I
situate my argument within the literature that describes technology as text and
explore the ways that certain configurations of technologies afford some types
of interaction more than other configurations. I then review the literature
on classification systems, and in particular systems of classifying technology.
Rather than arguing that technologies have essential properties that place them
in an objective classification system, I take up the position that categories of
technologies are interpretively flexible and established largely on a pragmatic
basis. Technologies need to serve many communities of practice, and often
each community will have a different way of describing and interacting with
similar technologies. When trying to establish a classification system that will
accommodate multiple communities, then, much effort will likely be spent on
deciding which aspects of the technology to define and which aspects to leave
ambiguous. The chapter then turns to a review of theories of export controls,
which come mainly from the literatures on law, international relations, and
institutional analysis. I conclude the chapter with a review of the theory of
sociocultural viability, which draws together many of the strands of thought
on technology, classification, and international relations.
Chapter 3 outlines the analytical framework and methodology I use in this
thesis. I employ the concept of a ‘wicked problem’ to analyse how multiple
framings of the problem of dual-use technology can be present in classification
debates. Each framing will be trying to establish a different form of social or-
ganisation and in the process possibly create ‘uncomfortable knowledge’, which
is knowledge that one framing in the debate knows is relevant, but undermines
the form of social organisation that framing is trying to institutionalise. To pre-
vent knowledge from becoming uncomfortable, each framing can employ several
strategies for handling anomalies in the classification system, and I outline the
strategies for the hierarchical framing, which dominates most of the discourse
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on dual-use technology. In addition to looking at individual debates, this thesis
also considers the Wassenaar Arrangement as a whole, and its ability as an in-
stitution to accommodate often-conflicting framings of the problem of dual-use
technology. By employing the concepts of ‘incompletely theorised agreements’
and ‘clumsy solutions’, I provide a framework to analyse this ability. The chap-
ter concludes with an overview of my research questions and the methodology
I employed to gather and analyse my data.
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the international development of export
control systems. I provide a brief history of export controls to show how there
have been continual debates between economic and security concerns on which
items should be controlled in international trade because of their military sig-
nificance. I provide background on Wassenaar’s predecessors, CoCom and the
New Forum. I then examine in depth the internal workings of the Arrange-
ment, from its founding documents to the structure of the meeting rooms and
the functioning bodies. In doing so, we can see how the Arrangement allows
for multiple framings of the problem of dual-use technology to interact with
each other.
The second part of the thesis begins with Chapter 5, which provides an
extended analysis of the development and structure of the Wassenaar lists,
especially the Dual-Use List. I place the lists in historical context, showing
how such lists have existed, and have influenced succeeding lists, from the 16th
through 20th Centuries. Analysing the changing structure of the CoCom lists,
we are able to see how the balance between framings of the problem of dual-use
technology shifted over time, as well as how the lists were able to incorporate
ambiguity into their definitions in order to satisfy each framing. The chapter
concludes with a description of the guidelines used to modify the lists, and the
structure of the proposal process through which modifications normally go.
Chapter 6 analyses three cases of modifications made to the Wassenaar
Dual-Use List. Each case demonstrates how different mixes of anomaly-handling
strategies are employed by the hierarchical framing, which views the problem of
9dual-use as one of control, in responding to arguments made by the competitive
framing, which views the problem as one of the marketability of technology.
The first case is the addition of quantum cryptography, and shows how the
definition of a dual-use technology is sometimes purposefully left vague, but
also how there are often many cases where agreement is reached quickly and
easily on list modifications. The second case covers the much more contentious
modification process concerning focal plane arrays. The case provides a rich
example of (a) the different—often non-technical—factors that play into tech-
nology definition, (b) the difficulty of controlling something that is already in
commercial production and the need to engage blame-management strategies,
and (c) how agreement sometimes is only reached through concessions on all
sides, but such concessions are acceptable because what a framing loses in one
debate it may win in another. The third case analyses the modification on
computer controls, including the eventual effective elimination of the controls
and shift to controlling software. This case demonstrates the very pragmatic
approach to defining dual-use technology, where agreement is reached when and
where it can be. Years of negotiations led to the acknowledgement that, even
though the technology was militarily significant, there was little a government
could do to prevent its transfer. The case therefore shows how there may be
some areas of the lists where controls serve more symbolic importance than
actually controlling the technology.
Chapter 7 then looks at the development of controls on intangible aspects of
technology, and on intangible transfers of technology. Since the 1970s, at least
one country, the US, has explicitly equated the tangible aspects of technology—
the ‘things’, artefacts, objects—with the intangible aspects—the knowledge and
skills necessary to engage with the artefact to some end. This logically makes
sense, some Participating States argue, as there is little point controlling a
technology if an adversary knows how to make it herself. However, control-
ling knowledge flows rather than the flow of tangible aspects of technology
also presents unique challenges, which this chapter covers. Primary among
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these is the creation of a space for a new framing of the problem of dual-
use technology—an egalitarian framing that views the problem as one of open
access to knowledge and technology. I relate the developments on intangible
transfers in Wassenaar to the development of the WTO’s TRIPS agreement to
show some likely consequences of continuing down the current path of devel-
opment.
At the same time, however, I show how being an incompletely theorised
agreement may help the Wassenaar Arrangement in this regard, because it
defers the need to reach agreement on all levels about what should be done
with regards to intangibles. Instead, by continuing to reach agreement where
and when the Arrangement can, it allows for any future control to be grounded
in trial runs within countries, such as those currently being carried out in the
US. I provide an analysis on how a clumsy solution space may be created within
the export control system, and argue for the need to deliberate, not only on
the actual lists of controlled items, but also on the balance between the policy
goals of each actor.
In recent years, little attention has been given to the
integration of, or conversion between, civilian and
military technology in [Science & Technology Stud-
ies].
—Rappert, Balmer & Stone (2008, p. 726)
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This chapter sets out the theoretical landscape of the thesis, providing an
overview of the main areas of theory I use in understanding the field and con-
structing my arguments. I have divided the literature into four broad areas in
order to highlight my focus on the Dual-Use List modification process.
The first section looks at theories of technology and how technology and
social relations interact. Research over the past thirty years in the field of
science and technology studies (STS) has developed several strands of thinking
on what constitutes technology and how technology shapes, is shaped by, and
constitutes social relations.
The second section provides a history of ideas about classification, focus-
ing particularly on the progression of thinking from classifying discrete entities
into discrete categories to classifying ambiguous entities into ever-fluid cate-
gories. Particular attention is paid to how classifying is done under non-ideal
conditions, e.g. constraints due to time, institutional structure, politics, eco-
nomics, and linguistics. I also review the literature on the concept of dual-use
technology.
The third section outlines the relevant areas of international relations the-
ory, in particular regime theory and institutionalism. I provide an overview
of the significant literature within this tradition that relates to the Wassenaar
Arrangement in particular and export controls generally.
Technology, classification systems, and international relations have all been
areas of analysis within the theory of sociocultural viability, and I conclude the
chapter with a review of this literature.
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2.1 Technology & social relations
“Technology has been taken as configured by and configuring, affected by and affecting, as
well as shaped and shaping. A key question and matter for disagreement though has been
exactly how to articulate the relation between the social and the technical, while not treating
the latter as simply indeterminate. This is where the conceptual difficulties and differences
for sociologists begin.”
— Brian Rappert (2003, 569–570)
How people understand technology has an effect on the types of arguments
they present on how to define what is dual-use. The etymology of the word
‘technology’ takes us back to the Greek τεχνηλογία, which comes from τέχνη
(‘techne’), meaning ‘craft’ or ‘skill’, and λογία (‘logia’), meaning ‘knowledge,
reasoning, or argument’. Since the industrial revolution, when the division of
labour between making and using tools increased, we have increasingly found
ourselves interacting with technologies with origins and internal workings that
we do not understand. The technology, in this sense, has often been ‘black
boxed’ (Latour, 1987; Pinch & Bijker, 1984); we provide it with an input and get
an output, not aware of how the input gets transformed into the output. Black-
boxing is pervasive in advanced industrial societies today. Most people are not
able to explain, for instance, how electricity works, or how an automobile is
made, or how the food supply chain works. When asked ‘what is technology?’
most people would respond with an example of an artefact, most likely based on
electronics, such as a computer or a mobile phone. Technology, however, also
includes the practices that allow humans to make and use these artefacts; thus,
manufacturing techniques and word processing skills could also be considered
technology. In addition to artefacts and practices, technology is also knowledge,
specifically knowledge about how to make and use artefacts.
If the goal of export controls is to prevent one’s enemy or potential enemy
from getting certain technology, then it is not only the transfer of physical arte-
facts with which one must be concerned. There must also be controls on access
to, training in, and knowledge of, how to design, build, and use an artefact.
The Wassenaar Arrangement has all of these aspects of technology on its lists,
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but interestingly defines only the last as ‘technology’. Specifically, ‘technology’
is “specific information necessary for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of
a product,” where ‘information’ is either ‘technical data’ (“such as blueprints,
plans, diagrams, models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifica-
tions, manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or devices
such as disk, tape, read-only memories”) or ‘technical assistance’ (“such as in-
struction, skills, training, working knowledge, consulting services. ‘Technical
assistance’ may involve transfer of ‘technical data’”) (Wassenaar Arrangement,
2007b, p. 203). There is no single term to describe artefacts, as will be shown
in Chapter 4. In this thesis, I use ‘technology’ as a general term to mean any
human construction, coupled with the practices and knowledge of how to en-
gage that construction towards a particular end. I put the term in single quotes
only when employing it according to the Wassenaar definition.
Technology is inherently social, and the nature of the relationship between
technology and society more broadly has been the source of much debate, as we
will see below. In this section, I review the main arguments that have been put
forward to explain the technology/society relationship. This debate is relevant
to the Wassenaar Dual-Use List modification process in two ways: first, the
dominant approach to understanding the interaction between technology and
society in the middle of the 20th Century, technological determinism, is still the
understanding that is employed by many practitioners today; second, through
current work that highlights how technology and social (and in particular gov-
ernance) relations are co-constitutive, we are able to analyse the maintenance
of the Dual-Use List as a process that maintains social as well as technical
order.
Technological determinism
Much of the literature on the distinction between technology and social rela-
tions can be sorted into three main groups: scholars who argue that technology
drives societal development; those who argue that society drives technological
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development; and those who mix the two, i.e. society and technology are co-
constructed or co-constitutive. Much of the work today is done in the third
category, but this is in large part in response to previous work in the first two.
There are difficulties in categorising the literature in this way. Langdon Win-
ner, for instance, has been put in both the first and third category (see Grint
& Woolgar, 1997).
Early attempts at analysing the relation between technology and social re-
lations tended to draw a causal link from the first to the second, that is, they
described technology mainly in terms of artefacts that exist independently of
social interaction but also define overall development of society (Ellul & Wilkin-
son, 1964; Mumford, 1967; Winner, 1977, 1986).1 ‘Technological determinism’
takes technology to be the determining factor in the drive for social change,
for good (Lenin, 1921) or ill (e.g. Ellul & Wilkinson, 1964).2 In every genera-
tion, there are a few inventions that are seen as providing the doorway to the
next level of civilization, and these are the ones that are taken up and thereby
transform society. This view, however, leaves little room for human choice,
and much work has been done to show its inadequacy.3 The view, however, is
not dead (Winner, 2001).4 As Sally Wyatt (2008) shows, technological deter-
minism still plays a significant role in policy making.5 Wyatt uses the work of
Heilbroner (1967), Bimber (1990), Freeman (1987), and Hughes (1994) to argue
that technological determinism should not be seen as a naive view of technol-
ogy to be dismissed, but rather that the view should be a point of (reflexive)
analysis for researchers. To a significant extent, this is the view of technology
that is held by the majority of practitioners in the Wassenaar Arrangement,
1Marxism is often considered a form of, or even the basis for, technological determinism
(Burns, 1969; Hansen, 1921; Heilbroner, 1967; Shaw, 1979), but this is a perennial debate in
the field (Bimber, 1994; MacKenzie, 1984; Miller, 1984).
2Some researchers add Marcuse (1964) here (e.g. Wyatt, 2008), though others disagree
(Grint & Woolgar, 1997, p. 25–6).
3A perusal through the journal Science, Technology, & Human Values quickly shows the
breadth of this critique.
4For an in-depth discussion on this point, see (Smith & Marx, 1994).
5An earlier example of this is the 1945 report of Vannevar Bush, the US President’s first
science advisor, titled Science, the Endless Frontier (Bush, 1945).
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as we will see in later chapters. We should—and in this thesis I do—ask ‘Why
would this person hold the view that technology shapes society?’
Social determinism & social construction of technology
A sustained critique on technological determinism has come from the area of
the ‘social shaping of technology’ (SST) (see Edge, 1995; MacKenzie, 1996;
MacKenzie & Wajcman, 1985; Williams & Edge, 1996). Instead of looking at
how technology shapes society, this approach aims to show how economic and
political factors shape the direction of technological development. A significant
area of this line of research for our purposes is the work done on the relation-
ship between society and military technology. MacKenzie (1987) uses the idea
of ‘technological systems’ (Bijker et al., 1987; Hughes, 1983) to show that what
constitutes an ‘accurate’ missile depends on the organisational and political
interests involved. Different actors will have different goals that missile accu-
racy will be serving, be they political, economic, or technical. MacKenzie goes
further, however, and shows how these different goals direct the development
of the technology. Indeed, even “[s]etting a design parameter such as missile
accuracy is [ ]6 a political matter” (MacKenzie, 1987, p. 203). Restated, the
choice of which characteristic of the technology (in this case, ‘accuracy’) would
be the one upon which debate centred is itself a topic of debate.
Another critique of technological determinism comes from Grint & Woolgar
(1997) who argue for moving away from what they call the ‘essentialist’ view
of technology, where a technology would have some independent ‘essence’. For
example, this would mean that what constitutes a gun depends on how it was
constructed (when did it become a gun rather than a bunch of parts?), what
it contains (does it need a rifled barrel? bullets?), how it is used (as a tool for
political repression, as a security measure for an old lady, or as a door stop?),
and other factors that involve the gun’s interaction with humans (and their
6I use [ ] to denote where I have removed a single word from the quoted text.
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organisational and discursive forms).7
But does this mean that there is a technology independent of social inter-
action? Grint & Woolgar take a very strong view here, deploying the ‘onion
model’ of technology to show that the realist idea that social constructions sit
around a hard technical core is only accepted because “the effort in continuing
to peel away layers increases. Ultimately, we suggest, it is only the surrounding
layers and the associated difficulty of removing them which sustains the illu-
sion that there is anything at the centre” (Grint & Woolgar, 1997, p. 155). At
the same time, they point out, “[c]onstructivists do not necessarily deny the
existence of a world beyond our capacity to reconstruct it; the point is that
our reconstructions of whatever it is are not true reflections of it. It is not a
question of saying ‘guns don’t kill anybody’ but of asking how we know that,
in this case, a particular causal relationship exists between gun ownership and
murder” (p. 149).8
Similar arguments are taken up as well by Edwards, Ashmore & Potter
(1995), who argue against what they take as bottom-line objections in relativist
arguments. As an example, they argue that a realist will slam his hand on the
table and say, “surely this (Bang!) must be real. . . ” (p. 29). But what does
it mean for it to be real? If the argument is that it is solid, then on the level
of atomic particles, most of the table is empty space. Does it mean that the
whole table is real, or only the part that was hit? The example demonstrates
rather that the table was invoked as real by our consensual common sense.
7See Grint & Woolgar (1992) for a constructivist account of being shot.
8The final position of Grint & Woolgar on this point is contested in their own work,
however. In the following quotation, they do indeed seem to suggest that there is no world
outside of our interaction with it (p. 164):
Even at the very centre of the onion, then, we would argue that there is no
residual technical core which is in principle impervious to social analysis. In
principle layers can continue to be stripped away until it is evident that there
is nothing at the centre. The layers themselves are what constitute the core.
The incremental costs of removing further layers might persuade us to stop at
any particular point. At that point the notion of the core becomes a convenient
shorthand for the fact that we have been persuaded that further deconstruction
is inappropriate.
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One of the difficulties with these approaches, however, is that they—as was
the case with technological determinism—draw a single causal line between
technology and society: in this case social relations create and drive technology.
This is shown in Figure 2.1.
Technology Society
Technological determinism
Social determinism
Figure 2.1: Two relationships between technology and society: technological deter-
minism and social determinism
One response to this difficulty is the ‘social construction of technology’
(SCOT) approach developed by Wiebe Bijker, Trevor Pinch, and others (Bijker,
1993; Bijker et al., 1987; Pinch & Bijker, 1984). Largely an outgrowth of
the work done on the sociology of scientific knowledge,9 SCOT develops the
notion of ‘interpretive flexibility’ of technology whereby different ‘relevant social
groups’ can have very different understandings of technology, including different
understandings of technical characteristics.
Demonstrating the interpretative flexibility of an artifact amounts
to showing that one seemingly unambiguous ‘thing’ (a technical
process, or some material contraption of metal, wood, and rubber
as in the case of the bicycle) is better understood as several dif-
ferent artifacts. Each of the different artifacts hidden within that
seemingly one ‘thing’ can be traced by identifying the meanings
attributed by the relevant social groups (Bijker, 1993, p. 118):
‘Relevant social groups’ are any group, formal or informal, where all mem-
bers “share the same set of meanings, attached to a specific artifact” (Pinch
& Bijker, 1987, p. 30). The most famous example of SCOT is Pinch & Bi-
jker’s (1987; 1984) social construction of the bicycle. In the 19th Century, there
were different groups in favour of different versions of bicycle design (and also
groups against bicycles in general). For instance, women were seen to have
9See Shapin (1995) for a review of this field.
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special needs (e.g. moral decency and dress-wearing) that needed to be met by
bicycle design (for it to be safe and relatively easy to ride), whereas the ‘macho’
men wanted a bicycle with higher wheels providing more risk. For the latter
group, the high-wheeled Ordinary bicycle was a desirable technology because of
its ‘macho’ status and therefore development of even higher wheels was some-
thing to be encouraged, whereas for the former group, the same artefact was an
unsafe machine and they encouraged the development of lower wheels. A sin-
gle artefact, therefore, is interpretatively flexible depending on which relevant
social group one is looking at, and that flexibility can lead different groups to
develop the artefact in different directions.
Technology & social relations are co-constitutive
One critique of the research we have so far discussed, however, is that tech-
nology and social relations are still seen as being two separate things. SCOT
argues that the social can construct the technical and that the technical can
construct the social, but later research down this train of thought sees the line
becoming increasingly blurred. Many researchers argue for abolishing the tech-
nical/social distinction as the unit of analysis for researchers, because it does
us no service analytically (e.g. Law & Mol, 1995; Orlikowski, 1992; Woolgar,
2002). Bijker (1993) proposes replacing it with the ‘sociotechnical ensemble’,
since all technologies are imbued with social relations, and all social relations
are mediated through, and encapsulated in, technologies. This is a dynamic
and constant process, where relevant social groups are continually seeking to
stabilise their group through an acceptance of their reading of the technology
by other social groups. Rip & Kemp (1998) develop the idea of a sociotechnical
landscape to describe how any one technology is not an ‘isolated artefact’, but
only a label we apply to part of the landscape in which we live, and which
sustains us. “The motorcar,” for instance, is “made up of steel and plastic,
concrete (the roads), law (traffic rules), and culture (the value and meaning of
personal mobility)” (p. 335).
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Actor-Network Theory (ANT) is another area which argues for treating
human and non-human entities in the same analytical light (i.e. agency is dis-
tributed) when looking at sociotechnical systems (Callon, 1986; Latour, 2005;
Law & Hassard, 1999). ANT explores how actor-networks are formed, persist,
and dissolve. Any actor-network is a transient phenomenon and must be con-
tinually performed in order for it to hold together. One key aspect of ANT
on which I will draw in this thesis is that entities do not reflect the actor-
network, but rather that it is through these entities that the actor-network is
constructed. Relating directly to the work of the Wassenaar Arrangement, this
would mean that the Dual-Use List, for example, does not reflect the tensions
between security and economic concerns. It actually constructs those tensions
by being a performative site of the actor-network.
Technology as text
Focus on the processes involved in interacting with technology is meant to
show that “many discussions and analyses of the impact of technology may
be premature, in the sense that they tend to adopt a relatively fixed view of
the capability of the technology in question” (Woolgar, 1991, p. 37). Wool-
gar developed the idea of ‘technology as text’ to serve as a reminder of this
(Grint & Woolgar, 1997; Woolgar, 1991). Woolgar describes three ways that
technology can be perceived as text. The first, which he calls the ‘instrumental
response’, “merely reemphasizes the interpretive flexibility of the character and
capacity of technology” (Woolgar, 1991, p. 37). It does so to show that argu-
ments which claim to have the definitive view on the impacts of a technology
may be premature. The second, ‘interpretivist response’, argues for the need
to understand “the ways in which technology texts are written and read” by
practitioners (p. 38). Doing so can show how different readings relate to the
organisational structure in which the technology takes shape. The third way
that technology can be seen as text is the ‘reflexive response’, characterised by
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showing that “readings of the technology text are accomplished both by tech-
nologists [i.e. practitioners] and by the analysts [i.e. researchers] in the course
of sociological argument” (p. 39, emphasis original). In so doing, Woolgar ar-
gues for analysis to start from the position that “the textuality of technologies
and the textuality of argument is essentially similar” (p. 39). Woolgar is quick
to draw a distinction between ‘ordinary’ texts and technologies, which is key
to our argument here:
We can ask how and why technologies can be read as relatively
robust pockets of interpretation in a sea of interpretively flexible
texts. Their robustness, or relative stability, consists in the extent
to which they are credited with the capacity to act or to effect
action. Whereas the effects of ‘ordinary’ texts upon the reader
are largely indeterminate, by contrast, technologies are texts with
largely (designable and) predictable effects (p. 39).
Why should technologies and ‘ordinary’ texts be different? Because tech-
nologies are credited with being able to act, to effect action. Put slightly
differently, “the relation between readers and writers is understood as medi-
ated by the machine and by interpretations of what the machine is, what it is
for, and what it can do” (Grint & Woolgar, 1997, p. 70, emphasis added). I
return to this point when looking at the concept of ‘affordances’ below.
Throughout this thesis, I argue that the lists of the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment and the items on them sit somewhere in between technologies and texts.
They describe characteristics of technologies, and yet also serve as technologies
themselves, allowing some actions and constraining others. The technology, in
this sense, is text. It is text that is formed through national processes and gets
sent to the Wassenaar Arrangement. It is text that is debated in the meetings
of the Arrangement. And it is text that is the primary output of those meet-
ings. The questions that now arise are whether these texts can be anything,
and what is the relationship between the texts and artefacts that are actually
exported.
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Affordances
One answer to these questions is that technologies have ‘affordances’. Coming
from cognitive psychology, ‘affordance’ is a term coined by James Gibson (1979)
(and used by Norman (1988)) to explain how we perceive things other than
ourselves. Rather than perceiving the thing directly, we only perceive those
properties that are relative to ourselves. A chair ‘affords’ sitting upon if it is
of a certain shape/strength/etc. relative to the person perceiving it. Gibson
would seem, at a first reading, to be separating the physical from the social (or
what he calls ‘psychical’): there is a thing perceived, there is a perceiver, and
there is a lens (the affordance) through which the two are connected. Moreover,
he states that it is possible to perceive the correct affordance of a thing (p. 142).
But his insistence that affordances are subjective is also clear, for instance when
he states (p. 139) that objects are only defined and classified in relation to one’s
social circumstances:
The theory of affordances rescues us from the philosophical muddle
of assuming fixed classes of objects, each defined by its common
features and then given a name. As Ludwig Wittgenstein knew,
you cannot specify the necessary and sufficient features of the class
of things to which a name is given. They have only a “family
resemblance.” But this does not mean you cannot learn how to use
things and perceive their uses. You do not have to classify and label
things in order to perceive what they afford.
The lack of clarity of Gibson’s concept is addressed by Ian Hutchby, who ar-
gues that “affordances are functional and relational aspects which frame, while
not determining, the possibilities for agentic action in relation to an object.
In this way, technologies can be understood as artefacts which may be both
shaped by and shaping of the practices humans use in interaction with, around
and through them” (Hutchby, 2001, p. 444). Hutchby uses the concept of af-
fordance to advance research on the ‘technological shaping of sociality’ rather
than the social shaping of technology, in line with criticisms that Science &
Technology Studies (STS) focuses too much on the latter (e.g. Vincenti, 1995).
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He criticises Grint & Woolgar’s ‘technology as text’ metaphor as assuming
that artefacts are tabula rasa, shaped only by the persuasiveness of arguments
(Hutchby, 2001, p. 446).
Instead, artefacts (and all material things) possess different affordances,
“and these affordances constrain the ways that they can possibly be ‘written’
or ‘read’” (emphasis original, Hutchby, 2001, p. 447). Hutchby describes four
aspects of affordances. Affordances are functional, in that they enable and con-
strain the ability of an artefact to engage in some activity. They are relational,
in that the same artefact will offer different sets of affordances depending on
what it interacts with. When humans interact with an artefact, what affor-
dance they choose will also depend on social conventions. Finally, affordances
can be designed into an object as well as naturally arising. It is important to
note here that Hutchby is not employing the same concept of technology I am.
He is referring only to artefacts, and not to practices or knowledge of those
practices. I extend the concept of affordances to include practices, e.g. by
saying that certain actions people do afford certain readings about what they
are doing.
Hutchby’s view is critiqued by Brian Rappert (2003).10 While recognising
that describing the relationship between social and technical, without saying
the former completely determines the latter, is a perennial topic of debate
in STS, Rappert argues that most attempts to ascribe more importance to
the technical—Hutchby’s included—fall short. What Woolgar is trying to do
with the ‘technology as text’ metaphor, according to Rappert, is continually
to remind the reader that closure on what constitutes the technology always
entails assumptions—political, social, and otherwise—about the role of technol-
ogy in society (Rappert, 2003, p. 572). There are four ways in particular that
Hutchby’s concept of affordances falls short: “it generates non-controvertible
claims that border on the banal or unhelpful; it closes down debates in often
arbitrary ways when they could be usefully opened up; it relies on a series
10And also briefly by Woolgar (2002).
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of unstated shared agreements; and it fails to provide a place for critical self-
examination” (Rappert, 2003, p. 573). Hutchby’s focus, in short, is on resolving
the properties of devices rather than on sensitising ourselves to the debates that
created the technology.
Granting Rappert’s critique, there is still an important point in Hutchby’s
article (see also Hutchby, 2003). Given that a technology has been inscribed
through discourse, can it function as inscribed? If an oven is meant to heat to
200C, but only heats to 190C, then it is not performing as we believe it should.
While we can deconstruct what we mean by ‘oven’, ‘heat’, and ‘200C’, given
what we mean, does the oven do what we believe it should do? The functioning
of the technology is constrained by something else in addition to discourse. In
this example, Hutchby would say that the oven ‘affords’ reaching 190C but not
200C. We could modify our concept of oven, heat, or 200C. Similarly, we could
modify the arrangement of the artefact we are calling an ‘oven’, say by making
a knob that turns further than the 190C marking.11
It is this second point to which I want to bring attention here. While the two
modifications are similar, they are also different in a very important respect.
The first involves a change in the definition of the technology (i.e. its social
construction), while the second involves a change in material or practice. This
is highlighted in the following two points:
• The discourse creates a technology.
– ‘What is technology X?’
• One must then determine whether an artefact (or practice) is an example
of the technology.
– ‘Is this thing (artefact or practice) an example of technology X?’
11Or, if we hold that technology is made up of practices and knowledge of those practices,
in addition to artefacts, then we could also e.g. modify the practice of the knob-turner
(perhaps it is a sticky knob).
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The concept of affordance conflates the technical and the social by equating
an artefact (or practice) with the label we put on it. Hutchby cannot ask
the question ‘what constitutes the artefact?’ because for him the (material)
artefact is the (discursively defined) technology. This point can be made clear
by revisiting Grint & Woolgar’s (1997, p. 65-94) work on ‘configuring the user’.
In a set of trials for a new computer (the Stratus 286), a user, Ruth, was asked
to connect the computer to a printer. The two are supposed to go together, but
Ruth’s attempt to put them together failed in the end because “it turns out
that Ruth had been asked to connect a printer to the Stratus 286 [. . . ] using
a lead designed for use with the earlier K-series machine” (Grint & Woolgar,
1997, p. 89). This, in turn, leads Hutchby to argue that “[w]hat is missed in
this interpretation is precisely the sense in which Ruth’s interaction with the
machine is underpinned by a material substratum in which she encounters, not
a text, but an array of affordances” (Hutchby, 2001, p. 452, emphasis added).
Grint & Woolgar ‘miss it’, however, because they are following a very different
philosophical argument on the question of agency. For them, it is not about
whether the technology has affordances, but rather how people decide what
affordances the technology has.
This differentiation between the discourse about technology and the arte-
facts and practices to which the discourse relates is important for this thesis. In
maintaining the Wassenaar Arrangement lists, member states spend their time
discussing ‘what is a dual-use technology?’ and thereby engage in discourse
about the technology. It therefore makes sense to employ the ‘technology as
text’ metaphor to analyse these debates. In contrast, once the lists are decided
and enacted in national legislation, export control officials are then tasked with
determining whether the license application they have in front of them is an
example of a dual-use technology as defined in the lists. There is therefore a
vested interest by at least some of the actors to make sure that the character-
istics of the technologies that are decided at Wassenaar are ones that (a) are
meaningful to the export licensing officers, and (b) can be related to actual
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artefacts in existence. While the items on the lists are the result of debates
involving politics, economics, and social and cultural considerations, they are
also bounded by technical considerations—by the relationship between text on
the lists and the artefacts that get exported. This will be elaborated upon
in relation to the Wassenaar Arrangement in Chapter 4 when we look at the
Criteria for the Selection of Dual-Use Items.
Whoever decides what the characteristics of a technology are and how hu-
mans relate to the technology has great power. It is often not a single person,
or even a single group, that makes such decisions, however. This is certainly
true in the Wassenaar Arrangement, where all decisions on modifications to the
Dual-Use List must be made by the consensus of the 40 member states. These
points, I argue, can begin to be addressed by looking at work on ambiguity.
Ambiguity
A significant use of the term ambiguity in the area of list making is in the work
of Bowker & Star (1999), which I will address in detail in the next section on
classification. Some of the main arguments in their book Sorting things out:
classification and its consequences call for the need for a “topography of [. . . ]
the distribution of ambiguity” (p. 31), for “zones of ambiguity” (p. 150, 215,
and 324), to define “the degree of ambiguity that is appropriate to the object
in question” (p. 158), and for an “ethics of ambiguity” (p. 313). They do
not directly address what they mean by such terms until the end of their book,
where they provide suggestions for those developing and changing classification
systems:
Classification schemes always represent multiple constituencies. They
can do so most effectively through the incorporation of ambiguity—
leaving certain terms open for multiple definitions across different
social worlds (p. 324).
This definition is a useful starting point for us. In order to talk about ‘zones
of ambiguity’ or the typography of the distributions of ambiguity, however, we
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first need to be clear about what it is that is ambiguous. For the purposes of
this thesis, ambiguity will refer to technological ambiguity, which resides both
in the definition of the characteristics of a technology, and in the choice of
which characteristics the list-makers are going to define. For example, in the
process of modifying the Dual-Use List, participants may choose not to select
particular characteristics to use in the definition in order to make sure that a
technology is or is not controlled. By making that selection, they are creating
a ‘zone of ambiguity’ around the characteristics that they did not choose. This
does not mean that there is a finite number of characteristics of a technology,
nor is the debate ever about a single technology. Theoretically, an infinite
number of technologies will share the same characteristic, and each technology
has an infinite number of characteristics.
This is similar to the stance of Rappert (2001, 2003, 2005), who argues for
the need to “move away from attempts to detail the social basis of technology to
consider instead where the ambiguities associated with technology are resolved”
(2001, p. 557). In analysing how ambiguities are resolved in the relationship
between technology and politics, Rappert is clear in noting that he is looking
at the framing of capacity through the definition of technology.12 Translated
into terms that I used earlier, Rappert is concerned with how an artefact and
practices come to be related to a conception of technology. The conception of
a technology, he argues, is always ambiguous because its ‘capacities’ can only
be defined in relation to the context of a particular artefact in a particular
12Thus, he builds on, but also rejects part of, the post-essentialist view of Grint & Woolgar
(Rappert, 2001, p. 571-2). He himself is not engaged in the definitional process, and so does
not make a claim about which definition is ‘right’. Instead, he analyses why the technology,
in his case ‘non-lethal weapons’, is framed in certain ways by certain social groups. I share
his outlook on the nature of technology in discussion around, in his case, non-lethal, and in
my case, dual-use technology:
The ultimate status of the claims is not something to be resolved here. Whether
they are, in some absolute sense, ‘real’ or ‘perceived’ claims, there is some
justification for the statements made, they are treated as real issues in that they
must be responded to by many of the actors involved and, therefore, whatever
their ultimate merits they shape the interpretation of events by participants and
the manner in which notions of responsibility are negotiated (2001, p. 573).
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environment employed by a particular person in a particular way. He goes
further, however:
It is not just that non-lethal [weapons] are difficult to define, but
that alternative definitions point to fundamentally different ways
of making sense of the contribution of non-lethals to conflict res-
olution. The assumptions implicit in the definitions of non-lethal
weapons inform notions of their legitimate deployment, and thus
the proper standards for their control (2001, p. 566).
Rappert makes a crucial shift here. He argues not only that there are dif-
ferent ways to define a technology, but also that different definitions are related
to different stances in the broader debate about the relations of accountability
between actors. In his case, how non-lethal weapons are defined will determine
the legitimacy of organisations that employ them. As we will see in Section 2.4,
this is very similar to the stance taken in the literature on the theory of socio-
cultural viability. When looking at the Wassenaar Arrangement, I will analyse
how the different arguments that people make when debating the definition of
items on the Dual-Use List relate to the different types of social structure that
they are trying to legitimate.
In this section, I have provided a broad review of the thinking on the inter-
action of technology and social relations, and a more fine-grained look at recent
work on the ideas of technological ambiguity, affordances, and technology as
text, all of which play a role in later arguments of this thesis when I address
the question of ‘What is dual-use technology?’ The reader should now see that
I do not intend to answer this question directly. Rather, one of my purposes in
conducting this research has been to learn many of the different ways that dual-
use technology is defined within different communities of practice, in different
contexts.
To be is to be in relation to something else. Dual-use technologies, like
anything, fit within a system of classification. But what is that classification
system, and is there only one? Such a question is important when analysing
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the process by which technologies come to be classified as dual-use (or not).
We have seen above that the technology that is classified is likely to be am-
biguous, but what about the classification system itself? Are we likely to find
rigid categories that have existed relatively unchanged for decades or longer,
or a nebulous ever-shifting scheme where a single technology could fall within
multiple non-exhaustive and non-exclusive categories? To aid an analysis into
such questions, we turn now to the literature on classification.
2.2 Classification
Classification is core to civilization. It is the basis of linguistics, engineering,
social networks, philosophy - in short, our engagement with anything. List-
making goes back to the advent of writing (Goody, 1977, 1987). One may
think, on first glance, that the structure of the Wassenaar Arrangement Dual-
Use List has little to do with, say, the structure of society as a whole. One
describes a collection of technologies while the other describes a collection of
humans. Surely such different sets of things require different ways of classifying.
This is representative of the debate on whether there is a difference between
‘natural kinds’ and ‘social kinds’.13 Since at least the beginning of western
philosophy, similar classification systems have been used for categorising our
thoughts on both natural and social kinds. For instance, take the ontological
debate between realism—the idea that there is a world external to, and prior
to, individual cognition—and nominalism—that this world is contingent upon
individual cognition and does not exist without that cognition. This debate
is played out in the social sciences (e.g. is there an international order in
which nations sit, or do nations create the international order?)14 and religious
studies (do(es) god(s) exist(s) outside of our perceptions?), just as much as
13For a relatively recent review of this debate as it relates to international relations, see
Wendt (1999, p. 68–78).
14For another example see Goodman & Quine (1947).
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in mathematics (are mathematical truths universal or contingent?) and the
natural sciences (is there a state of nature outside of interactions?).
There is a similar spread of thought in these (and all other) fields involv-
ing epistemology, which asks not whether the world exists, but rather what
can we know about the world. A positivist epistemology argues that we can
uncover/create regularities and causal relations between things, whereas rela-
tivism argues that knowledge is conjectural. It is not the purpose of this thesis
to thoroughly explore the depths of these debates. Rather, in this section, I
will be moving fluidly between discussions of classification in the social and
natural world, in part to show that there is little to be gained by keeping them
separate, as we saw in the last section. I begin with the essentialism debate in
order to draw out the tensions between competing ways of classifying things in
the world, and show that the idea of a polythetic classification system may be
useful for describing both the Dual-Use List and the different sets of social re-
lations in which people engage. I then provide a recent example of a polythetic
classification system at work.
Essentialism
The debate over whether things have ‘essences’ is as old as Western philosophy
itself. Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, Book IV, argues that we cannot think or
speak of things if they do not have an essential property, that is, a property
that a thing cannot both have and not have at the same time and that defines
‘what it is’.15 This is similar to Plato’s earlier idea of the ideal world of forms
that he developed in the Republic.16 This ‘essentialist’ view uses essences as
the logical basis of classification, because things with similar essences are said
to be of the same kind. For instance, if I am a human essentially (i.e. in
virtue of being the very thing that I am), and you are human essentially, then
both of us belong to the same general kind, being human. Essentialism makes
15Aristotle’s actual term that he uses is τὸ τί ἐστι, which roughly translates ‘what it is’
(Cohen, 2008) (cf. Plato (c400BC) on ‘what is’ vs. ‘what is not’).
16especially Book V.
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either/or distinctions, rather than there being degrees of a kind, and leads to
the development of static typologies and rigid classification systems. There is a
necessary and sufficient set of conditions which things need to meet to be part
of a kind. In this sense essentialism is ontologically realist and epistemologically
positivist.17 There is a world external to our perception of it and we can have
true knowledge of this world.
This view can be seen in much of the writing on technological determinism
that I discussed above. With regard to developing a list of technologies to
control in international trade, an essentialist stance would state that a nuclear
bomb is a weapon essentially, and therefore belongs to the kind ‘weapon’, which
warrants the control on its trade. Something is either a weapon or it is not.
It either has military capacity or it does not. This essentialist line is taken
by previous researchers regarding the CoCom and Wassenaar lists, as we will
see in the next section. It also forms the basis of the international treaties
on ‘weapons of mass destruction’—the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
and the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions (CWC and BWC)—
because the use of such weapons in any situation is seen to be abhorrent. This
essentialist line is mirrored in the realist position that states have essences, and
therefore are the basic unit of analysis in the international system.
One of the primary difficulties with an essentialist argument is in the han-
dling of anomalies, with things that cross the boundaries of the classification.
In short, anomalies do not exist in an essentialist world. We may perceive
anomalies because we are not able to see the true form of the thing (accord-
ing to Plato), or because we have not yet uncovered the essence of the thing
(Aristotle), but anomalies are the result of imperfect perception rather than an
imperfect world.
Most of the rest of the literature covered in this section, and my argument in
this thesis, does not support the essentialist position as a useful way to classify
17I recognise that I am characterising only a part of essentialism, but I do so in order to
provide a strong contrast to the alternatives. See Leplin (1988).
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dual-use technology. Instead, I take a more pragmatic line, arguing that the
system of classification in use by a particular person or group exists because it
serves the needs of that group. Let us look, for instance, at the development
of classifications in natural science and mathematics.
Pragmatic classifications
In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn (1964) argues that
most scientific research works within an established classification system, or
‘paradigm’, which is provided by the current set of established theories. In the
course of normal scientific research, anomalies will naturally occur in experi-
ments and theory development, but they are generally either accepted or the
theory is modified to account for their presence. As research progresses within
a paradigm, the anomalies may begin to build up, but scientists will tend to
hold onto the current theory rather than simply reject it (cf. Popper, 1972)
unless an alternative is presented. If there is an alternative that can explain
and predict the anomalies along with a majority of the findings of the current
paradigm, a ‘paradigm shift’ may occur where the old set of theories is rejected
and the new set adopted, often overturning many other previous ideas in ad-
dition to the one that caused the paradigm shift in the first place. Kuhn is
careful to note, however, that this process of creating an increasingly detailed
and refined understanding of nature should not be equated with “the notion,
explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigm carry scientists and those who
learn from them closer and closer to the truth” (p. 170).
A much stronger statement against the essentialist position can be found in
Lakatos’ famous Proofs and Refutations (1963a; 1963b; 1963c; 1964), where he
demonstrates how ‘mathematical kinds’ are not objective truths, but human
constructions, where humans draw the boundaries of natural kinds (and thus
the kinds are fully relative).18 He does this through a playful dialogue between
18Kuhn and Lakatos were in frequent contact (see, for example, Kuhn, 1970), so it is little
surprise that their thinking during this period was progressing along the same lines.
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students and a teacher over the proof of Euler’s theorem for polyhedra, which
mirrors a very intense debate that occurred from the time Euler provided the
theorem in 1758 until Poincare´’s work in 1899. What constitutes a ‘mathe-
matical kind’, according to Lakatos, depends on how people respond to things
that are anomalous to their definition of that kind. Lakatos provides different
strategies which one can use to deal with anomalies:
• Monster-barring: this is an argumentative term that focuses on excluding
anomalies from the concept (they don’t exist).
• Monster-adjustment or concept-stretching: this changes the boundaries
of the kind in such a way that the monster is no longer monstrous.
• Exception-barring: this excludes monsters by subdividing the kind (they
are kept on the outside). This amounts to reducing the applicability of
the kind.
We shall return to these anomaly-handling strategies in Section 2.4, where I
will connect them to the theory of sociocultural viability.
If we cannot speak of things as having essential properties, any classification
will necessarily have to be based on relationships between things, rather than
on properties that they have. This ‘anti-essentialist’ stance places an emphasis
on the context of the thing and how that context shapes the thing’s identity.
Perhaps the most famous example of a classification system based on non-
essential properties is Wittgenstein’s (1953, §65–71) work in philosophy on
‘family resemblances’, where items in a category are connected by similarities
between them, but no single similarity is shared by all of them. Wittgenstein
shows that items in the category ‘games’ cannot be described by a single com-
mon trait, and yet they can still commonly be thought of as games—i.e. they
are in the ‘family’ games. For example, football, cricket, and bowling all in-
volve balls, but chess does not. All of those involve two or more players, but
solitaire does not. Wittgenstein also gives the example of a rope spun from
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many threads, where not a single thread runs through the whole rope and the
strength of the rope lies not in any thread but in the relationships between
them. As Rayner (1982a) points out, Vygotsky (1962/1986) developed an al-
most identical notion in psychology with his idea of a ‘chain complex’ rather
than a rope in describing the way children form categories.
Needham (1975) develops on both Vygotsky and Wittgenstein to apply their
work to anthropology, and in so doing draws a connection to the concept of
a ‘polythetic’ classification system based on work done in the natural sciences
(Beckner, 1959; Simpson, 1961; Sneath, 1962; Sokal & Sneath, 1963). This
is as opposed to ‘monothetic’ systems such as that used by Aristotle, where
there is a single set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an item to be in
a category.19 A polythetic classification has the following three characteristics
(Beckner, 1959, p. 22):
A class is ordinarily defined by reference to a set of properties which
are both necessary and sufficient (by stipulation) for membership
in the class. It is possible, however, to define a group K in terms of
a set G of properties f1, f2, . . . , fn in a different manner. Suppose
we have an aggregation of individuals (we shall not as yet call them
a class) such that:
1. Each one possesses a large (but unspecified) number of the
properties in G;
2. Each f in G is possessed by large numbers of these individuals;
and
3. No f in G is possessed by every individual in the aggregate.
By the terms of (3), no f is necessary for membership in this aggre-
gate; and nothing has been said to warrant or rule out the possibility
that some f in G is sufficient for membership in the aggregate.
Needham (1975, p. 364) argues that conception of a polythetic classification
is of limited value in social anthropology because of an essential difference
between the social and natural sciences, as shown in the following excerpt:
19The monothetic/polythetic classification debate can also be seen as being between the
work of Linnaeus and Buffon (see Desrosie`res, 1991, Bowker & Star, 1999, p. 62).
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In what has been presented here as the most relevant example
of taxonomic method, namely quantitative bacteriology, the re-
searchers are in no doubt concerning what is or is not lactose or
about whether it is or is not present: it can be exactly defined in
advance, and its chemical properties and reactions are known or
testable. This kind of certainty about the materials under study
(whatever ambiguity may attend the discrimination of forms or the
assessment of degrees of resistance, etc.) permits the method of
classification by differences: a definite feature can be definitely de-
termined as either present or absent.
But in the realm of social facts this aspect of polythetic classification
is hardly to be found. A main reason is that in social anthropology
the determination of the constituent features of a polythetic class
cannot be carried out by reference to discrete empirical particu-
lars, but entails instead a reliance on further features of the same
character which themselves are likewise polythetic.
This conclusion is not necessarily warranted, however, because it is based on
an assumption that natural kinds and social kinds are essentially different. As
has been shown by, for example, Latour’s (1986) work on the construction of
a scientific fact, a fact is not so much discovered but created in the process of
negotiating the sociotechnical landscape. Latour’s study, and many others like
it, show that scientific and mathematical concepts are not ‘exactly defined’, but
rather are the upshot of, and constitutive of, many social processes. Therefore,
if polythetic classifications have been useful in the natural sciences, there is no
reason why they cannot be applied to the social sciences, as has already been
done in archaeology (Briault, 2007) or religion (Satlow, 2006), or indeed, as we
shall see below, to the theory of sociocultural viability (Rayner, 1982a).
The link between natural and social classifications was drawn out in detail
by Durkheim & Mauss (1903/1963) in Primitive Classification. They show
how the Zuni, the Sioux, and the Australian aborigines all base their natural
classification system on their social classification system. “It was because men
were grouped and thought of themselves in the form of groups, that in their
ideas they grouped other things” (p. 82). This idea—that our social classifica-
tions shape our natural classifications—has been heavily critiqued (see Lukes,
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1973), but also strongly supported. Bloor (1982), for instance, takes up the
idea and uses Hesse’s (1974) network model of classification to show how New-
ton and Boyle were influenced on how to classify natural phenomena based on
their theological and political preferences. This is very similar to the argument
presented above by Lakatos, and we shall see in Section 2.4 how Bloor ties
Lakatos’ work into that of Mary Douglas.
Intertwining classifications of the natural & social world
In the 1960s and 1970s, the anthropologist Mary Douglas drew together the
natural and social worlds in her work explaining how societies handle anoma-
lies in their classification systems, drawing heavily on the work of Durkheim.
In Purity and Danger (1966), Douglas analyses the abominations of Leviticus.
The abominations are set out in a list and form the basis of separating clean
from unclean things, and prescribe rules for relationships with both the natu-
ral world and with other people. Both Purity and Danger (1966) and Implicit
Meanings (1975) argue that classification systems of what is clean and unclean
help to bind a society together, and that “some pollutions are used as analogies
for expressing a general view of the social order” (1966, p. 3). The discussion
centres on anomalies in the natural and social worlds and how a society’s re-
sponses to them strengthen the bonds of that society. This is therefore a clear
example of how lists formed the focal point of both social and natural order.
Animals that deviated from the ideal of what an animal should be—e.g. if they
were on land but did not have feet (such as snakes)—were to be avoided. They
could neither be eaten nor brought into the Temple. Similarly, people who
deviated from being the ideal Israelite—e.g. by having sexual relations with
a non-Israelite—were ostracised from the society. Classifications, then, have a
symbolic role. They are a representation of an ideal form of organisation, and
an affront to the symbol is an affront to the form of organisation itself. The
symbolic importance of classification systems will be addressed in more detail
in Chapter 7.
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Douglas (1986) further develops these views in describing how systems of
classification are (un)institutionalised. She posits that social classification sys-
tems, in order to gain legitimacy, must be seen to embody a natural classifica-
tion system. “To acquire legitimacy, every kind of institution needs a formula
that founds its rightness in reason and in nature” (p. 45). But, critically, there
is not only one way to understand natural order, and the way that we choose to
understand it signifies the type of social classification we wish to substantiate.
This point is elaborated in the theory of sociocultural viability described below.
Douglas is quick to point out that “comparison of cultures makes it clear that
no superficial sameness of properties explains how items get assigned to classes.
Everything depends on which properties are selected” (p. 58). This is mirrored
in the work of Nelson Goodman (1972), whose Seven Strictures of Similarity
begins with the statement that similarity is “a pretender, an impostor, a quack.
It has, indeed, its place and its uses, but is more often found where it does not
belong, professing powers it does not possess” (p. 437). Sameness is not a prop-
erty of nature, but a thing conferred by our current institutional structure, our
current system of classification (Douglas, 1986, p. 63).
While we may shape classification systems, it is important to note that
classification systems also do a lot of work for us. A classification system is
a codification of social and natural order, and as such allows us to have to
no longer think about that order. If something is labelled as being taboo—or
being export controlled—it is much easier for us to accept that taboo than
to challenge it. This is because classifications, through repeated enactments,
become institutionalised within a society (Douglas, 1986, ch. 5). To challenge
an established (i.e. institutionalised) classification system would be to step out
of that system into a different system, and try to tear down the institutional
structures of the first so as to install the second. We can see similarities here
to Kuhn’s work on paradigm shifting.
Another point of note in Douglas’ work on the institutionalisation of clas-
sification systems is that it is through a society’s institutional structure that
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certain things are remembered and forgotten (Douglas, 1986, ch. 6). This is
similar to Kuhn’s statement that new paradigms deem some problems to be
nonsensical because they are based on a completely different system of clas-
sification. The field of the social construction of ignorance (e.g. Proctor &
Schiebinger, 2008; Smithson, 1985), which these works touch upon, analyses
how we decide what not to know as well as what to know. I will draw on this
occasionally in this thesis to show how certain systems of classification prevent
us from seeing certain framings of a problem.
An example analysis of a polythetic classification scheme
A classification system, according to Bowker & Star, is “a spatial, temporal,
or spatio-temporal segmentation of the world. [It is] a set of boxes (metaphor-
ical or literal) into which things can be put to then do some kind of work—
bureaucratic or knowledge production” (1999, p. 10). An ideal classification
system would have unique, consistent classificatory principles in operation, cat-
egories that are mutually exclusive, and would be complete (i.e. it would be
essentialist). It is unlikely that such an ideal could ever be achieved,20 however,
because: there are often contradictory classification principles in operation;
there will likely always be objects that can be placed in multiple categories;
and a complete system would imply perfect knowledge (p. 10-12).
These researchers explicitly draw out how classifications of the natural world
shape and are shaped by classifications of the social world. Indeed, they argue
that “our approach [. . . ] is to offer fine-grained analyses of the nature of infor-
mation infrastructures such as classifications systems and thus to demonstrate
how they simultaneously represent the world ‘out there’, the organisational
context of their application and the political and social roots of that context”
(p. 61). Rather than asking what an ideal classification scheme would be, in
analysing the International Classification of Disease (ICD) and a number of
20Bowker & Star say they have never seen one.
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smaller cases they ask three questions: What work do classifications and stan-
dards do? Who does the work in establishing and maintaining classifications?
What happens to the cases that do not fit? In answer to their first question,
these systems are not only for ordering diseases, but also for codifying and
coordinating social relations (cf. Douglas, 1986). Thus, they point out that
“the material culture of bureaucracy and empire is not found in pomp and
circumstance, nor even in the first instance at the point of a gun, but rather
at the point of a list” (p. 137).
Regarding who does the work to maintain the lists, they show that it is a set
of communities and organisations with conflicting requirements (p. 141–2). In
collecting international information on diseases, different countries have vary-
ing senses of obligation to submit their data, different bureaucratic structures
that lead to different types of reporting, and different emphases on how a dis-
ease is represented in the society. Moreover, the collecting agency (the ICD) is
not simply a repository of data, but is itself “politically charged in terms of its
internal bureaucracy” (p. 142). In short, the lists are made and maintained by
multiple groups including government officials, statisticians, anthropologists,
medical analysts, epidemiologists, and diplomats. The resemblances between
the ICD and the Wassenaar Arrangement are striking in this respect—at least
until one recognises that the classification problems that the ICD and Wasse-
naar address have “parallels with power struggles, control, and containment
in the multinational firm and its management—classic problems of decentral-
ized control in the post-Fordist era” (p. 143–144). These resemblances will be
explored more in further chapters of this thesis.
How does the ICD handle the heterogeneous definitions and goals that are
present in its classification process? Bowker & Star provide an inventory of
working solutions, several of which are useful in analysing the Wassenaar Ar-
rangement.
Distributed residual categories The first solution involves the distribution
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of residual categories (p. 149–150). Residual categories are categories of
things that do not fit nicely in the overall classification. The creation
of residual categories (the ‘other’ option on surveys, for example) is a
recognition of anomalies in the classification system. The maintenance
of residual categories is a process of maintaining ambiguity in the lists.
These categories are characterised by their very vague boundaries, and are
often distributed throughout a list in order to maintain the appearance
that the list as a whole is still a valid classification.
These garbage or residual categories, then, tend to fix the max-
imum level of granularity that is possible. Their advantage is
that they can signal uncertainty at the level of data collection
or interpretation under conditions where forcing a more precise
designation could give a false impression of positive data. The
major disadvantage is that the lazy or rushed death certifier
will be tempted to overuse ‘other’. By their nature, forms of
this kind are only manageable if there is a zone of ambiguity
written into them. In this case, precise definitions would drive a
wedge among doctor, statistician, and epidemiologist (p. 150).
I will return to this solution in a moment when discussing the concept of
boundaries below.
Heterogeneous lists There has always been a debate within the ICD over
whether its lists constituted a nomenclature or a classification. A nomen-
clature could be, for instance, a list of indicators that may lead something
to be categorised as a particular disease. A classification, on the other
hand, would be a list of disease definitions. “Classification systems are
more immediately convenient in that they carry more complex informa-
tion, but [. . . ] they change every few years with the development of new
medical techniques or knowledge” (p. 150). Bowker & Star argue that,
rather than settling on either of these principles, the ICD has “incorpo-
rated a workable (practically and politically) level of ambiguity. The ICD
2.2 Classification 41
has been as heterogeneous as possible to enable the different groups to
find their own concerns reflected” (p. 150–151).
Similarly, there has been a debate within the members of Wassenaar as
to whether the Dual-Use List should be based on specific characteristics
of the technologies (a classification system, in the sense that is employed
here) or on functions that the technology may do. For instance, should the
list contain the exact material parameters of all photon-sensing devices
that may find their way into night vision goggles (such as types of material
or manufacturing processes used), or should it contain the parameters of
any night vision device (such as the ability to discern movement at a cer-
tain distance or overall weight)? This debate will be explored especially
in Chapter 6.
Computerisation “The chief advantage that computing offers today to the
ICD and similar schemes is the ability to maintain uncertainty at the
level of closure on analysis” (p. 154). This is because, instead of having
to force diseases into one of a limited number of categories based on a
very small number of characteristics, the ICD can now use a polythetic
classification to delay deciding whether an outbreak of a particular disease
has occurred, and thus hold out on delegating resources for preventing
its further spread.
The is heralded, by
all of the people to whom I talked, to be a greatly beneficial step in the
development of international cooperation on export controls, and was
a key aspect of the Arrangement’s founding (Wassenaar Arrangement,
2008c). The impact of computers and the internet, however, has also been
very detrimental to the Arrangement in that the control of intangible
technology transfers (ITT) is now much more difficult. This will be a
point of analysis for Chapter 7.
information system of the Arrangement
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Standardised forms “It is clear that standard forms [e.g. death certificates]
are essential for the ICD to work and that these standard forms cannot
be overprecise or people will not be able to use them. . . Standardization
procedures must be tailored to the degree of granularity that can be
realistically achieved” (p. 155).
The Wassenaar Arrangement also has standard forms for developing changes
to the lists and for reporting the transfer of controlled items. The lat-
ter is not of direct relevance to this thesis, but the form is analysed in
Chapter 4.
Bowker & Star provide a list of recommendations for what to keep in mind
when developing and changing classification systems that will also be useful in
developing similar recommendations for the Wassenaar Arrangement (p. 324-
325):
• Recognise the balancing act of classifying “Classification schemes always
represent multiple constituencies. They can do so more effectively through
the incorporation of ambiguity—leaving certain terms open for multiple
definitions across different social worlds.”
• Render voices retrievable “By keeping the voices of classifiers and the
constituents present, the system can retain maximum political flexibility.”
• Be sensitive to exclusions “A detailed analysis of these others throws into
relief the organizational structure of any scheme.”
They are clear that any classification will be understood and used by people
in different contexts with different needs and wants. It is better to design the
classification in such a way that it can work, and continue to work, in as many
of these contexts as possible. By analysing the things that a classification
scheme leaves out, we can better see the structure of the scheme itself. These
points help form the basis of my analysis of the Wassenaar Arrangement.
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The Wassenaar Arrangement is built on a classification system that dis-
tinguishes technologies from each other according to whether or not they are
perceived to be militarily significant. At the same time, however, Wassenaar
exists because this classification system is not ideal. While all of the technolo-
gies on the Munitions List are classified as militarily significant, the Dual-Use
List, which occupies most of the Arrangement’s time and resources, covers
technologies that span the military/non-military divide. We should therefore
take a brief look at the different ways that the concept of ‘dual-use technology’
has been understood in the literature.
The concept of dual-use technology
One way to categorise the interpretations of dual-use is based on the relation
between the uses that constitute the ‘dual’. I have identified three groups in
this categorisation. One of the groups holds that dual-use technologies are ones
that are military (or hostile, malevolent, prohibited, or illegitimate), but that
they can be applied to civilian (or peaceful, benign, or legitimate) purposes, an
interpretation often called ‘spin-off’ (Albrecht, 1987; Cowan & Foray, 1995).
Often this view has a focus on revitalising the economic base of a country
by finding non-military uses for existing military technology—the ‘swords into
ploughshares’ idea developed in the inter-war period by Low (1940). More
recently, The US Defense Science Board (2001, p. 2–3) report on Protecting the
Homeland pointed to the negative implications of such a transition:
Weapons are now integrated within the civilian and commercial
infrastructures rather than military specific. This dual-use nature
of technology makes capabilities such as early warning, determining
what is out there and what can people do, increasingly difficult.
In contrast, another grouping of interpretations of ‘dual-use’ sees the flow
going the other way. For this group, the technology is civilian (or peaceful,
benign, or legitimate) but could be put to military (or hostile, malevolent,
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prohibited, or illegitimate) use. Sometimes called ‘spin-on’, this way of view-
ing dual-use is expressed by the United Nations (1988) and the US National
Research Council National (2005). It is also the view employed by many re-
searchers (Dando, 2002; Evan & Hays, 2006; Grimmett, 2004; Lloyd, 2004;
Mallik, 2004; Smit, 2001). Some of these researchers are directly concerned
with the Wassenaar Arrangment (Dursht, 1997; Smith & Udis, 2001) or its
predecessor CoCom (Cupitt & Grillot, 1997; Meese, 1981–1983). This is also
commonly the view taken when researchers prepare reports for government
agencies about export controls (Cevasco, 2001; Fergusson et al., 2003; Fisher,
2001). The concern often expressed here is the fear (or hope) that novel mili-
tary capabilities can come from employing widely available technology, and is a
key aspect of the idea of a ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) (Alic et al.,
1992). This interpretation of ‘dual-use’ has also been linked to the view in 19th
Century liberalism that military technology is a corrupt form of technology,
which corrodes society rather than enhances it (Edgerton, 1987).
The last grouping under this categorisation scheme is one that takes a bal-
anced view that a technology is dual-use if it can be used in either or both set-
tings. This is often the approach used by researchers who are concerned with
the term itself (Balmer, 2006; Branscomb, 1993; Davis, 2002; Klaus, 2004; Ma-
standuno, 1992; McLeish, 2007; McLeish & Nightingale, 2007; Molas-Gallart,
1997; Reppy, 1999; Roberts, 1999; Rudney & Anthony, 1996; Stowsky, 2004).
This view, which is more in line with the concept of ‘conditional contraband’
that I discuss in Section 5.1, has also in recent years been employed by US
government agencies, such as in the definition in Code of Federal Regulations
(15 CFR §730.3), the National Academies (1987) and the General Account-
ing Office’s definition of dual-use as “items which have both commercial and
military applications” (GAO, 2002, 2006a,b,c).
Another way to categorise the different interpretations of ‘dual-use’ is by
the types of technologies at which they look. There is the broad distinction
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between how the term is employed in the literature on weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD)21 and conventional technologies. Work done on nuclear dual-use
technologies, for instance, tends to focus only on the problems of prevent-
ing the spread of nuclear weapons (e.g. Scheinman, 2006), whereas work on
conventional dual-use technology—while still concerned about proliferation—
places emphasis on the point that there are large economic gains from many
of these items because they are (or could be) dispersed widely in society for
non-military uses.
Within WMD research, there has been a significant increase of interest in
the problems with biological technology and research. For example, Dando
(2002) argues that while “differences between a BW [Biological Weapons] facil-
ity and a legitimate facility might be detectable, it is equally true that biotech-
nology is classically dual-use—legitimate civil technologies could be misused
for offensive military purposes” (p. 19). Much of this research develops the
concern over the regulation of basic scientific research in biology because of
its direct application to weapons (James, 2007; McLeish & Nightingale, 2007;
Rappert & McLeish, 2007).
Another difference between WMD technology and conventional technology
is that there are international agreements banning the use of WMD, and also
restrictions on their possession. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
restricts the possession of nuclear weapons to five countries. The Chemi-
cal Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological and Toxicological Weapons
Convention (BTWC) state that no state should possess chemical or biologi-
cal weapons. In contrast, states are allowed to possess conventional weapons
sufficient for purposes of national defence (UN Charter, Article 51).
There is a distinction between how the term ‘dual-use’ is used in academia
and how it is used by the practitioner. While these literatures are often sepa-
rate, there are a few examples of where they overlap. A recent example is the
21WMD typically includes chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weaponised tech-
nology.
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work of Caitr´ıona McLeish and Paul Nightingale (McLeish, 2007; McLeish &
Nightingale, 2007), who try to clarify the different interpretations of ‘dual-use’
that are used in practice. Their work deals primarily with biological technolo-
gies and research, but I will use it as a basis for developing a similar set of inter-
pretations employed in the practice of defining conventional (i.e. non-WMD)
technologies. Building on the work of Molas-Gallart (1997), they define dual-
use as “the tangible and intangible features of technologies that enable them to
be applied to both (illegal) hostile and peaceful ends with little or no modifi-
cation” (McLeish & Nightingale, 2007, p. 163). This definition draws from the
perceived need to incorporate non-state uses of the technology for malignant
purposes (e.g. terrorism), and hence the choice of hostile/peaceful rather than
military/civilian.22
McLeish outlines three ‘models’ of policy response to the question of what
is meant by ‘dual-use’ (McLeish, 2007, p. 194–199):
• Context-driven: the technology is only dangerous when it is in certain
contexts. It should therefore be prevented from getting into the wrong
hands. This is the model, she argues, used in export controls.
• User-driven: rather than trying to control the transfer of technology,
this model tries to control the way users interact with the technology,
and the type of users that interact. Hybrids of these first two models
are “those governance efforts which emphasise both the future contexts
of users and the transfer of intangible elements of technology, such as
knowledge” (p. 198).
• Dual-use as an inherent characteristic of technology : advocates of this
view deem the “potential for misuse to be so high, and the outcome of any
potential misuse so grave as to warrant implementing controls covering
22McLeish & Nightingale classify dual-use in yet another way, showing how it is employed
as a positive (for industry) or a negative (for military applications) argumentative tool.
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all users, in all contexts” (p. 198). Such is the argument presented in
some efforts to moderate scientific publications.
Critiques of the concept of dual-use
The move in the middle of the 20th Century from favouring the term ‘contra-
band’ to ‘spin-off’ to ‘dual-use’ was part of a much larger transition in (mainly
Western) civilization that began with the Industrial Revolution. With the ad-
vent of technologies that allowed humans to do things on scales never before
known, the control of those technologies became a central tenet of power, be it
the ‘means of production’ or ‘means of destruction’.
‘Contraband’, which we will look at in Chapter 5, was a term used wholly
for the description of items during their transition from one place to another.
‘Spin-off’ was used wholly to describe the usefulness of military technology
in civilian industries. ‘Dual-use’, by contrast, has been employed to discuss
means of production as well as the things that are produced and the transfer
of those things. The difficulty with this term is a point that will be addressed
periodically in this thesis, and therefore I provide a brief overview of the limited
literature in this area.
The inadequacy of the term ‘dual-use’ as a tool for analysis (rather than
an object of analysis) was established early on. Gummett & Reppy (1987)
point out the inadequacy of the term ‘spin-off’ in describing the innovation and
production process of technologies. In so doing, they also draw out problems
with the term that was replacing it: ‘dual-use’.
In addition to the cases of ‘pure’ military or ‘pure’ civil technologies,
there is a large class of mixed or dual-use technologies, which are
nourished by a common technology base. Indeed, the variety of
institutional and market structures in the civil sector may make it
more appropriate to refer to ‘multiple-use’ technologies. Most new
technology at the generic level falls into this class, as well as most of
society’s existing stock of technical knowledge, accrued over time.
The difficulty in differentiating military from civil applications in
this class of technology suggests that spin-off is not a particularly
useful concept here (p. 3-4).
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Similarly, Gummett (1991, p. 66 note 36) notes this point in a report to
the British Parliament about the future relations between defence and civilian
science and technology:
These terms [‘dual-use’ and ‘dual-market’] are themselves inade-
quate. They suggest too sharp a dichotomy between the defence
and civil sectors, missing, for example, the shading between defence
and ‘quasi-defence customers’ like the nuclear industry or telecom-
munications which resemble defence ministries in being expert and
monopsonistic customers with high technical requirements. How-
ever, possible alternative terms have other difficulties. For example,
‘generic technologies’, which captures part of the sense intended
here, is sometimes used to refer to too narrow a set of technologies
for our purposes.
Reppy (1999, 2007, unpub. ms.) has devoted much thought to the in-
adequacy of the term. She argues that ‘dual-use’ is largely seen as a self-
explanatory concept (Reppy, 1999, p. 273; see also Albrecht, 1987), but that
the term can at least mean two very different things. The first meaning came
about because of a perceived separation of civilian and defence manufacturing
capabilities, primarily during the Cold War. This created ‘two sectors’ divided
by two common assumptions: “that most technologies can be coded as either
military or civilian (i.e. dual-use technologies are a relatively small set of all
technologies) and that shifting resources from military to civilian purposes (i.e.
conversion) will be difficult for technical and cultural reasons” (Reppy, 1999,
p. 273). Based on these assumptions, at least two policy implications arise: 1)
that it is possible to identify the technologies with military applications and
control them; and 2) since moving between sectors is difficult, international
transfers of civilian technology are not a security concern. Using this mean-
ing, dual-use technologies are an outcast of the classification system, a residual
category (Star & Bowker, 2007).
Conversely, one could make the assumption that “military technology is. . . embedded
in a larger civilian technology base, with shared roots in a common educational
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system, shared interest in a range of generic technologies and process technolo-
gies, and links into the commercial sector through companies that serve both
military and civilian markets” (Reppy, 1999, p. 273). With this assumption,
the opposite policy implications arise: 1) it is not possible easily to separate
technologies into civilian and military and therefore to control their dispersion
in society; but that 2) this dispersion is important because conversion between
civilian and military is easy. In the 1980s, Reppy argues, there was a shift in
the US from thinking of the separation of civilian and military technology as
difficult to cross, to thinking of it as easy to cross. This shift was done subtly,
“papering over political differences and providing cover for the shift from [US]
policies focused on export controls to the development of a mercantilist policy
of promoting competitiveness from within the defense budget” (Reppy, 1999,
p. 273). In so doing, however, political attention was no longer on the potential
for dual-use technologies to be used for military applications by an adversary.
Reppy argued that control might still be possible because technology is made
up of not just artefacts, but also the knowledge needed to build, maintain, and
operate them. This ‘intangible technology’ is often ‘tacit knowledge’ (MacKen-
zie & Spinardi, 1995) that is not easily transferred without significant contact
between supplier and end-user, and therefore controls should focus more on
the control of intangible technologies—but this poses a new set of problems
(Reppy, unpub. ms.).
McLeish (2007) is well aware of these problems and the lack of critical ex-
amination of the concept of dual-use. The lack of conceptual clarity, both
on the part of the practitioner and the academic—particularly in recognising
that there are multiple conceptions—“centre[s] on competing conceptualiza-
tions about what constitutes technology, and what is the relationship between
technology and function and the innovation process” (p. 200). Reppy places
herself within a culture that emphasises the second of her assumptions of ‘dual-
use’ and argues for the need to remember that dual-use technologies still have
security implications. McLeish, conversely, places herself within a community
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that heavily emphasises the security implications and argues for the need to
“accept that the dual use issue is not just a security issue” and therefore that
careful attention should be given to “understanding the dual use issue within a
technology governance framework” (McLeish, 2007, p. 200). They both argue
for the need to recognise that the concept of ‘dual-use’ is multifaceted. Reppy
(2006) is willing to relegate the concept to the dustbin if a more useful concept
becomes available. McLeish argues for more engagement with the concept at a
conceptual level, because making policy based on competing understandings of
dual-use is likely to result in “inadequate and/or short-term policy responses to
the long-term anti-proliferation goal” (McLeish, 2007, p. 200). An initial step,
she offers, involves recognising that the different understandings of dual-use
rest on different understandings of what constitutes technology. This thesis
is primarily about how different understandings of dual-use technology inter-
act with each other, and whether the term is likely to weather the inevitable
tension between alternative understandings.
Dual-use technologies are, by their very name, straddling a boundary be-
tween two categories. There is a strong tradition within Science & Technology
Studies to analyse the boundaries between categories, as they often provide
valuable information about the structure of the classification system as a whole.
We now turn to a brief review of this literature.
Boundaries
Work on boundaries flows across the social sciences. Boundaries, Lamont &
Molna`r (2002) point out, are a basic conceptual tool of social science, having
been employed since Marx (1898), Durkheim (1915), and Weber (1968/1922).
Douglas’ work analysed above on the abominations in Leviticus is a clear ex-
ample of the need to control the boundary between clean and unclean.
In looking at issues of science and technology, the work of Gieryn (1983)
on boundaries showed how scientists, from Victorian England to (then current-
day) America, are constantly (re)creating the boundary between science and
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non-science. Guston (1999, 2001) develops the work on boundaries along a
different line, building the idea of a boundary organisation, which continually
crosses the science/politics divide to develop policy recommendations that are
acceptable to both bodies. Star and her collaborators (Bowker & Star, 1999;
Star, 1992; Star & Griesemer, 1989) use the concept of boundaries to show how
what a technology is varies according to the context in which it is found, thus
developing the idea of a ‘boundary object’. Boundary objects are “those objects
that both inhabit several communities of practice and satisfy the informational
requirements of each of them” (Bowker & Star, 1999, p. 297). In addition,
they can be tailored to meet the needs of specific contexts while also having an
identity that is common across several contexts. They can therefore be both
ambiguous and concrete.
Boundary objects embody polythetic classifications. De Laet & Mol (2000)
provide a prime example of a boundary object in their paper on the Zimbab-
wean bush pump. The bush pump is, in their view, an exemplar of an object
that has no substantive core; rather, it is interpretively flexible depending on
the social, political, economic, and environmental contexts—that is, the so-
ciotechnical landscape—in which it exists. Moreover, it only ‘works’ when it
exists within a certain set of social and technical relations. It is of little use,
for instance, for people who do not know how to install or maintain it. It will
not work very well without a well of the appropriate dimensions from which
to pump water, unless the pump is reconfigured to sit within a landscape for
which it was not originally designed. The pump is able to be reconfigured
with remarkable dexterity, and in addition satisfy economic costs and cultural
requirements for local sourcing.
In a move away from viewing objects that cross boundaries as things to be
shunned, Bowker & Star (1999) argue instead that they can be used as tools
for communication and knowledge production. As will be argued repeatedly
in this thesis, items on the Wassenaar Dual-Use List, and the list itself, are
boundary objects. They are on the list because they need to serve more than
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one community of practice, and the way that they are described is telling of
what the informational requirements are of each community.
We now have an overview of research on how classification systems are
structured and the central role that they play in social and technical relations.
Classification systems are not something that exist ‘out there’, reified entities
that guide our lives. They are, instead, co-constitutive of the social and natural
environments through which people enact and institutionalise them. Making
and maintaining a classification system is a pragmatic endeavour, as it needs
to be constantly serving multiple communities of practice, each with its own
problems which it is trying to use the classification system to solve.
The Wassenaar Arrangement, in addition to being a classification system
and concerning itself with the definition of technology, is an international ar-
rangement between 40 different governments. Most analyses of the Arrange-
ment to date have come from the literature on international relations and law.
2.3 Regimes, institutions, & transnational sci-
ence and technology issues
Having provided an overview of the literatures on technology and classifica-
tion, I can now turn to the various academic analyses that have so far been
conducted on the Wassenaar Arrangement, CoCom, and multilateral export
controls in general. Most of these analyses come from the literature on regime
theory and organisational theory, and provide some perspective on the polit-
ical and structural frameworks that are constructed by and constrain these
international efforts. They lack, however, any significant analysis on the way
that technologies are constructed within the debates. Similarly, they do not
consider how knowledge of technologies that are or might be under control is
developed and employed to further alternative strategies in shaping the inter-
national export control framework. In order to conduct such an analysis in
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this thesis, I draw on previous work about the role of science and technology
in international affairs, which I outline at the end of this section.
Realism & regime theory
Much of the research on international export control efforts flows from work in
international relations on regimes (Keohane, 1984; Krasner, 1983; Rittberger
& Mayer, 1993; Young, 1982). Regime theory defines a regime as a set of
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures
around which actors’ expectations converge in given areas of international re-
lations (Krasner, 1983). It has mainly developed within one of the largest the-
oretical areas of international relations research, realism (Morgenthau, 1948;
Waltz, 1959), including contemporary manifestations in neorealism (Keohane,
1986; Waltz, 1979). Realism contains a broad range of theories, but it can
be characterised by at least five common assumptions: states are the primary
actors on the international scene; the international scene is anarchic; states
are self-interested, rational, and their primary motive is survival; states have
uncertainty about the intentions of other states; and the point of analysis is
on power relationships. Realism is mainly essentialist in its grounding, arguing
that rational actors pursue gains (relative or absolute), and therefore in a given
international structure their actions are predictable. While much of the regime
literature follows this line of thought, the concept of a regime is broad enough
to allow for other, non-essentialist, approaches as well. For instance, the neo-
liberal tradition (Keohane & Nye, 1977; Nye, 1993; Rosenau, 1990) also lays
claim to the idea of regimes.
While the multilateral export control arrangements are generally considered
to be regimes,23 it is important to point out that they are informal. They are
not based on any treaty, they are non-binding, and (apart from the Missile
Technology Control Regime) they have non-committal names—e.g. the Wasse-
23They are often called Multilateral Export Control Regimes (MECRS).
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naar Arrangement rather than the Wassenaar Agreement.24 Why this is the
case, at least for the Wassenaar Arrangement, is a point of analysis in this
thesis.
A classic example analysis of export controls from within regime theory is
Mastanduno’s (1992) thorough account of CoCom in a book published shortly
before CoCom disbanded, entitled Economic Containment: CoCom and the
Politics of East-West Trade.25 Mastanduno uses regime theory to analyse Co-
Com from three angles. First he shows how states who were members of CoCom
engaged in four different types of ‘economic statecraft’—using economic mea-
sures to reach political ends (Baldwin, 1985)—over the life of the organisation.
CoCom started out as a tool of economic warfare, where the idea was to weaken
Communist economies by denying almost all trade, military or otherwise, be-
cause of the (believed) adverse affect it would have on that state’s military
capabilities (Mastanduno, 1992, p. 40-46 & Ch. 3). That stance did not last
for more than the first few years of CoCom, Mastanduno argues, after which
time it became a tool of strategic embargo, whereby only trade in items of
direct military significance were controlled (p. 47-52 & Ch. 4). The other two
types of economic statecraft, tactical and structural linkage, focus on expanding
trade with an adversarial state rather than constricting it (p. 52-57). Tactical
linkage increases trade in response to, or as an incentive for, an improvement
in an adversarial state’s behaviour. CoCom served to foster these positions
during the 1970s (Ch. 5), after which there was an (unsuccessful) attempt to
return to economic warfare (Ch. 7).
The second angle from which Mastanduno analyses CoCom is looking at
how states were able to cooperate. He argues against the idea that a hegemonic
power is needed to create and sustain international regimes (c.f. Keohane 1980;
Keohane 1984, p. 32-39; Adler-Karlsson 1968). Rather, it was only when the
24The Arrangement may better be thought of as an informal group of states, for instance
(on informal groups, see Prantl, 2006).
25See also Mastanduno (1988).
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non-hegemonic (i.e. non-US) states’ interests were appeased with effective US
leadership that decisions were made in CoCom.
Finally, Mastanduno analyses CoCom to show that US trade policy was
an uneasy mixture of wanting to minimise government intervention in the in-
ternational market (economic liberalism) while at the same time purposefully
intervening on grounds of national security. This is in contrast to earlier work
that only highlighted economic liberalism (e.g. Maier, 1978; Ruggie, 1983).
CoCom’s ‘effectiveness’, according to Mastanduno, was determined by “the
extent to which member states, given their commitment to a strategic em-
bargo, faithfully formulate, implement, and administer their multilateral con-
trols” (Mastanduno, 1992, p. 15). In order to be effective, CoCom had to have
members that were able to define accurately the technology to be controlled
and then prevent exports of controlled technology.
The construction and interpretation of the control list is similarly
important. It is a sign of regime weakness if items of direct mili-
tary significance are left off the list (consciously or inadvertently) or
if member governments interpret controls differently, that is, some
allow sales that others presume to be restricted. Conversely, the
undertaking of list revisions that lead to the addition of items of
military significance or of policies that lead to uniformity in in-
terpretation can be taken as an indicator of regime strengthening
(emphasis original, Mastanduno, 1992, p. 16).
Drawing on the literatures about technology and classification above, we can
see how this definition of effectiveness is severely lacking because it assumes that
a technology’s military significance is independent of how it is interpreted, and
therefore that there is only one ‘correct’ interpretation of the technology. While
Mastanduno addresses many of the debates on list revision in CoCom, showing
how there are continuous compromises between economic and security drivers,
he does not demonstrate how the particular technology under consideration in
these debates is differently represented by those arguing for either its addition
or removal.
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Another approach used within the regime theory literature is that of game
theory, which tries to develop formal, logical rules that can describe and predict
international politics (Oye, 1986). In game theoretic models of international
interactions, participants (be they governments or groups within or between
countries) are taken to be unitary actors who make choices between strategies
in order to maximise expected payoffs. Zu¨rn (1989) performs a game theo-
retic analysis of CoCom, which is elaborated upon by Noehrenberg (1995).
Noehrenberg uses a two-level game approach (Putnam, 1988) that shows how
domestic and international factors both play into the negotiation dynamics at
CoCom meetings. Noehrenberg analyses five states (US, Britain, The Federal
Republic of Germany, France, and Japan) to draw out the following domestic
and international factors that affect their decision making: perceived security
risks from target states; perceived global competition in trade of strategic tech-
nologies; perceived economic gains from trade with target states; public and
official antipathy towards target states; and turf battles between government
departments (Noehrenberg, 1995, Ch. 7).
As these factors changed throughout the life of CoCom, Noehrenberg argues
that the states took different stances on the ‘size’ of the lists. These domes-
tic and international factors were meditated through the negotiation structure
of CoCom, which was characterised by: a high level of secrecy; a pattern of
repeated games; transparency; and the unilateral veto of each member (p. 173-
183). Noehrenberg then uses these factors in a game analysis on what the
optimal ‘list size’ (small, medium, or large) would be given the different prefer-
ences of each of these major actors in CoCom (p. 183-204). What Noehrenberg
means by ‘list size’, however, is clarified nowhere, nor does he ever discuss the
make-up of the lists, except in listing (incorrectly) the ‘technologies controlled
under CoCom’s Dual-Use List’ in an Appendix.26 Such focus on the politics
26Noehrenberg lists the categories of technologies on the September 1991 lists, though he
leaves several of them out and does not articulate the structure of the lists in any depth. He
also calls it the ‘Dual-Use’ List, when at the time it was still called the ‘Industrial List’. The
September 1991 lists, as will be shown in Chapter 4, also had a radically different structure
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of CoCom leaves much of the structure and process of the organisation ana-
lytically untouched. For example, there is little that he can say about how
different perspectives could be reconciled in debates on list modifications.
Organisational & institutional theories
While there may be ways that regime theory can be considered a subset of
institutional theory (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991, p. 6–7), insofar as it supports
realist assumptions there is a disconnect. There is a prominent strand of in-
stitutional theory—new institutionalism—that rejects realist assumptions, in-
stead focusing on “an interest in institutions as independent variables, a turn
toward cognitive and cultural explanations, and an interest in properties of
supraindividual units of analysis that cannot be reduced to aggregations or
direct consequences of individuals’ attributes or motives” (Powell & DiMaggio,
1991, p. 8). Lipson (1999) uses new institutionalism to argue that the Wasse-
naar Arrangement sits within an ‘organisational field’ (DiMaggio & Powell,
1991) of nonproliferation export controls, which allows for a diffusion of shared
practices, professional expertise and norms of conduct to spread between and
within Wassenaar and the other multilateral export control arrangements.
Risse-Kappen (1995) develops ‘transgovernmental coalitions’ as the unit of
analysis to look at how international institutions allow “networks of government
officials which include at least one actor pursuing her own agenda independent
of national decisions” (p. 9). As such, an international institution can be
thought of as a body with a degree of independence from the governments that
constitute it.
Along a similar train of thought, Slaughter (1997) argues that a new world
order, transgovernmentalism, is developing through the proliferation of ‘transna-
tional government networks’, which are ways of coordinating between function-
ally similar units within different governments. Such a network can be described
than the forty years of lists before them, and thus do not reflect the documents that formed
the framework of negotiation for much of CoCom’s existence.
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as one of regulators who focus on: exchanging information; coordinating pol-
icy; cooperating on enforcement issues; collecting and distilling best practices;
exporting particular regulatory forms; bolstering their members in domestic
bureaucratic politics; and transmitting information about their members’ rep-
utations (Slaughter, 2004, p. 40). These regulators work with some degree of
autonomy from their national political leadership, and Slaughter divides the
types of networks they can make into three kinds.
The first, information networks, focus on distilling the collected information
from different national regulatory processes into sets of ‘best practices’ that can
then be reintroduced at the national level in a recursive process. In enforcement
networks, regulators assist each other in enforcing national laws by tracking
down violators of national and international regulations. Harmonisation net-
works work on making national laws in different countries consistent with one
another. Within harmonisation networks, “regulators entrust many important
choices to technical expertise and [ ] allow network members to bolster one
another in domestic bureaucratic struggles. Such bolstering could mean the
privileging of a technocratic over a democratic regulatory voice against corrupt
political pressure” (Slaughter, 2004, p. 63).
Building on Slaughter’s ideas, Lipson (2006a) argues that the Wassenaar
Arrangement is a transgovernmental network of export control officials in or-
der to draw out its contrasts with international organisations and agreements.
International organisations facilitate international cooperation through a cen-
tralised semi-independent structure in order to reduce transaction costs (Ab-
bott & Snidal, 1998), and formal international agreements are precise, legally
binding obligations (Abbott & Snidal, 2000). Lipson argues that these forms of
‘hard law’ will not work for Wassenaar because of its “large number of states,
divergent preferences, varying levels of consensus across different sub-issues,
and varying levels of state capacity” (2006a, p. 64). Rather, what is needed—
and what Wassenaar provides—is ‘soft law’, which “facilitates compromise,
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and thus mutually beneficial cooperation, between actors with different inter-
ests and values, different time horizons and discount rates, and different degrees
of power” (Abbott & Snidal, 2000, p. 423).
While such a theory is useful to describe the larger picture of the Wasse-
naar Arrangement, it does not have much to say about how internal debates
play out and how preferences are formed and institutionalised through practice.
Nor does it pay particular attention to the alternative conceptions of Wasse-
naar, or to the technology on its lists, that are continually at play within the
Arrangement. The literature specifically on science and technology in inter-
national security does address these points, but, as we shall see below, there
are also difficulties in applying its arguments to the study of the Wassenaar
Arrangement.
Science, technology, & international security
Many international security issues today require scientific and technical exper-
tise to be significantly addressed. There is a growing literature that looks at the
role of scientific and technical expertise in developing and maintaining inter-
national efforts on these issues, though many researchers still find the paucity
of research in this area perplexing (Gummett, 1990; Rappert, 2007; Sapolsky,
1977; Smit, 1995).
Early thinking at the end of World War II tended to focus on the promise
(Bush, 1945) or danger27 of the development of a technocratic elite who held a
privileged place in the policy making process. This was driven by the idea that
threats to national security could largely be dealt with by advancing science
and technology. This train of thought has a recent manifestation in the work
on epistemic communities.
27Such as in Eisenhower’s Farewell Address as President on 17 January 1961: “in holding
scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the
equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-
technological elite.”
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The work of Haas and others operates loosely within regime theory, but
expands it to incorporate “network[s] of professionals with recognized exper-
tise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas, 1992, p. 3),
otherwise known as ‘epistemic communities’ (Adler, 1992; Haas, 1989). Epis-
temic communities arise in policy areas that are heavily dependent on scientific
and technical expertise and reliant on policy coordination between multiple
states. These communities become institutionalised by consolidating bureau-
cratic power within governments and international organisations.28 However,
such an approach has been criticised for assuming that science stands divorced
from politics, that ‘truth’ is separated from and speaks to ‘power’ (Litfin, 1994;
Stone, 1988). One of the major difficulties in employing an epistemic communi-
ties approach to studying the Wassenaar Arrangement is that the development
of the Arrangement was not driven by a scientific or even technological group
of experts, but rather by a political need to control access to militarily sig-
nificant technologies. The concept of an epistemic community also depends
upon the need for agreement on the definition of the problem to be addressed
(Haas, 1989). This is in contrast with the position I take in this thesis, as I
show how such agreement is not likely, nor is it necessarily desirable, within the
Wassenaar Arrangement. These points will be drawn out more in Section 2.4.
One question addressed by the literature on science and technology in in-
ternational affairs is whether the regulatory mechanisms currently in place are
the right sort of mechanisms for the types of problems they are trying to tackle.
This is a concern that has existed throughout the history of export controls
(Rappert, 2006). There is concern, for instance, that regulatory mechanisms for
controlling access to militarily significant technologies are fundamentally unable
to address the types of challenges likely to arise in response to developments in
biotechnology, nanotechnology, and the devices terrorists use (Arquilla, 2003;
28There is therefore a strong resemblance to the concept of an advocacy coalition (Sabatier
& Jenkins-Smith, 1993).
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Whitman, 2007). Part of the reason for this is that it is no longer the most ad-
vanced technology that is causing the most damage to societies. For instance,
on 11 September 2001, it was through the employment of several box-cutters
and some commercial airplanes that members of Al Qaeda were able to bring
down the World Trade Center buildings in New York City. Another problem
is that international cooperation on export controls was designed on the as-
sumption that technologies developed on an extended timeframe. As the pace
of technological advancement continues to increase, regulatory mechanisms are
falling further and further behind (Skolnikoff, 2001).
There is an area of this literature that emphasises that science and technol-
ogy are not the primary or most powerful drivers of security policy that prime
facie concern science and technology (Spinardi, 1997). Science and technology
factors should still be given weight, but it is not a case of science speaking truth
to power (Jasanoff, 1990). Instead, this area of the literature focuses on how
different groups each constitute what is the relevant science and technology
to discuss on a particular issue. A major concept in this literature, discussed
above in the sections on technology and classification, is the idea that social
order and technical knowledge are co-constructed (Jasanoff, 2004). One train
of thought that shows particular merit in being able to provide a new look at
international security issues involving science and technology is the theory of
sociocultural viability, to which we now turn.
2.4 Sociocultural viability
A theory that develops from many of the literatures discussed above is the
that of sociocultural viability, also known as the Neo-Durkheimian theory of
institutional viability, or Cultural Theory.29 The theory began with the work
of Mary Douglas (1966) as an anthropological tool to explain how systems
29I have chosen to use the perhaps more cumbersome name to avoid confusion with the
vast arrays of approaches that fall under the general label of cultural theory (lower case).
See Smith (2001).
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of classifications handle anomalies and ambiguity, with an emphasis on the
analysis of lists. It has always been concerned with the relationship between
the natural and social worlds, arguing that they are co-constituted. It is a
theory of power relations, social accountability, and sense-making. Today, it is
employed by researchers and practitioners in fields as diverse as town planning,
climate change, and gun control.30 In this section, I review the basic tenets of
this theory, drawing out its connections and tensions with the other literatures.
Douglas’ focus on classification, as shown above, is the starting point for
one of the two bases that she uses to form a two-dimensional matrix of social
relations, the ‘grid/group typology’ (1970/2003, p. 62). In a very ordered
system of social classification, each individual will have a place in society that
will be different from that of other individuals. Douglas calls this the ‘grid’
axis (cf. Durkheim, 1951). The other dimension, which Douglas calls ‘group’,
is defined by the degree to which an individual sees herself as part of a larger
collective. This typology therefore develops four quadrants of social relations.
When a person is in one of the quadrants, she will tend to use that model of
ordering as a general basis of cognition. Thus, when speaking about nature,
the higher a person goes on the grid axis, the more she will order the system
of natural classification, and the more each piece of nature will be put into a
specific category. The higher she goes on the group axis, the greater the degree
to which she will interrelate the categories of nature. Douglas does not believe
that society completely shapes cognition, however. An individual can choose to
hold different views of nature than those of the system in which he/she currently
resides. Douglas’ point is that the individual, in expressing those views about
nature, will be trying to change the system of social relations. Thus, the
typology is dynamic. It is also important to note that “Douglas instructs us
to treat the processes of classification and contention as inseparable, since the
dominant concern in any social context is how to organize together in society”
(Tansey, 2004, p. 20). Bloor (1978) uses this typology, graphically represented
30For a recent collection of these analyses, see Verweij & Thompson (2006).
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in Figure 2.2, to devise the different anomaly-handling strategies each quadrant
uses for maintaining a classification system, upon which I will elaborate in the
next chapter.
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Figure 2.2: The grid/group typology
This typology was developed further by Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky
(1990) to create the theory of sociocultural viability. They argue that each
of the quadrants in the grid/group typology represents a combination of a style
of social relations and a cultural bias (Douglas, 1978), which is a shared set of
values and beliefs. When people express their cultural bias through patterns
of behaviour, they are reinforcing a particular set of social relations, and when
they are in a certain set of social relations, they will tend to conform to certain
patterns of behaviour. It is from these patterns of behaviour that people begin
to develop preferences, whether they be regarding mathematics, risk, technol-
ogy, or anything else (Thompson et al., 1990, ch. 3). How these preferences
develop in relation to the Wassenaar Arrangement will be a matter of analysis
for this thesis.
The theory argues that there is a limited number of combinations of so-
cial relations, patterns of behaviour and cultural biases, called solidarities.
It is these solidarities that form the unit of analysis. The actual number of
solidarities that it is useful to include is a matter of debate. It is at least
three (Rayner, 1995)—to ensure complex interactions—and not more than five
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(Thompson et al., 1990, p. 48-51), to maintain parsimony. The different types
are shown overlaid on the grid/group typology in Figure 2.3. When there are
only three, they are usually defined as the ‘active voices’ in the debate, and are
the hierarchical, egalitarian, and competitive voices. The fatalistic voice is not
one that would generally engage in the debate, as individuals in this type of
social relations or holding this cultural bias would feel that their voice would
not get heard even if they used it (due to high classificatory structure and a
low sense of group membership). The hermit, which sits in the middle of the
graph here, is taken up by those who wish to withdraw from all forms of social
relations and has no voice (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 7).31
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Figure 2.3: The cultural theory typology
Steve Rayner (Rayner, 1995; Rayner & Malone, 2000; Thompson & Rayner,
1998) provides an alternative derivation of the solidarities, beginning not with
the work of Douglas, but rather synthesising the various dichotomies that so-
cial theorists have used over the past 150 years to explain the progress of social
institutions. For instance, Durkheim (1893) speaks of the movement of society
from forms of mechanical solidarity, where agents are bound by similarity, to
31The names of each voice vary within the literature. I have chosen the most common set.
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forms of organic solidarity, where they are bound by by interdependence of
specialised roles. Lindblom (1977), Williamson (1975), and Weber (1958) all
distinguish between markets and hierarchies. Similarly, Maine (1861), To¨nnies
(1887), and Bernstein (1971) all describe social relations—from the interper-
sonal to the international level—in a dichotomous framework, but when over-
laid, the dichotomies of all of these scholars are not collapsible into a single
uber-dichotomy. As Rayner argues: “there is a great deal of overlap among
these grand dichotomies of social theory. However, they are far from perfectly
congruent and, in sum, give rise to three, rather than two, basic forms of social
solidarity” (Rayner, 1995, p. 61). These three are the three active solidarities:
hierarchical, competitive or market, and egalitarian.
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Figure 2.4: Two-dimensional map of kinds of social solidarity underlying human
values preferences (redrawn from Rayner, 1995)
Rayner (1995) develops a two-dimensional map of human values to show
these overlaps, as shown in Figure 2.4. He proposes that these three forms of
solidarity create a dynamic space for social interaction. Any human activity
will be an effort to strengthen at least one of these forms of solidarity, and
any institution will be some mixture of each of these solidarities. Rayner shifts
from emphasising the individual (or institution or state) as the unit of analysis
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to emphasising the solidarity, and is thus able to show that the individual is ac-
tually a ‘dividual’ (Marriott, 1976), composed of a dynamic mix of solidarities
and able to perform complex strategy switching (Rayner & Malone, 2000) be-
tween them. The same is true of any institution, and therefore when speaking
generically about a person/group/institution that takes up a particular soli-
darity, I will refer to it as an actor. An actor may express different solidarities
in different contexts, but within a particular context, it will tend to adopt the
patterns of behaviour, cultural biases, and form of organisation of only one of
the solidarities to the extent that the context will allow it. Actors do not come
to an issue with their preferences already formed for a particular solidarity, but
rather their preferences emerge as a result of interactions within a particular
institutional context and with other actors (Thompson et al., 1990, Ch. 3).
The solidarities
A brief review of each of these solidarities is useful here, and will be comple-
mented later in the thesis by an elaboration of each one within the discourse on
dual-use technology. Each solidarity legitimates its form of organisation with
reference to a corresponding organisational style that is found in nature. The
importance of the connection between natural and social systems is explained
by Douglas (1986, p. 48):
There needs to be an analogy by which the formal structure of a
crucial set of social relations is found in the physical world, or in
the supernatural, or in eternity, anywhere, so long as it is not seen
as a socially contrived arrangement. When the analogy is applied
back and forth from one set of social relations to another and from
these back to nature, its recurring formal structure becomes easily
recognized and endowed with a self-validating truth.
Each solidarity has a distinctive style of framing a particular issue, where
a frame is defined as “the overarching or organizing concept that represents
the application to a specific context, of the general cognitive commitments of a
given solidarity, in its more moderate or more extreme form” (6, 2005, p. 104).
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The problem and solution framing that each solidarity will take on a particular
issue is also legitimated by a natural analogy (Rayner, 1991).32
These basic natural analogies for social relations and issue framing can then
be used to generate all manner of preferences on which each solidarity will have
a different stance, be it risk (Rayner, 1984), energy (Schwarz & Thompson,
1990), the distribution of goods and services (Rayner, 1995), international re-
lations (Verweij, 2000), perception of time (Rayner, 1982b), or fairness (Rayner
& Cantor, 1987), to name a few. For a thorough list of these preferences, see
Schwarz & Thompson (1990, p. 66–67) and Thompson & Rayner (1998, p. 331).
These natural analogies also generate the distinctive patterns of behaviour and
cultural biases of each solidarity.
The hierarchical solidarity
The natural classification system upon which the hierarchical solidarity is
founded is the relationship of the head to the body. This is a relation of
dominant to subordinate, and provides the basis for the separation of society
in a top-down fashion, be it in regards to class, role, expertise, etc. The head-
to-body analogy encapsulates the importance that the hierarchical solidarity
puts on both group cohesion and social regulation.
Problem and solution framing within the hierarchical solidarity is based
on the analogy of nature as tolerant within bounds. The natural system can
be pushed, but if pushed too much, it will collapse. As such, the problem is
framed as a problem of management, of keeping the issue within the bounds of
acceptability. The solution to the problem can be achieved by segregating the
problem and segregating society, assigning the appropriate part of the problem
to the appropriate part of society, much as the head co-ordinates the hands for
manipulating and the feet for walking. Because of the reliance this solidarity
has on knowing where the bounds of acceptability are on an issue, much of the
32These analogies are based on the work of Holling (1977).
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effort of institutions and other actors that take up this framing of an issue will
be spent on measuring and defining the boundary.
The types of transactions that the hierarchical solidarity supports are based
on rules and procedures, whereby decisions are made in a committee where the
authority rests with the most senior person there. Fairness is judged as equality
before the law. The distribution of goods and services should occur based
on the principle of proportionality, where the administrative determination of
rank, contribution, or need establishes how much each actor should receive.
Time is seen as bounded, but manageable; thus, everything has its time, and
things will be done in their proper order.
When looking at the issue of, for instance, radiation hazards in hospitals
(Rayner, 1984), an actor using a hierarchical framing looks towards establishing
rules and procedures for making sure that radiation doses do not go above a
certain level, which is defined by an expert committee. Within the issue of
climate change (Thompson & Rayner, 1998), an actor expressing this framing
seeks to identify, again through a committee of relevant experts, the bounds of
climate variability, and then to set up institutions to ensure the climate stays
within those bounds. Within the issue of flood protection (Linnerooth-Bayer
et al., 2006), actors using this framing employ expert judgement to determine
the likely frequency and strengths of floods, and then create institutions that
would ensure a that city could withstand those floods.
Any risks that occur within an issue should be addressed through estab-
lished institutions (which preserve the system of hierarchy already in place).
Consent to make decisions on behalf of society is considered to be hypothetical;
the individual, by being part of the society, consents to allow the governing in-
stitutions to make decisions on his behalf, even if he may not like the particular
outcome. Liability, when things go wrong, is handled within the hierarchical
solidarity through redistributive taxation, which will ensure not that everyone
bears the same cost, but that the most important parts of society survive. All
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of these preferences are tied back to the relationship of the head to the body,
and to viewing nature (and thus any issue) as something to be managed.
The competitive solidarity
The natural classification system upon which the competitive solidarity is
founded is that of predator to prey. It is focused on those individuals who
have the means to succeed. Neither group cohesion nor social regulation are as
important as individual motivation and capabilities.
The problem and solution framing for the competitive solidarity is based
on the analogy of nature as robust. There is no need to consider the bounds of
nature, as the focus is entirely on the individual. If nature is disturbed in the
process of self-improvement, there is little concern as it will bounce back. Thus,
a competitive framing sees the issue not as a management problem, but as a
problem of competition between other individuals. The only social relations of
value are networks that are established on a contractual basis and broken when
the contract terminates.
This competitive mode of transaction means that fairness should be based
on equality of opportunity. The market is open to anyone, but it is only those
with the skills and networks who will succeed. The distribution of goods and
services is therefore based on the principle of priority: first in time is first in
right. This is complemented by a view of time that focuses on the short-term
rather than the long-term. There is a constant need to reassert an actor’s
position within a competitive form of organisation because the actor cannot
rely on established rules and procedures to ensure its place. This creates an
‘innovate or perish’ mentality.
To use the same examples as above, an actor using a competitive fram-
ing addresses radiation hazards in hospitals by accepting a high level of risk
in order to reap the rewards of being the first to innovate a new medicine or
technique. When looking at climate change, an actor in this framing seeks to
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create markets for carbon and also boost markets for technologies that con-
sumers believe will help alleviate the effects of climate change. On the issue
of flood prevention, a competitive framing favours individual responsibility for
insuring against floods and siting decisions.
Risks are accepted within the competitive framing as inevitable if one is to
succeed. They are not something to be managed, as the hierarchical framing
would suggest. Consent of society to bear these risks is revealed through their
consumption patterns. Should something go wrong, the liability mechanism is
one of loss-spreading, where market mechanisms like insurance determine who
bears the losses. Once again, we can see how all of these preferences are linked
to the natural classification of predator to prey.
The egalitarian solidarity
The natural classification system upon which the egalitarian solidarity is founded
is that of equality within groups. For example, migratory birds form a V-
pattern in flight, where each takes turns being in the front of the V and
therefore breaking the wind-resistance for all the others. Group cohesion is
important within this solidarity, but regulation within that group is minimal.
Objectives are therefore best achieved through cooperation among equals rather
than through competition among rivals or hierarchical committees.
The problem and solution framing for the egalitarian solidarity is based on
the analogy of nature as ephemeral. Nature is a fragile system in a delicate
balance. Anything disturbing that balance may cause the complete collapse
of the system as a whole. This analogy therefore supports a precautionary
approach to a particular issue. It is important to view the issue not as an
isolated case, but as part of a larger interconnected system. The conception of
time in an egalitarian framing comes from the solidarity’s ability to compress
its perception of all of the past and all of the future into the present. This is
because the solidarity is as certain of the departure of the previous state of the
world as it is of the impending future.
2.4 Sociocultural viability 71
The cooperative mode of transaction preferred by the egalitarian solidarity
means that fairness should be based on equality of result. The distribution of
goods and services should therefore not be guided by the principles of propor-
tionality or priority, but by the principle of the parity of outcome. There are no
dispute-resolving mechanisms in an egalitarian framing other than expulsion
from the group. This usually comes about through labelling the actor to be
expelled as an ‘outsider’, and therefore not really part of the group at all.
To once more use the same examples as above, when addressing radiation
hazards in hospitals, the idea that nature is vulnerable and needs protection
translates into the idea that radioactive materials require far too many safe-
guards and other hierarchically orientated control mechanisms to achieve any
semblance of safety; and the safety achieved would never be good enough to
bear the burden of preventing any accident from occurring. When dealing with
climate change, actors expressing the egalitarian framing see the profligacy of
humanity as the cause of the problem and the solution as a radical shift towards
more sustainable living standards. Within the issue of flood preventions, any
attempt at bending the river to suit the needs of humans will have an adverse
effect on the natural environment. Instead, an actor expressing the egalitar-
ian framing would argue for allowing the river to take its natural course and
focusing instead on modifying human behaviour so as to be less disruptive to
the environment.
Any risks that occur within an issue must be agreed to by explicit consent of
all actors involved, rather than consent being hypothetically implied simply by
being part of society or revealed through consumption patterns. Liability for
unforeseen costs, from an egalitarian framing, falls on those directly responsible
for the risk; it is therefore a strict-fault system. This stance on liability allows
for the group as a whole to continue to survive. Each of these preferences gains
its legitimacy from its relation to natural systems of equality and from the
analogy of nature as ephemeral.
Each of the solidarities is summarised in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Preferences for each framing of the problem of dual-use technology
(Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Thompson & Rayner, 1998)
Solidarity
Preferences Hierarchical Competitive Egalitarian
Natural
classifica-
tion system:
head/body predator/prey collective
social regula-
tion (grid) &
social integra-
tion (group):
high/high low/low low/high
Nature anal-
ogy for is-
sue framing:
tolerant within
bounds
robust ephemeral
Solution
to issues:
management of
problem
encourage mar-
kets
shift social order
Transactional
mode:
rules & proce-
dures
competition cooperation
Fairness:
equality before
the law
equality of op-
portunity
equality of out-
come
Distribution
of goods
and services:
proportionality priority parity
Conception
of time:
bounded short-term long-term
Consent
to risks:
hypothetical revealed explicit
Liability
for risks:
redistributive loss-spreading strict-fault
driving values:
maintain status
quo
expansion equality
The theory of sociocultural viability is a theory of dynamics within and
between solidarities. Each actor is continually enacting one or another form
of organisation through performing or institutionalising certain sets of prefer-
ences. In doing so, the actor is also disorganising the other forms of organisation
(Thompson, 2008). Thus we can speak of positive feedback dynamics, which
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allow one solidarity to become further institutionalised within a particular con-
text, and negative feedback dynamics, which are the resistive forces that each
solidarity can use against the others (6, 2003).
A key aspect of this typology is that each solidarity relies on the other for
counter-balancing its assumptions.33 None of them has a fully accurate view
of the world, and reliance solely upon one often results in ineffective institu-
tions. For instance, Hood, Rothstein & Baldwin (2001) note that proponents of
the hierarchical solidarity will always propose a management-oriented solution
to the problem, even when such a solution may be more symbolic than effec-
tive. This symbolism is important, however, because it allows the solidarity
to remain intact. Marco Verweij (2006) has noted how the Kyoto Protocol on
greenhouse gas emissions may be an example of this. Perri 6 (2007) describes
ways that the different solidarities can co-exist with each other, which he calls
‘forms of settlement’, and in the process create viable institutional forms.
The theory of sociocultural viability is intimately concerned with power
(Tansey, 2004). Each of the solidarities incorporates a different conception of
the appropriate power relations. Within the hierarchical solidarity, power is
distributed according to position and status, whereas to the egalitarian soli-
darity, it is distributed equally among all in the collective. Both of these are
contrasted with the competitive solidarity, where power is in the hands of the
individual. The theory of sociocultural viability, Rayner (1992, p. 102–103)
argues,
enables us to analyze cultural values and beliefs as carefully main-
tained regulators of social organisation, rather than as mere reflec-
tions of the economic or political order. Through cultural theory
analysis, we are able to see how symbols are invoked by people
in order to convince and coerce each other to behave in a certain
way, as well as to justify their own actions. Cultural theory shows
how culture works as a social control mechanism and a means of
accounting for actions.
33This is called the ‘requisite variety condition’ (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 86).
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The theory has often been applied to technological decision making. Tech-
nology is not something which can be brought under social control, Schwarz &
Thompson (1990) argue, but rather is the thing through which social control is
instituted. This is very apparent when debating acceptable levels of risk, be it
for radiation hazards in hospitals (Rayner, 1984), nuclear waste siting (Gross &
Rayner, 1985), or climate change (Rayner & Malone, 1998). The predominant
approach in this research is to look behind the technical debate to see what
forms of social organisation are being attacked or defended. This is not to
discount the need for technical discussions to focus on the technically possible,
but rather to state that which version of the (infinite number of) technically
possible outcomes is realised will depend on the interplay of voices espous-
ing different forms of organisation (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Thompson,
2003). The approach is thus closely related to the concept of a ‘sociotechnical
ensemble’, which I discussed in Section 2.1. It is also similar to the notion
of interpretative flexibility in technology, since each solidarity incorporates a
different set of preferences for how to view ‘the same’ technology.
There is also a useful connection here with Rappert’s work on ambigu-
ity. Now, not only are we aware that social structure and the construction of
technologies are related, but we also have a framework in which to put those
different sets of relations. How ambiguities in technologies are resolved, in
other words, will depend upon the type of social organisation one wishes to
strengthen.
Within international relations, work within this literature suggests that in-
ternational organisations need to be subject to similar democratic controls as
are national governments (Verweij & Josling, 2003). The bureaucratic cultures
within these organisations would become self-defeating without checks from at
least markets (cf. Weber, 1968/1922) if not also civil society. Rayner (Rayner,
1994; Thompson & Rayner, 1998) argues that international issues often have a
‘hegemonic myth’ that is championed by one of the solidarities. Myths, within
the social science literature, are not mystical tales. Rather, they are stories that
2.4 Sociocultural viability 75
embody fundamental assumptions about everyday or scientific reality (Thomp-
son & Rayner, 1998, p. 283). The hegemonic myth describes the “fundamental
propositions or assumptions that are unquestionable within the context of a
particular discourse” (1994, p. 15). When one solidarity is hegemonic, the
people wishing to strengthen an alternative form of social organisation must
adopt the discourse of this solidarity, if only then to undermine it. Rayner
contrasts the idea of a hegemonic myth with Haas’ (1992) notion of a ‘shared
episteme’. Whereas Haas is concerned with the development of a cohesive epis-
temic community, Rayner emphasises the continual battle between solidarities.
Hegemonic myths, then,
set the rhetorical terms within which rival views and myths con-
tinue to compete, although in a more subdued manner. Arguments
based on rival myths are likely to accept the general assertions of
the hegemonic myth while providing for specific elaborations or ex-
ceptions that effectively undermine it—a ‘Yes, but. . . ’ approach
to debate. What a rival myth cannot do is directly challenge a
hegemonic myth and expect to remain a credible participant in the
dialogue (Rayner, 1994, p. 15).
As we can see, the theory of sociocultural viability has been incorporated
into theories of technology, theories of classification, and institutional and in-
ternational relations theories. It is well designed for a discourse analysis of
how different framings work to institutionalise different forms of organisation,
and how the ordering of people and the ordering of technology and nature are
inextricably intertwined. In looking at the different goals that are being sought
through the development and modification of the Wassenaar Arrangement list
of dual-use technologies, I am in some ways returning the theory back to the
original point of its formulation in Douglas’ (1966) work on classification of
purity and danger, of pollution and taboo. In the next chapter, I will use this
theory as a basis for my analytical framework.
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2.5 Conclusion
We have now reviewed the major sections of literature relevant to this thesis,
highlighting the ideas that will be useful in the analysis of the Wassenaar
Arrangement Dual-Use List modification process.
Technology is inherently social. The nature of the relationship between
technology and society, however, has been the source of much debate. Tech-
nological determinism sees technologies as driving social relations, while social
determinism draws the opposite causal line. Most work today sits somewhere in
the middle, such as the Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) approach.
A useful notion from SCOT that I employ in this thesis is that technology is
‘interpretively flexible’ depending on the ‘relevant social groups’ in which it is
situated.
The differentiation between the discourse about technology and the arte-
facts and practices to which the discourse relates is an important one for this
thesis. In maintaining the Wassenaar Arrangement lists, member states spend
their time discussing ‘What is a dual-use technology?’ and thereby engage
in discourse about the technology. It therefore makes sense to employ the
‘technology as text’ metaphor to analyse these debates. What constitutes a
technology is always ambiguous because its ‘capacities’ can only be defined in
relation to the context of a particular artefact in a particular environment em-
ployed by a particular person in a particular way. However, different definitions
of technology are related to stances in the broader debate about the relations
of accountability between actors.
When addressing literature on classification, I showed how classification
systems are not things that exist ‘out there’, reified entities that guide our
lives. They are, instead, co-constitutive of the social and natural environments
through which people enact and institutionalise them. Rather than viewing
things as having essential properties, I take up the argument that classifications
are based on the relationship between things. The work of Mary Douglas
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centres on anomalies in the natural and social worlds and on how a society’s
responses to them strengthen its bonds. The resolution of anomalies is an act
of conferring sameness, but sameness is not a property of nature; it is a thing
conferred by institutional structure, by a system of classification.
‘Dual-use’ is a particular classification of technology used by the Wasse-
naar Arrangement, and we saw how the term has been analysed by different
communities of practice, either emphasising a movement between military and
non-military, or showing the ambiguity of use in the technology. Through a
discussion on the inadequacy of the term, we saw that, once again, different
understandings of the classification system rest on different understandings of
technology and its role in society. Dual-use technologies are boundary objects,
and as such can be used as tools for communication and knowledge production
between different communities of practice that might not otherwise be able to
communicate with each other.
The literatures on technology, classification, and dual-use help us to under-
stand the case studies that we will be examining at in this thesis, but there
is also the context in which those case studies exist. For a background on
this, we turned to the literature on regimes, institutions, and transnational
science and technology issues. While much of this literature provides some
perspective on the political and structural frameworks that are constructed by
and constrain international efforts to harmonise export controls, they lack any
significant analysis on the way that technologies are constructed within the de-
bates. There is, however, a small and growing literature that does take up these
points. This literature points out, for instance, that regulatory mechanisms for
controlling access to militarily significant technologies are fundamentally unable
to address the types of challenges likely to arise in response to developments
in biotechnology, nanotechnology, and the devices terrorists use. Once again,
this literature also addresses the point that the social and technical orders are
co-constructed.
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The final section of this chapter drew together the previous literatures by
elaborating the theory of sociocultural viability. Based on Douglas’ work on
classification, the theory devises a set of solidarities that are combinations of
forms of social organisation, patterns of behaviour, and cultural biases. These
solidarities are continually interacting with each other as different actors—be
they individuals, organisations, states. . . even texts—use them to frame their
preferred stance on an issue. The theory is intimately concerned with power,
and has already been applied to analyse technological decision-making.
In drawing together the literatures on science and technology studies, clas-
sification, and international regimes, this thesis contributes to all three of the
ideas expressed by Javier Lezaun (2002) about how to draw together construc-
tivist theories broadly with other theories of international relations:
• This thesis examines “how knowledge is produced and deployed in practi-
cal interaction by the actors themselves that constitute the international
system.”
• This thesis argues that an analysis of the political constitution of the
Wassenaar Arrangement is inseparable from an analysis of how knowl-
edge (particularly about the technology being debated) is legitimated
and utilised.
• While this thesis is concerned primarily with the discourse on the develop-
ment of the Dual-Use List, this list is also a key part of the infrastructure
of international export controls. The thesis is focused on how the material
list and the social discourse constitute each other.
In the next chapter, I will use these literatures to design an analytical
framework for understanding (a) how technology gets defined as dual-use; (b)
what the Wassenaar Arrangement is trying to do; and (c) how the Arrangement
is trying to achieve its goals.
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This thesis is predominantly a discourse and textual analysis of the debates
about the definitions of dual-use technologies within and around the Wassenaar
Arrangement. In this chapter, I outline my analytic framework and methodol-
ogy.
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3.1 Analytic framework
The analytic framework I employ in this thesis is drawn from recent work
among researchers connected with Oxford University’s Institute of Science, In-
novation, and Society,1 but is also very closely connected to the framework
Hajer & Laws (2006) outline in Ordering through discourse. The framework
is comprised of three points of analysis: how the problem being analysed is
‘wicked’; how ‘uncomfortable knowledge’ arises and is addressed; and how dif-
ferent institutional structures allow and constrain different solutions to the
problem. I treat the framework as an ordering device, structuring “the concep-
tual tools that analysts use to capture how policy actors deal with ambiguity
and allocate particular significance to specific social or physical events” (Hajer
& Laws, 2006, p. 252).
We begin with some definitional issues. These are working definitions that
I employ in this thesis. Each of these terms has an entire body of literature dis-
cussing its meaning, but for the purposes of this thesis, I use them as described
below. The topic of my analysis is the discursive space within which different
framings of the problem of dual-use technology interact. The unit of analysis
for this thesis is the solidarity, defined within the literature on the theory of
sociocultural viability as a particular combination of a form of organisation, a
pattern of behaviour, and an accompanying rhetorical framework of account-
ability and justification for actions. Taking the solidarity as my unit of analysis
means that I view the discourse on dual-use technology as being a debate be-
tween different solidarities. The theory of sociocultural viability asserts that
at there are at least three different solidarities—hierarchical, competitive, and
egalitarian—which we reviewed in Section 2.4. We can identify solidarities by
analysing the types of organisation and forms of rhetoric that actors use within
the discourse on dual-use technology. An actor can be an individual, a com-
pany, a state. . . anything that embodies mix of solidarities. Actors likely hold a
1Formerly the James Martin Institute for Science and Civilization.
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combination of different solidarities, with the strength of each solidarity vary-
ing in different institutional contexts (each of which will itself be a particular
mix of solidarities) and interactions with other actors within that context.
Each solidarity has a different framing of the problem of dual-use technol-
ogy. The framing involves the definition of the problem and its solution, along
with the form of organisation, and the set of preferences of the solidarity. Soli-
darities can be applied to multiple issues, whereas framings are particular to a
particular issue.
Within a debate there is often a hegemonic framing of the problem, a term I
derive from the literature on hegemonic myths in Section 2.4. This hegemonic
framing has institutionalised its form of organisation more than the others.
In order for other solidarities to get into the discourse, they must ‘steal’ the
rhetoric and patterns of behaviour of the hegemonic framing (Thompson et al.,
1990, p. 263–265), but they do so in order to undermine the form of organisation
of that framing.
My starting assumptions in this analysis are that the process of modifying
the Wassenaar Arrangement Dual-Use List is often, if not always, a matter
of contention and ambiguity. The framing that people choose within the Ar-
rangement is shaped by the institutional context and by the solidarity they
are trying to strengthen or undermine. Given these assumptions, the question
I am interested in is how people who hold different, and often contradictory,
framings of the issue at hand are able to continue making policy to which all
can agree.
In this section, I outline each aspect of my analytic framework—wicked
problems, uncomfortable knowledge, and alternative solutions—and develop
the focused questions that I answer through my analysis.
Wicked problems
Wicked problems were first defined by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber (1973),
who addressed the need to disassociate planning problems in the field of op-
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erations research from natural scientific problems.2 At the time, most policy
research was conducted on the assumption that there were generalisable prin-
ciples that could be discovered to solve social problems that were discrete and
fully definable. Social science problems, in other words, could be treated as
natural scientific problems and solved as such. The policy problems, according
to Rittel & Webber, were considered to be ‘tame’. They argue instead that
such problems are not amenable to definitive definitions and solutions, and
should be considered ‘wicked’.3 For a recent review of the concept, see Conklin
et al. (2007, 2008).
Rittle & Webber provide ten characteristics of wicked problems which pre-
vent them from being solved through a systematic and generalised method;
Steve Rayner (2006) has collapsed these into six. In short, wicked problems:
• have multiple definitions, and each definition contains its own preferred
solution;
• are persistent and insoluble;
• contain contradictory certitudes;
• are often symptoms of another (wicked) problem;
• tend to have redistributive implications for entrenched interests;
• have little room for trial and error learning.
The definition of a wicked problem depends on an actor’s preference for
solving the problem. If an actor frames the problem of dual-use technology, for
instance, as a problem of control, then the solution is a matter of determining
the appropriate level of control. If, however, an actor frames the problem as one
2For an analysis of the development of the term ‘wicked problem’ see Logue (forthcoming).
3Their distinction between natural and social problems has since been argued to be spu-
rious (see Section 2.1), but their point still holds. The outcome is not that social problems
are once more seen as natural ones, but rather that problems in natural science are now seen
as having a significant social science component.
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of competition, the solution will involve strategies for remaining competitive.
Alternative framings of the problem will often involve contradictions in the
solutions they propose. Remaining a competitive military power, for instance,
may rely on exporting dual-use technology to provide a big enough market for
continued research and development. This solution may be seen as being in
direct contradiction to the need to control the spread of dual-use technology.
Wicked problems are often symptoms of other wicked problems. While one
actor may define a wicked problem in narrow terms—say, constructing an ade-
quate licensing process for dual-use technologies—others will likely define it in
broader terms, such as balancing national security with economic competitive-
ness, or the need for open access to technology. Rittel & Webber (1973) use
this point to draw out the constructed nature of wicked problems. “The level at
which a problem is settled depends upon the self-confidence of the analyst and
cannot be decided on logical grounds[. . . ] it is not surprising that the members
of an organization tend to see the problems on a level below their own level”
(p. 165).
Wicked problems are always (de)constructed within an institutional frame-
work that is some mix of solidarities. Since wicked problems are persistent
and insoluble, at some point the balance of solidarities within the institutional
framework will likely shift as one framing of the problem receives more legit-
imisation. As a result, other framings will weaken, causing a redistribution
of power among the entrenched interests that those framings have institution-
alised.
There is little room for trial and error learning in wicked problems. They
are one-shot issues, where each attempt at a solution shifts the problem into a
new context. Wicked problems, then, are continually being re-problematised.
There are two important points about wicked problems which are useful
in this thesis but have not yet been drawn out in the literature. First is the
distinction between simple and complex wicked problems, and second is the
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elaboration on how each definition of a wicked problem entails its own set of
relevant knowledge. I now address each of these points in turn.
Simple versus complex wicked problems
Developing the point that wicked problems are constructed, rather than having
an a priori existence, we should be able to speak, at least in general terms, of
the degree of wickedness that an actor prescribes to a problem. Problems are
not wicked, or indeed ‘problems’ at all, until an actor defines and enacts them as
such. One can imagine, for instance, using Kuhn’s (1964) concept of paradigms,
that an actor—be it a scientist, a research institution, or even a theory—will
first attempt to address a problem as if it neatly fits within the actor’s current
paradigm, and is thus susceptible to the established methods of its area of
practice. The actor will consider the decision stakes and any uncertainties
within the problem as being manageable; a state of ‘normal science’, according
to Funtowicz & Ravetz (1992). The problem, then, is constructed as ‘tame’,
since there is a single framing.
As an example, Verweij (2006) shows how the conceptualisation of climate
change in the Kyoto Protocol on the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change is very much based on the hierarchical model of the ozone
regime, especially the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone
Layer. The Montreal Protocol occurred shortly before the issue of climate
change became prevalent, and the policymakers at the time thought that this
model would also work for what seemed to be the similar issue of climate
change.
Should this framing come to be seen as inadequate—by the original framer
or others—an alternative framing of the problem is always present. Judging
between framings is not a matter of comparing like with like, of making a
rational decision based on a logical analysis of comparative costs and benefits.
Rather, it is a choice between competing sets of values, where the decision on
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which framing to use is based on the form of social organisation an actor wishes
to strengthen and the institutional framework within which the actor sits.
To continue the example of climate change, Thompson & Rayner (1998),
and later Rayner (2006), show how the debate mirrors an underlying debate
between different solidarities. In a hierarchical framing, the problem is seen as
a problem of planning. “What we need to be doing is building an international
regime for the governance of the global commons, and both the commons and
the global economy require monitoring and managing within limits” (Rayner,
2006, p. 8). In an egalitarian framing, however, the problem is seen as one
of profligacy, of humanity’s embrace of consumerism which has led to over-
consumption. Both framings, however, are not on the issue of planning or
profligacy itself, but on the mutual issue of climate change.
To the extent that these different framings interact, the actors that pre-
viously believed their problems to be unrelated, now see that resolving one
problem must in some way entail resolving the other problem as well. These
two problems are therefore shifted into being different framings of a common,
wicked problem. At the heart of every wicked problem is the construction of an
‘essentially contested concept’ Gallie (1955). I am aware of the apparent contra-
diction in saying that an essentially contested concept is constructed. I take the
position, though, that all language—and thus all concepts—are constructed.
Gallie provides five ‘conditions of essential contestedness’ (1955, p. 171–172),
of which the fifth is the most important here:
each party recognizes the fact that its own use of [the concept] is
contested by those of other parties, and that each party must have at
least some appreciation of the different criteria in the light of which
the other parties claim to be applying the concept in question.
According to this criterion, a concept can become and cease to be essentially
contested according to the degree to which people who hold different framings
of the concept are able to acknowledge the alternative framings. Essential
contestation is a theme taken up in many areas of social science, including
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security studies (Buzan, 1983; Smith, 2005), political science more generally
(Lukes, 1974), and in cultural studies (Verweij et al., 2006b).
The climate change problem that I have so far described is wicked, but only
wicked in a simple way. With only two framings, discussion revolves around
there being a ‘balance’ between profligacy and planning. We can easily fall into
the trap of thinking that deciding on a resolution to the problem is a zero-sum
game, where more emphasis on one framing means less emphasis on the other.
A complex wicked problem in contrast, is one that is recognised as hav-
ing at least three valid framings. In such a situation, negotiating in favour of
one of the framings is not necessarily taking a stand against one of the oth-
ers. Rather than discussions being along a continuum between two poles, they
now occur within a two-dimensional solution space. Perhaps the easiest way
to think of the value of a third framing is that there are always two sides to
a story (provided by two of the framings), but there is also always another
story to tell—the third framing. A third framing always undercuts the as-
sumption of the dichotomy to which the other two framings adhere. This can
be seen if we return to Figure 2.4 (p. 65), which overlaid several social science
theories on the typology of sociocultural viability. The hierarchical and com-
petitive solidarities, for instance, are at opposite ends of Williamson’s (1975)
dichotomy between hierarchies and markets, and are divided by dichotomies
between status or contract (Maine, 1861) and personal versus positional au-
thority (Bernstein, 1971), but they share a commitment to specialised roles
(Bennett & Dahlberg, 1990) and organic solidarity (Durkheim, 1893), neither
of which are shared by the egalitarian solidarity. The hierarchical and egalitar-
ian solidarities are also divided by the dichotomy of positional versus personal
authority, but are thrown into contrast when debating specialised versus me-
chanical roles. The place where these two solidarities come to agreement—e.g.
favouring status over contracts—is precisely what the competitive solidarity
opposes. By recognising a third framing of a wicked problem, the actor doing
the framing (a business, government department, academic. . . ) is able to see
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that the assumption upon which any dichotomy rests is undercut by the third
framing.
Multiple definitions and relevant knowledge
Each framing of a wicked problem comes with an understanding of what knowl-
edge is relevant and irrelevant. In reviewing the literature on Science & Tech-
nology Studies in Chapter 2 we saw that there has been significant research
on the social construction of knowledge and technology. The process by which
a finding becomes a fact, or technology takes its final form, is not set, but
is a matter of existing technical, environmental, and social structures, as well
as personal preference. Technology is not in the driving seat, taking society
down a deterministic path of development; nor can technology be anything we
imagine. Our context shapes how we generate knowledge and how we develop
technology by helping us decide what are the relevant things to focus on. Each
of the solidarities outlined in the theory of sociocultural viability has a different
type of knowledge that is relevant to (that solidarity’s framing of) the issue at
hand.
One characteristic of a sociocultural viability analysis is that we begin with
a set of probable framings we are likely to find in any debate, which we re-
viewed in Section 2.4. Each actor, in the process of trying to solve its framing
of the wicked problem, engages in acts of organising: determining the appro-
priate relations between people; constructing institutions for embedding their
approach to the problem; identifying the characteristics of technology that most
suit their preferred solution; and even pointing out the elements of the environ-
ment (natural as well as man-made) that support its view. These are all acts of
classifying—of structuring the world to a set of preferences—and by engaging
in one, an actor is supporting the legitimacy of the others. Moreover, each of
these processes delimit what constitutes relevant knowledge for the actor.
Thus, if an actor emphasises hierarchical relations between people, it will
tend to define the wicked problem as one of control and will work to institu-
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tionalise hierarchical relations through rules and procedures. Similarly, it will
focus on creating knowledge about the controllable aspects of technology, and
will justify its preferences by pointing out that natural and social systems have
bounds of tolerance to disturbance and must therefore be kept within those
bounds. In contrast, if an actor promotes competitive instead of collective
action, it will define the problem as one of competition and will create and
support institutions to that end. Knowledge about technology within the com-
petitive framing favours showing how one technology is ‘better’ than another.
The actor will defend its preferences with reference to a world in which it is
better to be the hunter than the prey. Both of these actors are contrasted with
the one that promotes social relations that are communal. This actor views the
problem as one of open access, and institutions should seek to become more
open by being transparent and non-discriminatory. The important knowledge
about technology is the knowledge about how it promotes the communality,
not how it drives wedges in society and disassociates people into ‘haves’ and
‘have-nots’. The social and natural orders that are important for this actor
are ones that promote views of humans as similar and their environments as
interconnected.
The first two of the four main questions addressed in this thesis build on
the concept of a wicked problem:
1) How do different actors involved in the Wassenaar Arrangement define
dual-use technology?
2) How do those different definitions of dual-use technology relate to differ-
ent framings of the problem? I.e. How wicked is the problem from the
participants’ perspective?
To answer the first question requires an investigation into the different sets
of knowledge that different actors perceive as relevant to their framing of the
problem. Some, for instance, may focus on the technology’s marketability or
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foreign availability while others focus on its ability to subvert current military
technology.
By defining what knowledge is relevant in solving its framing of the wicked
problem, each actor also defines what is irrelevant. Deciding what not to know
is often as important as deciding what to know. When strengthening the hierar-
chical framing, knowledge that does not aid in institutionalising a hierarchical
form of organisation is deemed irrelevant. This is very important when we look
at the strategies that other framings can use against the hierarchical framing.
Comfortable & uncomfortable knowledge
The second part of my analytical framework develops the concept of uncom-
fortable knowledge to draw out how the different framings of the problem of
dual-use technology interact with each other in the definitional process.4
How is space created in a discourse for alternative framings? This is the
question that I am trying to solve by employing the concept of uncomfortable
knowledge.
Knowledge that is relevant within one framing can support that framing’s
form of organisation, or it can undermine the form of organisation, or be am-
biguous as to whether it supports or undermines. I define the relevant knowl-
edge that supports a framing’s form of organisation as that framing’s comfort-
able knowledge. For a hierarchical framing, comfortable knowledge is knowledge
both about which things are, and are not, manageable, and how to manage the
things that are. It is not sufficient for an actor expressing this framing to
know that something should be managed (that is only relevant knowledge);
the knowledge will only become comfortable when the actor is satisfied that a
thing that should be managed is managed.
4While the formulation of uncomfortable knowledge I present here is my own, Steve
Rayner is also working on another formulation grounded in anthropology. We share the
basic point, however, which is that uncomfortable knowledge undermines the capacity of an
organisation to act. I credit Rayner with first thinking of the concept, and am grateful to
him for allowing me to publish my formulation of it here.
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To continue with the climate change example, knowledge that carbon diox-
ide contributes to climate change and is manageable is relevant knowledge for
the hierarchical framing, but it is not comfortable. It becomes comfortable as
the actor—in this case we could consider the actor to be a government depart-
ment tasked with implementing the Kyoto Protocol—becomes convinced that
carbon dioxide is actually being managed.
The knowledge that undermines the framing’s form of organisation is its
uncomfortable knowledge. Uncomfortable knowledge is a threat to the legiti-
macy of the framing of the wicked problem, because the framing is not seen
as adequate when measured by the framing’s own metrics. Within the issue
of climate change, uncomfortable knowledge for the hierarchical framing would
be knowledge that carbon dioxide, while a key greenhouse gas emission, is not
actually manageable. This in turn calls into question the assumption that the
problem of climate change itself is actually manageable.
In addition to there being comfortable and uncomfortable knowledge for
a particular framing of an issue, there is much knowledge that is ambiguous.
There is often a process of forming what is an ambiguous piece of information
into comfortable or uncomfortable knowledge. I call this ambiguous informa-
tion an anomaly, taking on the meaning implied by (Bowker & Star, 1999,
p. 311):
Anomalies. . . come when some person or object from outside the
world at hand interrupts the flow of expectations. . . [A]nomalies
arise when multiple communities of practice come together, and
useful technologies cannot be designed in all communities at once.
Monsters arise when the legitimacy of that multiplicity is denied.
Our residual categories in that case become clogged and bloated.
Anomalies arise in several ways:
• what was seen by an actor within one framing as irrelevant is now seen
as relevant and has the potential to become either comfortable or uncom-
fortable for that framing;
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• what an actor saw as relevant (either comfortable or uncomfortable) may
now be irrelevant;
• or it could be an actor’s first encounter with a piece of knowledge, in
which case the actor may decide whether the knowledge is irrelevant or,
if relevant, comfortable or uncomfortable.
In each of these cases, an anomaly can come about through an actor’s
interaction with the institutional context or because of arguments presented by
other actors expressing different framings of the issue. Each of the actors tries
to prevent anomalies becoming uncomfortable knowledge for its own framing,
as the anomaly would undermine the underlying form of organisation on which
the framing is based. One framing’s uncomfortable knowledge, however, may
be another framing’s comfortable knowledge.
In this thesis we are primarily focusing on the interaction between the hi-
erarchical framing (which is the hegemonic framing in Wassenaar) and the
others, so it is useful here to lay out the role of the others as challengers to
the hierarchical framing, and the available responses that actors expressing the
hierarchical framing can use.
Anomaly-handling strategies
Each solidarity has its own preferred way of handling anomalies, whether they
be social, natural, or even mathematical, as David Bloor (1978) points out in
great detail when he relates the grid/group typology—the forerunner to the
theory of sociocultural viability—to the work of Lakatos on the controversy
over Euler’s theorem about polyhedra, which I described above on page 32.
Within an institutional context that is low-grid (low level of differentiation in
the classification system, e.g. bi-polar) and high-group (high sense of collective
identity, i.e. the egalitarian framing), the preference is for an immediate collec-
tive taboo on anomalies. Within a particular issue where anomalies arise, an
actor that in other respects appears to be supporting an egalitarian framing,
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but does not immediately taboo an anomaly, is seen by other actors within this
framing as not supporting the collective and is likely to be ostracised. Bloor
relates this to Lakatos’ idea of ‘monster-barring ’, where objects that did not
fit Euler’s theorem were emphatically refuted as not being polyhedra. Bloor
imagines (p. 253–4) how this approach to anomalies could have been mirrored
in the social institutions of the mathematicians:
Imagine a closed group of practitioners with a leadership whose
authority derives, say, from the discovery of a theorem. A coun-
terexample becomes the basis for a revolution. Rivals can use it as
a justification for a take-over. Attitudes towards the counterexam-
ple will have to polarize.
This anomaly-handling strategy is contrasted by Bloor with ones that would
exist within an institutional context that is high-grid (lots of internal cate-
gories in the classification) and high-group, i.e the hierarchical framing. An
actor within this context tends to be focused on the complex internal system
of classification, rather than worried about the external boundaries. Responses
to anomalies within a hierarchical framing can take two forms, according to
Bloor. First, the anomaly can be accommodated within the system through
a process of ‘monster-adjustment ’, where a category will be enlarged to hold
it. Second, an anomaly can be be seen by actors supporting this framing as
an exception to the classification, where caveats are then put in place to show
the boundaries of applicability of the system (‘exception-barring ’). Exception-
barring is a statement that the classification system has a narrower field of
remit than previously thought. When looking at problems of mathematics,
as Bloor did, this means that theorems have acknowledged exceptions. “All
that a counter-example does is to restrict the scope of the theorem: its truth
is untouched but the span of its authority, as it were, is narrower than had
been thought” (Bloor, 1978, p. 255). An item is included in or excluded from
a classification system, thereby removing the anomaly’s status as anomalous.
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Monster-adjustment can therefore be a process of creating comfortable knowl-
edge, and exception-barring of turning comfortable knowledge into irrelevant
knowledge, i.e. what used to be an object of control or a control practice is
now seen as out-dated or in some way no longer necessary.
The third anomaly-handling strategy that Bloor points out is Lakatos’ own
one—a dialectical method of proofs and refutations—where the anomaly’s sta-
tus as being anomalous is embraced. This occurs in the low-grid, low-group
(low sense of collective identity) institutional context, representing the com-
petitive framing of the issue. Here, if a classification system does not work, it
is discarded, because there is little collective attachment to it. Moreover, new
classification systems only come about if an actor is able to question radically
the basis of classification. This is an individualistic and competitive form of
social organisation.
The fourth anomaly-handling strategy is touched on only briefly by Bloor,
who says that it is a primitive form of exception-barring. This makes sense if
we say that actors expressing this framing are in an institutional context with
a complex classification system of which they do not feel part (high-grid but
low-group).
primitive
exception-barring
dialectical proofs
and refutations
monster-adjustment
exception-barring
monster-barring
Group
Grid
Figure 3.1: Anomaly-handling strategies
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This description of anomaly-handling strategies leaves little room for con-
structive dispute between them. Lakatos points out each of the strategies, and
Bloor connects them with the solidarities of the theory of sociocultural viability,
but neither author considers in much depth how disputes between alternative
anomaly-handling strategies—and therefore alternative solidarities—might ac-
tually evolve. Lakatos simply makes the argument that the strategy of proofs
and refutations is better than the others. Bloor only shows how rhetoric and
social structure are related.
Both authors demonstrate how each strategy fails from the perspective of
actors that are employing other strategies, and therefore other framings of the
issue. For example, they show how exception-barring (a strategy employed in
the hierarchical framing) is unacceptable from the perspective of the compet-
itive framing, which favours proofs and refutations. While Lakatos goes on
to argue that the dialectical method of proofs and refutations—the preferred
anomaly-handling strategy of the competitive framing, according to Bloor—
does not suffer from any of the failings of the other strategies, he does not
question how it may fail on its own terms.
A much more potent argument would be to show how exception-barring is,
in practice, unachievable. That is, it may fail on its own terms. Once this is
shown, it opens the discussion for alternative solutions.
Bloor focuses on how rhetoric is tied to institutional context. Changes in
rhetoric about polyhedra, Bloor argues, should be accompanied by a similar
change in institutional context. He points out (Bloor, 1978, p. 258) that each
of the discussions around Euler’s theorem was not just about mathematics:
Take the pupils in Lakatos’s classroom: what they are doing is
rehearsing styles of life, and patterns of social interaction, as well
as moves in the game of mathematics. But in doing this they are
not doing two different things, nor are they doing sometimes the
one and sometimes the other; [. . . ] in doing the one they are doing
the other.
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Bloor (1978, p. 266) posits that Lakatos’ desire to see the triumph of the
competitive solidarity as the end-game in mathematics should be tempered:
We should not expect that the emergence of a dialectical method in
mathematics is a once-and-for-all phenomenon—a sort of method-
ological ‘big bang’. We may expect it to have faded away in some
circumstances after Lakatos’s crucial year of 1847, and also to have
been present well before that date. Earlier cycles through com-
petitive social forms should also reveal mathematicians thinking
dialectically.
Bloor hints that the theory of sociocultural viability might be able to help show
how anomalies are related to shifts in the social structure. “For instance, it
should help to show when and why an anomaly is turned into a crisis-provoking
anomaly in Kuhn’s sense, or why in Lakatos’s terms a research programme can
be said to be degenerating” (p. 266). This is not Bloor’s main argument, but
it touches on a valuable aspect of the theory of sociocultural viability—it is a
theory of the dynamics of social relations. Like Bloor, I am interested in how
social relations are tied to rhetorical style, but unlike Bloor, I see myself as
engaged in an analysis of a continual battle between alternative solidarities,
i.e. a wicked problem. This perspective requires that I look at the ways that
actors expressing each of the framings of an issue can question the legitimacy
of the other framings and thereby institutionalise their own preferred form of
organisation and rhetorical style. The analytic tool that allows me to do so, I
argue, is the notion of ‘uncomfortable knowledge’.
Uncomfortable knowledge is generated when an anomaly-handling strategy
of a particular framing of an issue fails by the metrics of that same framing. It
is closely related, as Bloor points out above, to Kuhn’s (1964) ‘crisis-provoking
anomalies’, which take on many forms, of which Kuhn notes two that are
significant here (p. 82):
Sometimes an anomaly will clearly call into question explicit and
fundamental generalizations of the paradigm. . . Or. . . an anomaly
without apparent fundamental import may evoke crisis if the appli-
cations that it inhibits have a particular practical importance. . .
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Kuhn is focused on the shift between ‘paradigms’, which are “particular co-
herent traditions of scientific research” (p. 10). These shifts occur through the
development of crisis-provoking anomalies and the emergence of alternative
paradigm candidates. This suggests a linear, if multiple-stream, advance of
paradigms in natural science theory-making. Kuhn, however, explicitly draws
a link between theory-making in the natural sciences and changes in political
institutions in deciding to use the term ‘revolution’ to describe the shift of
paradigms. He argues that there are two main parallels between political and
scientific revolutions:
• “Political revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, often restricted
to a segment of the political community, that existing institutions have
ceased adequately to meet the problems posed by an environment they
have in part created. In much the same way, scientific revolutions are
inaugurated by a growing sense, again often restricted to a narrow subdi-
vision of the scientific community, that an existing paradigm has ceased
to function adequately in the exploration of an aspect of nature to which
the paradigm itself had previously led the way” (p. 92).
• “Like the choice between competing political institutions, that between
paradigms proves to be a choice between incompatible modes of commu-
nity life” (p. 94).
Kuhn sees choosing between paradigms, then, as the same as choosing between
incompatible modes of community life, or what the theory of sociocultural
viability calls solidarities.
Revolutions, Kuhn argues, happen relatively infrequently in the natural sci-
ences. In between these revolutions, there are long periods of ‘normal science’.
While this may or may not be the case for theoretical traditions in the natural
sciences, revolutions in most other parts of society are a constant process. With
all wicked problems, for instance, there is a constant calling into question of
the assumptions upon which a particular framing of the problem is based.
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Crisis-provoking anomalies, then, are ones that question the ‘fundamental
generalisations’ of a particular solidarity. They are anomalies that are not able
to be adequately resolved by employing the anomaly-handling strategy of an
actor’s preferred framing. This creates uncomfortable knowledge, undermining
that framing’s legitimacy and providing space for an alternative framing to
gain strength.
The third question addressed by this thesis is derived from the concept of
uncomfortable knowledge and the typology of anomaly-handling strategies:
3) How successfully are the actors expressing the hierarchical framing able to
avoid the generation of uncomfortable knowledge—by adequately resolv-
ing anomalies—in the Wassenaar Arrangement debates about modifying
the Dual-Use List?
This question brings out the interaction between multiple framings. The more
contention there is in the Dual-Use List modification process, the more likely
multiple anomaly-handling strategies will be employed.
Uncomfortable knowledge, then, is the tool through which alternative fram-
ings are able to be incorporated into a discourse. The more uncomfortable
knowledge there is for one framing, the more likely people espousing the fram-
ing are to accept alternative framings. But how are multiple framings able to
co-exist within a single discourse?
Alternative solutions
4) How is it that two or three framings of the wicked problem of dual-use
technology are able to co-exist with each other over extended periods of
time?
This is the final question addressed in this thesis. It allows me to move be-
tween analysing framings and analysing the institutional context in which the
framings take place. To do so, I draw together the literature on the institu-
tional aspects of technology, classification systems, and international relations
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using two concepts: ‘incompletely theorised agreements’ and ‘clumsy solutions’.
Each of these are outlined below.
Incompletely theorised agreements
Cass Sunstein developed the concept of an ‘incompletely theorised agreement’
in his book Legal reasoning and political conflict (1996). Incompletely theo-
rised agreements are disassociated from completely theorised agreements, where
there is acceptance by an actor on “both a general theory and a series of steps
connecting that theory to concrete conclusions” (p. 35). Completely theorised
agreements, Sunstein argues, are rare. Incompletely theorised agreements, in
contrast, are very common, and take three general forms.
The first form of an incompletely theorised agreement is on a general prin-
ciple, where “people who accept the principle need not agree on what it entails
in particular cases” (p. 35). Thus, people may agree on principles such as
‘murder is wrong’, ‘racial equality’, or in our case, ‘dual-use technology should
be controlled’, without agreeing on what that means in particular cases. The
second form is where agreement is reached on a mid-level principle, but dis-
agreements remain on both general theory and particular cases. The third
form is an agreement on particular outcomes and the low-level principles that
accompany them, with disagreements remaining about higher-level principles.
Sunstein is quick to point out that the levels on which agreement is or is not
reached are ambiguous and relative. His point, though, is that there does not
have to be agreement on all three levels in order for a social system to func-
tion. Agreements are reached where and when it is possible. Sometimes this
involves consciously avoiding topics that are contentious, sometimes it involves
transforming the topic into one that is more likely to reach agreement.
In this thesis, I use the concept of an incompletely theorised agreement
to draw draw out how the ambiguities in technology are selectively resolved
(Rappert, 2001) and how classification systems may contain purposeful areas of
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ambiguity in order to function among different communities of practice (Bowker
& Star, 1999).
Clumsy solutions
A ‘clumsy solution’ is a term used in the sociocultural viability literature to de-
scribe a solution where each of the active solidarities are voiced and responded
to by all the others (Verweij et al., 2006a).5 Clumsy solutions have two key
features. The first is that the policy system on a particular issue must be
accessible to each of the primary solidarities that the theory articulates: hier-
archical, competitive, egalitarian, and fatalistic. Each of these solidarities has
a plausible way of framing the issue, defining the problem, and suggesting a
solution. But each of these ways is in counter-distinction to the others. Thus,
“conflict in policy making processes is endemic, inevitable and desirable, rather
than pathological, curable or deviant” (Verweij et al., 2006a, p. 18). The more
solidarities that are included in the generation of a (re)solution to a problem,
the more likely that solution will be able to adjust to the inevitable changes in
the future environment in which it will sit.
The second key feature of clumsy solutions is that they depend on construc-
tive deliberation between alternative framings. When the quality of delibera-
tion is low, it is likely that positions will become or remain polarised, creating a
deadlock where no agreement is possible. A viable solution space opens up only
when “the ‘rules of the game’ permit or even force policy actor to take seriously
different types of stories. . . [allowing] what Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith (1993) call
‘policy-oriented learning’ [to] take place” (Verweij et al., 2006a, p. 18). Clumsy
solutions must emerge from the deliberative process; they cannot be formulated
ahead of time in their complete form.
A clumsy solution is but one form of a long-term viable institutional frame-
work. Perri 6 (2007) distinguishes three other ‘forms of settlement’ between
5The term has its origin in the work of Michael Shapiro (1987-1988), who talks about
clumsy institutions for the selection of judges in the US.
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Figure 3.2: Viable forms of settlement between solidarities (6, 2007)
each of the solidarities within the theory of sociocultural viability, shown in
Figure 3.2. His settlements are defined by two characteristics: whether they
strengthen each solidarity’s own identity and whether they strengthen the
shared identities between them. Clumsy solutions create an institutional frame-
work that both maintains each solidarity’s identity and creates a shared space
for each solidarity to interact. When there is a blurring of the differences both
within and between solidarities, a settlement that emphasises exchange and
mutual dependency will emerge. Where the solidarities are each very well ar-
ticulated but there is little work done to draw them together, they will remain
separate. Finally, where there is much emphasis on drawing the solidarities
together and little drive to create cohesion within a single solidarity, we will
find a settlement of compromise and a hybrid institutional structure.
I use the concept of a clumsy solution, and 6’s work on settlements more
generally, to analyse how the two framings of the problem of dual-use technol-
ogy that have long dominated the debate might be able to incorporate a new
framing that has been taken up by academics affected by export controls on
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intangible dual-use technology.
Now that I have outlined my analytic framework, I turn to a discussion on
the methods I employed to gather my data and conduct my analysis.
3.2 Methodology
The purpose of this methodology section is to document the rationale behind
my research design and data analysis (Silverman, 2005). The initial design and
topic selection was a very extended effort, taking over a year and a half, and
found me enmeshed in four very different research communities: as a DPhil
student within the James Martin Institute for Science and Civilization at the
Sa¨ıd Business School; as a visiting scholar with the Harvard Sussex Programme
within SPRU at the University of Sussex; as a Young Summer Scholar at the
International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) outside Vienna;
and as a visiting researcher at Georgetown University’s Center for Peace and
Security Studies, part of the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service.
Initial candidate topics for my thesis were extremely varied, ranging from
an analysis of the collapse of North Sea fisheries to terrorist threats to nuclear
waste disposal sites to different understandings of biological dual-use technol-
ogy. I first came onto the topic of dual-use technology through several research
projects (Rappert & McLeish, 2007) connected with Britain’s ESRC Science in
Society programme, which was directed by my supervisor, Steve Rayner. Many
of these projects were connected with the Harvard Sussex Programme at SPRU
within the University of Sussex, and I made several visits there, including a
week-long stay, to troll through their extensive archives on (mainly biological
and chemical) dual-use technology reports and news items.
The concept of dual-use technology had immediate interest to me as it
touched on my background in physics and my desire to analyse how security is
a relative construction. My initial literature searches were heavily focused on
security studies and policy analysis. Within security studies, I focused on work
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that tried to displace the nation-state as the dominant unit of analysis and
traditional military concerns as the dominant topic (so-called “critical security
studies”) (Barnett, 2001; Booth, 2005; Krause & Williams, 1997; Wyn Jones,
1999). This work widened the concept of security to cover, for instance, the
environment, economy, energy, and food. I found it difficult then to connect
this work to my interest in dual-use technology. In the end, as can be seen
from my literature review, this body of knowledge has had little direct impact
on my eventual research design. This is neither to say that one could not nor
should not conduct an analysis of the Wassenaar Arrangement from within a
critical security studies paradigm. One could, for instance, use these theories
to draw out further the tensions between economic, political, and humanitarian
concepts of security and how they shape the institutions of multilateral export
control arrangements. The theories are not an acceptable tool, however, to
draw out how technological and social relations are co-constructed.
During my summer (2005) at IIASA, I shifted my focus to different ap-
proaches to policy analysis. This shift was spurred on by my interest in the
then-emerging concept of ‘clumsiness’, of which my supervisor has been a pri-
mary architect. My intention in conducting this literature review was primarily
theoretical. I wanted to situate work on clumsiness within a broader literature
than just the theory of sociocultural viability, not realising that Steven Ney
(2006) was doing the exact same thing but with a few years’ head start.
As I continued to search for a defined topic, my motivations were:
• a desire to study an international security issue involving multiple under-
standings of the role of technology and what technology is important to
control.
• to work on something about which I already had some empirical knowl-
edge (ruling out chemical or biological dual-use technology)
• a desire not to focus on nuclear technology, as it has a mainly linear path
of development from non-military to military use.
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These motivations led me, through extensive web-searching, onto the Wasse-
naar Arrangement website.6 It was not until a month after I left IIASA that I
discovered the Wassenaar Arrangement Secretariat was in the heart of Vienna,
a short bus ride from the Institute.
Document access & developing research relationships
Having decided on the Arrangement as my site of analysis, I then had to figure
out how to develop my research relationship with the people connected to
the Arrangement, and get access to document sources. The Arrangement’s
website provided the initial document access, with the current lists of controlled
technology and documents on its founding and major political agreements so far
reached. These documents, however, contained little information on the way
that decisions were reached, such as dissenting opinions, concessions made,
and alternative framings. The latest major change was in January 2006, when
the entire site was redone, moving from a purely basic HTML environment
to XHTML and CSS.7 Since then documents of a variety of types have been
appearing on its pages, such as their own analysis of the Arrangement (Auer,
2005).
Textual analysis is central to this thesis. My argument rests on under-
standing the variety of factors that shaped the documents that the Wassenaar
Arrangement produces, and in particular its List of Dual-Use Goods and Tech-
nologies. There is a wide range of documents that provide background informa-
tion, such as research articles, press articles, public government reports, and the
publicly available documents on the Arrangement’s website. There are other
documents that have been extremely helpful in this research which are not
publicly available. These documents include the proposals that Participating
States have made to modify Wassenaar documents and the Guidelines for the
6http://www.wassenaar.org
7This change can be seen by viewing the website through the Internet Archive’s Way-
BackMachine: http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.wassenaar.org
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Drafting of Lists. Of these I have been allowed to make both versions of the lat-
ter fully public and they can be found in Appendix G. The proposal documents
are often sensitive in nature, particularly if they concern ongoing negotiations.
Regarding the reasons for this sensitivity, one government official8 remarked:
In fact they are, obviously, confidential to the Arrangement. That’s
very much the idea. If you were to make these broadly available,
first thing is information would dry up. States are not going to vol-
unteer information that might be based on intelligence, if it’s going
to become publicly available. It’s very much one of the under-
standings within the Arrangement; you respect the confidentiality.
That’s where you get the general benefit from. We very much try
to encourage that general level of information exchange where we
can.
This confidentiality is explicitly enforced through Article IX of the Initial El-
ements, the founding document of the Wassenaar Arrangement. As a result
of this clause, I have agreed to anonymise all of my sources connected with
the Arrangement. I have also agreed, when analysing the internal discussions
of the Arrangement, only to identify states if I have received the information
directly from that state.9
My access to documents connected to the Arrangement was generally heav-
ily monitored, such as being only able to look at them for a few seconds while
in the office of a government official. These short data collection instances
were nevertheless very helpful in elucidating the structure of the proposals and
providing some of the more nuanced parts of the debates I analysed. I was also
allowed to publish an example proposal, which can be found on page 196. I
view these texts as being “produced on the basis of certain ideas, theories or
commonly accepted, taken-for-granted principles” (MacDonald, 2001, p. 196).
8Interview with British Government Officials A & B, 9 February 2006. For a full reference
of all interviews conducted, see Appendix E. In agreement with my governmental intervie-
wees, I maintain a variegated system of attribution. I never list their names, only country
and unit within that country. On sensitive topics, I may further anonymise them. These are
the stipulations under which I was given access to the data.
9For example, if I heard that The Netherlands took a certain position in a debate, unless
I was able to verify that information from a Dutch member of the Wassenaar delegation, I
will refer to the state as, e.g., ‘Country A’.
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Many of the press articles about the Arrangement contain misleading or inac-
curate information, which drew out early on the need to triangulate (Denzin,
1970) as many of my primary data sources as possible.
Since access to primary documents was limited, I relied heavily on interview
data with people who either had been in the negotiations I was analysing, or at
least had access to the primary documents and could relay information based
on the questions I asked. To find out who these people were, meet them, and
define and acquire the information I needed to conduct my research involved
significant effort, sometimes over the course of a few years. Their names and
contact details are seldom listed in any publicly available directories, and even
when I did have the details, I worked under the assumption that cold-calling
should be used as a last resort (Useem, 1995).
Through a fortuitous exchange programme between the James Martin In-
stitute10 and Georgetown University, I was able to spend five months over the
course of a year (June 2006–June 2007) as a Visiting Researcher at George-
town’s Center for Peace and Security Studies. While there I took courses
on International Security and in particular became familiar with the work of
Alexander Wendt (1999) on the social construction of international relations.
Being within walking distance of many US government departments, as well
as being a US citizen, aided my access to the US government, although initial
attempts to connect with government officials through NGOs and think tanks
proved wholly unfruitful. I ended up cold-calling the Department of State and
was lucky to receive a warm reception.
The most important initial meeting I had, however, was completely by
chance. Over the Christmas holiday in 2005–2006, I spent a few days in Wash-
ington, DC and called the University of Georgia’s Center for International
Trade and Security (CITS) Washington office. I discovered that the former
head of one of the Wassenaar Participating States delegations had just arrived
as a Research Associate. I set up a meeting and it quickly became apparent
10Now the Institute for Science, Innovation, and Society.
106 Analytic Framework & Methodology
that this person could serve as a gatekeeper for my access to the Arrangement,
as someone through whom I could discover other people to talk to, and who
could vouch for my legitimacy to those other people (Morrill et al., 1999). It is
also important to note that it was through my gatekeeper that I began really to
understand the internal social structure of the Wassenaar Arrangement, which
greatly aided me when deciding how to pitch my research to other members,
and what areas of questioning would be best suited to each member.
Rather than speaking of ‘gaining access’ (Bogdan & Biklen, 1982) or ‘ne-
gotiating entry’ (Marshall & Rossman, 2006) to the Wassenaar Arrangement,
I prefer to think of my qualitative data collection as establishing a continually
evolving ‘research relationship’ with those I study (Maxwell, 2005). This re-
flexive stance emphasises the contingent nature of the data I collected, while
also bringing out my role as a participant in their world of policy making. On
more than one occasion, the line of questioning I pursued led to the interviewee
mentioning that I provided an insight she would employ in her future work.11
Speaking of a research relationship also brings out the more intimate nature
of many of the connections I have developed with those I study. I often call
members of various delegations to get a quick answer to a single question—a
meeting too short to call an interview. I also have gone out for pints and dinner
with several of the delegations, and at least one person jokingly considers me
to be in a therapist’s role.
Considering those I study to be collaborators in my research is a particu-
larly useful approach when conducting elite interviews (Hertz & Imber, 1995;
Richards, 1996). “One of the more important functions of an elite interview,”
Richards notes, “is to try to assist the political scientist in understanding the
theoretical position/s of the interviewee; his/her perceptions, beliefs and ideolo-
11These insights varied from the mundane, such as adding titles to the sections of the Dual-
Use List table of contents (provided during a interview with a member of the 2007 assessment
year task force on standardising the Dual-Use List), to the abstract, such as providing an
easy template for uncovering the different assumptions that underpin different framings in
the Wassenaar debates (provided to several delegations already, mainly over dinner or pints).
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gies. Such information can rarely be gleaned from examining books, documents
or records” (p. 199–200). Elite interviewing usually places the one being inter-
viewed in a position of power, as they know they have information that I want.
In the early stages, this presented an obstacle because of the security concerns
that Participating States had about my asking in-depth questions about ne-
gotiations within and between states. These concerns were obvious from my
initial interviews with many countries, where one of the first questions asked
was “who is funding you?” The fact that I was self-funded and had no ties to
a particular government (other than being an American citizen), or to a think
tank trying to push a certain view of export controls, alleviated much of this
concern. The rest of it was alleviated by the particular approach I was taking
to my data collection and analysis.
With a generally ethnographic design, I have assumed there are good rea-
sons why the Wassenaar Arrangement works (or does not work) as it does, but
these reasons were originally foreign to me. The goal of my research has not
been to judge what constitutes ‘right’ designs or procedures for the Arrange-
ment, nor to determine or uncover the ‘real’ definitions of dual-use technology.
It has been, rather, to understand why the Arrangement is designed and op-
erates the way it does, and how different conceptions of dual-use technology
debate against each other and are codified in the Dual-Use List. This research
design has had the double benefit of relieving security concerns and piquing
the interest of most of the people with whom I have developed relationships.
How research relationships defined boundaries of analysis
I emphasise the last point because of its significance in my gaining such in-
depth access to the Wassenaar Arrangement. My research differs from nearly
all previous work on multilateral export control arrangements by focusing not
on the few high-profile political moments in the life of the organisation I am
studying, but rather on the mundane day-to-day practices of that organisation.
I was not nearly as interested in the 2-day Plenary meetings as I was in the 11
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months of work that went into developing the agenda for those meetings. Most
of that work occurs within the Expert Group of the Arrangement, but most
of the (small body of) research on Wassenaar focuses on the General Working
Group, which is seen as the more political of the two bodies. The heads of
delegations, who take an active role in the Plenary, do not usually take part in
the Expert Group meetings leading up to it. My research was aimed primarily
at the members of the Expert Group, who on the whole had more knowledge of
the day-to-day operations of the Arrangement and were happy to speak with
me, as they believed the Dual-Use List was where most of the action of the
Arrangement took place and were happy to see someone actually studying it.
Interviewee 1: What you are doing is extremely interesting to us.
We will be extremely interested see what your research shows[. . . ]
In my view, the dual-use control list is the single most important
thing that Wassenaar does. There are a lot of other things that
are important, but it’s really the foundation for everything else.
Without that everything else is nice but-
Interviewee 2: It’s the reason for the Arrangement. If you don’t
have a viable list, all the political statements are worthless.12
While my topic and my gatekeeper opened many doors for data collection,
I did not have full access to the Arrangement. I was not allowed to attend any
of the meetings at the Secretariat in Vienna, though I was able to be in Vienna
during several of the Expert Group meetings and met with various delegations
out of working hours. It was during these Vienna trips that I was able to develop
relationships with the Russian, German, Canadian, and Japanese delegations,
as well as meet more of the American, Swedish, and British delegations. Many
of these were more informal sessions—I cannot really call them ‘interviews’—
and provided valuable ethnographic data about relations between and within
delegations.
I was able to meet most of the Wassenaar Secretariat as well, and while
heavily constrained regarding what they could say about actual negotiations,
12Interview with US State Department Officials A & B, 11 September 2006.
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they were able to provide valuable knowledge on the history of the organisation
and the logistics of running it.
All of these factors helped draw boundaries around my analysis. Without
full access to the meetings, I likely lost some of the richness of the debates and
the dynamics between individuals. This was a necessary constraint, however,
as access—and any publication as a result of that access—would have to have
been approved by all forty Participating States; a task not well suited to the
time constraints of a doctoral thesis.
However, through continually developing research relationships with several
individuals, I have been able gradually to gain more knowledge of the history
and intricacies of the Arrangement. Part of this is because of the development
of trust between me and those I studied, but it is also due to the mutually
reiterative process of defining what it is that the other person wants to know.
I am conscious, for example, that my research will likely be used to give
weight to arguments that export controls are in need of reform because of some
inadequacy. While I am not opposed to such use of my material, I believe
that the same material can be used to show how the current system is also
adequate. It depends on the form of social organisation the actor using my
material wishes to institutionalise further. Expressing this adequately to those
I study has been vital to their continued support of my research.
Reflexivity
Being reflexive in STS research can be crippling when it comes to writing. One
is stuck trying to describe a technology while at the same time trying to impress
upon the reader that the technology is fluid and constructed. It is easy either to
turn to vacuous phrases, relying on the reader to perform all of the construction
herself, or at the opposite end to dive into a technical/social description of the
technology, hedging each sentence with an ‘it could be otherwise’ clause. Both
of these outcomes, I feel, leave the reader frustrated.
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The importance of being reflexive in social science research, however, should
not be understated (Gouldner, 1970; Pels, 2000). My ability to conduct this
research was directly related to my skills in communication, genuine interest in
listening to those I studied, and not judging their answers until I had learned
their own framework of judgement. Similarly, my ability to be fluent in English,
but in no other language, both opened and closed opportunities for alternative
perspectives on the Arrangement.
When deciding how deep into the technological analysis I needed to go in my
research, I applied the idea of ‘pragmatic reflexivity’, similar to Dick Pels (2000)
notion of reflexivity ‘one step up’. This may seem a bit like a contradiction—
that one who is reflexive questions assumptions and tries not to make them—
but I contend that we all stop questioning at some point and the reason we
stop is that we have other concerns. Pausing reflexive analysis often comes
down to a lack of time, but our time may be constrained for myriad reasons.
My logistical constraints were monetary and due to university regulations, but
there were also methodological constraints. I cover a significant number of
disciplinary fields in this thesis, from electromagnetics in the focal plane array
case to international economics and politics to argumentation analysis, and of
course the loosely coupled field of Science & Technology Studies. The purpose
of being pragmatically reflexive is to state habitually what one believes to be
the relevant assumptions one is making in the course of developing an argument.
I have striven to do just that throughout this thesis.
It is impossible to find all of the answers to a question like “What is a dual-
use technology?” because there are infinite contextual angles from which one
can approach it. Rather, in this thesis I attempt to show some of the richness
of those myriad angles by being reflexive enough about them to remind the
reader that this is only one way that a person can address this question.
The original conundrum of technology for war or
peace is articulated in the Old Testament—swords
into ploughshares. But the fact is that it didn’t rise
with bronze or iron metallurgy. If you can lap flint, is
it for a mastodon, or that tribe over there? The short
answer is, it depends. ‘Today it’s for the mastodon,
but if that sonofabitch tries to come over here and
get any of my mastodon, it’s for him.’
—Interview with US State Department Official A,
January 19, 2007
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The problem of dual-use technology has existed since tools began to be
used. This chapter serves two purposes. The first is to provide a brief history
of dual-use technology, drawing out the different framings that people have
employed to define and address the problem. This allows me to address both
the question of how different actors understand ‘dual-use technology’ and how
different framings have interacted throughout history, i.e. how wicked the
problem has been. The second is to provide a background on the current and
historical institutional structure for multilateral export control arrangements
for conventional technology, which is necessary for my detailed analysis of list
modifications in later chapters. This will be complemented in the next chapter
by an analysis of the development of the lists of dual-use technology.
A wicked problem, as we recall from the last chapter has multiple defi-
nitions, and each definition contains its own preferred solution; is persistent
and insoluble; contains contradictory certitudes; is often a symptom of another
(wicked) problem; tends to have redistributive implications for entrenched in-
terests; and has little room for trial and error. The theory of sociocultural
viability predicts that there are at least three framings of the problem of dual-
use technology. These ‘ideal types’ are often not apparent in their pure form,
but we can see certain communities of practice reinforcing their preference for
one of the framings by attempting to institutionalise one framing over another.
In the next section, I go through each of these ideal types—hierarchical, com-
petitive, and egalitarian—drawing out the interconnection between the pref-
erences each framing has for: defining the problem; what is at risk; the goal
to be sought; the transactional mode; the method of decision-making; and the
driving values. The hierarchical framing is currently the hegemonic framing of
export controls, and I explore the myth upon which this hegemonic framing is
based. The competitive framing uses two rhetorics, one for speaking outside
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the context of export controls, and one for speaking inside, where it must con-
form to the hegemonic framing of the problem. The egalitarian framing is still
nascent, and I elaborate on it further in Chapter 7, so here I only provide an
overview of the likely characteristics such a framing would have.
After outlining each of these framings, showing how the hierarchical fram-
ing has been hegemonic throughout the international development of export
controls, I provide an analysis of the institutional structure of CoCom and
the Wassenaar Arrangement. It may come as little surprise to most readers
that CoCom and Wassenaar are predominantly hierarchical, but what may be
more striking is how the institutional framework of the Wassenaar Arrangement
in particular is suited to accommodating multiple framings of the problem of
dual-use technology, and as such helps to define the problem as wicked.
I start with the Arrangement’s origins in the Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) after World War II, highlighting the
structure of the CoCom control lists. I then briefly discuss the interlude be-
tween the disbanding of CoCom in 1994 and the creation of Wassenaar in
1996—the time of the New Forum. As I show in Section 4.3, this resulted in
a restructured set of lists and the Initial Elements of the Arrangement. From
there I explore the various facets of the Arrangement in operation—its mem-
bership, Secretariat, and internal groups—seeing how the lists play into each
of them, and how the hierarchical framing is expressed throughout. Since the
Arrangement is concerned with not only developing the lists, but reporting on
transfers of controlled technology, I briefly outline this latter feature.
4.1 Framing the problem of dual-use technol-
ogy
The control of trade in militarily significant items has occurred for thousands
of years. Likewise, however, there have been international markets for these
items, for both their military and non-military uses. The need for export
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controls has always been balanced between the economic needs for exporting
items of military significance and the desire to prevent an enemy from acquiring
those same items. This balance leads to two different framings of the problem
of dual-use technology: as either a problem of control or a problem of the
marketability of technology.
Cupitt (2000, Ch. 2) provides a very engaging account of the early develop-
ment of export controls, beginning with Pericles of Athens’ restriction of trade
with the Megarians in 432 BC. The Megarian Decree, as this action came to be
known, prevented all exports from Athens to Megara, and is significant because
it represents the first such control enforced in peace-time. Cupitt points out
that there was a “dearth of multilateral controls” on trade before the 18th Cen-
tury because most controls were in place to maintain domestic supplies of war
materials rather than to prevent foreign supplies or to project foreign policy
(p. 34).1
In the English-speaking world, the first example of the institutionalisation
of export controls was during the reign of King Charles II of Britain, who
was granted power under the Tonnage and Poundage Act of 1660 to restrict
the transfer of gunpowder, arms, and ammunition outside of the kingdom.2
Later additions to the British controls included ‘naval stores’—the substances
such as tar and pitch that were not munitions themselves, but were needed
to maintained the wooden sailing ships that formed the might of the British
military (Atwater, 1939). The British Exportation of Arms Act of 1900 and
its extensions at the outbreak of World War I were also clearly in this line
of protecting domestic supply, extending the control of exports to cover all
technology and food if the monarch so wished.3
1The latter two, the argument goes, generally require participation from multiple countries
unless a monopoly on the controlled item is held by the exporting country.
2See 12 Charles II, cap. 4 (Great Britain, 3 Stat. at L, p.4). There were apparently
earlier examples of the practice of export control: Cupitt (2000, p. 34) traces it back to
Queen Elizabeth I in 1574, but I was unable to verify that account.
3Customs (Exportation Prohibition) Act of Aug. 28, 1914. 4 and 5 Geo. V, ch. 64 (52
Law Reports, Statutes, p. 378); and the Customs (Exportation Restriction) Act of Nov. 27,
1914, 5 and 6 George V, ch. 2 (53 Law Reports, Statutes, p. 9).
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Even in these early stages of development, however, there was also recog-
nition that the need to control trade had to be balanced with the need for
markets in the things to be controlled. Moravcsik (1991) provides a very en-
gaging account of the early stages of this relationship, and the early dominance
of economic concerns over military concerns. “Military planners,” he argues,
recognised that a nation cannot be self-sufficient in obtaining military technol-
ogy, and they “have often supported freer trade in arms, in the hope thereby
of securing greater quantities of superior weaponry either through their own
increased production or by purchase abroad” (p. 23). For instance, saltpetre,
a crucial component of gunpowder, was a very scarce resource in the 14th &
15th Centuries and widely traded (Braudel, 2002/1981, p. 387). Tall straight
pine and fir trees, the trunks of which formed the masts for most European
navies, had by the 17th Century all but disappeared from these countries’ forests
(Bamford, 1956, p. 206–208). The British were able to exploit their American
colonies, but the French and Spanish often had to rely on obtaining their masts
from countries around the Baltic Sea, acquiring them at significantly increased
prices (thus forming a lucrative trade for the exporting countries).
Another example of the problem of dual-use technology is the development
of the British cannon industry in the 17th Century (Cipolla, 1965; Clark, 1958;
Hale, 1985). British cannon were at the time considered the best in Europe,
and there was therefore a large market for them abroad. Charles II, as we noted
above, tried to curtail the export of this technology through the Tonnage and
Poundage Act, but there was a catch. In order to maintain the knowledge and
capacity to create these advanced cannon, the companies making them needed
to sell them, but the English market only provided enough work for a few weeks
of production. While the export of cannon was legally controlled, if requests for
licenses were not expedient enough or were not approved, the law was largely
ignored.
Using the theory of sociocultural viability, we can use the examples above
to outline two framings of the problem of dual-use technology. One of the
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propositions of this theory is that the discourse on dual-use technology actually
reflects a much deeper debate among different world-views and value systems.
Each framing has a preferred definition of the problem of dual-use technology,
and this definition is related to much more fundamental preferences of that
framing on institutional structure, mode of transaction, conception of risk, and
driving values.
Hierarchical framing: a problem of control
The framing that has dominated the problem of dual-use technology for the
last hundred years sees it as a problem of control. This framing sees the am-
biguity of a technology’s militarily significance as something to be resolved. It
can be resolved by systematically developing a classification of technology as
either military, dual-use, or neither, and then employing a set of routines and
procedures (a bureaucracy) to ensure that technology which should be con-
trolled, is controlled. This is exactly what was done with the development of
the classification of ‘contraband’, which we will look at in the next chapter.
Contraband, it was thought, was something that could be measured, and an
enforceable line was drawn defining it apart from other things.
The best way for any framing to gain power is for its preferences to be
institutionalised. The preferred institutional style for the hierarchical framing,
unsurprisingly, is hierarchical. The focus is on nested, bounded groups of in-
dividuals each performing their own specialised task under the direction of a
common policy. Such an institutional form thrives on the creation of routines
and procedures, of rules for when and how everything within the institution
gets done. As long as these rules are adhered to, the status quo will be kept,
and the appropriate technology will be controlled.
Export controls by their very name are about controlling the international
flow of technology. The hierarchical framing has, at least since WWII, estab-
lished itself as holding the ‘hegemonic myth’ of the problem of dual-use tech-
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nology.4 Hegemonic myths, the reader will recall from Section 2.4, “describe
fundamental propositions or assumptions that are unquestionable within the
context of a particular discourse” (Rayner, 1994, p. 15). This myth is based
on three assumptions about export controls:
1. That it is possible to control the flow of dual-use technology;
2. That it is possible to know from whom dual-use technology should be
kept;
3. And that it is possible to define what is and is not dual-use technology.
These assumptions underpin all attempts at developing export control systems,
from Charles II in 1660 through to the present-day work of the Wassenaar
Arrangement. Saying that the hierarchical myth is hegemonic does not mean
that this framing of the problem of dual-use technology has triumphed over all
the others (cf. Haas, 1990). Rather, any actor who wishes to become involved
in the discourse on dual-use technology must adopt the rhetorical style of the
hegemonic framing, if only then to undermine that framing by pointing out
how the myth does not relate to actual events.
It is important to disassociate the legitimacy of the myths from the legiti-
macy of the institutions that are formed around those myths. Showing how an
institutional structure of export controls is not adequate is not necessarily a di-
rect attack on the myth that control over dual-use technology is possible. The
Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval War, which established one of the
first multilateral lists of controlled goods in 1909, served a purpose: to enable
common policy on shipping goods in times of war. By the end of WWII that
purpose was complete, and it fell by the wayside and a different institutional
structure was put in place. The Declaration became a de facto embargo on the
Axis powers, and when the Axis ceased to exist, the Declaration fell into disuse.
4Recall that myths, within the social science literature, are not mystical tales. Rather,
they are stories that embody fundamental assumptions about everyday or scientific reality
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 283).
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This does not suggest that control of dual-use technology is not possible. The
institution was seen as no longer adequate, but the framing was still entirely
adequate, and was used as a basis for future institutional structures.
It is possible, however, for the legitimacy of the myth to be called into
question as well as the institutions. As an example, take the problem of defin-
ing dual-use technology from within a hierarchical framing. It is a matter of
deciding on a parameter that is controllable and then negotiating the value
of that parameter. ‘The best’ parameter for this framing is one that is both
important for an item’s military use and is controllable. It is no use, for in-
stance, controlling computers based on processor speed if someone can buy two
computers below the speed threshold and link them together to get a com-
bined speed above the threshold. If they cannot find a controllable parameter,
but the technology is still considered to be militarily significant, then it is the
myth—and therefore the framing itself—that is seen as no longer legitimate,
rather than just the institutions it has created. This poses a much more seri-
ous problem for actors that adhere to the hierarchical framing because of the
uncomfortable knowledge that it generates. I will address this point in detail
in the case studies in Chapter 6.
Framings are espoused by actors, be they individuals or organisations. The
two main ways that a framing becomes de-institutionalised are by 1) actors
institutionalising alternative framings and 2) events not playing out as the
myth of that framing would expect. These two points are often interconnected.
If an actor were, for instance, to start a business in another country producing
a technology similar to technology which is under control in order to capture
a new market, the competitive framing would be further institutionalised on
the international level. This could lead to the technology no longer being
controllable because it could be bought from outside the area of control. There
would therefore be a weakening of institutional structures that embody the
hierarchical framing.
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The controllability of a technology is not an objective fact, but determined
through a series of interactions (both between actors and between actors and
the technology) where the technology is enacted as being either controllable or
not. This is often the case, for instance, when comparing the export control
systems of different countries.5 The ability, for instance, of the United States to
monitor its borders and check all exports—thus controlling technology flow—is
often much more advanced than that of other countries.
Critiques of the hierarchical framing
There have been several critiques of the current institutionalisation of the hi-
erarchical framing, which I briefly outline here. Predominantly, they centre on
the first two assumptions of the myth of this framing: that it is possible to
know at whom controls are directed, and it is possible to control the transfer
of technology. Research that questions at whom controls should be directed
was prevalent at the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union dissolved,
but such critiques also existed prior to then, mostly in the legal literature (e.g.
Adler-Karlsson, 1968; Berman & Garson, 1967; Bertsch & McIntyre, 1983; Ru-
bin, 1967–1968). However, there was a significant study by the US Defense
Science Board in 1976, often called the ‘Bucy Report’, which called for the
drastic reduction of controlled items, placing an emphasis not on the export of
things, but on the export of knowledge (Defense Science Board Task Force on
Export of U.S. Technology, 1976). This distinction, which can be understood
as being between tangible and intangible technology, is one that has been a
perennial problem for export controls, as will be analysed in Chapter 7.
At the end of the Cold War, many researchers argued that CoCom’s purpose
had been served and it should be disbanded (e.g. Bailey, 1991; Raanan, 1991;
van Ham, 1990), though there were strong arguments for the continued need of
CoCom and other multilateral export control arrangements as well (e.g. Karp,
5On comparing export control systems, see the series of country reports from the Univer-
sity of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security: http://www.uga.edu/cits/
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1993). Those who are not members of these regimes have also made arguments
that such directed controls are unfair and hinder technological development
(Mallik, 2004). More in-depth analysis of the points raised by these researchers
will take place alongside analysis of the Wassenaar list modification process in
the following chapters.
Questioning the second assumption—how to (and whether an organisation
or state can) prevent states or people from getting technology—has received the
bulk of attention from the research community. There is work that argues for a
shift in focus from only controlling the export of technology to also controlling
the import of technology into states of concern (Yuan, 2002). Other work points
to the fact that technology has been disseminated so widely that controls are
futile, and rather than seeking to prevent the target of controls from getting all
technology, the goal should be to put in place as many impediments as possible
to a target getting the most advanced technology.
Much of the literature is on the prevention of proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems (e.g. Cupitt et al., 2001;
Hofhansel, 1993; Smith, 1987), though there is the occasional mention of con-
ventional weapons and dual-use technology. Gahlaut (2006) makes several ar-
guments in this regard: there are the problems with controlling trade internal
to multilateral companies; the development of new technology with military
potential is more often coming from civilian efforts rather than governmental
ones; existing capacity for military technology pressures companies to export
as defence budgets shrink; and proliferation is more likely now to occur on a
black market, even between states. These points are echoed in a major publica-
tion by the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security
(CITS), Roadmap to reform (Gahlaut et al., 2004). The report also points out
what its authors see as several problems with current attempts at international
coordination of export controls: that consensus voting rules present in multilat-
eral export control arrangements allow a single member to prevent agreement;
that implementation of controls is left to national discretion; and that there is
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an unnecessary degree of redundancy between the regimes (see also Beck, 2000;
Beck et al., 2002; Beck & Gahlaut, 2003; Cupitt, 2001).
Anderson & Sarup (2005) point to the need for Wassenaar to improve its
information exchange, harmonise licensing procedures of participating states,
engage in extraordinary review of the lists of technology, and promote closer
cooperation with industry.6 Latham & Bow (1998) and Roberts (1993) describe
the challenges in proliferation between North and South. Joyner (2004) and
Dursht (1997) argue for the development of a ‘World Trade Organisation’-style
multilateral export control arrangement, and Klaus (2004) argues for the need
to institute dual-use free trade agreements instead of export controls. Jaffer
(2002) argues for the need for denial consultations in Wassenaar to prevent
‘undercutting’, which is when one state makes a sale that other states have
denied (or would deny).
Analysing the third assumption of this myth, that it is possible to define
the technologies to be controlled, is one of the main purposes of this thesis, and
an area that has not received significant attention from the literature to date,
as I noted when looking at the critiques of the concept of dual-use technology
above in Section 2.2.
Competitive framing: a problem of marketability
Since the hierarchical framing of the problem of dual-use technology is cur-
rently hegemonic, the other framings must be defined in relation to it as well
as standing on their own. This is in line with the theory of sociocultural vi-
ability’s argument that each framing is defined in counter-distinction to the
others (Thompson et al., 1990). Slightly different rhetoric will be employed
in each case. The competitive framing defines the dual-use problem as one
of marketability of the technology, rather than one of controlling it. When
standing on its own, such as when a company has markets only within a single
country, dual-use technology is seen as either ‘spin-off’ or ‘spin-on’ technology.
6For another critique, see Ga¨rtner (2008).
122The Wassenaar Arrangement & the wicked problem of dual-use technology
As discussed in the Literature Review (p. 43 above), spin-off technology is tech-
nology that was developed primarily for military purposes, but has since found
a market in non-military purposes. Spin-on is the opposite, where technology
mainly developed for non-military applications finds military uses. In both of
these cases, the more advanced technology in one area can be used to create a
market niche in the other area if someone has the motivation, resources, and
networks to make the transition.
The preferred institutional structure for the competitive framing is network-
based. People and institutions strengthen and weaken links to others when and
where they need to in order to achieve their goals, rather than having a hierar-
chical (and much more rigid) structure for interaction. Routines and procedures
are often seen as things that stifle the creation of new ideas and ‘thinking out-
side the box’, so the preferred transactional mode is instead competitive. In
competitive transactions, the key to success is remaining innovative and tim-
ing the entrance to market well enough to create a niche. Always seeking to
expand, the actor that employs this framing will constantly be looking for how
new technologies can cross boundaries in the established classification system.
The largest risk perceived in this framing is the failure of a market, which would
mean the collapse of the environment within which competition is possible.
When addressing the problem of dual-use technology, the myth of the com-
petitive framing is that a market exists and that, if an actor meets or develops
a new need in the market for a technology, that technology will be taken up,
as long as it is priced appropriately and is perceived as ‘better than’ any com-
petitors. The parameters of the technology that are important depend on the
buyers of the technology, and are therefore revealed through market uptake of
one technology over another.
The rhetoric an actor would develop as it strengthens the competitive fram-
ing of the dual-use problem depends on what the hegemonic myth (if any) is
in a particular context. If the other actor is also employing a competitive
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framing, the discourse will likely be about such things as market shares, effi-
ciency, and the pace of change in the market. If, however, the hegemonic myth
is hierarchical—as it is in the context of international harmonisation of ex-
port controls—an actor wishing to strengthen a competitive framing must first
destabilise the hegemonic status of the hierarchical framing. The rhetoric of
the competitive framing must employ the terminology of the assumptions of the
hierarchical myth rather than its own. Thus, instead of talking about market
shares, the discussion must centre on whether the technology is controllable.
When controls hinder the marketability of a technology (or are at least
perceived to), there are several avenues of recourse for the competitive fram-
ing. One can argue 1) that similar technologies are available from beyond the
purview of current controls, or 2) that the technology is not really in need of
control (e.g. it is not ‘really’ militarily significant), or 3) that it is not possible
to control the technology (too easily disseminated or unable to find a control-
lable parameter). We will explore these in more depth in Chapter 6 when
discussing anomaly-handling strategies.
Dual-use technology as a simple wicked problem
While the myth of control may currently be the hegemonic one for the problem
of dual-use, there has always been a battle between the hierarchical and com-
petitive framings. A prime example of how the competitive and hierarchical
framings are interconnected is the British cannon industry in the 17th century,
described above. The hierarchical framing had not yet developed an institu-
tional structure to enforce its routines and procedures of control, and therefore
could not control, even though control was important. Such an institutional
structure began to be established with things like governmental awards for
scientific and technological innovations and the rise of the professional army
over mercenaries, both of which allowed more governmental control over which
technologies were developed and who had access to them. The hierarchical
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framing was also further institutionalised by the development of international
agreements on controlling technology and lists of what technology to control.
That these two framings have been in contention with each other for several
centuries suggests that the problem of dual-use technology is at least a simple
wicked problem. There is much else to support this claim. The problem is
certainly persistent. Each of the framings of the problem has its own preferred
solution: the hierarchical framing seeks to establish institutions of control,
whereas the competitive framing seeks to create market share. The myths upon
which each framing is based often spawn contradictory certitudes about what to
do about the problem, i.e. the hierarchical framing may argue for more control
while the competitive argues for less, though both are completely rational.
The problem of dual-use technology is intimately tied to problems of access
to resources—both natural and in terms of knowledge—and the establishment
of a vibrant economy, both of which could be considered wicked problems in
their own right. Trying to change the structure of the institutions designed by
one framing often means that framing will lose power within the discourse. As
international efforts to strengthen export controls have advanced, the ability
of companies to export as they please to whom they please has been curtailed,
sometimes dramatically affecting that company’s viability. These points give
weight to the argument that the problem of dual-use technology is a simple
wicked problem.
I argue that this continual contention between the hierarchical and com-
petitive framings is something to be fostered. When the competitive framing
becomes over-institutionalised, as was the case with the Krupp family being
the primary supplier of weapons technology to many European countries on all
sides of wars from the Thirty Year’s War in the 17th Century through World
War II (Manchester, 1968), access to that technology becomes cheap (due to
market forces) and it spreads accordingly. While this may level the playing
field—or rather, the warring field—it also may make it more likely for hostil-
ities to escalate once they begin. If there is too much institutionalisation of
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the hierarchical framing, markets are likely to suffer from an inability to com-
pete internationally. But are these the only two framings taking part in the
discourse?
Egalitarian framing: a problem of open access
While much of the history of dual-use technology falls into a debate between
hierarchical and competitive framings of the problem, there is another framing
that has recently been strengthening. This framing sees the problem of dual-use
technology as a problem of too narrow a focus. Of course any technology may
have military uses, but the military applications should not be given precedence
over all of the other applications such technology may have.
A computer, for instance, could be used in missile guidance systems, or
for sequencing the genome, or for creating a stable banking system that could
compete in—or at least interact with—the global market, to name but a few
uses. Privileging the military applications is tantamount to saying that killing
people with guns is not acceptable, but killing them by, for example, preventing
access to vaccination technology is fine. The knowledge upon which military
technology is based is the same knowledge that is employed in many non-
military areas, and aggregating all of these different areas under one label
(‘non-military’, or ‘civilian’) is an injustice. If the problem is that there is
too narrow a focus, then the solution is to broaden that focus by integrating
export controls with work on, for example, international development and other
transnational problems like climate change, human migration, epidemics, and
resource management.
The myth that this framing develops is the myth of equality, and in par-
ticular that military policies should be seen on an equal footing with all of
the other policies that drive a society. One of the primary ways that such
broadening can occur is through basic scientific research, which develops the
underlying knowledge for future technology development in all areas, as long
as such research is available to all.
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When an actor wishes to strengthen this framing from within a context
where the hierarchal framing is hegemonic, the rhetoric will be concerned with
showing all of the perspectives on a technology that a focus on control leaves
out. In my research, I have found this framing emerging along two very dif-
ferent lines. One, developed for instance in the work of Mallik (2004), argues
that multilateral export control arrangements are hindering development of
countries who are not members of those arrangements. The other, taken up
by academics performing basic scientific research that may, sometime in the
future, have some military application, argues that the current export control
system and proposed future developments, are likely to overly stifle the collab-
orative and international nature of academic research. I explore this framing
in Chapter 7 in the work of the US Deemed Export Advisory Committee and
its successor, the Emerging Technology Research Advisory Committee.
The preferred mode of transaction within the egalitarian framing is one of
cooperation, where information is freely shared, be it between policy areas or
between academics in countries around the world. The most common risk for
this framing is that we may lose the small window of opportunity we have to
make a difference in other areas of society because we are too focused on the
military/non-military classification system for technology.
While this framing has yet to be institutionalised significantly within export
controls, we can look at another very similar area where it is making headway,
namely international efforts at regulating intellectual property. I will draw
out this connection in Chapter 7 when looking at the Trade-Related aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS) agreement within the World Trade Organization
and how it relates to current developments within Wassenaar Participating
States on controlling intangible technology.
Should this framing be further institutionalised within the dual-use dis-
course, it is likely that what has for centuries been a simple wicked problem
may become a complex wicked problem. Such a shift would bring out the
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fundamental assumptions that have supported the hierarchical-competitive di-
chotomy, one of which is that all technologies can be considered to be excludable
goods. By bringing this assumption into question, it is possible that the entire
apparatus of export controls may need to be rethought—a point that I also
touch on briefly at the end of my analysis.
Equipped with three possible framings of the problem of dual-use technol-
ogy, we are now ready to go into some detail on the development of the Wasse-
naar Arrangement. We saw from the discussion above that early attempts at
export controls had to contend with a hegemonic framing that was competitive
instead of hierarchical. In the next section, I point out how the development
of CoCom in 1950 saw a significant shift in the balance of the framings, with
the hierarchical framing becoming hegemonic.
4.2 The Origins of Wassenaar
This section provides a history of multilateral export control development, a
very brief history of Wassenaar’s predecessor CoCom, and of the Arrangement’s
founding period. This period is covered extensively by Mastanduno (1992),
Noehrenberg (1995), and Lipson (1999). In describing the period below, I
therefore focus on identifying the centrality of the lists in the structure and
processes of CoCom and Wassenaar. In doing so, I draw out the many ways
that the hierarchical framing of the problem of dual-use technology has become
institutionalised, thereby establishing its myth as the current hegemonic myth.
At the beginning of the 20th Century, multilateral efforts to harmonise the
types of technology that were allowed to be controlled in international trade
resulted in the 1909 Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval War, which I will
analyse in the next chapter. With this development and the subsequent events
of World War I, countries began to shift their understanding of the purpose of
export controls. In addition to ensuring domestic supply of the things that a
country would need to wage war, the controls started to be used more for other
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purposes, namely foreign policy and preventing foreign supply. We can see this
change in the British position as witnessed by Atwater (1939, p. 299):
[The export licensing system] had been used during the war with
respect to virtually all goods as a means of providing flexibility in
the administration of the general export prohibitions, preventing
strategic goods from reaching the enemy, and in some instances
influencing neutral governments to adopt policies favorable to Great
Britain and her Allies.
The United States underwent a similar transition. Early (failed) attempts
at export controls occurred in 1807 with the Embargo Act against Britain and
France. Institutionalised export control policy first began in 1917 with the
Trading with the Enemy Act.7 The US developed a licensing system between
the World Wars,8 and in the early post-war period export controls became
fully established as a function of government through the Export Control Act of
1949.9 This Act had three objectives: to reduce continuing national shortages
of critical materials; to aid the President in implementing foreign policy; and
to control items deemed critical to US national security.10
The international harmonisation of export controls further developed out of
World War II with the establishment of CoCom (the Coordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls) in 1950. CoCom focused on drawing together
like-minded states (‘the West’) to control the flow of technology to a common
adversary (‘the communist bloc’).11 We can see that the original purpose of
7Ch. 10, 6 Stat. 411 (1917), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. Sec 1-44 (1964).
8This was done through the Neutrality Act of 1935 : 49 stat. 1081 (1935); 22 U.S.C. 441
note
9Ch. 11, 63 Stat. 7, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. Sec 2021-32 (1964).
10For a thorough review of the development of US export control policy until the 1990s,
see Committee on Science Engineering and Public Policy (U.S.) (1991).
11While CoCom never published any documents of its own, it was generally agreed that it
was directed at Communist states, as highlighted by the following quote:
An examination of the lists of proscribed destinations by British, Dutch and US
authorities, however, indicated that the targets of COCOM controls in the mid-
1980s were Afghanistan, Albania, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Czechoslovakia, Cuba,
the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea, the
Peoples Republic of China, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Vietnam
(Cupitt & Grillot, 1997, p. 364).
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export controls—to ensure domestic supply—has now completely left the scope
of discussion. Instead, export controls were developed as a tool of foreign pol-
icy through their ability to prevent certain technologies from reaching certain
destinations.
The 1970s saw the formation of the Zangger Committee (ZC)12 and the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)13 to control the spread of nuclear technologies
and related dual-use items.14 Primarily in response to the use of chemicals in
the Iran-Iraq War, the Australia Group (AG)15 was formed in 1985. Its aim
is to prevent the flow of dual-use technologies that could be used for chemical
and biological weapons and weapons-programmes. Finally, in 1987 an informal
political arrangement called the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)16
was formed to control missile and unmanned air vehicle systems capable of de-
livering weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The ZC, NSG, AG, and MTCR
are still in operation today.17 CoCom was disbanded in 1994 (British Govern-
ment, 1993b) and replaced by the Wassenaar Arrangement in 1996.
Lists of items to control are the basis of any hierarchical framing, and are
central to all of these organisations except the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which
uses the lists developed by the Zangger Committee. The lists for the ZC, AG,
and to a lesser extent the MTCR remain relatively static. CoCom had phases
where the lists changed significantly, while in Wassenaar, there are usually
dozens of changes every year. This difference reflects the types of lists that each
maintains. The Zangger Committee maintains a ‘Trigger List’ of items that, if
exported, would require safeguards enforced by the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency (IAEA). There are a limited number of ways to develop nuclear
12website: http://www.zanggercommittee.org
13website: http://www.nuclearsuppliersgroup.org
14The Zangger Committee maintains the ‘Trigger List’ of ‘especially designed or prepared
equipment or material for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material’, as
noted by the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty, Article III.2(b). The NSG only maintains a set
of Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers and Guidelines for Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment,
Materials, Software and Related Technology.
15website: http://www.australiagroup.net
16website: http://www.mtcr.info
17For a comparative list of member states for each regime, see Appendix F.
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weapons, and thus there is little (or infrequent) need to redefine the stage of
technological development where controls are needed. The Australia Group
maintains six control lists: Chemical weapons precursors; Dual-use chemical
manufacturing facilities and equipment and related technology; Dual-use bio-
logical equipment and related technology; Biological agents; Plant pathogens;
and Animal pathogens. The AG’s concern in monitoring international trade to
prevent the ability to produce chemical or biological agents in sufficient quantity
for incorporation into weapons. Again, there is a limited number of methods of
production, and the possible agents of concern do not change very often. That
said, at least some of the lists have changed on an almost yearly basis since
2002, but because of their narrow focus, they remain small. The MTCR is
concerned specifically with delivery systems for WMD. These systems develop
on a more regular basis, and as a result there are more discussions around
the lists. Together, these regimes cover the bulk of the technologies needed to
develop weapons of mass destruction.
There is at least one significant difference that sets these regimes apart from
CoCom and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The impact on a country’s economy
of export controls of most WMD-related technology is marginal.18 Many of
these technologies, if exported at all, are done so in small quantities. Control-
ling knowledge about how to design, produce, and use these technologies has
wide acceptance from most if not all of those who are affected by the controls.
In contrast, the impact from conventional dual-use technology—that covered
by CoCom and Wassenaar—has a major effect on national economies, because
the text of the lists can be interpreted as covering significant proportions of
the number of items exported generally from a country. Due to this impact
(perceived or actual) on the economy, we can expect a competitive framing
to have some form of institutionalisation within CoCom and the Wassenaar
18Controlling biological dual-use technologies may have more of an impact on the economy,
especially as this area continues to develop. There are arguments now being presented that
labelling it in the same category as nuclear and chemical technologies is a misnomer (McLeish,
personal communication).
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Arrangement. An early indicator of the presence of a competitive framing is
that CoCom and Wassenaar are the only regimes that take significant numbers
of items off of their lists.
CoCom
At the end of World War II, there was initially no consensus on whether further
institutionalisation (or even maintaining the current level) of export controls
was necessary. Yasuhara (1991) provides a detailed account of this period.19
Within the Department of Commerce, for instance, when the war finished de-
control became the ‘fixed policy’ (US Congress, 1947, p. 1813). The US military,
however, saw things differently and sought “permanent legislation for export
controls both to meet a national emergency and to prevent the increase of the
warmaking potential of a foreign nation ‘inimical to US interests’20” (Yasuhara,
1991, p. 129). Yasuhara draws out in detail how the US moved between 1945
and 1950 from an institutional form that focused on controlling technology to
ensure domestic supply to one controlling a technology’s foreign availability.
Myriad events colluded to produce this shift. For instance:
When the news of the coup in Czechoslovakia [in 1948] arrived, de-
mand for tighter trade controls gained further impetus in the United
States. Among those actively advocating tighter controls were long-
shoremen, Catholics, and veterans (Yasuhara, 1991, p. 131).
The dilemma in starting CoCom was that the US wanted to export tech-
nology to Europe to help it rebuild under the Truman Plan after WWII, but
it needed to ensure that those exports, as well as other exports from Europe,
did not continue on to Communist countries (Yasuhara, 1991, p. 132).
Initially, CoCom had two lists: List I was composed of items to be embar-
goed unconditionally, and List II contained items for which members agreed
19See also Adler-Karlsson (1968).
20JCS 1561, Appendix ‘A’, Draft Memorandum for the Secretaries of War and the Navy,
18 January 1946, in JCS 1561/4, CCS 091.31 ( 9-28-45), sec. 1. RG 218, Records of the US
Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Archives, Washington, DC.
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they would restrict their exports to the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact to ‘rea-
sonable’ levels and exchange information on what was exported (Mastanduno,
1992, p. 80). They were still shifting between the understanding of export
controls as ensuring domestic supply and as preventing foreign supply. With
the 1954 list review, however, these lists were replaced by the following, which
remained similar in structure until 1991: the Munitions List, covering conven-
tional arms; the Atomic Energy List, covering technologies needed for both
nuclear energy and weapons production; and the Industrial List (IL), which
covered technologies that had military significance, but were not weapons them-
selves. The items on CoCom’s lists were subject to a blanket denial if they were
going to certain countries, and approvals for ‘exceptions to export’ from one
member country had to be approved by a consensus vote by all members.
CoCom had about seven founding members,21 though within a few years it
had grown to fifteen, and by the time it was disbanded in 1994, there were sev-
enteen members, representing the major non-Communist producers of technol-
ogy: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States.22 “The target countries of CoCom for most of the
organization’s existence were all of the former Warsaw Pact countries, as well
as Albania, Mongolia, Cambodia, North Korea, Vietnam, and the People’s
Republic of China” (Noehrenberg, 1995, p. 38).
21Exactly who were the founding members of CoCom is a matter of debate. The US
Office of Technology Assessment (1979, p. 158) states them as Belgium, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, and the United States, but a more detailed
analysis by Yasuhara (1991) shows that there were several other states that participated
in some of the meetings that established CoCom, and some of those listed were not at all
of the meetings. Since there was never an official document launching CoCom, there is no
established date for its beginning, and therefore no meeting that unambiguously states who
the founding members were. I place the founding in 1950 as that is when the lists were
agreed to.
22This was often described as “all NATO members minus Iceland, plus Japan and Aus-
tralia” (British Government, 1990; Price, 1987; US White House, 1991, p. 195).
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It was run out of the US Embassy in Paris23 and had three main purposes:
to establish and review the lists of technologies; to review and approve licenses
to export controlled items; and to co-ordinate national enforcement of export
controls (Mastanduno, 1992, p. 7). All of the activities at CoCom used as their
foundation the construction and maintenance of the lists. “Deciding which
technologies were on the lists was the major task of CoCom and was the one
which caused the most disagreements among members” (Noehrenberg, 1995,
p. 46).
Some of the drivers behind the development of the lists are noted by Noehren-
berg (1995, p. 46):
The members of CoCom, aside from the US, tried to keep the lists
shorter and more narrowed for ease of administration and enforce-
ment, as well as for increasing the opportunities for profitable trade.
The US, on the other hand, generally had less interest in trade with
the East and had more of a rivalry with the USSR than the Allies
had. Therefore, the US placed more emphasis on security consider-
ations than on benefits from trade compared to the Allies and was
the major force in CoCom for strengthening controls.
We can begin to see suggestions here of how different members preferred dif-
ferent framings during the list modification process. The focus on administra-
tion and enforcement, and the corresponding desired list style—narrowed and
focused—suggests that the non-US members of CoCom were arguing from a
hierarchical perspective. However, the goal of such a style of administration
was to allow more trade, which meant removing or preventing the addition of
all but the most important items to the lists.
That the US, and in particular the military, saw itself in a rivalry with
the Soviet Union seems a clear sign of the competitive framing, but it is im-
23According to Mastanduno (1990), this was in an annex to the Embassy at 58 Rue La
Boetie. The building was seen as being highly inadequate for the task at hand. The technical
meetings were held in a “cramped, L-shaped room” in the 2nd floor of the annex (Kempe &
Lachia, 1984), its budget was only a million dollars at the time of disbanding (Price, 1987),
and it lacked “secure communications, and, ironically, [ ] access to modern data processing
equipment. CoCom reportedly relied on a hand-cranked mimeograph machine until the [US
Department of Defense] donated a photocopier in 1983” (Mastanduno (1992, p. 275) citing
Perle (1984)). See also Kempe & Lachia (1984).
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portant to point out that this rivalry was not around the problem of dual-use
technology, but around another wicked problem, which might be described as
the problem of international anarchy (Wendt, 1992). This separate, but very
interconnected, problem is about the nature of the international system and
how states should act within it, and has been a major focal point for much of
the research in international relations. While the US military may develop a
competitive framing when viewing their work as addressing this problem, when
they view their work as instead addressing the problem of dual-use technology,
the issue at hand is not a competition among rivals. It is a matter of control.
This is a delicate, but important, point for my argument.
We could think of the international development of export controls as a
result of the clash of two competitive framings of two different problems: econ-
omy and international anarchy. Just as the competitive framing of economy is
concerned with market failure, the competitive framing of anarchy is concerned
with the failure of the state. While employing the same rhetorical style, these
framings would reach polar opposite stances on whether technology should be
traded. When addressing the economy problem, the wider technology is dis-
tributed, the better. When addressing the anarchy problem, the less access to
technology the enemy has, the better. In order to have any dialogue among
these problems, a new—wicked—problem was formed: the problem of dual-use
technology.
By institutionalising the hierarchical framing of a new problem, the com-
petitive framings of the economy and the anarchy problems now had a common
topic of interaction. Each of them needed to adopt the rhetoric of the hierar-
chical framing to push its own views, be it either that the controls were too
weak (anarchy) or that they were too strong (economy). It was the job of the
newly created hierarchical framing to decide what constituted an adequate level
of control. Put another way, CoCom and Wassenaar are seen from the hierar-
chical framing as being about neither the problem of anarchy nor the problem
of economy, but about the problem of determining a balance between the two.
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A ‘good day at the CoCom office’ for an actor strengthening the hierarchical
framing was not a day where more or less technology was controlled, but a day
where agreement—whatever it may be—was reached.
CoCom had four types of meetings: licensing meetings, Executive Com-
mittee meetings, working groups, and High Level Meetings. All of these were
concerned in some way with the lists, and most often with the Industrial List
(the predecessor to the Wassenaar Dual-Use List). The licensing meetings were
attended by licensing experts from various delegations—usually from their Paris
embassies—and were held once a week.24 They focused on licensing issues, and
the perception that they were unable to process exceptions applications fast
enough was a factor in the ‘Core List’ revision in 1990–1991.25
The Executive Committee was made up of policy level officials and met
twice yearly “to consider broad policy issues and to establish or review the
progress of CoCom’s ad hoc working groups” (Mastanduno, 1990, p. 76). This
is sometimes referred to as the Consultative Group (Defense Science Board Task
Force on Export of U.S. Technology, 1976; Yasuhara, 1991). Working groups
contained mostly technical experts and considered issues such as “trade among
CoCom members, the streamlining of the control lists, and the harmonization
of national enforcement procedures” (Mastanduno, 1990, p. 76–77), and thus
either used or modified the lists.
The High Level Meetings (HLM) began in 1982, and were attended by sub-
cabinet level delegates. Their purpose was to “inject political vigor into and
develop political support for the multilateral control process” (Mastanduno,
1990, p. 77), and thus represent a clear strengthening of the hierarchical fram-
ing, with its emphasis on further institutionalising the idea that control was the
appropriate framing of the dual-use problem. The 1982 HLM, at least from the
US perspective, had three initiatives: the expansion of the lists, improvements
24On Tuesdays, at least in the late 1980s, according to Mastanduno (1990, p. 76).
25For example, the United States requested 1150 general exceptions in 1982, and 3790 in
1985 (table in Ross, 1986, p. 30, citing the US Department of Commerce).
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in enforcement, and the strengthening of CoCom’s institutional structure (Ma-
standuno, 1992, p. 268). The 1990 HLM had four initiatives, three of which
involved the lists directly: to override the list review process in place at the
time; to remove entire categories of technology from the lists; to replace the
Industrial List with a much more selective Core List; and to change from view-
ing Eastern Europe as a target of control to viewing it as a collaborator in
controlling (Mastanduno, 1992, p. 333–335). Much of this was a direct result
of the fall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.
As we can see, the lists played a central role in CoCom. An analysis of the
way these lists changed over CoCom’s life occupies the next chapter. Through
the creation of CoCom and its establishment of routines and procedures for ex-
port control, we can see how the problem of dual-use technology came mainly
to be seen as a problem of control. CoCom had created a space for the dis-
course on dual-use technology, and as such it also set the terms of the debate.
By focusing on the lists, it created a common discourse whereby framings of
other problems, such as the economy or international security, could inter-
act constructively. Each actor in the discourse had to adopt the rhetoric of
the hierarchical framing of the problem of dual-use technology, which it could
then use to further its own goals, be they more or less stringent controls, or a
further strengthening of the hierarchical framing itself. Thus, while the hier-
archical framing may be dominant, it exists in part through allowing space for
the other framings to engage in debate. By allowing space for other framings
of the problem to engage in the debate, we can argue that there was recogni-
tion in CoCom of the wickedness of the problem of dual-use technology. The
problem, however, was only wicked in a simple way, as the balance to be struck
was only between the competitive and hierarchical framings. We now continue
on to see how the hierarchical framing was further institutionalised during the
New Forum and the development of the Wassenaar Arrangement.
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New Forum
Between 1994 and the end of 1995, the members of CoCom—plus Austria,
Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland, and, by 12 September
1995, Russia, Hungary, Poland, and the Czech and Slovak Republics—set about
to rethink how to co-operate on international export controls. They held a
series of meetings, called the New Forum, that turned into “a bit of a ‘talk
about export controls and see the world’ sort of organisation, really.”26
The discussions in the New Forum were broken into different ‘working
groups’, each of which looked at the different aspects of what the members
wanted from an export control regime: Group 1 developed the goals, rules, and
procedures for the new arrangement; Group 2 developed the lists of technologies
to be controlled; and Group 3 was set up to deal with organisational matters
(Wassenaar Arrangement, 2008b). Each of these groups, then, was working on
the assumptions that control was still feasible and that it was possible to have a
list of technologies to be controlled—assumptions that underlie the hierarchical
framing of the problem of dual-use technology. The complexity of this process
was noted in one of my interviews:
It takes time to develop [those documents] because every word is
weighed. It’s tested. And then it’s translated. You have to remem-
ber that every word that is there has to work in the 33 countries.27
The modification of the lists in the New Forum was a long and difficult
process. As with the 1990–1991 ‘Core List’ revision (see Chapter 5), Working
Group 2 took everything off the lists. However, they seem to have kept the
reworked structure of the lists. In the process, they noted a number of areas
of technology that were deemed to be ‘sensitive’, including stealth, underwater
equipment, night vision, and encryption.28 This process of modification took
26Interview with British Government Officials A & B, 9 February 2007.
27Interview with Swedish Former Government Official, 6 January 2006.
28Interview with Swedish Government Official, 27 March 2007.
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much longer than expected, and time became a critical factor, as one official29
noted:
The New Forum was an extremely interesting but frustrating time.
We spent weeks and weeks in Paris going through each item, all with
our own agendas, and it came down to the last three days, which
was just before Christmas in 1995. The main players simultaneously
received telegrams from their capitals. We actually had one direct
from [the Prime Minister], telling us nothing but nothing was going
to get in the way of us reaching agreement by the end of the week.
So at that stage, bearing in mind that we had a lot of controls
on the table which were meaningless and out-dated, no reason for
being there, you name it, we had to give in. And as I say, about
three days before, we started doing the last round of every single
subject, and the US and Britain—basically the two protagonists at
the time—were just lifting our reserves, and accepting what was on
the table, because we had to have an agreement.
This can be seen as a key point in institutionalising the hierarchical fram-
ing’s myth of control as the hegemonic myth for the Wassenaar Arrangement.
Even though there was significant unresolved debate about the adequacy of the
lists, if agreement was not reached, there would be no lists at all. Even if the
lists were not perfect, at least the basic premise on which they were founded—
that it is possible to define the technology to be controlled—was still intact.
This strong relationship to a particular classification system represents a strong
collective identity (high-group). The belief that anomalies can be accommo-
dated through a process of adjustment of category definitions, or through the
creation of new categories and sub-categories, suggests a high-grid predilection.
Both are characteristics of a hierarchical framing.
The review process in the New Forum was certainly a learning experience
for those involved, and later on it led to the reformatting of the MTCR and
NSG lists as well, which were undertaken in part by the same people who
participated in the New Forum.30
29Interview with British Former Government Official, 8 March 2007. Emphasis original.
30Interview with German Government Official, 27 March 2007.
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Finally, in the little town of Wassenaar outside of the Hague in The Nether-
lands on 19 December 1995, agreement was reached to start the Wassenaar Ar-
rangement, and on 11–12 July 1996, after a postponed Plenary on 2–3 April,
agreement was reach on the ‘Initial Elements’, and Argentina, Bulgaria, the
Republic of Korea, Romania, and Ukraine had by this time been brought in as
founding members (Wassenaar Arrangement, 2008b).31 Why the name Wasse-
naar? As the member of one delegation32 said to me in an interview, “I think
everyone thought that New Forum was an awful name, and that Wassenaar
was far better, and no more cryptic.”
4.3 The Wassenaar Arrangement
The Wassenaar Arrangement is just that, an arrangement among Participating
States. While I may speak of it occasionally as an organisation or a regime,
it is technically a political forum for states to get together for one purpose or
another. States do not have to follow through on any of the decisions reached
at Wassenaar. Yet many of them do. More importantly, many of them spend
significant resources in trying to improve Wassenaar one way or another. Of
the people I interviewed who were or are directly involved in the proceedings of
the Arrangement, quite a few speak of it in language one would use to describe
a pet project, with hope and pride.
In reviewing the basic structure of the Wassenaar Arrangement, I will once
again be highlighting the centrality of the lists to the functioning of the Ar-
rangement. The Arrangement has two main lists—the Dual-Use List and Mu-
nitions List—and two subsets of the Dual-Use List: the Sensitive List (SL) and
the Very Sensitive List (VSL). These are arranged hierarchically by the level of
control each warrants, with the Munitions List having the most control, then
the VSL, SL, and common Dual-Use List, as shown in Table 4.1.
31For a list of countries and when they became members, see Appendix F.
32Interview with US State Department Official A, 28 September 2006.
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Table 4.1: Hierarchy of Wassenaar lists
non-military items least control
common dual-use items |
Sensitive List items |
Very Sensitive List items |
Munitions items most control
Initial Elements
The Initial Elements, or Guidelines & Procedures, including the Initial Ele-
ments as they were renamed in 2003, form the basic outline of the functions
of the Arrangement.33 They are separated into nine sections: I. Purpose; II.
Scope; III. Control Lists; IV. Procedures for General Information Exchange; V.
Procedures for Exchange of Information on Dual-Use Goods and Technology;
VI. Procedures for the Exchange of Information on Arms; VII. Meetings and
Administration; VIII. Participation; and IX. Confidentiality.
The purpose of the Arrangement is clearly laid out in section I.1:
The Wassenaar Arrangement has been established in order to con-
tribute to regional and international security and stability, by pro-
moting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of con-
ventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies, thus prevent-
ing destabilising accumulations.
It does so by focusing on enhancing cooperation to prevent the “threats to
international and regional peace and security which may arise from transfers of
armaments and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies where the risks are
judged greatest” (I.2–3). In stark contrast to CoCom, it is not directed at “any
state or group of states and will not impede bona fide civil transactions.” This
statement shows the first explicit recognition by the Arrangement that there is
a balance to be struck between the security and economic concerns of dual-use
technology.
33This and other publicly available documents, including the lists, are on the Wassenaar
Arrangement website: http://www.wassenaar.org. All of these except the lists have also been
published in a regularly updated compilation volume (Wassenaar Arrangement, 2008c).
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To carry out its purpose, Wassenaar Participating States (as they are of-
ficially called) meet on a regular basis (II.1 and VII.1–2), exchanging, on a
voluntary basis, information that will enhance transparency (II.2), including
information on transfers and denials to transfer (II.3–4). They also continually
assess the overall functioning of the Arrangement (II.6)34 and develop guide-
lines and procedures for Participating States to use in various aspects of export
controls (II.5,7). In doing so, all decisions are reached by consensus (VII.5).
States, except for the Russian Federation, France, and Ukraine, have agreed
to control all items on the List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Mu-
nitions List, which will be reviewed regularly “to reflect technological develop-
ments and experience gained by Participating States” (III).35 All Participating
States agree to exchange general information on the risks associated with trans-
fers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies (IV), and specific
information on the denial of licenses of dual-use items and the approval of items
on the Munitions List (V–VI).
The Arrangement maintains that it is open to any state that may wish to
join, though admission is based on consensus of all current members (VIII).
Finally, Article IX states that “Information exchanged will remain confidential
and be treated as privileged diplomatic communications. This confidentiality
will extend to any use made of the information and any discussion among
Participating States.”
Wassenaar is currently composed of forty Participating States.36 I have de-
34This has taken the form of Assessment Years, which occur every four years and at which
any aspect of the Arrangement can be put on the table as in need of reform. There have
been three Assessments so far: 1999, 2003, 2007.
35Russia, France, and Ukraine “view this list as a reference list drawn up to help in the
selection of dual-use goods” (IIIn), though their national controls do reflect—and often go
beyond—the Wassenaar Lists.
36The Participating States as of December 2006 were: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian
Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine,
United Kingdom, United States. For a list of dates on which each joined, please see Appendix
F.
142The Wassenaar Arrangement & the wicked problem of dual-use technology
signed a graphical representation of these States, shown in Figure 4.1. As can be
seen, with the addition of South Africa in 2006, “the Arrangement now enjoys
representation from all continents” (Wassenaar Arrangement, 2006). However,
that representation is heavily skewed. What is immediately obvious with this
map is that there are no Participating States within the Tropics of Cancer and
Capricorn.37 Likewise, one can easily see the lack of participation from Asia,
most notably China. Countries with significant exports of controlled items that
are not members of the Arrangement include Brazil, China, India, and Israel.38
Secretariat & building
The Secretariat is based a block from the Oper in the centre of Vienna, on
Mahlerstraße, and is made up of around a dozen
staff,
39
This is different from all of the other current multilateral export control
arrangements, which do not have a secretariat. It is also a strong institution-
alisation of the hierarchical framing, since there are people whose sole job is to
ensure that the rules and procedures of the Arrangement are adhered to. The
Secretariat exists for several reasons. Historically, CoCom also had a Secre-
tariat. In fact, some of the furniture in the rooms of the Arrangement came
from the CoCom rooms in the US Embassy in Paris. The Secretariat is also
37The tips of Argentina, Australia, and South Africa cross the Tropic of Capricorn, but
the majority of these States lie further south. Similarly with Hawai’i for the United States.
38Israel implements the Wassenaar lists even though it is not a member for political reasons.
39Interview with Wassenaar Secretariat Official A & Wassenaar Secretariat Official B, 1
March 2006. The other information in the next few paragraphs also come from this interview.
Redacted at request of the British Government
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needed to coordinate the information exchange (described below). A third rea-
son is that a Secretariat is needed to organise the many meetings that take
place in a given year for Wassenaar. Unlike the NSG, AG, and to a lesser
extent the MTCR, the Wassenaar lists change significantly every year. This is
because, rather than trying to control a narrow pathway to a particular end
product—say a nuclear bomb—Wassenaar tries to control all technology that
may have a potential military use that is not controlled by the other regimes.
In this way, it could be thought of as the ‘residual’ category in the work of
Bowker & Star (1999).
All decisions regarding the running of the Wassenaar Arrangement, and also decisions 
on procedure and changes to lists, are made by Participating States on a consensus 
basis.  The Secretariat advises, but has no vote, in this process.
The Secretariat functions as a historian for the 
lists, providing information on why and when list 
definitions were developed and other decisions 
reached.
Redacted at request of the British Government
Redacted at request of the British Government
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The layout of the rooms in the Secretariat enables and constrains the types
of interactions the members of delegations can have with one another, both
socially and in terms of constructing the list text.42 There is a main meeting
room that is used for the main sessions of the EG and GWG, and for the
VPoC.43 It has an oval table that is just big enough to fit at least the primary
member of each delegation at the table, the rest sitting on the chairs against
the wall.
This equal placement of delegations around the table suggests that an egal-
itarian framing has been institutionalised, but I caution the reader in assuming
that it is an egalitarian framing of the problem of dual-use. More likely, it is an
egalitarian framing of the problem of international anarchy mentioned above.
All states are treated as equals. This is mirrored by the institutionalisation of
a veto power for each state in any discussion.
In 2005 the Arrangement upgraded their presentation equipment in this
room. This was not a trivial matter and has had a significant effect on oper-
ations, particularly the EG.44 Instead of having a projector at one end of the
room which not everyone could see, they now have a series of recessed monitors
in the middle of the oval. This allows everyone to see the changes to the actual
text in real-time, eliminating much of the need to take long breaks while the
changes were made and photocopied for all at the meeting.
Another time-saving feature of the Arrangement is that all discussions are
held in
42This information comes from a tour of the building that I was given.
43The Plenary is too large to be held in the Secretariat, so they usually rent someplace
else.
44Interview with British Former Government Official, 8 March 2007.
Redacted at request 
of the British 
Government
Redacted at request of the British Government
Redacted at request of the British Government
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Outside of the main meeting room, there is
a set of computers where, during
the breakout session of the meetings, members from delegations can discuss
items with each other, correspond with their capitals, and talk to other delega-
tions. Beyond that, there is one smaller room, big enough for about 10 people
comfortably, though it can hold “up to 50 in a pinch”,46 and is used particu-
larly for the EG breakout sessions.47 All of these features of the building allow
for more debate to occur on what constitutes an adequate level of control, and
therefore strengthen the hierarchical framing.
Functioning bodies
Having an overview of the membership and the Secretariat, we now turn to the
functioning bodies of the Arrangement. There are five main bodies that are
made up of delegates from the Participating States and that meet on a regular
basis in Vienna: the Expert Group; the General Working Group; the Plenary;
the Licensing and Enforcement Officers Meeting, and the Vienna Points of
Contact. Each of these is described below.
Expert Group
The Expert Group (EG) is the body within Wassenaar that does most of the
negotiation with regards to the modifications made to the Munitions List and
Dual-Use List. Its nearest parallel in CoCom was the working groups that used
to review the lists. During the course of a year, the EG usually meets in two
46Interview with British Former Government Official, 3 Jun 2008.
47This is compared to the small and cramped quarters of CoCom described above. While
the people I interviewed provided small complaints about the rooms being too hot in the
summer, there seemed to be few other negative aspects of the current set-up.
Redacted at request of the British Government
Redacted at request of the British 
Government
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formal sessions—in March-April and September—and one informal session in
June-July.48 The sessions are usually two weeks long, and can involve anywhere
from a half dozen to all of the Participating States. The informal sessions are
strictly that, informal; they are not administered by the Secretariat, and there
is a ‘no-tie’ policy.49
The EG is chaired by a representative of a Participating State, selected on
a rotating alphabetical basis. Some countries decide to pass on chairing the
EG, as a technical background and a command of technical English are seen
as necessary in aiding understanding when discussion moves too far off topic.50
Informally, the Chair is asked to serve for two years as opposed to the one year
term for Chairs of the GWG and Plenary. This is because many Chairs learn
a lot in their first year that they can then apply to making their second year
run more smoothly. “It’s a far tougher job [than the chair of the GWG or
Plenary], and it’s a job that requires all of the diplomatic skills of the others,
but substantive technical skills as well.”51
Countries send varying numbers of delegates to the EG meetings. Some
rarely send any, such as Belgium, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Malta. Others, like
Canada and Sweden, send one or two, occasionally supplemented by more when
they are submitting a proposal. Large delegations, typically the US, Britain,
and Russia, will send 10 or more delegates.52 These delegates usually come
from the Ministries of Defence, Trade, or Foreign Affairs, depending on the
country. There are also delegates from industries, but they are always brought
in as part of a State delegation, and must as such represent the interests of
48Interview with Swedish Former Government Official, 6 January 2006. There is often
more than one informal session if specific proposals warrant further discussions. Discussions
also occur in ad hoc fashion between small numbers of states.
49Interview with British Former Government Official, 8 March 2007. Initially they were
not even held at the Secretariat.
50Interview with US State Department Official A & US State Department Official B, 11
September 2006.
51Interview with US State Department Official A, 28 September 2006.
52This information comes from informal discussions with members of various delegations
at EG meetings, supplemented by a copy of the List of Participants for the 19–29 September
2005 Expert Group Meeting that I received from a source who wished to remain anonymous.
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the State rather than their company. It should be pointed out that if the
industry representatives are at a Wassenaar meeting, it is most likely because
their company’s interests and those of the State line up with one another. This
suggests that some states, or parts of state delegations, are trying to strengthen
the competitive framing of the problem of dual-use technology. They are seen
as technical experts on a particular item under debate and are usually brought
in only for the part of the meeting that discusses their technology.
Even given six weeks a year to work through changes to the list, mem-
bers of the EG find it difficult to get through the average of 60 proposals per
year, the vast majority of which concern the Dual-Use—as opposed to the
Munitions—List.53 The typical day of an EG formal meeting sees some of the
larger delegations meeting in the morning for breakfast at 7.30, and getting into
the Secretariat by 8.30.54 The first round is supposed to begin at 9.30, though
rarely does.55 There is an introduction to the day, followed by a round table of
questions and answers. The delegations then break up into Technical Working
Groups (TWGs, pronounced ‘twigs’)—each of which has a Chair appointed by
the Chair of the EG—to discuss specific proposals in more depth. Many TWGs
only have a few people, but in a contentious case, there may be 30 people or
more in a single TWG.56 TWGs often extend over the two-hour lunch break.57
After lunch, the main session of the EG is reconvened and reports are made on
the morning’s discussion. There is a further round of questions and answers,
and then provisional decisions are made about list changes. These decisions are
provisional because all ‘decisions’ are made only at the Plenary each December.
The head of a delegation to the EG has a number of options when it comes
to the provisional decision period. A State could choose to go on Favourable
53Interview with Wassenaar Secretariat Official C, 13 June 2007.
54Interview with British Former Government Official, 8 March 2007 and Interview with
US State Department Official A & US State Department Official B, 11 September 2006.
55Interview with British Former Government Official, 8 March 2007.
56Interview with US Defense Department Official A & US Defense Department Official B,
5 February 2007.
57Interview with British Former Government Official, 8 March 2007.
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Reserve, which means that the State is likely to accept the modification to the
list without further revisions. If a State went on Study Reserve, it is saying that
it needs more time to consider the details of a proposal, but is still considering
accepting it. For more contentious issues, States may be on ‘study reserve’
for years.58 Finally, a State could choose to go on Reserve, which means that
there is a problem with the proposal—either political or philosophical—which
the State is unlikely to accept.59 One might think that an easy way to scuttle
the hegemonic classification system in use at the Wassenaar would be for a
Participating State simply to veto any decision. These vetoes do happen, as we
will explore in Chapter 6, but they work against the hierarchical framing of the
problem of dual-use technology. A person wishing to go against a hierarchical
framing is rarely in the position to veto, which is the reserve of the head of
each delegation—a position that often comes well into a career in the civil
service, and therefore is likely held by a person who has for many years stated
a preference for a hierarchical framing of the problem.
The EG is a social body as well as a working body. On one of the first
few days of each formal session, there is a reception hosted by the Secretariat
for all of the delegations, as a chance to break the ice with new members of
delegations and in general engage with each other in a more conversational
way. In addition to this, multiple delegations may meet up on occasion for
meals—usually dinner. Such extensive contact between delegations is all meant
to help integrate the professionals across national boundaries, and is strong
evidence in support of the argument of Lipson (2006a) that Wassenaar serves
as a ‘trans-governmental network’ of governmental officials with export control
responsibilities (see also Lipson, 2005-2006b).
58Interview with British Former Government Official, 8 March 2007.
59Interview with US Defense Department Official A & US Defense Department Official B,
5 February 2007.
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General Working Group
The General Working Group (GWG) is the internal body that discusses mat-
ters that are more policy-related. That is not to say that they do not work in
technical areas as well, as will be seen in the case study on Intangible Technol-
ogy Transfers in Chapter 7. They normally meet in May and October for only
a few days. GWG meetings are usually attended by higher-level representation
than at the EG, but generally not as high as the ambassadorial level of the
Plenary.60 The Chair of the GWG rotates yearly in reverse alphabetical order,
thereby preventing a continuous follow-on between the GWG and the Plenary.
There was not much interaction between the GWG and EG before the 2003
Assessment Year. They were seen as being separate, with the GWG focusing
on political matters and the EG focusing on technical matters. Since then,
however, there has been increasing cross-over between the two.61
The GWG is the place where much of the groundwork is laid for the other
text outputs of the Arrangement, such as the ‘Statements of Understandings’,
‘Elements for. . . ’, and ‘Best Practices’ documents. Statements of Understand-
ings are seen as ‘first steps’ to either an Elements document or a Best Practice.
For example, in 2001 the GWG developed the Statement of Understanding on
Intangible Transfers of Software and Technology, which stated, in one para-
graph, that transfer of controlled technology poses a risk, regardless of the
medium of transfer. In 2006, the GWG developed the Best Practices for Im-
plementing Intangible Transfer of Technology Controls, which lays out, over
the course of two pages, how States should go about trying to control these
types of transfers. It is therefore a more complicated document, and is based
on the common understanding to which they had previously agreed.62 While
the GWG does not itself make modifications to the lists, it does clarify the
60Interview with Swedish Former Government Official, 6 January 2006.
61Interview with Swedish Former Government Official, 6 January 2006.
62For a full list of the documents produced by the GWG, see Appendix B.
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boundaries of the lists by producing a document on ‘intangible technology’ or
a Statement of Understanding on Control of Non-Listed Dual-Use Items.
Plenary
The Plenary meets for two days once a year, usually in the first week of De-
cember. As noted above, this is where all of the formal decisions for the Ar-
rangement are taken. Everything from budgetary decisions for the functioning
of the Secretariat to deciding on the documents that come out of the GWG,
to approving the modifications to the lists by the EG, must be squeezed into
these two days. Moreover, the people making the decisions will likely not have
been involved directly in the EG or GWG. They will have been briefed about
the developments over the past year, and may have—such as in the US case—
actually been overseeing the entire process, but this will be the first trip of the
year to the Secretariat for the majority of them. The purpose of the Plenary
is for Participating States to give either their political approval to the work of
the EG and GWG, or if a State is not able to give its approval, for it to make a
political statement as to why it cannot do so. As will be seen in the discussions
below on the proposal process for changing the lists, there is almost an art to
deciding which proposals will not result in one State or another having to make
a political statement about a list change. A major unspoken objective of the
EG is to sort out all of the political matters regarding a list change before it
reaches the Plenary.
LEOM & VPoCs
There are two other significant bodies of the Wassenaar Arrangement. The
first is the Licensing and Enforcement Officers Meeting (LEOM). The LEOM
is a forum in which licensing and enforcement officers discuss issues which
are directly germane to their responsibilities in their State, including how to
implement the Elements and Best Practice documents that come out of the
GWG. The licensing officers are the people who actually decide whether a
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technology presented for export has sufficient characteristics to be matched to
a piece of text on the Dual-Use (or Munitions) List. The enforcement officers
are customs officials who have to make a similar assessment of the characteristic
of the technology in order (a) to decide if a license is needed if it does not have
one, or (b) to ensure that the license is valid. The LEOM also provides advice
to the GWG. The chair of the LEOM does not rotate like the chairs of the
other groups, because
a lot of countries don’t seem to have somebody who can deal with
that issue well. . . Instead each year we try to recruit someone who
is knowledgeable on the substance, who’s got leadership skills, and
has good English.63
The licensing and enforcement officers (LEOs) are an important part of the
overall export control system, but their role is not one that I address directly in
this thesis other than to point out that there is a direct connection between the
texts of the Dual-Use List and the technology that may get exported. As a user
of the lists, ability for a LEO to make this connection is an important aspect
for the hierarchical framing in the process of list modification. The process of
list modification, in this sense, can be seen as ‘configuring the user’ (Grint &
Woolgar, 1997) in the process of inscribing the technology. The ‘user’ in this
case is the LEO who has an established classification system and must become
skilled in fitting each technology (or license application) he comes across into
that classification system.
Finally, there are the Vienna Points of Contact (VPoCs, pronounced ‘v-
pocks’). These are usually people from the State’s Embassy or Mission in
Vienna who meet with the Secretariat on a monthly or bi-monthly basis to
handle more of the administrative side of the Arrangement, such as budgeting,
maintaining the building, etc. These people are, in a way, technical experts of a
different nature.64 Vienna is a city where many international organisations are
63Interview with US State Department Official A, 28 September 2006.
64Interview with British Government Official A & British Government Official B, 9 Febru-
ary 2006
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Figure 4.2: Relation of the internal units of the Wassenaar Arrangement
based, in particular many international security organisations, such as the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the United Nations (UN). A single VPoC
will likely go to a few if not all of the organisations to perform similar duties,
and thus provides a linkage between them. For many of the smaller countries,
the VPoC may be the only person who ever attends any of the Wassenaar
meetings. For some of the larger countries, such as Russia and Japan, the
VPoC serves as the head of delegation to the EG and GWG.65 The VPoCs
also serve as official communication channels with the State, and are used by
national delegations to the EG and GWG to get the official line from the State
if the negotiating situation changes during a meeting. This is another example
of Lipson’s (2006a) idea that Wassenaar is a ‘transgovernmental network’ of
export control officials. Figure 4.2 provides a graphical representation of the
various standing bodies of the Wassenaar Arrangement, as described above.
65Interview with Russian Government Official & British Government Official F, 28 March
2007, and Interview with Japanese Government Official, 19 June 2007.
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& Outreach
There are two other structural aspects of the Wassenaar Arrangement that
deserve mention here before we move on to look at the lists themselves. The
first is the secure communication system that the Arrangement has developed,
. This consists of
a secured line
The documents fall into two broad categories: proposals and
reporting. Within the proposal section, there are all of the proposals that
States have made over all the years of the Arrangement, both for changes to
the lists and for the creation of new documents through the GWG. Within the
reporting section, there are the statements from each State about the approvals
and denials of licenses they have processed. States are required to notify the
Arrangement on the denial of licenses for export of items on the Dual-Use
List to non-members twice per year, except for items on the Sensitive and Very
Sensitive Lists (SL & VSL), which require notification within preferably 30, but
no more than 60, days of the denial. For items on the SL, VSL, and Munitions
List, States are required to report on actual transfers every six months.66 Each
State puts its own information and also has instantaneous access
to all information entered by other States. They are therefore not beholden to
the Secretariat to distribute the information from one State to all the others.
The final aspect of the Arrangement we will note here is the Outreach
Seminar, which has been held twice, the first on 19 October 2004, and the
second on 3 October 2005. The first, called “The Wassenaar Arrangement:
Responsibility, Transparency and Security”, brought together a wide range of
participants from non-governmental organizations, think-tanks, academic in-
stitutes, industry and the media, together with representatives from a number
of non-Wassenaar countries in order to “raise awareness of the positive con-
66These requirements are noted in the Initial Elements, V.2–4 and VI.2.
Redacted at request of the British Government
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tribution that the Wassenaar Arrangement makes to responsible transfers of
conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies” (Wassenaar Arrange-
ment, 2004d). The day allowed a unique interaction between the Arrangement
and all of these other bodies, which has not been repeated since. Presentations
covered
the Arrangement’s history, method of work, conclusions of the 2003
Assessment of its functioning, including its renewed focus on ter-
rorism, current activities and areas of on-going negotiation. Other
topics included the export control lists and how the lists are re-
viewed, arms brokering, work on small arms and light weapons and
its ground-breaking work on shoulder-held anti-aircraft missiles or
MANPADS. Participants from leading think tanks and NGOs also
contributed their perspectives on arms export control issues, and
how the Arrangement and civil society might enhance their coop-
eration (Wassenaar Arrangement, 2004d).
In 2005, the Seminar was repeated, but with much more of an industry focus.
This time called “Outreach to Industry”, the aim was “to provide for a profes-
sional exchange of views and sharing of national experiences with the aim of
strengthening the effectiveness of export controls” (Wassenaar Arrangement,
2005b). At the time of writing, there were no plans to hold any future seminars.
This is seen as unfortunate by some members, because it is one of the few ways
that the Arrangement has been able to open up its internal workings to the
outside world:
But there are opportunities there [at the Outreach Seminars] to
then fire back their own views, be they positive or negative. That’s
what we want. Partly to dispel this idea that this is some sort of
secret club that engages in black arts. We don’t sit around with our
trouser legs rolled up and all that sort of thing. It’s not true. And
to an extent I suppose what I was saying about my frustration of the
lack of understanding is a function of this lack of transparency, and
this is the thing now that we are trying to address. We’re saying,
“no this is not secret, it’s just that nobody’s bothered to come and
ask us, and we haven’t found the appropriate forum to sit down with
everybody and say what we do.” So let’s do it, and get rid of this
idea that we won’t talk about what we do. I mean, information
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exchange—sensitive government information—Hell, you’ve got to
keep that secret. But how we do what we do, and why we do what
we do, is not a secret.67
In terms of the methodology I employ in this thesis, this quote is key. It
shows that the way I have defined my thesis questions is compatible with the
type of information that the members wish to provide. That is, I want to
analyse the relationship between patterns of social relations and the texts of the
lists, and doing so does not necessarily require access to current negotiations,
which may be too politically sensitive, nor to information about how many
exports of controlled items country X licensed or denied. Instead, it requires
understanding first what the Wassenaar Arrangement does, and second why
each of the people involved in it believes they need to be engaged in the debate.
This is precisely the information they are willing to give.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen how, throughout the last several centuries, the
need for export controls has always been a balance between the economic needs
for exporting items of military significance and the desire to control who has
those items. This balance leads to two different framings of the problem of dual-
use technology: either as a problem of control or a problem of the marketability
of technology.
If the problem is constructed as one of control, it can be resolved by sys-
tematically developing a classification of technology as either military, dual-use,
or neither, and then by employing a set of routines and procedures (a bureau-
cracy) to ensure that technology which should be controlled, is controlled. This
framing rests on three assumptions, which form its ‘myth of control’: that it is
possible to control the flow of dual-use technology; that it is possible to know
67Interview with British Government Official A & British Government Official B, 9 Febru-
ary 2006.
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from whom dual-use technology should be kept; and that it is possible to de-
fine what is and is not dual-use technology. It is these assumptions that have
largely been institutionalised through the development of international export
control systems. While the first two assumptions have recently come under
heavy critique, the third has been largely neglected in the academic literature.
This hierarchical framing of the problem of dual-use technology has always
had to contend with another framing which views the problem not as one of
control, but as one of competition and the marketability of technology. When
addressing the problem of dual-use technology, the myth of the competitive
framing is that a market exists and that, if you meet or develop a new need in
the market for a technology, that technology will be taken up, as long as it is
priced appropriately and is perceived to be ‘better than’ any competitors.
The development of CoCom was, in part, a way for actors espousing two
very different competitive framings to come together. The competitive fram-
ing of the economy is concerned with market failure, whereas the competitive
framing of anarchy is concerned with the failure of the state. While employing
the same rhetorical style, these framings would reach polar opposite stances
on whether technology should be traded. By making the problem about main-
taining lists of controlled technology, CoCom institutionalised a hierarchical
framing of the problem, creating a common rhetoric that these otherwise in-
commensurable views can use to come to agreement.
The New Forum and the establishment of the Wassenaar Arrangement fur-
ther institutionalised the hierarchical framing of the problem of dual-use tech-
nology. Wassenaar, like CoCom, has a permanent Secretariat that organises the
meetings of the Arrangement and hosts them in its office space in Vienna. The
Arrangement is organically (Durkheim, 1893) structured, with each function-
ing body addressing a separate part of the problem of dual-use technology, be
it the technical side (Expert Group), political side (General Working Group),
enforcement (Licensing and Enforcement Officers Meeting), or the day-to-day
running of the Arrangement (Vienna Points of Contact).
158The Wassenaar Arrangement & the wicked problem of dual-use technology
All discussions at Wassenaar are centred on one primary aspect of technol-
ogy: its military significance. This is the main criterion for the selection of
items for each of its lists,68 and guides all of the discussions in both the Expert
Group and the General Working Group. Within that broad framework, the
Arrangement clearly defines the types of knowledge that are relevant for dis-
cussions in its Criteria for the Selection of Dual-Use Items : foreign availability;
the ability to control the item; the ability to clearly and objectively define the
item; and whether it is controlled by another regime. Each of these criteria
is control-related, and discussion about technology within the Arrangement is
usually about negotiating the knowledge of how a technology does or does not
meet the criteria. Knowledge about these technologies that is not seen by the
hierarchical framing as related to the criteria (e.g. market share, or impact on
health, environment, or poverty,. . . ) is therefore irrelevant. I am not saying
that these areas of knowledge are not important, only that, in order for them to
be considered within Wassenaar discussions, they must be presented as relating
to one of the criteria for control.
Within the Wassenaar Arrangement, the fact that there are lists of con-
trolled items is comfortable knowledge, as is the knowledge about how to es-
tablish and run a national export control system. All of the rules and proce-
dures for modifying the lists that we have discussed in this chapter are part of
the hierarchical framing’s comfortable knowledge. This knowledge is comfort-
able because it supports the assumption that the wicked problem of dual-use
technology can be addressed through control measures.
While these points would suggest that there is only room within the Wasse-
naar Arrangement for a hierarchical framing, there have also been significant
moves by the Arrangement to allow space for competitive framings. Major
attempts at this include the two Outreach Seminars that were held in 2004
68“Dual-use goods and technologies to be controlled are those which are major or key
elements for the indigenous development, production, use or enhancement of military capa-
bilities” (Wassenaar Arrangement, 2005a).
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and 2005, where industry and academic input was specifically sought on how
the Arrangement might be improved. It is also the case, however, that many
countries take up a competitive framing of the problem of dual-use technology
during debates on specific list modifications, as we will see in later chapters.
The problem of dual-use, we can now see, is a wicked problem. There are
multiple framings of the problem interacting on a continual basis within the
Wassenaar Arrangement. The problem itself has been around for many cen-
turies, and shows no signs of being soluble. The problem of dual-use technology
can be seen as a symptom of other wicked problems, such as the effects of con-
trols on the economy, or the effect of lack of controls on decreased security.
The problem, for all of the history of CoCom and most of the history of Wasse-
naar, has only been a simple wicked problem, however. The discourse has been
dominated by a debate between hierarchical and competitive framings of the
problem and how to balance the two. This, as we explore in Chapter 7, may
be beginning to change with the strengthening of a third, egalitarian, framing
of the problem.
We now have an overview of the history of the Wassenaar Arrangement
that is remarkably different than those that have been produced before, either
for CoCom (Mastanduno, 1992; Noehrenberg, 1995) or Wassenaar (Lipson,
1999, 2006a). Instead of focusing primarily on the external environment in
which the Arrangement sits, we have focused on viewing the Arrangement as
a classification system that builds and maintains lists. Having established the
importance of the lists, we now turn to an overview of the lists themselves.
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The material culture of bureaucracy and empire is
not found in pomp and circumstance, nor even in
the first instance at the point of a gun, but rather at
the point of a list.
—Bowker & Star (1999, p 137)
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Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement are supposed to imple-
ment the lists of controlled technology in their national export control systems
in order to monitor the flow of the items to non-member countries and actively
to make decisions on which items they want to export and which they do not.
Having provided an overview of the history and structure of the Wassenaar Ar-
rangement in the last chapter, in which we saw how the lists are central to their
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functioning and to the discourse on dual-use technology, I now turn our atten-
tion to the history and structure of the lists themselves. The lists represent the
basis of the hierarchical framing and fulfil one of the assumptions of the myth
of control: that it is possible to define a list of technology to control. Through
an analysis of the history and structure of the international lists of controlled
technology, we are looking for clues as to how they incorporate technological
ambiguity.
We begin this chapter with a short history from the 16th to 20th Centuries
of international lists of items controlled for their military significance. We
explore in depth the CoCom lists to see how they developed throughout the
life of CoCom. Key in this development is the shift that occurred during the
1990-1991 ‘Core List’ revision. The overall structure of the lists relates to the
needs that the lists serve, which in turn relate to how the technologies on the
lists are described, or, as I argue, inscribed. The structure of the lists between
CoCom and Wassenaar changed little, so in turning to the lists as they appear in
the Wassenaar Arrangement, we focus on some definitional matters. I conclude
with a description of the standard proposal process that Participating States
go through when they want to make modifications to the Dual-Use List.
5.1 Lists prior to CoCom
As early as the late 16th and early 17th Centuries, there were international
collaborations to control the trade in militarily significant items. The most
prominent among these early examples were all bilateral treaties, often involv-
ing much more than just the control of goods, such as the treaty of the Pyrenees
in 1659 between France and Spain and the treaty of Whitehall in 1661 between
England and Sweden (Westlake, 1913, p. 278–280). The items listed were seen
as ‘contraband’, a concept elaborated by Grotius (1625) on his work concerning
the classification of goods transferred in times of war. Continuing through the
18th and 19th Centuries, many countries used ‘contraband’ to refer to things
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that were controlled in trade (Cupitt, 2000, p. 35–36; Westlake, 1913, ch. X).
It is noteworthy that the term was, perhaps intentionally, ambiguous (Latane´,
1919, p. 169). Efforts to define contraband reached the United States Supreme
Court in its 1866 decision1 on The Peterhoff, a ship that was said to have car-
ried contraband between London and a neutral port during the American Civil
War (¶136):
The classification of goods as contraband or not contraband has
much perplexed text writers and jurists. A strictly accurate and
satisfactory classification is perhaps impracticable; but that which
is best supported by American and English decisions may be said to
divide all merchandise into three classes. Of these classes, the first
consists of articles manufactured and primarily and ordinarily used
for military purposes in time of war; the second, of articles which
may be and are used for purposes of war or peace, according to cir-
cumstances; and the third, of articles exclusively used for peaceful
purposes. Merchandise of the first class, destined to a belligerent
country or places occupied by the army or navy of a belligerent,
is always contraband; merchandise of the second class is contra-
band only when actually destined to the military or naval use of a
belligerent; while merchandise of the third class is not contraband
at all, though liable to seizure and condemnation for violation of
blockade or siege.
It is important to note that whether or not something was contraband de-
pended on its use in addition to physical characteristics. This is contrasted
below (page 194) with the current application of ‘dual-use’ within the Wasse-
naar Arrangement, which specifically is not based on use. Use, as we shall see,
is notoriously difficult to determine, and the British had decided well before
the Peterhoff case that the classification of the good depended instead on its
destination.2
We can also see here the difference between war and peace, which is only one
of the ways that the ‘dual’ in dual-use can be split, as we reviewed in Section 2.2.
1This can be found in the files of the Supreme Court under 5 Wallace 28
2This was apparently decided in the Prize Court ruling of Jorge Margaretha in 1799,
though I was not able to locate the original case. See Førland (1993, p. 159), a report on
a similar case in 1949 (The Frankisky (no. 1): Eygpt, Prize Court of Alexandria. July 21,
1949, 1955, p. 592), and Pyke (1915, p. 119).
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Technology, during this era, was controlled only in times of war. The tension
with the definition of the term ‘contraband’ did not ease, and was the subject of
much debate at the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences. The British made
a declaration at the beginning of the 1907 Conference arguing that “profound
doctrinal and practical differences exist as to contraband” (Westlake, 1913,
p. 287). The difficulty with the concept of contraband, Westlake (1913, p. 288)
notes, is:
that the progress of science has increased the number of things
which in certain circumstances are of use in war though not absolute
contraband in the strictest sense—that the complaints of neutrals
on account of interference with the trade in things of that class have
consequently increased—that the complexity of the cargoes carried
by modern merchantmen of large size makes the search in them for
contraband goods difficult and vexatious—that further difficulties
would arise if a ship accused of carrying contraband was allowed to
proceed on her voyage, the alleged contraband being transhipped or
destroyed—that the destination of contraband to the enemy is often
difficult of proof, and that under the doctrine of continuous voyage a
belligerent might almost entirely interrupt neutral commerce—that
for all these reasons the principle of contraband is the source of
great damage to trade in non-contraband goods, and that neutrals
demand indemnities so large that prize courts refuse them[. . . ] and
that to abandon it would be a work of peace and justice.
The rapid development of science, the complaints on the effect on commer-
cial trade, and the difficulty of actually enforcing any control mechanisms are
all points that appear time and again within the dual-use discourse, and form
part of the rhetoric used by the competitive framing of the problem of dual-use
technology. These arguments carried much strength, and while a resolution to
accept the British position to abolish the concept of contraband received the
support of twenty-five states,3 it was also opposed by five: France, Germany,
Montenegro, Russia, and the United States. Other states had put forward pro-
posals for either abolishing or modifying the concept of contraband, but in the
3For a full list, see (Westlake, 1913, p. 288)
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end, no agreement was unanimously reached and the matter was passed on to
the Conference of London in 1908–9.
This Conference culminated in the Declaration Concerning the Laws of
Naval War in London on 26 February 1909.4 This declaration produced the
first multilateral lists of controlled items in trade: ‘absolute contraband’, which
have a direct use in war; ‘conditional contraband’, which may be used in both
war and peace; and the ‘free list’, which contained things that are not contra-
band and therefore should not be stopped in their international transfer. The
list of conditional contraband is in Article 24 (in Table 5.1), and the term is
elaborated in Articles 33 & 35:
Art. 33. Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown
to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a government
department of the enemy State, unless in this latter case the circum-
stances show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the purposes
of the war in progress.
Art. 35. Conditional contraband is not liable to capture, except
when found on board a vessel bound for territory belonging to or
occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces of the enemy, and
when it is not to be discharged in an intervening neutral port.
We can see here how it might be difficult to call the things under control
‘technologies’. Most people, for instance, would not consider food, grain, or gold
technologies. We will explore this point more when looking at the development
of controls on intangible transfers of technologies in Chapter 7. The 1909 list of
contraband quickly grew during the World Wars, as countries moved items from
the ‘free list’ onto the ‘conditional contraband’ list, and by the end of World
War II there was nothing left on the ‘free list’, thereby making the concept of
contraband vacuous, as everything was considered contraband (Førland, 1991,
p. 10–11; Mastanduno, 1990, p. 47–48). Little reference is made to the term—as
it applies to export controls—after this period.
4Available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1909b.htm
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Table 5.1: Conditional contraband, as defined in the 1909 Declaration concerning
the Laws of Naval War
Art. 24. The following articles, susceptible of use in war as well as for
purposes of peace, may, without notice, be treated as contraband of
war, under the name of conditional contraband:
1. Foodstuffs.
2. Forage and grain, suitable for feeding animals.
3. Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes, suitable for
use in war.
4. Gold and silver in coin or bullion; paper money.
5. Vehicles of all kinds available for use in war, and their component
parts.
6. Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds; floating docks, parts of docks
and their component parts.
7. Railway material, both fixed and rolling-stock, and material for
telegraphs, wireless telegraphs, and telephones.
8. Balloons and flying machines and their distinctive component
parts, together with accessories and articles recognizable as in-
tended for use in connection with balloons and flying machines.
9. Fuel; lubricants.
10. Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use in war.
11. Barbed wire and implements for fixing and cutting the same.
12. Horseshoes and shoeing materials.
13. Harness and saddlery.
14. Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of nautical
instruments.
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Instead, CoCom employed the term ‘strategic goods’ to refer to all of the
items on its lists (e.g. British Government, 1954), and the term reflects the
larger Cold War bipolar stance of the time. The term never had much use out-
side of CoCom, however, and in the 1980s the US began referring to the items
under control, which were not specifically military, as ‘dual-use’ (Mally, 1982).5
The term was concurrently adopted in the academic literature (Mastanduno,
1985; Meese, 1981–1983).
This brief history shows that there has been significant international col-
laboration on export controls, and specifically on developing lists of controlled
technology, for at least the past three hundred years. This process has of-
ten incorporated ambiguities into the controlled technology, either through not
specifically naming the items controlled or by allowing the lists to shift over
time. Neither earlier treaties nor the Declaration of 1909 were seen as carrying
much weight, however, as the controls were so difficult to impose.
5.2 The CoCom lists
The CoCom lists were never publicly available, but were “virtually identical to
the national lists published by some CoCom members” (US Office of Technology
Assessment, 1979, p. 156). All references to the lists in academic literature
refer instead to the British lists, published by the Export Control Organisation
within the Department of Trade and Industry as a supplement to its trade
journal. The members of CoCom themselves often referred to the British lists
as well, because they were published in easy to carry booklets.6 I therefore
base this discussion of the CoCom lists on those published by Britain (British
Government, 1954, 1958, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1964, 1966, 1969, 1972, 1976, 1980,
1985, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1991a,b, 1993a).
5Mally was a Foreign Affairs Officer with the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
at the Department of State.
6Phone interview with Robert Anstead, member of US delegation to CoCom, 24 March
2008.
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The US was by far the most dominant player in all of the CoCom meetings,
but particularly in the lists meetings, as they had more resources and more
people than the other delegations. While decision making occurred by con-
sensus, “CoCom delegations almost never opposed an export of which the US
approved during the 1980s” (Noehrenberg, 1995, p. 51). Similarly, “the US was
always the instigator for including a technology on the lists. Due to its greater
resources, it could investigate, prepare, and argue a case for such inclusion bet-
ter than any other delegation” (Noehrenberg, 1995, p. 54). The US dominance
was not complete, though. From the very beginning of CoCom there were com-
promises between the US position and that of other countries (Mastanduno,
1992, p. 81).7 The US position was also not always unified. There were many
differences of opinion between the military and the Department of Commerce
(Yasuhara, 1991).
While the US continually argued for putting items on the lists, it also—
at least until the 1990s—continually vetoed taking items off, even when the
technologies became less and less militarily critical due to technological progress
(Mastanduno, 1992). This suggests that the US viewed the list less as a system
of nested categories and more as a homogenous whole, supporting my point
earlier that the concern was less with the problem of dual-use and more with
the problem of international anarchy. When in doubt, things go onto the list,
though it does not matter where. At the same time, the US very much believed
in the need to form the lists and for all to agree to them, thus recognising that
the problem of dual-use must also be addressed. Even a preliminary look at the
political situation in the late 1940s and early 1950s shows how these views of
the lists were mirrored in the social framework the US was using—a competitive
framing focused on a rivalry with the Soviet Union and a recognition that that
7The US wanted CoCom to be part of NATO, “so that issues of economic security could
be treated as part of political and military strategy” (Mastanduno, 1992, p. 81). In a footnote
to that sentence, Mastanduno notes, “[t]he US preference that export controls be handled
within the context of NATO is expressed in a telegram from Harriman to Hoffman, November
5, 1949, reprinted in FRUS, 1949, 5:169–71.” I was unable to get access to this telegram.
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required the joint effort of many states.
An excerpt from Mastanduno (1990, p. 76) provides some insight into a
typical CoCom list review process; as we will see in the case studies in later
chapters, this process is largely the same in Wassenaar.
Several criteria are relevant in this review process, including mil-
itary utility and significance, and the availability of the item in
question from non-CoCom countries. In a typical bargaining se-
quence, the United States might provide an assessment of a partic-
ular item’s military utility (e.g. “these machine tools are used in
the following way by our Air Force”), while other members might
produce evidence that the item can be readily purchased in non-
CoCom countries or can be produced by controlled destinations
themselves. The review process is tedious and time-consuming. It
usually involves a series of proposals and counterproposals based
on technical assessments colored by bureaucratic or economic in-
terests. Delegations in Paris frequently must refer back to their
home governments for guidance and negotiating instructions. Some
of the technologically less advanced members do not participate ac-
tively in list reviews, and instead rely on the technical judgements of
others. The United States will frequently seek bilateral agreement
with certain key member states as a means to facilitate reaching
multilateral agreement.
Throughout the life of CoCom there was a series of major list reviews: 1954,
1958, 1978, 1982–1984, and 1990–1991 (the ‘Core List’ revision). There were
also minor list reviews conducted yearly from 1958–1969, and every three years
from 1969–1984 (Mastanduno, 1992, p. 110n). From 1985 until 1990, there was
a rolling list review, where segments of the lists, rather than the entire list,
were up for review each year (Mastanduno, 1990, p. 76).
In the first few years of CoCom, during the Korean War, the lists were
broadened beyond items of direct military utility to those with more general
economic significance. “This was done on the grounds that Soviet economic
and military power were synonymous” (Mastanduno, 1990, p. 77). However,
the revisions to the lists in 1954 and 1958 saw significant reductions in the
items controlled (British Government, 1954, 1958). They remained relatively
short for the next twenty years, but became increasingly controversial among
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members as global trade grew and requests for exceptions to export mounted
(Mastanduno, 1990, p. 77). Here, then, we see the now hegemonic hierarchical
framing being challenged by the competitive framing, which argued for doing
away with the lists, or at least decreasing the level of control.
In the beginning of CoCom there were two lists. List I contained items
that were subject to a full embargo for shipment to the Soviet Union. List II
contained items that had quantitative limits of the number of exports (British
Government, 1954).8 List I was broken into Groups A-M. Most of these items
were not weapons, but things like machine tools, industrial chemicals, bearings,
locomotives, radio equipment, electronic equipment, oils, and rubbers. Group
H had atomic materials, and Group M covered conventional, biological, and
chemical weapons. List II contained some of the first set of items, but with
different specifications. List I was 6 two-column pages, and List II not quite
one page.
The 1958 revision saw the ‘List’ categorisation removed (British Govern-
ment, 1958). Adler-Karlsson (1968) says that this move came from removing
List II (the quantitative control list), which could “almost be regarded as a
final revision in the economic warfare, as the CoCom policy hereafter, with few
exceptions, was concentrated on commodities which by all participating states
were considered to be properly ‘strategic’” (p. 96). Another way to view it,
however, is the receding of the competitive framing of the alternative framing
of the problem of international anarchy, and its gradual replacement with a
hierarchical framing of the problem of dual-use technology. However, List II
seems to have been incorporated into List I by means of ‘Notes’, which explic-
itly said that, at least for Britain, applications for export would be considered
for certain items.9 As of 1958, CoCom was also now directed at the following
8 Some note a List III, which contained items whose place on Lists I & II was not yet
decided (Mastanduno, 1992, p.94n and US Office of Technology Assessment, 1979, p. 155),
but it depends on when you place the actual start date of CoCom. I place it when Lists I &
II were first finalised (1950), which was when there was no longer a List III.
9These ‘Notes’ were replaced by words in italics in 1972, and greatly expanded.
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countries: “Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, North Korea,
North Vietnam, Poland, Roumania, The Soviet Union, the Soviet Zone of Ger-
many and Tibet” (British Government, 1958). This represents a strengthening
of the competitive framing of the alternative problem of anarchy. The Groups
on the lists were labelled as shown in Table 5.2. One of the main things to
Table 5.2: Categories of the 1958 Industrial List
Group A Metalworking Machinery
Group B Chemical and Metallurgical Plant,
Compressors, Furnaces, Pumps, Valves,
etc
Group C Diesel Engines and Electric Generators
Group D Miscellaneous Goods and Machinery
Group E Transport
Group F Electronic Equipment including Com-
munications and Radar
Group G Scientific Instruments and Apparatus,
Servomechanisms and Photographic
Equipment
Group H Metals, Minerals and Metal Manufac-
tures
Group I Chemicals, Plastics and Synthetic Rub-
bers
Group J Petroleum Products, Lubricant and
Hydraulic Fluids
Group K Arms, Munitions, Military Equipment
and Machinery etc. Specially designed
for their Production
note about these early lists is that most of the items that were on them were
easily identifiable as items. That is, they would contain the title of the item
and perhaps one or two characteristics. You could easily talk about an item
as an ‘entry’. Thus, in 1954, Group G contained a single line for computers,
shown in Figure 5.1.
1960 saw another reorganisation of the lists (Table 5.3), moving the single
paragraph that was all arms and munitions, along with the single sentence
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Computors, electronic, other than office calculating machines.
Figure 5.1: 1954 entry for computers (not actual image) (British Government,
1954)
that was the atomic list, into their own Groups (British Government, 1960).
All totalled, it was 9 pages. All of the items now had numbers as well, “as a
means of ready identification and reference,” instead of the simple itemised list
that existed before (British Government, 1960, p.276).
Table 5.3: Categories of the 1960 Industrial List
Group A Munitions List
Group B Atomic Energy List
Group C Metal-Working Machinery
Group D Chemical and Petroleum Equipment
Group E Electrical and Power-Generating
Equipment
Group F General Industrial Equipment
Group G Transportation Equipment
Group H Electronic Equipment including Com-
munications and Radar
Group I Scientific Instruments and Apparatus,
Servomechanisms and Photographic
Equipment
Group J Metals, Minerals, and their Manufac-
tures
Group K Chemicals, Metalloids, and Petroleum
Products
Group L Synthetic Rubber and Synthetic Film
In the 1966 lists, the Munitions and Atomic Energy Groups fully separated
from the others, and each became their own lists (British Government, 1966).
The lists were now: Munitions List; Atomic Energy List; Groups A-J (the old
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Groups C-L).10 One point of note here is that the British Government began
(with the 1962 edition of the lists) sidelining the changes that were made in
the actual text (this process stopped by the 1972 lists). This made it very easy
to note where additions were made. Deletions were noted in the beginning of
the lists. As a whole, the statement at the beginning of the lists from most
years contained some form of the phrase “the net effect is to reduce the scope
of the embargo,” and yet the lists continued to get longer. In 1966, they were
25 pages. 1966 also saw the introduction of a new paragraph in the preamble
to the lists:
Manufacturers are reminded that the purpose of these strategic con-
trols will be defeated if technical information or technical know-how
concerning embargoed equipment is revealed to the above countries.
Great care should therefore be taken to prevent this happening. A
particular danger arises when technicians or students from these
countries are visiting or are being trained at British factories.
This was the first mention of trying to control the intangible transfer of tech-
nology. It appeared in all lists after this date. We shall be looking at this issue
in depth in Chapter 7.
As the lists became more complex, further qualifications were needed on
what constituted an item on the list. Why was this happening? Mastanduno
(1992) argues that this was due to conflict between two different perceptions of
the relationship between technology trade and (inter)national security (p. 13 &
Ch.2). According to one view—‘economic warfare’—controls would be broad-
ened to include any technology that would strengthen the economy of an ad-
versary. “The assumption here is that because military power is ultimately
dependent on an economic base, quantitatively and qualitatively, trade that
significantly enhances the economy of an adversary indirectly enhances its mil-
itary power and thus should be prohibited in the interest of national security”
(p. 13). This was the view that the US took, particularly in the 1949-1958 and
10Note that these Group letters equate to the 1958 revision of the lists, minus Group K.
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1980-1984 years, when it saw its relationship with the Soviet Union as more
politically confrontational.
According to the other view, strategic (security) aims could be met by con-
trolling only the technologies that made a “direct and significant contribution
to an adversary’s military capabilities” (p. 13). This view would include tech-
nologies deemed to be purely ‘military’, but also those which had commercial
as well as specific military uses, and Mastanduno refers to it as a ‘strategic
embargo’. This was the view preferred by European members of CoCom, Mas-
tanduno argues, because they, unlike the US, did not see themselves in an arms
race with the Soviet Union and they had a greater economic interest in East-
West trade, and therefore preferred the competitive framing of the problem of
dual-use technology. Many European members of CoCom held this view from
the beginning, and after 1958 they were able to convince the US to relax the
controls, or at least they were able to thwart many attempts to broaden the
controls. This often meant that the text on the lists got longer because they
were more narrowly focused. As we shall see in the next chapter, such an out-
come is the result of the ‘monster-adjustment’ strategies that the hierarchical
framing employs to handle anomalies to the dual-use classification system.
From listing technologies to listing parameters
Rather than listing technologies under control, the CoCom Industrial List,
from 1958 onwards, shifted to describing the parameters of a technology under
consideration and the value of each parameter. To return to our earlier example
of the single line to describe computers, it had by 1976 turned into item 1565 in
Group G (actually now combined with Group F) and covered three two-column
pages, plus another page and a half for describing 1564, “Electronic component
assemblies, sub-assemblies, printed circuit boards, and microcircuits”. 1564 is
worth closer inspection to help us understand the changes taking place in the
lists. It first appeared in the 1960 lists and occupied seven lines. By the 1972
lists it consisted of the the text shown in Figure 5.2.
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1564. Electronic components as follows:
(a) Assemblies and sub-assemblies constituting one or more func-
tional circuits with a component density greater than 75 parts
per cubic inch (4.575 part per cubic centimetre);
(b) Modular insulator panels (including wafers) mounting single or
multiple electronic elements and specialised parts therefor.
Explanatory Note: Circuit boards and panels which do not contain com-
ponents described in this list and which do not come within the scope
of sub-item (a) above are not covered by sub-item (b) unless they are
constructed of insulating materials other than paper base phenolics,
glass cloth melamine, glass cloth epoxy resin or of insulating mate-
rials with an operating temperature range not exceeding that of the
above-mentioned materials.
(c) integrated circuits, i.e. assemblies and sub-assemblies containing
one or more functional circuits in which there are both compo-
nents and inter-connections formed by the diffusion or deposition
of materials into or on a common substrate.
Devices described in sub-items (a), (b), (c), provided that the devices have
been designed specifically for identifiable civil applications and, by na-
ture of design or performance, are substantially restricted to the par-
ticular application for which they have been designed.
Figure 5.2: 1972 entry for item 1564 (not actual image) (British Government,
1972)
We can see here both the use of the ‘Explanatory Note’ and the italicised
text noting items that were more likely to receive a license to export. The next
two pages show 1564 as it appeared in the 1976 lists (British Government,
1976, p. 317-318), and using this image of the lists we can ask, ‘how many
technologies are controlled here?’
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One answer to ‘how many technologies are on the list?’ is that there are four,
as noted in the title of 1564 : electronic component assemblies; sub-assemblies;
printed circuit boards; and microcircuits. But are these technologies, or are
they categories of technology, a container for more defined items that might
be presented in an export license request? There were many different items
which may have been presented for export which could all have had the label
‘microcircuit’, and there were many items which did not fall under the label
because they did not meet the further elaborated criteria.
If we look a level down then, we find that 1564(c) ‘microcircuits’ is actually
four different things: monolithic integrated circuits; multichip microcircuits;
hybrid microcircuits; and film type microcircuits. If we accept that ‘microcir-
cuits’ is a category of technology composing these four items, then might each
of these be considered a technology which could be controlled? They might, but
only if they did not fall into one of the further sub-categories, sub-subcategories,
or sub-sub-subcategories, all of which are covered in an exception clause. But
even if it did fall into one of those sub-sub-subcategories, it still might not be
controlled if it had certain characteristics. Thus 1564(c)(2) encapsulated and
tested circuits which are 1564(c)(2)(ii) encapsulated and tested circuits11 that
are not designed or rated as radiation hardened and that are packaged in TO-5
outline cases or non-hermetically sealed cases, would only be controlled if they
could not be considered (5) operational amplifiers that met characteristics (a)
through (e).
We are almost there. We have now reached the Explanatory Notes and
the italicised notes, which as noted above describe items that were likely to
receive a favourable license application review. Thus, given all of the above, our
‘technology’ on the Industrial List seems to have become entirely ambiguous.
The ‘interpretative flexibility’ of the lists, to use Bijker’s (1993) terminology,
has been narrowed, but at the same time it is clear that the technologies to
which the broad categories of text refer (e.g. ‘computers’) are no longer the
11Yes, the exact label is applied to both 1564(c)(2) and 1564(c)(2)(ii).
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“robust pockets of interpretation in a sea of interpretively flexible texts” that
Woolgar notes technologies usually are (Woolgar, 1991, p. 39).
How many technologies are controlled? It is impossible to say for several
reasons. First, by using an exception clause, 1564 controls everything but a
small section of ‘microcircuits’. This is like asking, “how many widgets are in
the box?” and getting the answer, “no widgets that are blue are in the box.”
A stronger argument for why we cannot count how many technologies are
on the lists is that ‘technology’ is actually a container phrase. It does not refer
to an artefact or set of practices so much as it refers to a set of characteristics
that those artefacts or practices (or indeed knowledge) might embody. As the
lists get more complex and items on the lists become more defined, what we
are seeing is a negotiation that involves finding a characteristic of a technology
which satisfies the different framings of the problem of dual-use technology.
Rather than defining a technology that is controlled, the actors making the
changes to the lists are creating a new container, a new collection of charac-
teristics. They are inscribing the technology, rather than describing it. In so
doing, they are trying to decide between the many characteristics that might be
included. That is, they are working with the ambiguity of technology. Which
characteristics are finally inscribed are ones that allow enough ambiguity to
remain in the technology so that each of the framings is heard and responded
to (see Schwarz & Thompson, 1990).
The 1980s saw a major expansion in the text of the lists, particularly in
electronics, where IL 1565 —computer controls—had not changed in nearly a
decade (British Government, 1985, 1987). And by 1990, the lists had grown
both lop-sided—with extensive control text on some Groups and virtually none
on others—and still out-dated. The rolling review process adopted in the sec-
ond half of the 1980s was moving too slowly for many members who wanted to
see more technologies removed (Noehrenberg, 1995, p. 78–79).
There are several points about these lists that deserve mention here. First,
the numbering of the Industrial List (IL), generated in a time when the list
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was still largely a list of technologies, was by now seen as inadequate, because
CoCom members were trying instead to list parameters of technologies. The IL
was broken into eight Groups, each with 100 possible divisions (i.e. from 1000–
1099 for Group A). Not all of these divisions were used. When the numbered
divisions were first introduced, the gaps between them seemed highly arbitrary
and likely reflected either the perception of future needs to control technology
which might have fallen in between two divisions, or else were the result of
an initial culling of the lists that were used to generate the first CoCom lists
(Yasuhara, 1991). Within each division, technologies and parameters were
listed in the order in which they were added to the list. As the list shifted to
describing parameters of technologies, it was no longer adequate just to have
a standardised organisation of the Groups and the divisions (numbers) within
Groups. There needed to be more organisation.
Secondly, the IL was by now riddled with Notes, Technical Notes, and N.B.s.
For instance, Figure 5.3 shows IL 1519, which is only 21 lines long without the
Notes. These notes, combined with the layout of the pages, make it difficult
to understand where one is in the lists—particularly when a division may go
on for pages—and the precise classification an item would have to come under
in order to be controlled (or licensed for an exception to a control). More
importantly, there was not a consistent pattern of when each type of note was
used.
Another point of note, as also shown by Figure 5.3, is that, as of March
1990, the IL was massively lop-sided. Many divisions had been deleted. Group
B, for example, had only IL 1110, IL 1129, IL 1131, and IL 1145. Similarly,
some divisions had grown enormously long, such as IL 1565, which laid out
the characteristics of computers that were controlled. Most of the IL Groups
were under 10 pages each—Group B was under one page—while Groups F &
G ‘Electronic equipment including communications, radar, computer hardware
and software’ were combined and totalled 56 pages. This lop-sidedness demon-
strated that different types of technologies were of strategic value in the 1980s
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Figure 5.3: IL 1519 (British Government, 1990)
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and 1990s from those in the 1950s. It also showed cracks in the underlying
system of classification.
The Core List revision
In 1989–1990, there were growing concerns about the credibility of CoCom,
voiced by CoCom members themselves, as a result of the end of the Cold
War and the rapid transformation occurring in East-West relations. The US
attempted to appease these concerns by offering to ease licensing for many
technologies on the lists, but this offer was met by resistance by West Germany
and other West European members (Mastanduno, 1992, p. 332), who were
arguing for more drastic revisions of the lists (Magnusson, 1990). In June
of 1990, such drastic revisions began to occur with the ‘Core List’ revision,
where members started with no technologies on the lists and had to justify any
item that they wanted to include, rather than starting with the current lists
and placing the burden of justification on those who wanted to take items off.
They also threw out the old structure of the lists.
“The very idea of controlling a short list of only the most sensitive items
was not new,” Mastanduno (1992, p. 334) notes. “It had been the ‘ideal’
preference of West European governments in CoCom, particularly the French,
for at least a decade.” The new ‘Core List’ can be seen in the September
1991 publication by the British Government (1991a), shown in Figure 5.4. Its
structure, completely revamped, resembles much more closely the structure of
the Wassenaar lists than the previous CoCom lists.
Throwing out the old lists can be seen as a major coup for the competitive
framing, as it showed the anomalous status of many of the items on the In-
dustrial List. However, this framing was not able to seat its myth—the open
market solution (Rayner, 1994, p. 20–21)—as the hegemonic one, nor did it
necessarily want to. From the perspective of this framing, the view of a sin-
gle classificatory scheme for all technology (and correspondingly all patterns
of social relations) is anathema. The role of the competitive framing will be
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Figure 5.4: Table of Contents from British Government (1991a)
explored in more detail when we look at specific list changes in the following
chapters.
We can now see that the lists have a rich history in CoCom. They began
as simple alphabetical lists of technologies and changed over the course of
forty years to be highly structured lists of parameters of technology. This
change can be seen as representative of the hegemonic institutionalisation of
the hierarchical myth of control. Throughout this time, though, the competitive
framing was continually competing for power.
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While there are significant differences between the overall structure of Co-
Com and Wassenaar as organisations, as we saw in the last chapter, the lists
with which Wassenaar started are essentially the ones with which CoCom
ended. What the New Forum provided was a chance once again to reassess
the lists, but also to clearly define their structure and content. It did so by
creating the Guidelines for the Drafting of Lists and by defining many of the
common terms they used in the lists. I incorporate a discussion of these aspects
of the lists into the overview of the Wassenaar lists below.
5.3 The Wassenaar lists
While the Wassenaar Arrangement has two main lists of controlled items that
came out of the New Forum—the Munitions List and the Dual-Use List12—it
also has a set of auxiliary documents attached to the lists. These consist of:
a list of definitions of common terms in the lists that have specific meanings;
a table of acronyms and abbreviations; and a collection of Statements of Un-
derstandings and Validity Notes. Statements of Understandings are “aimed at
providing common ground for the understanding of the issue and at provid-
ing guidance to Participating States” (Wassenaar Arrangement, 2008d, p. 4).
Validity Notes are “agreement[s] by Participating States to review a certain
list entry before the end of a specific period of time, in the light of experi-
ence gained and technological developments” (Wassenaar Arrangement, 2008d,
p. 4). If they do not review the text before the validity note runs out, then the
text automatically reverts to the previous addition.13 This is a key way that
the debate between views about the definition of text can be maintained while
still modifying the lists. It is therefore a signifier of anomalies that are having
difficulty being incorporated into the classification system, which means that
the other framings are trying to use the technology in question to point out the
12The Atomic Energy List was subsumed by the Zangger Committee.
13Interview with British Former Government Official, 3 June 2008.
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inadequacy of the system as a whole. This is a way of holding the dominant
framing to account.
Unlike CoCom, these lists are implemented only at national discretion.
France, Russia, and the Ukraine actually view the list, not as a control list, but
as a reference list, as shown in Figure 5.5.14 One methodological point needs
to be mentioned here. I have chosen to provide figures of key pieces of text
rather than copy the text because the configuration of the text on the page
also is significant in much of my analysis. For example, the use of a footnote
here instead of an in-text note suggests that this behaviour has only mild ap-
proval. It is also worth noting that the Arrangement lacks a directed focus for
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
DUAL-USE LIST - CATEGORY 9 – AEROSPACE AND PROPULSION 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
WA-LIST (07) 2 
- 128 - 06-12-2007 
 
9. A. SYSTEMS, EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS
 
N.B. For propulsion systems designed or rated against neutron or transient 
ionizing radiation, see the Munitions List.*  
 
9. A. 1. Aero gas turbine engines having any of the following: 
   a. Incorporating any of the technologies specified by 9.E.3.a.; or
Note 9.A.1.a. does not apply to aero gas turbine engines which meet all 
of the following: 
a. Certified by the civil aviation authority in a Participating 
State; and
b. Intended to power non-military manned aircraft for which any 
of the following has been issued by a Participating State for 
the aircraft with this specific engine type: 
1. A civil type certificate; or 
2. An equivalent document recognised by the International 
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). 
 
   b. Designed to power an aircraft designed to cruise at Mach 1 or higher, for 
more than 30 minutes. 
 
9. A. 2. 'Marine gas turbine engines' with an ISO standard continuous power rating of 
24,245 kW or more and a specific fuel consumption not exceeding 0.219 kg/kWh 
in the power range from 35 to 100%, and specially designed assemblies and 
components therefor. 
Note The term 'marine gas turbine engines' includes those industrial, or 
aero-derivative, gas turbine engines adapted for a ship's electric power 
generation or propulsion. 
 
9. A. 3. Specially designed assemblies and components, incorporating any of the 
"technologies" specified by 9.E.3.a., for gas turbine engine propulsion systems 
and having any of the following: 
   a. Specified by 9.A.1. or; 
   b. Whose design or production origins are either non-participating states or 
unknown to the manufacturer. 
 
9. A. 4. Space launch vehicles and "spacecraft". 
Note 9.A.4. does not apply to payloads. 
N.B. For the status of products contained in "spacecraft" payloads, 
see the appropriate Categories. 
 
9. A. 5. Liquid rocket propulsion systems containing any of the systems or components, 
specified by 9.A.6. 
                                                 
* France, the Russian Federation and Ukraine view this list as reference drawn up to help in the 
selection of dual-use goods which could contribute to the indigenous development, production or 
enhancement of conventional munitions capabilities. 
Figure 5.5: Dual-Use List as ‘reference list’ rather than ‘control list’ (Wassenaar
Arrangement, 2007b)
the controls, thereby making a ‘strategic embargo’ such as existed in CoCom
more difficult. The lists can no longer be tailored to a particular threat, but
must instead address the more general threat of ‘destabilising accumulations’
of technology.
The Munitions List
The Munitions List (ML) is fairly straightforward, consisting of 22 categories
and covering 24 pages. Some categories, such as ML16, are only a few lines
long, others are a few pages. There are typically a handful of changes to
the ML each year. There are a few ‘Notes’ and very infrequent specification
of parameters in this list. It is therefore still largely a list of technologies.
14All figures are from the 2007 Corrected version of the Dual-Use List unless otherwise
noted.
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These technologies include aircraft, ships, and land vehicles; guns and their
attachments; explosives and propellants; fire control equipment; chemical and
biological agents; electronic equipment; armour; military training equipment;
imaging and countermeasure equipment; directed energy weapons; and ‘su-
perconductive’ equipment. Most of these technologies, in order to fall in the
Munitions List, need to be ‘specially designed for military use’. However, they
do not have to be ‘finished products’ (ML16 ). In addition to those technologies
of direct use in military operations, the Munitions List also controls:
ML17. Miscellaneous equipment, materials and libraries, as fol-
lows, and specially designed components therefor: . . .
ML18. Equipment for the production of products referred to in
the Munitions List, as follows:
a. Specially designed or modified production equipment for
the production of products controlled by the Munitions
List, and specially designed components therefore;
b. Specially designed environmental test facilities and spe-
cially designed equipment therefor, for the certification,
qualification or testing of products on the Munitions List.
. . .
ML21. “Software” as follows: . . .
ML22. “Technology” as follows: . . .
ML21 and ML22 will be discussed below when talking about the more
general meaning of those terms. ML17 contains a random assortment of tech-
nologies that do not fit neatly into the other categories. Again, this is another
example of a ‘residual category’ (Bowker & Star, 1999). Watching this cate-
gory’s size is therefore a useful way to judge the adequacy of the structure of
the list—if ML17 becomes the longest category, it will likely be time to mod-
ify the categories themselves. ML18 is an extremely broad category, covering
any tool specially designed to produce any technology that is listed on the list.
While these technologies may have non-military applications, if they are ‘spe-
cially designed’ to produce technologies controlled by the Munitions List, then
they are controlled. What constitutes being specially designed for military use
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is an interesting question, but is not the focus of this thesis. It is enough here
to note that when something is considered specially designed for military use,
it no longer falls in the ‘dual-use’ category. This provides a clear boundary in
the overall classification system (recall Figure 4.1).
Table 5.4: Categories of the Dual-Use List
Category 1 – Advanced Materials
Category 2 – Materials Processing
Category 3 – Electronics
Category 4 – Computers
Category 5 – Part 1 – Telecommunications
Category 5 – Part 2 – “Information Security”
Category 6 – Sensors and “Lasers”
Category 7 – Navigation and Avionics
Category 8 – Marine
Category 9 – Aerospace and Propulsion
Table 5.5: Sections of the Dual-Use List Categories
A – Systems, Equipment, and Components
B – Test, Inspection, and Production Equipment
C – Materials
D – Software
E – Technology
The Dual-Use List
The Dual-Use List, however, is much more complex. As shown in Table 5.4,
it is composed of the categories agreed to for the September 1991 CoCom list.
As noted above, a key aspect of the revised list is that it has a more com-
plex structure. Each Category is now divided into five Sections, as shown in
Table 5.5.15 Later categories are also meant to build on earlier ones. Thus,
15These are reproduced in Appendix B for ease of reference in later chapters.
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Category 9 (Aerospace & Propulsion) may control an ‘unmanned aerial vehi-
cle’, but the gyroscope in it may be controlled in Category 7 (Navigation and
Avionics), and the circuitry used to make the gyroscope may be controlled
in Category 3 (Electronics).16 The list also has two sub-lists: the Sensitive
List and the Very Sensitive List. The Sensitive List is for “key elements di-
rectly related to the indigenous development, production, use or enhancement
of advanced conventional military capabilities whose proliferation would signif-
icantly undermine the objectives of the Wassenaar Arrangement” (Wassenaar
Arrangement, 2004a). The Very Sensitive List has almost the same require-
ments, “key elements essential for the indigenous development, production, use
or enhancement of the most advanced conventional military capabilities whose
proliferation would significantly undermine the objectives of the Wassenaar
Arrangement” (emphasis added, Wassenaar Arrangement, 2004b).
The balance between competing framings of the problem of dual-use tech-
nology over the Dual-Use List definitions, and the hegemony of the hierarchical
framing, is clearly present in the following quote:17
What do [Participating States] see as [the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment’s] purpose and how do they internally work at it? As X com-
mented a minute ago, for the United States, I think it’s pretty much
a balance between- the purpose of it is national security. For us
there’s no ambiguity about that. For us it’s national security. But,
we strive in what we’re doing to find a balance between national
security and commercial interests. Our perspective is very much
driven by the notion that you have controls on technology- limiting
who can get access to technology is the national security purpose
of Wassenaar. At the same time, whenever you’re doing that, you
have to recognise that you are creating impediments, grit in the
system, for regular commerce. And that regular commerce- United
States leadership in regular commerce, United States leadership in
commercial technologies, their development, their production, etc,
is also a national security interest.
16Specific example used in Interview with Wassenaar Secretariat Official C, 13 June 2007.
17Interview with US State Department Official A & US State Department Official B on 11
September 2006. I have changed the name of the interviewee referred to in the quote to ‘X’.
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Multiple words, multiple meanings
We will get into more detail about the structure of the lists in the specific
case studies in following chapters. Here, we pause to consider some definitional
issues. Up until this point, I have used the word ‘technology’ in its common
usage definition. One would imagine that an organisation focused on defining
dual-use and military technology would have a definition of technology itself,
and it does. However, as shown in Figure 5.6—and as I first pointed out
in Chapter 2 when discussing the concept of technology—this definition only
pertains to a fraction of the items on the lists.
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
DEFINITIONS 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
  WA-LIST (07) 2 Corr. 
 06-12-2007 - 203 - 
 
Cat 1 "Superconductive" 
Cat 3, 6 Refers to materials,(i.e., metals, alloys or compounds) which can lose 
Cat 8 all electrical resistance (i.e., which can attain infinite electrical 
ML18, 20 conductivity and carry very large electrical currents without Joule heating). 
 Technical Note
 The "superconductive" state of a material is individually characterised by a 
"critical temperature", a critical magnetic field, which is a function of 
temperature, and a critical current density which is, however, a function of 
both magnetic field and temperature. 
 
Cat 6  "Super High Power Laser" ("SHPL") 
  A "laser" capable of delivering (the total or any portion of) the output 
energy exceeding 1 kJ within 50 ms or having an average or CW power 
exceeding 20 kW. 
 
Cat 1 "Superplastic forming" 
Cat 2 A deformation process using heat for metals that are normally characterised by 
low values of elongation (less than 20%) at the breaking point as determined at 
room temperature by conventional tensile strength testing, in order to achieve 
elongations during processing which are at least 2 times those values. 
 
Cat 5  " Symmetric algorithm " 
  A cryptographic algorithm using an identical key for both encryption and 
decryption. 
  Technical Note
 A common use of "symmetric algorithms" is confidentiality of data. 
 
Cat 6  "System tracks" 
  Processed, correlated (fusion of radar target data to flight plan position) and 
updated aircraft flight position report available to the Air Traffic Control 
centre controllers. 
 
Cat 4 "Systolic array computer" 
  A compu er wh re the flow and modification of the data is dynamically 
controllable at the logic gate level by the user. 
 
GTN & "Technology" 
Both Lists Specific information necessary for the "development", "production" or 
"use" of a product.  The information takes the form of technical data or 
technical assistance.  Controlled "technology" for the Dual-Use List is 
defined in the General Technology Note and in the Dual-Use List.  
Controlled “technology” for the Munitions List is specified in ML22. 
Technical Notes
 1. 'Technical data' may take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, 
models, formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, 
manuals and instructions written or recorded on other media or 
devices such as disk, tape, read-only memories. 
 2. 'Technical assistance' may take forms such as instruction, skills, 
training, working knowledge, consulting services. 'Technical 
assistance' may involve transfer of 'technical data'. 
 
Figure 5.6: Definition of ‘technology’ (Wassenaar Arrangement, 2007b)
In Wassenaar discussions, therefore, ‘technology’ only refers to a small part
of the things controlled. In particular, it refers to information in the form of
‘technical data’ and ‘technical assistance’. This is the ‘knowledge’ aspect of
the rough definition of technology that I employ in this thesis: any human
construction coupled with the practices and knowledge of how to engage that
construction towards a particular end. The ‘technology’ that is controlled is
defined in the list itself, but there is also a definition of ‘controlled technology’
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in the General Technology Note (Figure 5.7), which comes at the beginning of
the Dual-Use List. We will return to why the Wassenaar Arrangement chose to
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
DUAL-USE LIST 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Note Terms in "quotations" are defined terms.  Refer to 'Definitions of Terms used in these 
Lists' annexed to this List. 
 
 
 
GENERAL TECHNOLOGY NOTE 
 
 
The export of "technology" which is "required" for the "development", "production" or "use" 
of items controlled in the Dual-Use List is controlled according to the provisions in each 
Category.  This "technology" remains under control even when applicable to any 
uncontrolled item. 
 
Controls do not apply to that "technology" which is the minimum necessary for the 
installation, operation, maintenance (checking) and repair of those items which are not 
controlled or whose export has been authorised. 
 
Note This does not release such "technology" controlled in entries 1.E.2.e. & 1.E.2.f. and 
8.E.2.a. & 8.E.2.b. 
 
Controls do not apply to "technology" "in the public domain", to "basic scientific research" or 
to the minimum necessary information for patent applications. 
 
 
GENERAL SOFTWARE NOTE 
 
 
The Lists do not control "software" which is either: 
 
1. Generally available to the public by being: 
 
 a. Sold from stock at retail selling points without restriction, by means of: 
  1. Over-the-counter transactions; 
  2. Mail order transactions; 
  3. Electronic transactions; or
  4. Telephone call transactions; and
 
 b. Designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by the 
supplier; or 
 
Note Entry 1 of the General Software Note does not release "software" controlled by 
Category 5 - Part 2 ("Information Security"). 
 
2. "In the public domain". 
   WA-LIST (07) 2 
 06-12-2007 - 3 - 
Figure 5.7: Definition of ‘controlled technology’ (Wassenaar Arrangement,
2007b)
have such a narrow definition of technology in a moment, but for now we must
ask, “If ‘technology’ is so narrowly defined, then what are all the other things on
the list called?” The answer is that there is no single name for them. Having
used the term ‘technology’, it appears that the list refers to everything else
using a variety of te ms, namely ‘goods’, ‘systems’, ‘equipment’, ‘components’,
‘materials’, ‘software’, ‘products’, and ‘items’. Let us see if he e is any order
behind which term is used when.
The most obvious place that the term ‘goods’ occurs is in the name of the or-
ganisation: The Wassenaar Arrangement for Export Controls on Conventional
Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies. That, however, is virtually its
sole occurrence. The term is used once in 1.A.2.‘Note 2’ to describe ‘sport-
ing goods’ and in four other places in the list where it refers to the list as a
whole (2.A.‘N.B.’, 2.B.4.‘N.B.’, 6.A.5.f.‘N.B.’, and 9.A.‘N.B.’ ).18 The latter
18For help on locating references to the list, please see Appendix B.
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instances are of note in their own right as they are part of a clarification on
the purpose of the lists.
As can be seen in Figure 5.5, ‘goods’ occur in a footnote to nota benes in
the text, making clear that France, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine see
the list as a ‘reference’ “to help in the selection of dual-use goods”. A ‘good’,
then can be understood to mean anything that is on the Dual-Use List that is
not ‘technology’.
‘Systems’, ‘equipment’, ‘components’, and ‘materials’ refer to subsections
of Dual-Use List categories, as does ‘software’. ‘Software’, however, also has
its own definition, as shown in Figure 5.8.
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
DEFINITIONS 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
  WA-LIST (07) 2 Corr. 
 06-12-2007 - 201 - 
Cat 1 "Rotary atomisation" 
  A process to reduce a stream or pool of molten metal to droplets to a 
diameter of 500 µm or less by centrifugal force. 
 
Cat 2 "Run out" (out-of-true running) 
  Radial displacement in one revolution of the main spindle measured in a plane 
perpendicular to the spindle axis at a point on the external or internal revolving 
surface to be tested (Reference: ISO 230/1-1986, paragraph 5.61). 
 
Cat 7 "Scale factor" (gyro or accelerometer) 
  The ratio of change in output to a change in the input intended to be 
measured. Scale factor is generally evaluated as the slope of the straight line 
that can be fitted by the method of least squares to input-output data 
obtained by varying the input cyclically over the input range. 
 
Cat 3 "Settling time" 
  The time required for the output to come within ne-half bit of the final 
value when switching between any two levels of the converter. 
 
Cat 6  "SHPL" 
 "SHPL" is equivale t o "Super High Power L ser". 
 
C t 3  "Signal analysers" 
  Apparatus capable of measuring and displaying basic properties of the 
single-frequency components of multi-frequency signals. 
 
Cat 3 "Signal processing" 
Cat 4 The processing of externally derived information- 
Cat 5 bearing signals by algorithms such as time 
Cat 6 compression, filtering, extraction, selection, correlation, convolution or 
transformations between domains (e.g., fast Fourier transform or Walsh 
transform). 
 
Both "Software" 
Lists A collection of one or more "programmes" or "microprogrammes" fixed in 
any tangible medium of expression. 
 
  "Solidify rapidly" 
  A process involving the solidification of molten material at cooling rates 
exceeding 1 000 K/sec. 
 
Cat 4 "Source code" 
Cat 5, 6 A convenient expression of one or more processes which may be 
Cat 7, 9 turned by a programming system into equipment executable form ("object 
code" (or object language)). 
 
Cat 7 "Spacecraft" 
Cat 9 Active and passive satellites and space probes. 
Figure 5.8: Definition of ‘software’ (Wassenaar Arrangement, 2007b)
For ‘products’ and ‘items’, the analysis becomes ore difficult. When re-
ferring to things commonly known as technology, the term ‘product’ appears
about a dozen times in the lists. In all occurrences apart from ML16 and
ML18, ‘product’ is always found in a Note or a definition.19 The definitional
occurrences appear in ‘development’, ‘required’, ‘space-qualified’, and most in-
terestingly, ‘technology’. Returning to Figure 5.6, we notice that ‘product’ is
the thing that ‘technology’ is used to ‘develop’, ‘produce’, or ‘use’, and thus
should refer to other things on the list.
The most explicit term used to describe things on the lists, however, is
‘item’. It first occurs in the Table of Contents referring to each section of the
Munitions List (“Items 1 to 22. . . ”). It then occurs in the General Technology
19The non-definitional occurrences are 1.C.‘Technical Note’, 4.A.3.c.‘Note 2’,
5.‘Part 2’.‘Note 2’, 9.A.4.‘Note’.‘N.B.’, ML8.c.‘Note 1’, ML16, ML18.a, ML18.b,
and ML18.‘Note’.f
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Note in a similar capacity to ‘product’.20 It appears in a number of Notes,21 in
the Munitions List a few times22, and in the definition of ‘nuclear reactor’. It
also occurs four times in the Statements of Understanding and Validity Notes,
which are appended on to the end of the lists. It refers to both ‘goods’ and
‘technology’. But what gives this term the most weight is its use outside of
the lists. It occurs over a hundred times in the Basic Documents compilation,
including extensively in the Initial Elements (Wassenaar Arrangement, 2007a),
and is also the only one of these terms used in the original Guidelines for the
Drafting of Lists document, where it is defined as “anything which may be
presented for export” (Hathway, 1996, p.12).23 I will therefore now use the
term item whenever I refer to the ‘containers of parameters’ on the lists. I
will continue to use technology as I defined it before, namely as any human
construction coupled with the practices and knowledge of how to engage that
construction towards a particular end. When I need to refer to ‘technology’ as
defined in the lists, I will enclose the word in single quotes.
Guidelines for the Drafting of Lists
When deciding how to structure the lists during the New Forum, the Drafting
Group came up with a set of guidelines. These Guidelines for the Drafting of
Lists24 were revised in 2007-2008 (Wassenaar Arrangement, 2008d), and I have
included an exact reproduction of both versions in Appendix G.25 I encourage
the reader to take a moment to browse through them before continuing, as a
working knowledge of them will greatly aid in following the technicalities of the
list modifications I analyse in the next chapter.
20See Figure 5.7.
211.A.2.‘Note 2’, 2.D.‘Note 2’, 3.A.1.b.4.’Note 2’, 5.‘Part 2’.‘Note 3’, 5.‘Part 2’.‘Note 3’.e,
6.A.3.b.4.‘Note 3’.c.‘Note’, 6.A.3.b.4.‘Note 4’.‘Note’.
22ML4.a, ML4.b, ML5.c, ML5.d, ML7.‘Note 2’, ML.8.‘Technical Notes’.1,
ML.8.‘Technical Notes’.2, ML17.n, ML17.‘Technical Notes’.2, ML22.a, ML22.b.1,
ML22.‘Note 1’, ML22.‘Note 2’.a.
23Unfortunately, this definition disappeared in the revised version of the Guidelines.
24Hereafter referred to as Guidelines.
25This is the first time either version of the Guidelines has been made public.
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The Guidelines document itself is very structured, with the revised version
having its own table of contents and hierarchical numbering system. The first
thing to note about the current version of the Guidelines is Section III.1, the
‘General Principle’ used in drafting control text. It begins by laying out the
difference between the Dual-Use List and the Munitions List:
There is a difference in approach to controls specified in the Dual-
Use List from those specified in the Munitions List. Controls in the
Dual-Use List rely on greater specificity for the controlled items and
are evaluated against the agreed selection criteria. The nature of
military goods requires less specificity.
This clearly shows the boundary between dual-use and military items. Mil-
itary items are ones that do not require the negotiation between different fram-
ings of technology in order to be inscribed on the Munitions List. Establishing
that they are ‘specially designed for military use’ is sufficient to override any
other parameter of the technology. The ambiguities of the technology are not
of concern, and therefore the item does not need as much specificity.26
Dual-use items, on the other hand, do not have this overriding parameter,
and as such their ambiguities must be negotiated with more ‘specificity’ in
order to find ‘criteria’ that each framing can ‘agree’ to. Section III.3. of the
Guidelines describes in some detail the need for clarity in the Dual-Use List,
which further supports this claim.
For the Dual-Use List, clear and objective specifications should in-
clude control parameters known by industry and associated con-
trol thresholds or technical characteristics/performance. Control
text should break out the overall specification into clearly identified
characteristics and the combination in which they are to be met. A
combination of parameters may be designated using the terms and
or or. And is used when more than one parameter must be met
to satisfy the conditions for control and or is used when there are
different alternatives for satisfying the conditions for control. At
times and and or may be used in combination to clearly specify
the items to be controlled. However, such complex combinations
26The rest of the Guidelines therefore focuses mainly on the structure of the Dual-Use
List.
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are not always possible, especially where technology or software is
concerned.
Wherever possible the use of decontrol Notes and illustrative lists
of controlled items should be avoided. On a case by case basis they
may be used when necessary.
This is a clear statement of the dominance of a highly structured and tightly
bound classification of technology, marking it high on both the grid and group
axes, and therefore representative of the hierarchical framing.
Finally, this section argues that “[s]ubjective controls, which are based on
end-use, should be avoided. A subjective control is a control that treats an item
differently if it is used for a different purpose.” This is essentially negating the
‘designed for a purpose’ parameter that delimits dual-use and munitions items.
By delegitimising any criteria based on use, the Guildelines are constraining
the ambiguity of the technology. An entire class of ambiguities, the use of
the technology, is eliminated except for ‘military use’. However, there are
exceptions to every rule, and the Guidelines provide an example of what not
to do that is taken from the actual Dual-Use List, as shown in Figure 5.9.
Wassenaar Restric ed 
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Page 5 of 13 
Wherever possible the use of decontrol Notes and illu trative lists of controlled items 
should be avoided.  On a case by case basis they may be used when necessary.  
 
To further clarify the scope of controls, Nota Bene, Technical Notes, and/or Notes can be 
added to the control text. 
 
Definitions can also be used to clarify the scope of controls when, for WA export control 
considerations, the meaning of a word/term differs from that of common usage.  
 
Subjective controls, which are based on end-use, should be avoided.  A subjective control is 
a control that treats an item differently if it is used for a different purpose. 
Example: 
3. A. 1. a. 2. "Microprocessor microcircuits", "microcomputer microcircuits", … 
Note 3.A.1.a.2. does not apply to integrated circuits for civil 
automobile or railway train applications. 
 
2. Entry Structure (see examples in Annex 1) 
 
Each entry should comprise all or some of the following elements, as required: 
a. Chapeau as required to introduce sub-entries 
b. Sub-entries 
c. Note 
d. Technical Note 
e. Nota Bene 
 
a. Chapeau 
 
The chapeau identifies the items to be controlled.  The chapeau may introduce 
control parameters but more detailed parameters may be listed in sub-entries.  Where 
the controls for a particular entry can be written without ambiguity in a single 
paragraph, it should stand alone in the form of a chapeau.  When a sub-entry is 
required, the chapeau identifies the items to be controlled in any associated sub-
entry.  It is essential that the chapeau covers all items intended to be controlled by a 
given entry.  For clarity, when a chapeau contains a parameter between the items 
intended for control and one of the enumerating phrases, “as follows”, “any of the 
following”, or “all of the following”, an “and” should be inserted between the 
parameter and the enumerating phrase. 
 
b. Sub-entries 
 
Where an entry consists of a list of several sub-entries, characteristics or 
specifications, the chapeau should introduce the list of sub-entries by the enumerating 
phrases …having all of the following, having any of the following, … as follows or 
some variation of these.  By convention, the enumerating phrases …having all of the 
following, having any of the following, require the use of the conjunctions and or or, 
respectively.  The conjunction should only be placed before the last sub-entry and 
underlined.  The different sub-entries should be separated by a semi-colon. 
 
The enumerating phrase as follows does not require the use of a conjunction.  
 
Figure 5.9: Constraining ambiguity by disallowing subjective controls (Wassenaar
Arrange ent, 2008d, p. 5)
The Guidelines then continue by describing the structure of an individual
entry, as shown in Figure 5.10. An ‘entry’ may be found generally in the third,
fourth, and occasionally fifth levels of the list, i.e. an entry could have sub-
entries which in turn could have sub-sub-entries. It begins with a ‘chapeau’,27
which is a container for all the items to be controlled:
27‘Chapeau’ is French for ‘a hat’. This nicely supports my argument that entries are
containers rather than technologies.
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Chapeau the entry
Sub-entries consisting of either further entries or characteristics of
the entry
Note used to clarify what is or is not included in the control. “A
Note must not expand the scope of control”
Technical Note used to: clarify meaning; provide test methods; de-
fine alternative terms; or provide local definitions.
Nota Bene usually references another Category or item, “which
should also be reviewed to determine control status.”
Figure 5.10: Individual entry structure in Guidelines. (not actual image)
(Wassenaar Arrangement, 2008d)
The chapeau may introduce control parameters but more detailed
parameters may be listed in sub-entries. Where the controls for a
particular entry can be written without ambiguity in a single para-
graph, it should stand alone in the form of a chapeau. When a
sub-entry is required, the chapeau identifies the items to be con-
trolled in any associated sub-entry. It is essential that the chapeau
covers all items intended to be controlled by a given entry (III. 2. a.).
This structure is very clearly followed in the lists. There are of course
exceptions. In my discussions with one of the leaders of the revision of these
Guidelines, he pointed out how hard it was actually to find a piece of text on
the lists that was a perfect example of how the list should be written. The
trend, however, has been a yearly reduction of the exceptions, rather than an
ever-increasing number of them, as had been the case before the 1990-1991
CoCom list revision. The year 2008 was the first where Wassenaar used the
revised Guidelines. One will be able to tell how much these Guidelines are
adhered to by monitoring the types of changes on the lists. It is important
to note that the Guidelines lay out the structure of the lists, but they do not
lay out how to change that structure. Major changes to the list, such as the
possibility of creating a Category 10 for terrorism technology, do not as yet
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have an established procedure for discussion or implementation.
This analysis of the Guidelines has shown that the Dual-Use List of the
Wassenaar Arrangement clearly controls parameters of technology rather than
technology itself. It has also shown the degree to which the hierarchical framing
has embedded itself as the hegemonic myth. We now turn to a brief discussion
of the proposal process used to make changes to the lists.
The proposal process
In order to make changes to the lists, Participating States of the Wassenaar
Arrangement engage in a proposal process that takes at least one year. There
are many ways that ideas come for proposing changes to the lists, as will be
shown in the following chapters. Here, we will only look at the logistics of the
process, as the detail will be addressed in the following chapters. The process
typically begins in winter with the identification of items that a State would like
to change and the development of a proposal. The proposal itself has thirteen
sections covering the desired changes to the text, the background for the change,
a justification, the satisfaction of the Criteria for Control (described below),
other changes that are needed, and any other information. A typical proposal
is provided below.28
28The name of the country has been ‘X’ed out
WA-EG (07) XX 010
07-02-2007
Page 1 of 4
WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT EXPERT GROUP - PROPOSAL
Submitting country XXX
Title of Proposal Fibre Lasers
Current text 6.A.5.a. Non-“tunable” continuous wave “(CW) lasers”, having any of 
the following:
1. …
2. …
3. …
4. …
5. …
6. An output wavelength exceeding 975 nm but not exceeding 
1,150 nm and having any of the following:
a. A single transverse mode output having any of the 
following:
1. A wall-plug efficiency exceeding 12% and an 
output power exceeding 100 W; or
2. An output power exceeding 150 W; or
b. A multiple transverse mode output having any of the 
following:
1. A wall-plug efficiency exceeding 18% and an 
output power exceeding 500 W; or
2. An output power exceeding 2 kW;
6.A.5.b. Non-“tunable” “pulsed lasers”, having any of the following:
1. …
2. …
3. …
4. …
5. …
6. An output wavelength exceeding 975 nm but not exceeding 
1,150 nm and having any of the following:
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a. A “pulse duration” of ………
b. A "pulse duration" exceeding 1 ns but not exceeding 1 
s, and having any of the following:
1. A single transverse mode output having any of the 
following:
a. A "peak power" exceeding 100 MW;
b. An "average output power" exceeding 20 W 
limited by design to a maximum pulse 
repetition frequency less than or equal to 1 
kHz;
c. A wall-plug efficiency exceeding 12% and an 
"average output power" exceeding 100 W and 
capable of operating at a pulse repetition 
frequency greater than 1 kHz;
d. An "average output power" exceeding 150 W 
and capable of operating at a pulse repetition 
frequency greater than 1 kHz; or
e. An output energy exceeding 2 J per pulse; or
Proposed text 6.A.5.a. Non-“tunable” continuous wave “(CW) lasers”, having any of 
the following:
1. …
2. …
3. …
4. …
5. …
6. An output wavelength exceeding 975 nm but not exceeding 
1,150 nm and having any of the following:
a. A single transverse mode output having any of the 
following:
1. A wall-plug efficiency exceeding 12% and
[a. A bandwidth not exceeding 100MHz 
and an output power exceeding 5 W; or
b. A bandwidth exceeding 100MHz and] an 
output power exceeding 100W; or
2. An output power exceeding 150 W; or
b. A multiple transverse mode output having any of the 
following:
1. A wall-plug efficiency exceeding 18% and an 
output power exceeding 500 W; or
2. An output power exceeding 2 kW;
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6.A.5.b. Non-“tunable” “pulsed lasers”, having any of the following:
1. …
2. …
3. …
4. …
5. …
6. An output wavelength exceeding 975 nm but not exceeding 
1,150 nm and having any of the following:
b. A "pulse duration" exceeding 1 ns but not exceeding 1 
s, and having any of the following:
1. A single transverse mode output having any of the 
following:
a. A "peak power" exceeding 100 MW;
b. An "average output power" exceeding 20 W 
limited by design to a maximum pulse 
repetition frequency less than or equal to 1 
kHz;
c. A wall-plug efficiency exceeding 12% and 
[1. A bandwidth not exceeding 100MHz 
and an “average output power” 
exceeding 5W; or
2. A bandwidth exceeding 100MHz and] 
an "average output power" exceeding 100 
W and capable of operating at a pulse 
repetition frequency greater than 1 kHz;
d. An "average output power" exceeding 150 W 
and capable of operating at a pulse repetition 
frequency greater than 1 kHz; or
e. An output energy exceeding 2 J per pulse; or
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Background Additional control parameters in items 6.A.5.a.6.a.1, 6.A.5.a.7.a, 
6.A.5.b.6.b.1.c, 6.A.5.b.6.c.1.b, 6.A.5.b.8 of the long term fix for very 
narrow bandwidth lasers in the 975-1555nm bandwidth.
The change from a technology based control to a parameter based control 
system necessitates the control of any new technology with military utility 
based on the parameters of the laser. Fibre lasers have developed apace 
and in late 2006 narrow bandwidth fibre lasers capable of efficient 
frequency doubling became commercially available. 
Technical justification Due to their low weight, small size and high efficiency (battery operated) 
the lasers present a viable method for producing a credible man-portable 
laser dazzle weapons. Dazzle for magnifying sights and image intensifiers 
would be greater and to greater ranges. Hazard distances to the unaided 
eye would be hundreds of metres to kilometres range for the powers 
available.
Major/key element New technology allows portable, efficient fibre lasers to be used as dazzle 
sources.
Foreign Availability Currently only available in the USA.
Controllability These lasers have only recently become available (Oct. 2006) so numbers 
are currently unknown.
Controlled in another 
regime?
No
Consequential 
changes?
No other changes are necessary.
Proposed Review Date
Other information www.ipgphotonics.com/products_1micron_lasers_singlefrequency_ylr-
lp-sfs.htm
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The first four sections are self-explanatory, though it is interesting to note
that the ‘Title of the Proposal’ uses a term that appears nowhere on the list.
This is further evidence that the list controls parameters, not technologies.
The ‘Background’ section provides the accepted rationale for proposing the
change. Note here too, that in this case, this proposal explicitly states there is
a “change from technology based control to a parameter based control system.”
In a proposal arguing to increase the scope of control, such as this one, the
‘Justification’ is usually based on the security need. In a proposal arguing for
a decrease in the scope of control, the ‘Justification’ is usually based on the
current text not meeting one of the four Criteria of Control listed next. These
criteria come from the Criteria for the selection of Dual-Use items (Wassenaar
Arrangement, 2005a), shown in Figure 5.11.
As we can see, in this case the Participating State is arguing that the item is
a “key element for the indigenous development, production, use or enhancement
of military capabilities,” that it is not available outside Participating States,
that it is likely that they can control it, and that it is not controlled by another
regime (such as the ZC, AG, or MTCR).29 Finally, there is a proposed review
date and any other information needed (i.e. the ‘residual category’).
The proposal is usually uploaded onto the
in early March, which gives the other countries time
to develop their positions on it by the first Expert Group (EG) meeting. At
the first EG meeting, proposals are divvied up and Technical Working Groups
(TWGs) are formed. Counter-proposals may also be offered. In an average
year there are roughly 60 proposals.30 On some of them agreement is reached
quickly and there is no need to form a TWG. Why this agreement is so quick
for some and not for others will be the topic of analysis for Chapter 6. At the
29The other criterion of control is “the ability to make a clear and objective specification
of the item,” which is done in Sections 3 and 4.
30Interview with Wassenaar Secretariat Official C, 13 June 2007 and Interview with British
Former Government Official, 8 March 2007.
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CRITERIA FOR THE SELECTION OF DUAL-USE ITEMS 
 
(as updated at the December 2005 Plenary) 
 
 
Dual-use goods and technologies to be controlled are those which are major or key 
elements for the indigenous development, production, use
1
 or enhancement of military 
capabilities
2
.  For selection purposes the dual-use items should also be evaluated against the 
following criteria: 
 
• Foreign availability outside Participating States. 
 
• The ability to control effectively the export of the goods. 
 
• The ability to make a clear and objective specification of the item. 
 
• Controlled by another regime
3
. 
                                                
1
  Use means operation, installation (including on-site installation), maintenance (checking), repair, overhaul and 
refurbishing. 
2
  Controlled by the Munitions List. 
3
  An item which is controlled by another regime should not normally qualify to be controlled by the Wassenaar 
Arrangement unless additional coverage proves to be necessary according to the purposes of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement, or when concerns and objectives are not identical. 
Figure 5.11: Criteria for the Selection of Dual-Use Items
end of the first two-week-long EG meeting, a poll is taken, as described above,
to determine each state’s stance on each proposal.
Over the course of the Summer, States engage in informal meetings of the
EG and bilateral relations to negotiate the text in an attempt to find parameters
and values of those parameters that satisfy each framing. This work culminates
in the Autumn EG meeting, also two weeks. If agreement is reached in the EG,
i.e. a ‘conditional agreement’ is reached, then the changed text is sent to the
Plenary for ratification. If agreement is not reached, the States decide whether
to throw the proposal out or to continue reviewing it again the next year. There
is an unspoken rule that a proposal can only be on the table for three years,
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after which it must be taken off and reformulated.31
Once the Plenary agrees to a change in the text of the lists, States must
implement that change in their national controls. The time needed to do this
varies from instantaneous, for countries that simply use the Wassenaar lists,
to almost a year because the text needs to be translated into a different list
structure or language. Thus, the time from the beginning of a proposal to
its implementation in export control systems is at least one year, and often
much longer. As a result, members of the EG must not only be aware of the
current state of technological development, but also where it is likely to go in
the time between the present and the actual implementation of the controls.
In some categories, this is not too difficult, but in others, where technology is
advancing generations in a few years, this can be a source of many difficulties
in the Arrangement, as will be shown in the next chapter when we look at
controls on computers.
5.4 Conclusion
International collaboration on export controls, and specifically on developing
lists of controlled technology, has been ongoing for at least the past three hun-
dred years. Early lists had many things on them that we may not consider
technology, such as food, grains, and gold. The first significant multilateral
initiative to harmonise national lists of items controlled for their military sig-
nificance was the 1909 Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval War, but
it steadily grew less useful to countries and was abandoned, along with the
concept of contraband, at the end of the Second World War.
It was replaced by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls, a group of seventeen countries that met regularly in the US Embassy
in Paris from 1950 through 1993. CoCom had three lists, of which the Industrial
List was the one that changed most often. As the text on the lists steadily grew
31Interview with US Defense Department Officials A & B, 5 February 2007.
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over the life of CoCom, the scope of the controls generally became narrower.
In the beginning of CoCom, the lists could be said to describe technologies
under control, such as ‘computers’. With time, the lists began instead to
define the parameters of controlled technology rather than the technology itself.
That is, the technologies under control became more qualified, more finely
defined, and therefore there were fewer technologies that were likely to meet
the specifications of control.
Along with more specification, there were numerous exemptions on the
lists, which made it impossible to say exactly how many technologies were
controlled. These exemptions and the ambiguity in the definitions themselves,
I have posited, are the outcomes of multiple framings of the problem of dual-use
technology interacting with each other over extended periods of time.
The Core List revision saw a shift in the institutional structure of CoCom
from being in a default position of control (i.e. when in doubt, the technology
is under control), to being in a default position of decontrol. The New Forum
reworked the lists again, but maintained the revised CoCom structure.
The Wassenaar Arrangement has two primary lists, the Munitions List and
the Dual-Use List. The Munitions List is clearly separated from the others
by covering all technologies designed for military use. It defines technologies
rather than parameters of technologies, much as the early CoCom lists did.
This is because the single criterion of ‘use’ is sufficient for any item to get onto
the list.
The Dual-Use List, in contrast, is much more complex and logically struc-
tured than the Munitions List and early CoCom lists. It is difficult to speak
of all of the things on the list as ‘technologies’, since ‘technology’ has a very
specific use within Wassenaar, only referring to the “specific information nec-
essary for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of a product” (Wassenaar
Arrangement, 2007b, p. 203). Instead, the best term to use to describe the
things on the lists is to speak of them as ‘items’. This goes very well with
viewing the Wassenaar Arrangement as primarily a classification system, and
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also appropriately blurs the line between technologies and the texts that define
them.
The Wassenaar Arrangement makes yearly modifications to the control lists,
but these modifications often take significant amounts of time between proposal
inception and implementation in export control laws of the forty Participating
States of the Arrangement. Still, the lists represent the basis of the hierarchical
framing of the problem of dual-use technology, and fulfil one of the assumptions
that underlie export controls: that it is possible to define a list of technology
to control.
We now turn our attention to specific attempts to make changes to the Dual-
Use List. In Chapter 6, I analyse how anomaly-handling strategies compete in
the process of list modification. This enables us to see in further detail how
attempts are made to unseat the hierarchical framing, and how ambiguity is
maintained in the final definition that the list-making process produces. The
final analytic chapter is Chapter 7, in which I will look at how discussions
around intangible technologies have mainly taken place in the GWG instead of
the EG, and how that relates to the divide between social and technical worlds.
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There is no simple solution to this quandary: split-
ting a dual-use item such as a sophisticated com-
puter into its ‘military’ and ‘civilian’ parts is like
King Solomon dividing the child.
—Førland (1993, p. 160)
6
Anomaly-handling & the Dual-Use List
Contents
Questions asked in the proposal process . . . . . . . . . . . 209
6.1 Quantum cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
An historical context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
The proposal process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
6.2 Focal plane arrays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
An historical context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
The proposal process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
6.3 Computers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
The development of high-performance computers . . . . . . 248
From megabits per second to MTOPS . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
From MTOPS to software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
6.4 The Wassenaar Arrangement as an incompletely
theorised agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
6.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
We now have an understanding of how the Wassenaar Arrangement plays
a part in addressing the wicked problem of dual-use technology. The wicked
problem can be defined in many ways, and while the current hegemonic framing
sees the problem as one of control, there are other framings that define the
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problem as one of competition or of inequality. Each of these framings is valid,
though none of them is able completely to encapsulate the wicked problem. By
analysing the history and structure of the Arrangement, I showed that while
the hierarchical framing is hegemonic within Wassenaar, the other framings—
and in particular the competitive framing—are also present in the debates.
This chapter addresses the technical side of the Arrangement to show how it
is dynamic and constantly evolving. While the hierarchical framing is still
hegemonic, actors expressing it constantly have to reassert it as the lists are
shown to be inadequate in some way. This inadequacy is expressed by pointing
out anomalies in the classification system which, if not resolved, can lead to
uncomfortable knowledge for the hierarchical framing.
The first section looks at the first of the anomaly-handling strategies, monster-
adjustment. When the monster-adjustment is done with minimal contention
with the other framings, as was the case with the quantum cryptography de-
bate, we find that the anomaly is easily situated within the now-expanded
classification system and the hierarchical framing’s preferred form of organisa-
tion is strengthened. This is what happens with most of the modifications to
the Dual-Use List of Wassenaar.
When the adjustment involves greater amounts of contention than expe-
rienced with quantum cryptography, as when addressing the topic of thermal
imaging (Section 6.2), compromises must be made which force actors express-
ing the hierarchical framing out of their comfort zone. In this case, we can see
a mixture of monster-adjustment and exception-barring strategies. To control
more technology in one part of the list, exceptions have to be made in another
part of the list.
The third section of this chapter provides an example of when actors ex-
pressing the hierarchical framing predominantly employ the exception-barring
strategy to handle an anomaly. By doing so, the scope of the classification
system is made narrower in order to maintain control. Within the Wassenaar
Arrangement, this is generally done through decontrolling items on the lists,
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and we look at the case of decontrolling computers. By barring exceptions—in
this case the knowledge that computers cannot be controlled based on their
level of performance, interconnect, or memory—an actor expressing the hierar-
chical framing accepts that, while the anomaly is relevant to its framing of the
wicked problem, it is not resolvable within the current classification system.
Moreover, continued irresolution actually undermines the hierarchical framing
as a whole—thus creating uncomfortable knowledge—because it shows that
while control is desirable, it is not possible.
In the final section, we explore how the Wassenaar Arrangement can be
thought of as an incompletely theorised agreement, where actors supporting
different framings of the problem of dual-use technology are able to agree on
particular list modifications even though they hold widely different and even
contradictory views on what the technology is and the role it plays in society.
Questions asked in the proposal process
It is useful here to break the process for modifying the lists into a series of
questions—using the analytic framework devised in Chapter 3—the answers to
which will provide evidence for the type or types of anomaly-handling strategies
employed. All proposals need to start with an actor determining that the topic
of the proposal is relevant to the Wassenaar Arrangement. While this may seem
obvious to some, determining something to be relevant can lead to significant
amounts of uncomfortable knowledge for the hierarchical framing if that thing
subsequently cannot be adequately controlled, and therefore there might be
more to be gained (in terms of the framing’s internal stability) by deeming the
topic to be irrelevant.
Following on from the question of relevance is a determination of what type
of proposal needs to be made: for tightening controls, which would incorporate
more technology into the lists; relaxing controls; or ‘cleaning’ the text with no
substantive change. When tightening controls, the proposal must justify how
the proposed addition to the lists meets all of the criteria set out in the Criteria
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for the Selection of Dual-Use Items. Arguments for this type of proposal often
use the monster-adjustment strategy, as they are trying to show how items that
were previously not in the classification system can easily find a place there.
When relaxing controls, the proposal needs to justify how the current item on
the lists no longer meets at least one of the criteria. Arguments for this type
of proposal can be monster-adjustment as well if the argument is that the item
is no longer militarily significant (i.e. relevant), but most often the exception-
barring strategy is employed, arguing that the item cannot be controlled for
some reason. ‘Cleaning’ the text often involves reformatting items so that they
are in line with the Guidelines for the Drafting of lists, but is not supposed to
involve a change on the level of control. This was the major concern of the
Wassenaar Arrangement’s 2007 Assessment Year task group on list clean-up.1
In most cases, a proposed list modification will have economic implications,
and many Participating States solicit opinions from industries about the impact
a proposal may have. It is also the case that many proposals, especially to
relax controls, originate from industry. Industry representatives usually seek
to strengthen a competitive framing of the problem of dual-use technology,
focusing on expanding the marketability of the technology. The weight given
to the economic impact varies from case to case and depends on several factors,
including the economic benefit of relaxing controls or—if there is an established
market—when tightening controls, but is generally seen as something that must
be balanced with the perceived military significance of the item. Getting all
Participating States to agree on the level of military significance of an item,
however, is sometimes a very difficult task.
There are also political and logistical considerations to take into account.
Negotiations at Wassenaar form part of a State’s overall presence on the inter-
national stage, and negotiations in another area of international politics may
impact upon a State’s decision to put forward or oppose a particular proposal.
Logistically, the terminology in the proposal must be able to be translated into
1Interview with US State Department Official B, 19 January 2007.
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the dozens of languages used by Participating States, and it often takes signif-
icant time during the Expert Group meetings to find terminology that works
for all. Another logistical factor is the question of how many proposals a State
is submitting in a particular year, and the fact that there are only so many
hours of meetings for the Expert Group. States may hold off submitting too
many proposals that are likely to be contentious in order to get agreement on
at least one of them.2
One of the key questions that States address in determining if a proposal
should be submitted to Wassenaar is if ‘the time is right’ for this tighten-
ing/relaxing of controls. “Often the most difficult decision to take in putting
forward proposals. . . is to try not to control something too early because it’s
still in academia, and then missing the chance of it being put in the pub-
lic domain when you can’t control it anymore.”3 This is a clear example of
Collingridge’s (1980) ‘control dilemma’: Participating States do not want to
control something that does not yet exist, but at the same time, they want to
make sure that, once something does exist and is deemed in need of control, it
is controlled.
Each of these questions can play not only into the decision as to whether or
not a proposal should be put forward, but also into the technical specifications
of the item in the proposal. Having a technology become labelled as ‘dual-use’
is the result of all of these factors, and undoubtedly more.
6.1 Quantum cryptography
An historical context
Cryptology—the art of writing and solving codes—is an ancient science. It is
composed of two parts. The first, cryptography, is the design and employment
of methods (called ‘ciphers’) for processing plain text through an algorithm
2This primarily happens with the larger delegations, as many States only submit a few,
if any, proposals in a given year.
3Interview with British Former Government Official, 8 March 2007.
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(‘encrypting’ it) such that only the intended recipient can read it (by ‘decrypt-
ing’ it). The information the recipient needs to decrypt the cipher text is called
the ‘key’. The second part of cryptology is cryptanalysis, the art of decrypting
cipher text without knowledge of the key (also called ‘cracking’ the cipher).
There has always been an interest in secret communication from both mili-
tary and non-military actors. Books specifically on cryptology date back to at
least 900 AD (Al-Kadit, 1992), and one of the most famous ciphers, which uses
permutations, is named after Julius Caesar as it was used in many of his official
communications.4 The Julius Caesar cipher takes the alphabet and transposes
it by a set number of places. For example, transposing by 5 would mean that
what was an ‘a’ becomes a ‘f’, a ‘b’ becomes a ‘g’, etc.
The Julius Caesar cipher
takes the alphabet and trans-
poses it by a set number of
places. A transposition of 5
would produce the following
cipher text:
plain text:
Beware the Ides of March
cipher text:
Gjbfwj ymj Nijx tk Rfwhm
Figure 6.1: Example of the
Julius Caesar ci-
pher
The security of a cipher is determined by
the ability of an enemy either to acquire the
key and perform the decryption using the key,
or to crack the cipher without the key.5 Some
ciphers, such as the Julius Caesar cipher, are
relatively easy to crack, especially with to-
day’s computing power. Others, such as the
Enigma cipher used by the Germans in World
War II, are much more difficult. Enigma re-
lied on a machine like a typewriter with mul-
tiple rotors (and later a plugboard) that al-
lowed complex substitution ciphers, and a handbook that told the operator
where to set the rotors for each day. Attempts to crack this code involved both
the stealing of the machines and handbooks and the creation of a machine that
could work through all of the permutations and select the ones most likely to
be correct.
4See, for instance, his account of using the cipher in the Gallic Wars.
5The enemy can acquire the key either by cryptanalysis or by finding where the recipient
stores the key and stealing it.
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Both the Julius Caesar and Enigma ciphers were military creations for mil-
itary use. Cryptography can have a much wider aim than that, however. Al-
Kadit (1992), in a landmark study of the history of Arab cryptology, discusses
its use in translation. The Arab culture was rapidly expanding in 700–1000
A.D, acquiring texts from all their neighbouring civilizations. Often lacking
a translator, they relied on cryptanalytic techniques to understand the struc-
ture of the language and thereby the contents of the texts. Religious leaders
also have need for cryptography, and the Catholic Pope’s communications from
the Renaissance onwards have been the subject of much study (Alvarez, 1993;
Meister, 1906; Pasztor, 1984).
It wasn’t until the advent of computers, however, that the ability (and
need) to encrypt information was more widely accessible. In 1974, Interna-
tional Business Machines (IBM) responded to a call6 by the US government to
produce a standard encryption algorithm “that could satisfy a broad range of
commercial and unclassified government requirements in information security”
(Burr, 2001, p. 250). The algorithm became the Data Encryption Standard
and spurred much interest in deploying encryption in all business transactions.
Today, everything from personal emails to online banking to telephone conver-
sations and, of course, state secrets, can be encrypted to levels that make the
data very difficult to read, even for the most advanced cryptanalytic govern-
ment units.7
Almost all of the ciphers that have been created to date are susceptible to
some form of cryptanalysis; that is, they can be cracked. There is at least one
cipher, however, that is theoretically uncrackable without the key, and it is this
cipher that is used in quantum cryptography. It is called the ‘one-time pad’
6The call was first sent out in Federal Register (May 15, 1973), and sent out again in
Federal Register (August 17, 1974).
7There was much debate in the late 1990s over how secure personal communications
should be (e.g. Anonymous, 1998; D’Amico, 1998; Hogg, 2000; Madsen, 1999; Shehadeh,
1999). While this debate did reach Wassenaar discussions and are a cause for many people
initially learning about and trying to influence the Arrangement, I decided not to analyse
this particular debate because I was unable to reach many of the primary sources and a
proper treatment of the case would likely be a book in its own right.
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and was developed by Gilbert Vernam around 19198 and proved uncrackable
by Claude Shannon (1949).9 The one-time pad consists of a key that is a string
of binary text (0 and 1’s, called ‘bits’) at least as long as the message to be
sent. The sender (whom we shall call Alice) and receiver (Bob) both have a
copy of the key. Alice has a plain text in binary form10 and adds it using binary
addition to the key to get the cipher text.11 Alice then sends the cipher text
to Bob via an unencrypted channel. Bob performs the binary addition of the
cipher text with the key to get the plain text back. This process is shown in
Figure 6.2. Since the key is random, an eavesdropper is unable to retrieve any
useful information from the cipher text. This cipher depends entirely on the
secrecy of the key, which has to be changed after every message, hence calling it
the ‘one-time pad’ cipher. The difficulty of securely transmitting a key between
the sender and receiver has meant this cipher has been used relatively little,
except for situations where the highest levels of secrecy were demanded.
The difficulty of key transfer is what quantum cryptography claims to over-
come (e.g. Sergienko, 2006). Quantum cryptography is therefore more usefully
called ‘quantum key distribution’ (QKD). If Alice is able to give Bob a key
in such a way that she knows if anyone has looked at it during the transfer
(thus compromising it), then she can use the key as a one-time pad cipher
and can securely transfer information to Bob knowing that the mathematical
properties of the one-time pad ensure that no one can crack her cipher text.
The properties of quantum bits, or ‘qubits’, allow the key exchange to occur in
such a way that, in theory, any eavesdropping can be detected. This theoreti-
cal capability has given quantum cryptography a lot of public attention and a
fair degree of sensationalisation (see Anonymous, 2003; Markoff, 2002; Marks,
2007; Singh, 1999). Currently, there are at least three companies that claim to
8US Patent number 1,310,719, issued 22 July 1919.
9At the present time, it is the only cipher to be mathematically proven uncrackable.
10This is not difficult, since all computer languages are based on a binary system.
11The cipher text is therefore simply a statement of whether the plain text bit is the same
or different than the key bit.
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sell quantum cryptographic systems, Magiq Technology,12 BBN Technologies,13
and Id Quantique.14 It is important to note that, while quantum cryptography
may be in principle a perfectly secure way to transfer a key, to ensure complete
secrecy would require a perfectly noiseless communication channel. Since such
channels do not exist, error correction and noise cancelling algorithms must
be employed as well, which make the system no longer ‘perfectly’ secure. The
amount of noise in a communication channel is the primary limiting factor in
current attempts to employ quantum cryptography.
While this is a very brief overview of quantum cryptography, it should give
the reader enough knowledge to understand the debate within the Wassenaar
Arrangement. We now turn to the proposal process for this list modification.
The proposal process
As with most debates at the Wassenaar Arrangement, this one started with a
proposal for a list change, this time from the British government, and specifi-
cally from the Communications-Electronic Security Group (CESG) at the Gov-
ernment Communication Headquarters (GCHQ). The text of any proposal has
the potential to become anomalous, undermining the classification system as
a whole. While the proposal offered a specific change—the text to go on the
list—the process of accepting the proposal was one that involved discussion on
both what the technology was, and whether it was anomalous. Those in the
debate had to decide whether the technology was actually a form of cryptog-
raphy, and, if it was, whether or not it was covered under the current controls.
In creating the final text of 5.A.2.a.9, they further had to decide how specified
(and conversely how ambiguous) the text should be. We will look at each of
these aspects in turn.
12http://www.magiqtech.com
13http://www.bbn.com/
14http://www.idquantique.com/
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The one-time pad cipher adds
each bit of a plain text to a cor-
responding bit of a key to get the
cipher text:a
plain text: 010111001010
key: + 110111101101
cipher text: 100000100111
To get the plain text back, one
need only add the key to the ci-
pher text:
cipher text: 100000100111
key: + 110111101101
plain text: 010111001010
aIn binary addition, 1+1=0. Es-
sentially, the cipher bits are therefore
just statements of whether the key
bit and the plain bit are the same (ci-
pher bit = 0) or different (cipher bit
= 1).
Figure 6.2: Example of the one-time
pad cipher
Is quantum cryptography a form
of cryptography? It has the label of
‘cryptography’, and for some, that is
enough for them to consider it a cryp-
tographic system. But what does a
cryptographic system do? Does it
transfer information securely, or does
it allow for information to be trans-
ferred securely? The former is a more
widely accepted definition, but quan-
tum cryptography falls more into the
latter. Recall that quantum cryptog-
raphy can more accurately be called
‘quantum key distribution’; it trans-
fers the key that is used in the one-
time pad cipher, but does not actu-
ally encrypt the message itself. This
is why one member of a delegation,
when I mentioned quantum cryptog-
raphy, replied, “It’s now controlled. And we had an interesting debate on that
because it’s not really cryptography, it’s quantum key distribution.”15 And
indeed, when we look at the text of the list, there is a Technical Note after
5.A.2.a.9 that says, “‘Quantum cryptography’ is also known as quantum key
distribution (QKD).” This is further supported by the definition of quantum
cryptography provided in the list (Figure 6.3).
Recall that a cryptographic system is composed of an encryption and de-
cryption algorithm and a key. The algorithm used in quantum cryptography—
the one-time pad—is very simple and widely known. Trying to control the
15Interview with US State Department Official A & US State Department Official B, 11
September 2006.
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____________________________________________________________________ 
 
DEFINITIONS 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
WA-LIST (07) 2 
- 198 - 06-12-2007 
Cat 2 "Programme" 
Cat 4 A sequence of instructions to carry out a process in, or convertible 
Cat 5 & 6 into, a form executable by an electronic computer. 
 
 
ML8 "Propellants" 
 Substances or mixtures that react chemically to produce large volumes of 
hot gases at controlled rates to perform mechanical work. 
 
 
Cat 6 "Pulse compression" 
  The coding and processing of a radar signal pulse of long time duration to 
one of short time duration, while maintaining the benefits of high pulse 
energy. 
 
 
Cat 6 "Pulse duration" 
  Duration of a "laser" pulse measured at Full Width Half Intensity (FWHI) 
levels. 
 
Cat 6 "Pulsed laser" 
  A "laser" having a "pulse duration" that is less than or equal to 0.25 
seconds. 
 
ML4 "Pyrotechnic(s)" 
ML8 Mixtures of solid or liquid fuels and oxidizers which, when ignited, undergo an 
energetic chemical reaction at a controlled rate intended to produce specific 
time delays, or quantities of heat, noise, smoke, visible light or infrared 
radiation.  Pyrophorics are a subclass of pyrotechnics, which contain no 
oxidizers but ignite spontaneously on contact with air. 
 
 
Cat 5P2 "Quantum cryptography" 
  A family of techniques for the establishment of a shared key for 
"cryptography" by measuring the quantum-mechanical properties of a 
physical system (including those physical properties explicitly governed by 
quantum optics, quantum field theory, or quantum electrodynamics). 
 
 
Cat 6 "Q-switched laser" 
  A "laser" in which the energy is stored in the population inversion or in the 
optical resonator and subsequently emitted in a pulse. 
 
Cat 6 "Radar frequency agility" 
  Any technique which changes, in a pseudo-random sequence, the carrier 
frequency of a pulsed radar transmitter between pulses or between groups 
of pulses by an amount equal to or larger than the pulse bandwidth. 
Figure 6.3: Definition of ‘quantum cryptography’
international dissemination of the algorithm, then, is not an option for the
Arrangement. Controlling the knowledge of and technology for producing and
transferring the key, however, is an option, and in this way Wassenaar can in
effect control the whole quantum cryptographic system. This process of iden-
tifying the best point of control is common in the list modification process, as
one participant noted:
[People working on our delegation are aware of] what’s being devel-
oped, what’s being used, what is an enabling technology or a key
enabling technology for a given military system. And when that’s
identified, we say, “ok. Can we control it and where can we control
it? What’s a critical choke point that needs to be controlled? Is it
the software? Is it the materials? Is it the manufacturing technol-
ogy for it, which is just a know-how beyond the software?”16
When quantum key distribution is viewed as a ‘critical choke point’ for the
application of a quantum cryptographic system, we can understand why the
proposal placed this text within Category 5 – Part 2: it is, for the purposes of
control, cryptography. This was succinctly stated by a member of the British
delegation:
Interviewee: From my angle it [quantum cryptography] was a very
very simple thing, and the least controversial of all the topics going
forward. It was CESG’s proposal. There was no reason from any
angle why a new form (or new to us anyway) of encryption should
not be added to the control, particularly because it seemed to us
to be quite important. So in practical terms the proposal went
forward. The interested parties were shut in a room upstairs in
Wassenaar to really make sure that everybody understood what it
was that we wanted to control.
16Interview with US Defense Department Official A, 8 August 2006.
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SE: Which is not at all clear on the actual lists. It says that you
control ‘quantum cryptography’.
Interviewee: I think that was deliberate, at the end of the day, as a
lot of the Cat 5 controls are. They are open to interpretation. It’s
not something that I ever felt very happy about, but one couldn’t
change overnight controls that had been there for a long time.17
Quantum cryptography was therefore established by at least one delegation
as being a relevant technology for the purposes of the Wassenaar Arrangement.
The next step in the proposal process was to determine if the technology was
already controlled in Category 5 – Part 2.
It is useful here to recall that, if such a proposal had come up in 1980,
it is very likely that no one would have seen the need to add text to the
list because IL 1527 (5.A.2 ’s predecessor) covered “Cryptographic equipment
and ancillary equipment. . . designed to ensure secrecy of communications. . . ”
When the quantum cryptography proposal was submitted in 2004, however, the
then-current control text was the chapeau18 for 5.A.2.a, shown in Figure 6.4.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"
"
!"#$%"&'($)&*(%(+#*',-./(0(%(1#.*(2(%(3)45-.6#*)-4(&'+".)*/3(
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"
"
"
""" #$%&'()"*+,-"."
" +/%+0%.++1" %"23"%"
4567"."%"8'9:;<=$)';9"(>?@<')A8"
"
!"#$%&% '($% )"*#+",% -#.#/-% "0% 12*0"+3 #2"*% -$)/+2#41% $5/263$*#7% 1-"0#8.+$17% -4-#$3-7%
.66,2).#2"*% -6$)202)% 1$,$)#+"*2)% .--$39,2$-17% 3":/,$-7% 2*#$;+.#$:% )2+)/2#-7%
)"36"*$*#-% "+% 0/*)#2"*-% 2-% :$#$+32*$:% 2*% <.#$;"+4% =7% >.+#% ?! $@$*% 20% #($4% .+$%
)"36"*$*#-%"+%1$,$)#+"*2)%.--$39,2$-1%"0%"#($+%$5/263$*#A%
"
!"#$%?% <.#$;"+4%=%B%>.+#%?%:"$-%*"#%)"*#+",%6+":/)#-%8($*%.))"36.*42*;%#($2+%/-$+%0"+%
#($%/-$+C-%6$+-"*.,%/-$A%
"
!"#$%D% <+46#";+.6(4%!"#$%
%
=AEA?A%.*:%=AFA?A%:"%*"#%)"*#+",%2#$3-%#(.#%3$$#%.,,%"0%#($%0",,"82*;G%
.A% H$*$+.,,4% .@.2,.9,$% #"% #($% 6/9,2)% 94% 9$2*;% -",:7% 82#("/#% +$-#+2)#2"*7% 0+"3%
-#")I%.#%+$#.2,%-$,,2*;%6"2*#-%94%3$.*-%"0%.*4%"0%#($%0",,"82*;G%
&A% J@$+K#($K)"/*#$+%#+.*-.)#2"*-L%
?A% M.2,%"+:$+%#+.*-.)#2"*-L"
DA% N,$)#+"*2)%#+.*-.)#2"*-L%"+"
OA% '$,$6("*$%).,,%#+.*-.)#2"*-L%
9A% '($%)+46#";+.6(2)%0/*)#2"*.,2#4%).**"#%$.-2,4%9$%)(.*;$:%94%#($%/-$+L%
)A% F$-2;*$:%0"+%2*-#.,,.#2"*%94%#($%/-$+%82#("/#%0/+#($+%-/9-#.*#2.,%-/66"+#%94%
#($%-/66,2$+L%.*:%
:A% F$,$#$:L%
$A% P($*%*$)$--.+47%:$#.2,-%"0%#($%2#$3-%.+$%.))$--29,$%.*:%82,,%9$%6+"@2:$:7%/6"*%
+$5/$-#7% #"% #($% .66+"6+2.#$% ./#("+2#4% 2*% #($% $Q6"+#$+C-% )"/*#+4% 2*% "+:$+% #"%
.-)$+#.2*%)"36,2.*)$%82#(%)"*:2#2"*-%:$-)+29$:%2*%6.+.;+.6(-%.A%#"%)A%.9"@$A%
%
'$)(*2).,%!"#$%
R*%<.#$;"+4%=%K%>.+#%?7%6.+2#4%92#-%.+$%*"#%2*),/:$:%2*%#($%I$4%,$*;#(A"
"
"
1B" $B".B" (A()>=(C">D@'4=>9)"$9E"?;=4;9>9)("
%
" " " 5B" (FG7HIGC"HJKLMIHN7C"5MMOLP57LQN"GMHPLRLP"8HOHP76QNLP"5GGHISOLHG8C"IQTKOHG"
5NT"LN7HU657HT"PL6PKL7G"RQ6"8LNRQ6I57LQN"GHPK6L7F8C"5G"RQOOQVGC"5NT"Q7WH6"
GMHPL5OOF"THGLUNHT"PQIMQNHN7G"7WH6HRQ6X"
"
!ASA% T"+% #($% )"*#+",% "0% ;,"9.,% *.@2;.#2"*% -.#$,,2#$% -4-#$3-% +$)$2@2*;%
$5/263$*#% )"*#.2*2*;% "+% $36,"42*;% :$)+46#2"*% U2A$A% H>V% "+%
HWJ!EVVX7%-$$%YAEA=A%
"
1B" $B" .B" 5B" YB" EHGLUNHT" Q6" IQTLRLHT" 7Q" KGH" 8P6FM7QU65MWF8" HIMOQFLNU" TLUL75O"
7HPWNLJKHG" MH6RQ6ILNU" 5NF" P6FM7QU65MWLP" RKNP7LQN" Q7WH6" 7W5N"
5K7WHN7LP57LQN"Q6"TLUL75O"GLUN57K6H"W5ZLNU"5NF"QR"7WH"RQOOQVLNUX"
Figure 6.4: Chapeau for 5.A.2.a (Wassenaar Arrangement, 2004c)
This chapeau does not actually control any technology itself. The “as fol-
lows” denotes that items to be controlled are only specified in the sub-entries.
This chapeau was created in the Core List revision of 1991, when IL 1527 be-
came Category 5 – Part 2. With that move there was an important shift in
the structure of the controls. IL 1527 controlled all cryptographic equipment
17Interview with British Former Government Official, 8 March 2007.
18Recall that the Guidelines for Drafting the lists states that entries are to be broken down
into chapeaux, sub-entries, Notes, Technical Notes, and Note Benes, in that order. Refer to
Appendix G.
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and components, whereas 5.A.2.a. only controls that equipment specified in
the sub-entries. What was a blanket control text became a blanket decontrol
text. This supports the remark that the 1991 Core List revision was a shift
from controlling all technology with specific decontrols, to only controlling the
most important technologies (see page 182). This shift tends to create more
anomalies because a more fine-grained classification system will leave more
technology out than in. As a very simple analogy, the old CoCom lists would
control ‘blocks’, whereas the post-1991 lists would control ‘blocks meeting any
of the following criteria: red; square; smaller than 2 metres on any side’. For
something to be controlled under the former classification system, it would only
have needed to be understood as a block, but under the latter system, many
things which are blocks would not fall under control. The former system is de-
signed to prevent many anomalies by having a broad characteristic that covers
a large range of technology. The latter system will generate more anomalies
because it tries to control only specific instances of a general category.
Whether a system is broad or fine-grained is, of course, a relative mat-
ter. One could say that calling something a block is more fine-grained than
just calling it a ‘shape’. Returning to the Wassenaar lists, they could be very
simple and just control ‘technology’ instead of having so many categories and
items. Such a system would likely have few anomalies arising from something
not being controlled but, as we shall see below, many more anomalies arising
from contestations over whether technologies under control can actually be con-
trolled. For now, it is sufficient to say that within 5.A.2.a there was no text
under which the participants thought quantum cryptography could be placed,
and therefore new text needed to be created. This solidified quantum cryptog-
raphy as an anomaly within the dual-use classification system, which meant an
anomaly-handling strategy was now necessary.
We can now see that the team that put together the proposal on quantum
cryptography positioned it to be relevant to the Arrangement and not currently
220 Anomaly-handling & the Dual-Use List
under control. Moreover, we have the beginnings of the next part of the pro-
posal process—determining whether the technology can be controlled. Implicit
in any proposal to add a technology to the list is the assumption that such tech-
nology can be controlled. This is a clear statement of the monster-adjustment
strategy:
1. A technology is relevant
2. It is not currently under control
3. It can easily be controlled by a modification of the current text
Having established that quantum cryptography is relevant, is not already
controlled, and can be controlled, Britain then submitted the proposal to the
Wassenaar Arrangement, where the other Participating States had an opportu-
nity to comment on it and debate whether the modification should actually be
made to the list. The discussions to make the list change for quantum cryptog-
raphy were typical in that there was little debate over whether the technology
should be controlled. There were also characteristics of the discussions typ-
ical specifically of changing Category 5 – Part 2.19 They were conducted in
a Technical Working Group (TWG) in a room on the upper floor of Wasse-
naar, at the same time of day as the Expert Group (EG) main meeting in the
room downstairs. The meeting was composed mostly of members of national
delegations from their respective intelligence ministries. When this group—
sometimes called the ‘security & intelligence experts subgroup’20—proposes a
change, it is usually accepted without debate by the main EG. With quantum
cryptography, however, there were a lot of people in the room who would not
necessarily be thought of as security and intelligence experts, and were there
more to find out about this new technology that they did not know about than
to help establish controls.21
19Interview with British Former Government Official, 8 March 2007.
20Personal correspondence with US State Department Official A, 23 October 2008.
21Interview with British Former Government Official, 8 March 2007.
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This raises an important point about how specific the control text becomes
in a list change. While there is the official specification that the text must
be a “clear and objective specification of the item” (Wassenaar Arrangement,
2005a), there is also the concern of giving away too much information. The
lists, in other words, are not meant to be blueprints and procedure manuals for
technology.
But why state the text of the list as simply controlling ‘quantum cryptog-
raphy’ with no parameters other than that it is also known as ‘quantum key
distribution’? They could have been more specific, for instance by breaking it
down into arial systems and optical-fibre systems. They could have included
parameters for the number of qubits per second that could be transferred, or
the distance over which the system could work. One answer could be that the
artefacts which currently exist are still more at the theoretical stage than the
production stage. Until the technology is more developed, a person employ-
ing the monster-adjustment strategy would be satisfied with a broad level of
control.
There are several analytic points that come to light here. First is that the
text functions as the technology under control. Providing information about
the technology for the purposes of control is itself an uncontrolled transfer
of knowledge about the technology. This leads to the second analytic point,
which is that the decisions on the text involved decisions on creating strategic
ignorance (McGoey, 2007) for potential adversaries by purposefully building
ambiguity into the definition of dual-use technology. There is as much interest
in what is not used to define quantum cryptography as what is. Finally, a third
analytic point is that the decision on how specific to make the definition was
also a matter of finding parameters acceptable to all, getting agreement where
possible and leaving the rest alone. This point will be addressed in detail
when we discuss the Wassenaar Arrangement as an ‘incompletely theorised
agreement’ in Section 6.3.
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How could this proposal have been defeated? Those actors expressing the
competitive framing could have used the point that the text is very broad
to argue that the item should not be controlled because the text was not a
“clear and objective specification of the item,” and could not be because the
technology is still in the early stages of development (including the develop-
ment of the global market for the technology). Another point that could have
been raised by this framing at the national as opposed to international level
is that the controls would have put too heavy a burden on industry, or that
the controls would significantly hinder competition on the global marketplace.
To my knowledge, however, these arguments were not made. One reason may
be that actors expressing the competitive framing were placated by actors ex-
pressing the hierarchical framing early on. “Nobody’s saying they are going to
be stopped from using [quantum cryptography]. The only factor that I perhaps
put into [the design of the proposal] was that it didn’t seem to me to be any
burden on UK industry whatsoever.”22 Another reason may be that signif-
icant potential uses of this technology were already specifically decontrolled.
Banking and financial transactions were decontrolled by 5.A.2.‘Note d’, and
mass market uses were decontrolled with 5.‘Note 3’. The competitive framing
therefore was assured that marketing the technology would not be subject to
undue hindrance from export controls. Agreement was therefore reached with
little dispute and the avoidance of all uncomfortable knowledge. And thus,
5.A.2.a.9 was inscribed and the anomaly was successfully resolved into the
now-expanded classification system.
6.2 Focal plane arrays
The focal plane array debate was very different from the case of quantum
cryptography, although both ended with the resolution of the anomaly. ‘Focal
22Interview with British Former Government Official, 8 March 2007.
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plane arrays’—covered in section 6.A.2.a.3 —are technologies for thermal sens-
ing, and one of the most recent modifications to this section of the Dual-Use
List was very contentious. In analysing this case study, we are looking for the
reasons why this modification was so contentious while our previous case was
not. As with my analysis above, we begin here with a brief history of thermal
sensing and the closely-related technology of night-vision equipment, and then
turn to the proposal process.
An historical context
All of the categories of the Wassenaar Dual-Use List are permeable. Some tech-
nologies may be able to fit into multiple categories, and the technologies within
any of the categories may have very little to do with one another. Category 6
represents a broad container for technologies that can be classified as either
‘sensors’ or ‘lasers’. But this is a relatively new container; along with the other
categories, it was devised in the Core List review of CoCom in 1990-1991.
I noted in Chapter 4 that the CoCom lists had become significantly lop-
sided in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly with reference to Groups F & G
‘Electronic equipment including communications, radar, computer hardware
and software’. Electronics, which were only just gaining prevalence at the end of
WWII, had by then become a major component of both military and economic
viability. During the Core List revision in 1990–1991, these groups—items
with numbers in the 1500s—were split up into several different categories, and
other categories were mixed with items in these groups. This was particularly
the case with the new Category 6 – ‘Sensors and “Lasers”’, which contains
items from most parts of the old Groups F & G, but also parts of Group C
‘Electrical and power generating equipment’ (the 1200s), Group D ‘General
industrial equipment’ (the 1300s), and Group I ‘Chemicals, metalloids, and
petroleum products’ (the 1700s).23 Space does not permit me here to delve
into the specific reasons why the category of ‘Sensors and “Lasers”’ was seen
23See Appendix C for a full listing of the CoCom origins of the items in Category 6.
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as a more appropriate container than the old groups, but it is important to
note that, within the world of export controls, the development even of these
broad categories is not a clear-cut process with a single definitive outcome.
Category 6 – ‘Sensors and “Lasers”’ is divided, as the other categories are,
into five sections (see Appendix B). 6.A is further divided into subsections as
shown in Table 6.1. Focal plane arrays are placed into 6.A.2 ‘Optical Sensors’
and are defined as shown in Figure 6.5.
Table 6.1: Subsections of 6.A.
6.A. Systems, Equipment and Compo-
nents
6.A.1. Acoustics
6.A.2. Optical Sensors
6.A.3. Cameras
6.A.4. Optics
6.A.5. Lasers
6.A.6. Magnetic and Electric Field Sen-
sors
6.A.7. Gravimeters
6.A.8. Radar____________________________________________________________________ 
 
DEFINITIONS 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
WA-LIST (07) 2 
- 190 - 06-12-2007 
Cat 6 "Focal plane array" 
  A linear or two-dimensional planar layer, or combination of planar layers, 
of individual detector elements, with or without readout electronics, which 
work in the focal plane. 
  Note This definition does not include a stack of single detector elements 
or any two, three or four element detectors provided time delay 
and integration is not performed within the element. 
 
 
Cat 3 "Fractional bandwidth" 
  The "instantaneous bandwidth" divided by the centre frequency, expressed 
as a percentage.  
 
 
Cat 5 "Frequency hopping " 
  A form of "spread spectrum" in which the transmission frequency of a 
single communication channel is made to change by a random or pseudo-
random sequence of discrete steps. 
 
 
Cat 3 "Frequency switching time" 
Cat 5 The maximum time (i.e., delay) taken by a signal, when switched from one 
selected output frequency to another selected output frequency, to reach any 
of the following: 
  a. A frequency within 100 Hz of the final frequency; or
  b. An output level within 1 dB of the final output level. 
 
 
Cat 3 "Frequency synthesiser" 
  Any kind of frequency source or signal generator, regardless of the actual 
technique used, providing a multiplicity of simultaneous or alternative 
output frequencies, from one or more outputs, controlled by, derived from 
or disciplined by a lesser number of standard (or master) frequencies. 
 
 
Cat 1 "Gas atomisation" 
  A process to reduce a molten stream of metal alloy to droplets of 500 µm 
diameter or less by a high pressure gas stream. 
 
 
Cat 6 "Geographically dispersed" 
  Sensors are considered "geographically dispersed" when each location is 
distant from any other more than 1,500 m in any direction.  Mobile sensors 
are always considered "geographically dispersed". 
 
 
Cat 2 "Hot isostatic densification" 
  A process of pressurising a casting at temperatures exceeding 375 K 
(102°C) in a closed cavity through various media (gas, liquid, solid 
particles, etc.) to create equal force in all directions to reduce or eliminate 
internal voids in the casting. 
Figure 6.5: Definition of ‘focal plane array’ (Wassenaar Arrangement, 2007b,
p. 190)
The chief characteristic of focal plane arrays that Participating States con-
sider to be of military significance is their ability to sense infrared light, and
to do so quickly, with high resolution, at a significant distance, and/or be
lightweight, robust, and durable. Why these features are desirable, and the
parameters of each which all can agree to be ‘militarily significant’, are, as we
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might expect, a matter of debate within the Wassenaar Arrangement. It is the
sensor characteristic that the States used to place focal plane arrays in Cat-
egory 6—‘Sensors and “Lasers”’, while the characteristic of it detecting light
(electromagnetic radiation) instead of sounds (acoustical vibrations) places it
in 6.A.2 as opposed to 6.A.1.
Focal plane arrays provide a detectable change in electric properties due
to absorbed thermal radiation. ‘Thermal’ imaging means looking at how hot
or cold an object is in relation to its surroundings. Key military activities
that use thermal imaging include heat-seeking missiles and vision systems in
no-light conditions.
The ability to see in the dark is one of the military technologies that Partic-
ipating States believe provide a key advantage to the development of military
capabilities generally, and is thus controlled on the Sensitive List as well as the
Dual-Use List.
Why are they important? They first of all generate night vision
capability. And night vision has been shown by our Army and
all the other forces (Air Force, Navy, what have you) as a critical
enabler for the success of your operations. That’s the long and short
of it. So it does have a strong military utility.24
Early work on technology to aid sight in darkness began at the end of World
War II and focused on image converters. Image converters produce images
through the use of photocathodes, which sense near-infrared light and produce
an image on phosphor that a person can view through a lens. Drawbacks of this
technology are seen to include the requirement of a near-infrared light source,
a low quantum efficiency of the photocathode, and no internal amplification of
the signal produced by the photocathode (Wood et al., 1992).
These perceived drawbacks were addressed through the development of ‘im-
age intensifiers’ that do not need an integrated infrared light source, as they
24Interview with US Defense Department Official A & US Defense Department Official B,
5 February 2007.
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are sensitive enough to produce a readable display using reflected moonlight
or airglow (a glow in the night sky caused by radiation from the upper at-
mosphere) (Inoue´ & Spring, 1997). First generation (Gen I) intensifiers were
employed by the US in the Vietnam War, and use electrostatic focusing and
electron acceleration to produce a brighter display (Anonymous, 2008). Per-
ceived problems with Gen I intensifiers include image distortion, short-lived
components, and large size (Anonymous, 2002). Second generation (Gen II)
intensifiers developed in the early 1970s make use of a ‘microchannel plate’,
which multiplies the number of electrons that impact the phosphorous display
as well as accelerating them (Inoue´ & Spring, 1997, p. 336). These intensi-
fiers have a higher resolution, are smaller, and produce less image distortion
(Wood et al., 1992). Third generation (Gen III) intensifiers added a gallium
arsenide (GaAs) coating to the photocathode, which makes them 2–3 orders of
magnitude more sensitive to ambient light (Anonymous, 2002). While Gen I
intensifiers needed the equivalent light source of a full moon to produce a image
deemed useable, Gen III could do the same in heavily overcast situations.
Image intensifiers are used widely by militaries today, as well as by com-
mercial security systems, police, hunters, and the media. You can tell an
image that is produced this way because it is only in shades of green (a re-
sult of the phosphor, which only emits green light). Early types of image
convertors were covered in Group F of the 1954 CoCom lists, “Electronic vac-
uum tubes or valves of the following descriptions: [. . . ] (g) Image convertors
and electronic storage tubes, except television camera tubes other than photo-
conductive camera tubes” (British Government, 1954, p. 785). In the 1958
lists, this became IL 1555. They are currently controlled under 6.A.2.a.2 of
the Wassenaar Dual-Use List, of which 6.A.2.a.2.a and 6.A.2.a.2.b are also
controlled on the Sensitive List.
Instead of taking ambient visible or near-infrared light (electromagnetic
radiation with wavelengths of roughly 400 nm to 700 nm) and magnifying
it, thermal sensing detects electromagnetic waves in the infrared spectrum,
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with wavelengths generally agreed to be between 750 nm and 1,000,000 nm
(1 mm, or 1,000 microns (µm)).25 An object’s emission of infrared light is often
linked to its temperature relative to the ambient temperature. Thus, generally
speaking, hot things (relative to their environment) emit more infrared photons
than cooler ones around them. As an example, if you were able to see in the
infrared spectrum, it could be pitch black in a room and you would be able
to see humans and other animals, an electric hob turned on, and gaps in the
walls that are letting in cold air. Moreover, certain bands of infrared radiation
have certain properties that visible light does not, one of which is the ability
to penetrate common types of fog and smoke.
In theory, “all physical phenomena in the range of about 0.11 eV can be
proposed for IR detectors” (Norton, 1999). These phenomena include:
thermoelectric power (thermocouples), change in electrical conduc-
tivity (bolometers), gas expansion (Golay cell), pyroelectricity (py-
roelectric detectors), photon drag, Josephson effect (Josephson junc-
tions, SQUIDs), internal emission (PtSi Schottky barriers), fun-
damental absorption (intrinsic photodetectors), impurity absorp-
tion (extrinsic photodetectors), low-dimensional solids (superlattice
(SL) and quantum well (QW) detectors), different type of phase
transitions, etc. (Rogalski, 2002, p. 188).
The oldest CoCom lists available (1954) define controls for infrared detection in
Group F as a sub-item of “Electronic vacuum tubes or valves” (Figure 6.6).26
By 1960, advances in bolometers and thermocouples were seen by the mem-
bers of CoCom as warranting separate controls from ‘photo-electric’ and ‘photo-
conductive’ cells, which had by then become IL 1548. These technologies were
instead defined by their ability to sense ‘thermal’ energy, as shown by IL 1550
(Figure 6.7), first found on the lists in 1960.
25There is no scientific consensus on where the visible light portion of the electromagnetic
spectrum ends and the infrared portion begins. Different groups of scientists use different
methods for drawing the line. Meteorologists, for instance, divide the infrared portion ac-
cording to how the light is absorbed by different molecules, while engineers tend to draw
the lines based on the the absorption capabilities of different detector materials. Generally,
this is taken as evidence that the electromagnetic spectrum is, as thought, continuous rather
than discrete.
2612,000 Angstrom units = 12 µm
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(h) Photo-electric cells of the following descriptions:
1. Photo-electric cells with a peak sensitivity at a wave-
length longer than 12,000 Angstrom units;. . .
Figure 6.6: Early infrared detection controls (British Government, 1954, p. 785)
(not actual image)
1550. Thermal detecting cells, i.e. bolometers and thermocou-
ple detectors, radiant energy types only, with a response
time constant of less than 10 milliseconds measured at
the operating temperature of the cell for which the time
constant reaches a minimum.
Figure 6.7: The first appearance of IL 1550 (British Government, 1960, p. 282)
(not actual image)
IL 1550 disappeared in the 1980 CoCom lists, and while it may appear
that ‘thermal detecting cells’ are no longer controlled, there is also evidence to
suggest that they were instead no longer seen as in Groups F & G (then called
‘Electronic equipment including communications, radar, computer hardware
and software’), but instead as part of Group C ‘Electrical and power-generating
equipment’. In particular, IL 1205(b)(1–3), which covered ‘photo-voltaic cells’,
later became 6.A.2.a.3 after the Core List revision, as shown in the Cross
Reference Index.27 These ‘cells’ were controlled based on their ‘power output’,
rather than by the wavelengths they absorbed. I choose to use the word ‘absorb’
here rather than ‘detect’ as that seems more in keeping with the mindset of
viewing the cells as power-providers rather than radiation-detectors.
6.A.2.a.3, which was the topic of the debate at Wassenaar in 2002–2004 that
I analyse in this section, does not solely owe its existence to 1205(b)(1–3) as the
27See Appendix C.
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Cross Reference Index suggests. When 6.A.2.a.3 first came into existence in
1991, it had the chapeau ‘Non-“space-qualified” linear or two dimensional focal
plane arrays’. The term ‘focal plane array’, however, first appeared in IL 1548
in 1985 (British Government, 1985, p. 29), and the parameters used to define
the technology in 6.A.2.a.3 were not those of IL 1205 (i.e. ‘power output’),
but rather the wavelengths of radiation that the material could detect/absorb,
which were the parameters used by IL 1548. As we can see, then, 6.A.2.a.3
has had a checkered history of development, and has found homes in multiple
areas of this classification system.
The real trouble for the 2002–2004 debates within Wassenaar, however, was
a decontrol note that appeared with the Core List review, 6.A.2.a.3.‘Note 2’,
“6.A.2.a.3. does not embargo silicon focal plane arrays. . . ” (British Govern-
ment, 1991a, p. 39).28 One member of a delegation29 provided me with a
succinct reason for this decontrol:
Nobody thought that you could get silicon to respond in the right
wavelength. That was the original thinking. They were specifically
excluded because a lot of conventional charge couple devices were
made of silicon. The CCD in your camcorder is made of silicon, but
it doesn’t see well at night. It doesn’t respond in the IR [infrared].
So in order to get the solid-state devices controlled, the [other Par-
ticipating States] said, “we want to make sure we don’t control the
conventional CCDs.” And everybody said, “sure. They’re no good
anyway.”
To gain an understanding of why this Note provided such difficulty, it is
useful to turn to a brief history of the development of focal plane arrays,
and in particular uncooled focal plane arrays. The term ‘focal plane array’
first appeared on the 1985 CoCom lists under IL 1548(d), but work on focal
plane array development had already begun by the 1950s (at least in the US).
This early work focused on photon detection, which requires the detector to
28This became 6.A.2.a.3.‘Note 2’.a by 2002.
29Interview with US Defense Department Official A & US Defense Department Official B,
5 February 2007.
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be cryogenically cooled.30 Over the following decades, these sensors became
increasingly sensitive and are today employed for such military uses as un-
manned aerial vehicle (UAV) night reconnaissance systems and targeting and
acquisition systems on Apache helicopters. Unclassified resolution capabilities
of cameras employing cooled focal plane arrays are such that a person could
use the camera to detect the heat from a recently shot rifle from 8 miles away
and 20,000 feet up.31
Cooled detectors have, to date, always been able to detect infrared radiation
with a higher sensitivity than uncooled detectors, but the perceived downsides
of cooled detectors for military use include low reliability (3,000–4,000 hours
between failures for cooled detectors, compared to 40,000–60,000 hours for
uncooled detectors), and that they are bigger, heavier, more expensive,32 and
require longer starting times to allow the sensor to cool down (Bogue, 2007).
Imagers based on cooled focal plane arrays, as well as all electronic sens-
ing technology ‘specially designed for military use’, could be covered under
ML 11.a, as could be all “specially designed components therefor.”33 When
not designed for military use, cooled focal plane arrays are covered on the
Dual-Use List by 6.A.2.a.3.a–e, where each of the subdivisions are based on
effective response in different bands of infrared radiation.
The United States provided major funding for research into uncooled focal
plane arrays in the late 1980s through a classified Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) contract called ‘high-density array development’
(HIDAD). This was part of the Balanced Technology Initiative (BTI) pro-
gramme managed by the US Army Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Di-
30Usually to 77 K (-196 C) for Mercury Cadmium Telluride (HgCdTe) detectors or 195 K
(-78 C) for others such as Indium Antimonide (InSb) (Kruse, 1994).
31Interview with intelligence officer working with UAVs in Afghanistan.
32In 1993, cooled infrared imaging systems typically cost $100,000 (Wood, 1993a), and by
2002 they were still around $50,000 (Rogalski, 2002).
33ML 11.a.‘Note c’ says that ML 11.a includes “Electronic systems and equipment de-
signed either for surveillance and monitoring of the electro-magnetic spectrum for military in-
telligence or security purposes or for counteracting such surveillance and monitoring” (Wasse-
naar Arrangement, 2007b, p. 172).
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rectorate (NVESD). “DARPA was pushing this technology, because they were
looking for a very low cost thermal weapons sight, and light and power and all
the other good stuff[. . . ] When they first developed the rudimentary [uncooled
focal plane array] devices, the sensitivity was terrible. You could see a soldering
iron and that was about it. A soldering iron turned on.”34
Two companies, Texas Instruments and Honeywell, received funding through
this contract and each worked on developing uncooled focal plane arrays with
different types of material (Buser & Tompsett, 1995). Engineers at Texas In-
struments decided to make use of a physical principle called the pyroelectric
effect, whereby infrared radiation hitting a ceramic—in this case, the ferroelec-
tric ceramic barium strontium titanate (BST)—cause the ceramic to become
electrically charged (Hanson et al., 1992). Engineers at Honeywell used a prop-
erty of some materials—mainly different configurations of vanadium and oxy-
gen, together called vanadium oxide (VOx)—whereby infrared photons hitting
the material cause an increase in the material’s electrical resistivity (Wood,
1993a,b).
It is important to note here that NVESD had a big reputation within the
night vision world, but it did not have very much money to fund projects on
its own, and certainly not enough to fund the massive development needed
to bring uncooled focal plane array technology to a state where it could be
deployed on the battlefield. In order to get the funding, the NVESD had to,
in effect, lobby DARPA through the US Congress and convince a DARPA
programme manager that this research and development was worth funding.35
Here we see an example of very non-technical reasons why some technologies
are developed and others are not.
Pyroelectric focal plane arrays were first developed by Texas Instruments
34Interview with US Defense Department Official A & US Defense Department Official B,
5 February 2007.
35Interview with US Defense Department Official A & US Defense Department Official B,
5 February 2007.
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in the late 1970s.36 The basic pyroelectric phenomenon—where a change in
temperature of a crystal produces a charge—was known thousands of years ago,
and was described by Theophrastus in the 4th Century BC.37 One characteristic
that is commonly seen as important in these types of focal plane arrays is that
they only respond to changes in the temperature over their area of detection
(Hanson et al., 1992). If one were taking a still image or only concerned about
movement in the area of detection, this characteristic would not be seen as a
disadvantage. If, however, one were interested in continually viewing a scene,
i.e. providing a video image rather than a still image, then this is a drawback.
To get around this characteristic, pyroelectric focal plane arrays used for video
purposes are fitted with a ‘chopper’ that effectively works like a shutter of a
camera, combined with electronics to integrate the chopped still images into
a video, typically at a speed of 30 frames per second (30 Hz), which is about
the speed where humans can no longer disassociate individual images from one
another.
Electric [48]. This approach is unique, based on an
all-silicon version of microbolometer.
The 240! 320 arrays of 50 lm microbolome-
ters are fabricated on industry-standard wafer (4
in. diameter) complete with monolithic readout
circuits integrated into underlying silicon. Radford
et al. [49] have reported a 240! 320 pixel array
with 50 lm square vanadium oxide pixels, for
which the average NETD (f =1 optics) was 8.6 mK.
Larger arrays size was described by Altman and
colleagues at Lockheed Martin [50]; they reported
a 640! 480 FPA with 28! 28 m2 pixels with
NETD (f =1 optics) of about 60 mK.
At present, several research programmes are
focused towards enhancement of performance
level in excess of 109 cmHz1=2 W"1. It is antici-
pated that new materials will form the basis of the
next generation of semiconductor film bolome-
ters. The most promising material appears to be
amorphous silicon [51].
4.7.2. Pyroelectric detectors
The imaging systems based on pyroelectric ar-
rays, usually need to be operated with optical
modulators which chop or defocus the incoming
radiation. This may be an important limitation for
many applications in which chopperless operation
is highly desirable (e.g., guided munitions). Hith-
erto, most of the ferroelectric detectors have been
operated well-below Curie temperature TC, where
the polarisation is not affected by changes in am-
bient temperature. It is, however, possible to op-
erate ferroelectrics at or above TC, with an applied
bias field, in the mode of a ‘‘dielectric bolometer’’.
Several materials have been examined in di-
electric bolometer mode. Barium strontium titan-
ate (BST) ceramic is a relatively well-behaved
material with a very high permittivity. Texas in-
struments (TI) has improved the performance of
pyroelectric FPAs using a bias voltage applied to
maintain and optimise the pyroelectric effect near
the phase transition [52]. Fig. 16 shows details of
the completed pyroelectric detector device struc-
ture. For the United Kingdom array programme
lead scandium tantalate (PST) material has been
chosen [53].
Although many applications for this hybrid
array technology have been identified, and imagers
employing these arrays are in mass production, no
hybrid technology advances are foreseen. The
reason is that the thermal conductance of the
bump bonds is so high that the array NETD (f =1
optics) is limited to about 50 mK. Pyroelectric
array technology therefore is moving toward
monolithic silicon microstructure technology. The
monolithic process should have fewer steps and
shorter cycle time. Most ferroelectrics tend to lose
their interesting properties as the thickness is re-
duced. However, some ferroelectric materials seem
to maintain their properties better than others.
This seems particularly true for lead titanate
(PbTiO3) and related materials, whereas BST, the
material used in hybrid detectors, does not hold its
properties well in thin-film form. Various tech-
niques for the deposition of thin ferroelectric films
have been investigated, including radio frequency
magnetron sputtering, dual ion beam sputtering,
sol–gel processing, and laser ablation.
5. Dual-band IR focal plane arrays
Multicolour capabilities are highly desirable for
advance IR systems. Systems that gather data in
separate IR spectral bands can discriminate both
absolute temperature and unique signatures of
objects in the scene. By providing this new di-
mension of contrast, multiband detection also en-
ables advanced colour processing algorithms to
further improve sensitivity above that of single-
colour devices. Currently, multispectral systems
rely on cumbersome imaging techniques that either
disperse the optical signal across multiple IR FPAs
Fig. 16. BST dielectric bolometer pixel (after Ref. [31]).
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Figure 6.8: TI BST pyroelectric focal
plane array implementation
(Hanson t al., 1992)
Resistive microbolometer focal
plane arrays do not need a chopper
because they make use of a differ-
ent physical phenomenon. A ‘mi-
crobolometer’ is a technology that,
according to the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment, is “a thermal imaging detec-
tor that, as a result of a tempera-
ture change in the detector caused by
the absorption of infrared radiation,
is used to generate any useable signal.”38 The concept of such a technology
has been moving within communities of sensor experts since at least Samuel
36See, for instance, US Patents 4080532, 4142207, 4143269, 4162402.
37For a history of pryoelectricity from Theophrastus through to the 1970s, see Lang (1974).
386.A.2.a.3.f.‘Technical Note’ in lists fter 2003.
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Pierpont Langley’s first demonstration in 1879 of a bolometer for astronomi-
cal observations (Barr, 1963; Langley, 1880–1881b, 1881a). Most sources say
that the microbolometers developed by Honeywell used VOx as their detecting
element (e.g. Cole et al., 1998; Kruse, 1994; Rogalski, 2003), but early publica-
tions shortly after the HIDAD programme was declassified refer only to silicon
microbolometers (e.g. Wood, 1993a; Wood et al., 1992).
fracted light inside the illuminated pixels, increas-
ing responsivity and eliminating crosstalk. The
thinning also allows the detector array to stretch
and accommodate the thermal expansion mis-
match with the Si ROIC.
Gunapala and co-workers at Jet Propulsion
Laboratory (JPL) demonstrated a 256! 256
QWIP FPA in an Amber hand-held camera. The
current state of the art for QWIP FPA size has
been 640! 480 recently demonstrated by JPL
[43,44] and Lockheed Martin [45]. The measured
mean NEDT of the QWIP camera was 36 mK at
an operating temperature of T ¼ 70 K at 300 K
background [44].
4.7. Thermal detectors
IR semiconductor imagers use cryogenic or
thermoelectric coolers, complex IR optics, and
expensive sensor materials. Typical costs of cryo-
genically cooled imagers of around $50 000 restrict
their installation to critical military applications
allowing conducting of operations in complete
darkness. Very encouraging results have been
obtained with micromachined silicon bolometer
arrays and pyroelectric detector arrays. Several
countries have demonstrated imagers with NEDT
of 100 mK or better, and the cost of simple systems
is sometimes below $10 000. It is expected that
high-performance imager system costs will be re-
duced to less than $1000 [46] and above IR cam-
eras will become widely available in the near
future. Although developed for military applica-
tions, low-cost IR imagers are used in non-military
applications such as: drivers aid, aircraft aid, in-
dustrial process monitoring, community services,
firefighting, portable mine detection, night vision,
border surveillance, law enforcement, search and
rescue, etc.
4.7.1. Micromachined silicon bolometers
The most popular thermistor material used in
fabrication of the micromachined silicon bolome-
ters is vanadium dioxide, VO2. From the point of
view of IR imaging application, probably the
most important property of VO2 is its high nega-
tive temperature coefficient of resistance (TCR) at
ambient temperature, which exceeds 4% per degree
for single element bolometer and about 2% for
FPA.
The final microbolometer pixel structure is
shown in Fig. 15. The microbolometer consists of
a 0.5 lm thick bridge of Si3N4 suspended about 2
lm above the underlying silicon substrate. The use
of a vacuum gap of #2.5 lm, together with a
quarter wave resonant cavity between the bolo-
meter and the underlying substrate, can produce a
reflector for wavelengths near 10 lm. The bridge is
supported by two narrow legs of Si3N4. The Si3N4
legs provide the thermal isolation between the
microbolometer and the heat-sink readout sub-
strate and support conductive films for electrical
connection. A bipolar input amplifier is normally
required, and this can be obtained with biCMOS
processing technology. Encapsulated in the centre
of the Si3N4 bridge is a thin layer (500 !A) of
polycrystalline VOx.
Honeywell has licensed this technology to sev-
eral companies for the development and produc-
tion of uncooled FPAs for commercial and
military systems. At present, the compact 320 !
240 microbolometer cameras are produced by
Raytheon, Boeing, and Lockheed Martin in the
United States. The US government allowed these
manufactures to sell their devices to foreign
countries, but not to divulge manufacturing tech-
nologies. In recent years, several countries, in-
cluding the United Kingdom, Japan, Korea, and
France have picked up the ball, determined to
develop their own uncooled imaging systems. As a
result, although the US has a significant lead, some
of the most exciting and promising developments
for low-cost uncooled IR systems may come from
non-US companies, e.g., microbolometr FPAs
with series p–n junction elaborated by Mitsubishi
Fig. 15. Bridge structure of Honeywell microbolometer (after
Ref. [47]).
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Figure 6.9: Honeywell VOx resis-
tive microbolometer focal
plane array implementation
(Wood, 1993a)
Indeed, both the Texas Instru-
ments’ focal plane array and Honey-
well’s relied on at l ast silicon base
for their detectors (Figures 6.8 & 6.9),
but this was not seen by the Partic-
ipating States within Wassenaar as
meaning that these technologies were
not controlled, even though there was
a decontrol note for ‘silicon photode-
vices’. It was not until a subset of microbolometers gained the label ‘amorphous
silicon’ that questions of the control status for the technology came up, i.e. the
technology became an anomaly. Unlike ‘quantum cryptography’, where hav-
ing the word ‘cryptography’ in the name aided its placement on the Dual-Use
List, calling this technology an ‘amorphous silicon’ (α-Si, pronounced ‘alpha
silicon’) microbolometer caused tension in the classification system because
parts of Participating State delegations that were expressing the competitive
framing—such as various Ministries of Trade—argued that the decontrol note,
which to the did not apply to the BST or VOx focal plane arrays even though
they also depended on silicon, very much applied to α-Si.
α-Si was developed in several countries, but most notably in the US, Aus-
tralia, and France. In the US, Texas Instruments did initial d elopment then
handed the technology to R ytheo , which has since become L3. In Australia,
the Ministry of Defence (DSTO) put in significant effort on α-Si, handing it off
to the company Infrared Components C poration (Liddiard t al., 2001). In
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France, CEA/LETI (the Electronics and Information Technology Laboratory
of the French Atomic Energy Commission) pushed for commercial development
of α-Si focal plane arrays by setting up ULIS, a company that took the initial
work on focal plane array functionality and developed packaging and industrial
production processes (Tissot, 2002). Each of these countries demonstrated that
it was possible to make microbolometers out of α-Si using the same fabrica-
tion techniques that build computer chips, thus lowering production costs—a
key factor if one’s goal is the mass deployment of these detectors. Indeed, the
process is so similar that it is possible that many government officials would
not classify this technology as a focal plane array at all: “you have people in
different government organisations, and unless they’re clued in or tuned in or
sensitised to certain issues, they’re not going to recognise it. To them it’s just
another integrated circuit.”39 In addition to the trouble in distinguishing an
α-Si microbolometer from an integrated circuit, this technology also makes it
much more difficult to distinguish between a focal plane array and an imaging
system, as shown by the following quote:
Interviewee: And basically, what is happening with these is[. . . ]
how do you distinguish a core from a camera? Nobody could come
up with a fool-proof way of drawing a hard line between a camera
and a core. Therefore, they were merged. Everybody knows what
a bare FPA is, ok or just side electronics with the FPA.
SE: but then you add the lenses and box-
Interviewee: Well it’s not only that, but it’s the formatting electronics-
you have to address these focal plane arrays. They’re silicon chips,
you have to put digital signals into them, analogue voltages to power
them. But you do need some side electronics in order to get a signal
out that you can use. All of that is done basically in the core. The
hard part is done in the core. Slapping a lens on it, or a display,
that’s trivial. So that’s how the difference between a camera and a
camera core disappear.40
39Interview with US Defense Department Official A & US Defense Department Official B,
5 February 2007.
40Interview with US Defense Department Official A & US Defense Department Official B,
5 February 2007.
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The production process for α-Si microbolometers generates an anomaly for
the Wassenaar classification system in terms of the technical parameters. This
alone, however, may not have led to a controversial debate within Wassenaar
were it not for the fact that many companies, once a determination was made
that this technology was not export-controlled, began finding non-military ap-
plications for the technology. Many non-military uses for VOx and BST focal
plane arrays had already been identified by the early 1990s. They included
product inspection for fire detection and prevention in both aircraft (Parsons
et al., 1990) and spacecraft (Harper et al., 1990), remote temperature mea-
surement in aeromechanics (Lutovinov et al., 1990), medical diagnosis (Black
et al., 1990), monitoring of burns patients (Cole et al., 1990), and automotive
vision enhancement (Callahan, 1991). All of these applications, before the de-
velopment of α-Si, were subject to export controls. But by employing α-Si
technology, the controls were lifted and a significant export market opened up.
While some actors in the Wassenaar debate—those wishing to strengthen the
hierarchical framing—argued for showing how α-Si was actually like VOx and
therefore should be subject to the same controls, others—wishing to strengthen
the competitive framing—used the same reasoning to argue that VOx should
also be decontrolled. We now turn to this debate to see how the anomaly was
eventually resolved by removing the decontrol note, adding 6.A.2.a.3.f, and
adding more decontrol notes for specific applications. This required the hier-
archical framing to employ anomaly-handling strategies both to increase the
scope of control by incorporating the anomaly (monster-adjustment) and to
decrease the scope of control through decontrol notes (exception-barring).
The proposal process
The first proposal to modify 6.A.2.a.3 in relation to the silicon decontrol note
came in 2002. The French delegation submitted a proposal to simply eliminate
the decontrol note, since the original concerns about 6.A.2.a.3 controlling tech-
nologies used for video cameras were addressed by the choice of wavelength as
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a technical parameter, i.e. it only controlled detectors for infrared, not visible,
light. This proposal, however, was dismissed by the US delegation:
We killed it because we didn’t understand it[. . . ] That pertains to
a lot of controls- they depend on the people on the job. If they’re
not tuned in, if the organisation is not set up to represent the disci-
plines, at least at a passable level, an adequate level, you’re going to
miss a whole lot of stuff, and that’s what happened here. The con-
trolling organisations, or at least the people concerned with export
controls, didn’t recognise that what the French had proposed was
fine! Problem solved, had everybody accepted that. But anyway,
the Americans[. . . ] basically scuttled it.41
The next year, 2003, the Swedish delegation submitted a proposal for decon-
trols on cameras that incorporate focal plane arrays which are used for civilian
applications:
Sweden circulated a proposal[. . . ] related to infrared cameras and
focal plane arrays- focal plane arrays were mentioned as a way of
determining the sophistication of the camera. We released the pro-
posal during the first Expert Group, saying that we would like to
release some of these cameras for wider distribution without license
because there was a plain commercial use for these cameras. This
was launched in March because that was the date for proposals,
and it wasn’t so much discussed at that point in time, but many
countries expressed their interest in this because they could see the
big market for the automotive applications, the industrial mainte-
nance applications, the firefighting - they all saw these areas where
this technology would be very handy.42
Imaging cameras incorporating focal plane arrays are covered by 6.A.3.b.4,
but the parameter of control that this proposal wanted to use to define the
technology was the pixel count of the focal plane array within it. This was in
line with the current decontrol note, as shown in Figure 6.10.
Such a decontrol, however, was not acceptable to members of the US delega-
tion, who argued that a camera that is exported ostensibly for e.g. fire-fighting
can, with minimal modification, be employed as a rifle sight. For two years in a
41Interview with an anonymous US source.
42Interview with Swedish Former Government Official, 14 September 2006.
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____________________________________________________________________ 
 
DUAL-USE LIST - CATEGORY 6 - SENSORS AND "LASERS" 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
WA-LIST (01) 2 
- 88 - 06-05-02 
6. A. 3. b. Imaging cameras, as follows: 
Note 6.A.3.b. does not control television or video cameras specially 
designed for television broadcasting. 
 
    1. Video cameras incorporating solid state sensors, having any of the 
following: 
     a. More than 4 x 106 "active pixels" per solid state array for 
monochrome (black and white) cameras; 
     b. More than 4 x 106 "active pixels" per solid state array for colour 
cameras incorporating three solid state arrays; or 
     c. More than 12 x 106 "active pixels" for solid state array colour 
cameras incorporating one solid state array; 
     Technical Note 
     For the purpose of this entry, digital video cameras should be evaluated 
by the maximum number of “active pixels” used for capturing moving 
images. 
 
    2. Scanning cameras and scanning camera systems, having all of the 
following: 
     a. Linear detector arrays with more than 8,192 elements per array; and 
     b. Mechanical scanning in one direction; 
 
    3. Imaging cameras incorporating image intensifier tubes having the 
characteristics listed in 6.A.2.a.2.a.; 
 
    4. Imaging cameras incorporating "focal plane arrays" having the 
characteristics listed in  6.A.2.a.3. 
Note 6.A.3.b.4 does not control imaging cameras incorporating 
linear "focal plane arrays" with twelve elements or fewer, not 
employing time-delay-and-integration within the element, 
designed for any of the following: 
a. Industrial or civilian intrusion alarm, traffic or 
industrial movement control or counting systems; 
b. Industrial equipment used for inspection or monitoring 
of heat flows in buildings, equipment or industrial 
processes; 
c. Industrial equipment used for inspection, sorting or 
analysis of the properties of materials; 
d. Equipment specially designed for laboratory use; or 
e. Medical equipment. 
 
6. A. 4.  OPTICS 
 
   a. Optical mirrors (reflectors), as follows: 
 
    1. "Deformable mirrors" having either continuous or multi-element 
surfaces, and specially designed components therefor, capable of 
dynamically repositioning portions of the surface of the mirror at rates 
exceeding 100 Hz; 
 
6. A. 4. a. 2. Lightweight monolithic mirrors having an average "equivalent 
density" of less than 30 kg/m2 and a total mass exceeding 10 kg; 
Figure 6.10: 6.A.3.b.4 Imaging cam ra incorporating focal plane arrays (Wasse-
naar Arrangement, 2001)
row, then, anomalies were prevented from arising around the focal plane array
technology. The first time was through an apparent lack of technical knowledge
of the proposed change, and the second time was a refusal to accept ‘use’ as a
parameter of a technology, i.e. decontrol for ‘civilian use’.
Sweden agreed to withdraw its proposal from the 2003 list modification
process, and re-work it for 2004:
We submitted a proposal, again taking out the focus on the focal
plane array, but focused on the camera instead, on the actual end-
use, on what the camera would do, to limit it to those cameras that
would be used for firefighting and industrial maintenance. The
debate was about how far these cameras could see, how clear the
picture was, how easy it would be to open up the camera, take out
the focal plane array, cluster it with other focal plane arrays and
thus get a better range and focus. What the cameras can do is that
you can measure the heat and you can see almost down to the facial
features of the person, if it’s a really good camera. So the rationale
for the Swedish proposal was to take the cameras that were less
sophisticated, were tamper-proof, the range, the sharpness of the
image - these were the issues that we were trying to work around
and get some consensus on.43
The US, in the meantime, developed a proposal for modifying 6.A.2.a.3 by
adding a new item (6.A.2.a.3.f ), which it also submitted in 2004. The ba-
sic premise of the proposal was to ‘close the loophole’ created by the silicon
43Interview with Swedish Former Government Official, 14 September 2006.
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decontrol note.44 This was widely seen as a desirable move, but several delega-
tions thought that, in addition, the US was trying to expand controls on focal
plane arrays in a way that would control too many civilian applications.45 For
example:
I expect the silicon was there[. . . ] probably because of silicon pho-
todetectors which will work in the near-infrared. and the α-Si com-
panies grabbed ahold of it and said, “that’s there, therefore we are
not covered.” Which was ok when the α-Si was relatively poor per-
formance. But as it improved it became quite significant. And the
whole point of the discussion in 2004 was that we wanted to get rid
of the exception for silicon because it’s anomalous, because α-Si is
now performing just as well as everything else. So why should it be
a special case?46
Noticing the similarities between the Swedish and American proposals, one
Participating State suggested that the proposals be dealt with simultaneously.
The discussions were very intensive, with multiple meetings outside of the for-
mal and informal Wassenaar Expert Group meetings.47 The issue, however,
quickly became polarised between those arguing for controlling based on mili-
tary utility (simply saying that focal plane arrays are relevant to Wassenaar and
therefore should be controlled) and those arguing for decontrol on account of
either foreign availability or controllability. This polarisation was shown very
clearly when, early on in the discussions, those arguing for control brought
a very high-ranking Army officer to the Expert Group meeting to point out
how critical night vision systems were to military affairs, and how military
capabilities of Wassenaar Participating States would be compromised if these
technologies found their way into enemy hands. The officer then quickly pro-
ceeded to ask the focal plane array Technical Working Group not to ask him
44Interview with US Defense Department Official A & US Defense Department Official B,
5 February 2007.
45I spoke with several Officials from other countries that found issue with the US proposal.
46Interview with British Wassenaar Industry Consultant C for thermal sensing technology,
5 June 2008.
47Sources noted meetings in Paris, Brussels, and Moscow.
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any technical questions, as he did not have any technical knowledge in this
area.48
Those arguing for control engaged upon an extensive campaign to raise
awareness amongst the other delegations’ Ministries of Defence:
What we wanted to make sure was that the Ministries of Defence
weighed in[. . . ] There are usually MoD reps from about 10-12 coun-
tries that show up at Wassenaar Meetings. So that means that there
are about 20 countries that don’t have MoD reps, and so the de-
fence perspective isn’t represented. So we thought that we needed
to meet with defence reps and tell them about this issue so that
they could weigh in with their government. Otherwise it was run
by the Ministry of Trade and Industry or the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and we just wanted to make sure that- We thought that
our way of thinking was in line with the way probably that most of
the Ministries of Defence were thinking.49
This was seen by many Participating States as ‘going behind the back’ of
their national delegation, and did much to erode the trust among States which
had been developing. Maintaining the trust of actors trying to strengthen
different framings of the problem of dual-use technology, as we shall see in
Chapter 7, is a key part of maintaining the legitimacy of the forum where the
discourse among framings occurs—in this case the Wassenaar Arrangement as
a whole. Here, it is important to point out that none of the countries was
arguing that α-Si microbolometer focal plane arrays should not be covered
under the Dual-Use List. The anomaly, in that sense, was easily resolved. The
difficulty in this case was determining what level of integration was appropriate
to control. Most delegations believed that controlling at the level of the focal
plane array was impractical, both because they were now mass-produced, and,
more subtly, because it was difficult to disassociate the focal plane array from
more integrated technologies. The production process used for α-Si focal plane
48This event was mentioned to me by several people in different delegations who were at
the meeting.
49Interview with US Defense Department Official A & US Defense Department Official B,
5 February 2007.
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arrays created an array that was already packaged with at least a minimal set
of electronics. Was the thing produced a focal plane array, or was it something
else, e.g. an ‘integrated array’ or a ‘camera without the lens’?
There was also the difficulty of deciding the parameters for 6.A.2.a.3.f, as
noted in one of my interviews:
Interviewee: [The Technical Working Group] was quite friendly and
collaborative, until you get, for example, [State A] determining that
the detectivity shouldn’t be below this and [State B] determined
that it shouldn’t be below this and the two don’t match and you
reach a stalemate. And they each contact their capitals in the night
and they come back in the morning and it’s still a stalemate. So yes
it was friendly and open and frank, but you did reach these points
where you couldn’t go any further and it comes to a full stop. And
that’s why we had to compromise on this rather than define it on
performance, which is what everybody really thought was the best
thing to do - to define it on performance.
SE: Give me an example of defining it on performance.
Interviewee: Detectivity. Number of elements. Those are the major
two. The number of elements: should it be 16x16, 32x32, 100x100.
We couldn’t agree on where the limits should be as to what was
useful or not. And detectivity even more so. Not only could you
not get them to agree on what they figures should be, you couldn’t
get agreement on how you should measure it.50
From an engineering standpoint, the best definition of the performance of
an imager is its non-equivalent temperature difference (NETD), but this can
only be defined for an array when the array is fitted with a lens to make a
camera (Kruse & Skatrud, 1995).
The complaint voiced most often to me about the focal plane array de-
bate was that the polarised position of the US allowed for very little negoti-
ation. The US was not seen to give sufficient credit to the other delegations
for their acknowledgement that controls on focal plane arrays were relevant to
the Arrangement. Similarly, the US was not seen to give sufficient weight to
50Interview with British Wassenaar Industry Consultant C for thermal sensing technology,
5 June 2008.
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the practicalities of their proposed change, i.e. the controllability and foreign
availability of focal plane arrays. Here are a few technologies that other Par-
ticipating States believed would fall under control if the US proposal had been
approved as it was:
JAN-ERIK KÄLLHAMMER
Manager, Active Safety  Autoliv Research, Vårgårda 
SE-44783, Sweden.
 e-mail: jan-erik.kallhammer@autoliv.com
Road accidents involving pedestrians are far more frequent at night than during the day. Analysis of US tra!  c 
fatalities by the University of Michigan 
Transport Research Institute (UMTRI) 
has shown that the risk of a pedestrian 
fatality is around four times higher at night 
than during daylight hours, a" er all the 
contributing factors are taken into account. 
Although higher alcohol consumption, 
increased fatigue and greater exposure to 
animals on the road are partly to blame, an 
important factor is the driver’s dramatically 
reduced range of vision. 
One reason that driving at night is 
so di!  cult is that high-beam headlights 
can rarely be used owing to the frequent 
presence of oncoming tra!  c. # e 
experience is especially challenging for 
older drivers, who typically have shorter 
detection distances of just 30–50 m for 
dark objects when driving with low-beams 
and facing oncoming vehicles. 
# e main safety bene$ t of night-vision 
systems is to increase the driver’s range of 
vision when using low-beam headlights 
and emphasize the presence of animals, 
pedestrians, cyclists and other vulnerable 
road users. 
 FAR- AND NEAR-INFRARED NIGHT-VISION 
# ere are two types of night-vision 
technologies on the market: far-infrared 
(FIR) and near-infrared (NIR) systems. 
An FIR system is passive, detecting the 
thermal radiation (wavelength of around 
8–12 µm). Warm objects emit more 
radiation in this region and thus have high 
visibility in the image. NIR systems use a 
near-infrared source to shine light with a 
wavelength of around 800 nm at the object 
and then detect the re% ected illumination. 
# e main advantage of NIR systems is 
that the cost is lower, because the sensor 
technology at these wavelengths is 
already well developed for other imaging 
applications such as video cameras. 
NIR hardware can also potentially be 
combined with other useful functions 
such as lane departure warning.
In contrast, FIR systems o& er a superior 
range and pedestrian-detection capability, but 
their sensors cannot be mounted behind the 
windscreen or other glass surfaces. UMTRI 
studies comparing the ability of drivers to 
Car night-vision is fast becoming practical and cost effective thanks to improvements in moulded 
infrared optics and thermal image sensors. 
IMAGING
The road ahead for car night-vision 
Figure 1 Avoiding accidents. BMW’s new FIR night-vision system in action. An FIR image of the road ahead is presented 
to the driver by an internal display integrated into the dashboard. Warm objects such as people and animals show up 
as bright white features on the image. The system offers a range of 300 m and a refresh rate of 30 Hz.
a b
Figure 2 Forward looking. a, The passive thermal image sensor is mounted on the car bumper just below and to one 
side of the front number plate. b, The sensor consists of a microbolometer featuring a 320 × 240 array of detector 
elements (pixels) that sense very small temperature differences in the environment of less than 0.1 °C.
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The Autoliv Night Vision System developed by
BMW. It has a refresh rate of 30 Hz, meaning
that it can provide a video feed, and is capable
of detecting objects at up to 300 m (Kallham-
mer, 2006).INDOOR PEOPLE COUNTER
The Irisys IRC 1004 is a novel thermal array based people counter family
applicable to a wide variety of counting applications:
• Retail, Shopping Malls & Shops
• Leisure, Hotels & Casinos
• Museum & Gallery
• Transportation
• Smart Buildings
The key benefits include: 
• Operation independent of ambien  light
• Minimal set up
• User-Definable Count Lines
• Bus Connectivity up to 30 units
• Wide Opening Capability up to 8 u its
Description of the IRC 1004
The IRC 1004 is a people counting device with the imaging optics, sensor,
signal processing and interfacing electronics all contained within a moulded
plastic housing. The unit is us d in a downward looking manner, with an
unhindered view of the target area. The unit functions optically, seeing the heat
emitted by people passing underneath as Infra-Red radiation, through a
germanium lens with a 60° field of vi w. The sensing rea is a square on the
floor whose width is approximately equal to the mounting height; at 3.5m the
unit ‘sees’ a 3.5 x 3.5m square on the floor. Mounting height ranges from 2.5-
4.5m can be covered with the standard lens, and a 40° field of view lens,
offering increased mounting heights, is available as a factory fitted option. 
The units may be used as single counting nodes, linked into networks of up to
30 individual units or configured to span a wide opening. In the wide opening
mode up to 8 units are linked to span the wide opening and will appear to the
user system as a single counter unit with a wide ‘footprint’. 
Two styles of output are provided which allow connectivity to the majority of
user input/output requirements. The simplest data output is by relay; there are
two relays within the unit that are software configurable to provide count data
from the system. The relays allow stand-alone systems to be implemented by
connecting the relays to a simple digital counter, for example. A data bus
output is also provided; this is based on the CAN protocol (Controller Area
Network) which is a two-wire, high-performance multi-drop bus standard with
high noise immunity and the ability to drive over many hundreds of metres.
The setup tool is a laptop PC running windows XP. This allows set up by a lone
operator and is also discreet and portable. The set-up tool is used to configure
the counting lines which may be configured uniquely to the requirements of the
scene, as described overleaf. 
The Product Family
• IRC 1004-0 Basic counter with relay interface 
• IRC 1004-1 Basic counter with CAN bus interface 
• IRC 1004-2 Master counter with relay interface
• IRC 1004-3 Master counter with CAN interface
IRC 1004
“ The IRC 1004 is a people countingdevice with the imaging optics,
sensor, sig al processing and
interfacing electronics all
contained within a moulded
plastic housing  
“
The IRISYS IRC 1004, a people counter used
to monitor traffic flow in buildings. Such tech-
nology is useful in settings like grocery stores to
know how many people come into the store and
therefore how many cashiers need to be ready
to check them out.
Negotiations on both 6.A.2.a.3.f and 6.A.3.b.4 continued right until the
night before the Plenary session in 2004. The US was caught in the position of
having taken a very firm no-negotiation stance, but at the same time it would
fail completely in its task if any Participating State vetoed the list modification.
Britain was willing to veto if compromises were not reached, and that helped
break the deadlock in the debate, because the US had to begin to negotiate. The
overall British stance in this is typical of that Participating State’s attempts
to balance security and economic concerns:
The MoD was virtually 100% behind the US in wanting to control
virtually every focal plane array - again based a lot on the fact of
the banning of land mines, because they were developing sensors
that they were going to throw out of aircraft in the thousands, with
very simple focal plane arrays in them that would detect movement.
So you scatter these on the battlefield and they literally just sit
there and say, “hello, there’s movement there.” So that meant that
they wanted to control very simple focal plane arrays[. . . ] On the
other end of the scale, I had British industry saying to me, “This
is going to affect us, this is going to control garage door opening,
people detectors, all sorts of very mundane items.” So that was the
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real two ends of the equation[. . . ] We certainly considered where
things were going, although I made it certainly clear to them that
we could not have, from an industry point of view, these types of
focal plane arrays being under control. That was accepted as our
bottom line for our negotiations, which as I said earlier did come
down to Britain standing out against the US, of which [members
of our delegation][. . . ] convinced the foreign office that Britain was
right on this occasion. And whilst there was a military use for
these, they were so widely available that it was stupid to control
the bottom end of the market. And it was only when the US found
out for themselves that I had Foreign Office permission, that they
came to me.51
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Figure 6.11: 6.A.3.b.4.‘Note 1’ The definition of an ‘imaging camera’ (Wasse-
naar Arrangement, 2004c)
A significant amount of this discussion was spent on the Notes for 6.A.3.b.4,
which mushroomed from the 12 lines they constituted in 2003 to 63 lines.
‘Note 1’ (shown in Figure 6.11) provides us with insight into the difficulty of
resolving this anomaly. The final definition of an ‘imaging camera’ indirectly
defines the bound of what is a ‘focal plane array’. As we can see, a focal plane
array may include a readout circuit, but cannot on its own produce either an
analogue or digital signal if it gets power. This is still in line with the general
definition of a focal plane array (Figure 6.5), but this Note provides evidence
that the line between a focal plane array and an imaging camera was in need
of clarification, i.e. monster-adjustment.
More telling of the eventual concessions that were made in the days before
the 2004 Plenary is Note 3 (Figures 6.12 & 6.13). Part (a) of Note 3 defines the
maximum frame rate that a decontrolled camera may have, but the scientific
basis for this number is tenuous:
51Interview with British Former Government Official, 8 March 2007.
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Figure 6.12: 6.A.3.b.4.‘Note 3’: Decontrols for cameras incorporating mi-
crobolometer focal plane arrays (part 1). (Wassenaar Arrangement,
2004c)
The US position was 5 Hz and other people wanted 30 Hz or what-
ever. It turns out that normal video rate is 30 Hz. At about 15–
17 Hz you get a very jumpy picture that looks like a movie from the
1920s. Our Defense Department does not want people to produce a
video camera - they want a still camera. So 5 Hz is definitely still.
15 is a jumpy moving thing. So it was then 10 and 5, and then
the US went to 8 and someone held out and wouldn’t compromise
so we went to 9 because the difference between 8 and 9 [laugh] it’s
not quite still but it’s still enough that you can’t see motion very-
and what [the Department of] Defense doesn’t want is for someone
to be able to use a camera like this and see someone throwing a
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Figure 6.13: 6.A.3.b.4.‘Note 3’: Decontrols for cameras incorporating mi-
crobolometer focal plane arrays (part 2). (Wassenaar Arrangement,
2004c)
grenade.52
One reason that the control text needed to be at least 9 Hz was that it
allowed for the decontrol of some thermal imagers, a point in favour of actors
taking a competitive framing of the problem of dual-use technology:
If it’s chopped at less than 9 Hz or if its update rate is less than
9 Hz then it’s not controlled. So that covers our imagers. Because
they at the time updated at 8Hz. And that’s where the 9 Hz came
from. We tried for 30 Hz, and I’ve got an email here that I sent
to [a member of the delegation] which says, ‘these are the limits
which we’d like to see. 30Hz is what we desire, but 8Hz is our limit.
We’ve got to have 8 Hz.’ And so it was 9 Hz that was put in.53
People counters, mentioned above, are decontrolled by Note 3.b:
But the other thing that we put in was basically to cover our coun-
ters when you don’t have a chopper. And that was defined in terms
52Interview with US State Department Official B, 19 January 2007.
53Interview with British Wassenaar Industry Consultant C for thermal sensing technology,
5 June 2008.
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of (a) that there was no image displayed on it, and (b) the field
of view is defined in terms of ‘instantaneous field of view (IFOV)’,
so it’s fairly useless for any military application. So the two bits
of that - the 9Hz chopping and the IFOV and no display - were
written effectively around our imager and counter.54
We can see the bounds of the definition of a camera, as well as a focal
plane array, being stretched here. 6.A.3.b.4.‘Note 3’.b.4.a, for instance, decon-
trols imaging cameras that have “no facility to obtain a viewable image of the
detected field-of-view.”
The civilian passenger vehicle note (‘Note 3’.c) was not seen as immediately
obvious to some delegations:
If you were a car manufacturer, then you are shipping 10,000 of the
sensors twice a year to your main manufacturing places. That’s not
a licensing burden, because it’s a bulk license. You don’t send out
two or three, you send out a thousand twice a year. The problem
arises in the repair situation. That’s where the licensing burden,
in theory, kicks in. And that’s why you have this weasely wording
that’s trying to get around that problem. That only came out as
part of the discussions. It wasn’t immediately obvious to us that
that was the main problem. We were thinking, “Well this is not
a licensing burden.” Whereas for us, it was a licensing burden
potentially, and a huge headache, because the people counters and
the door-opening devices were sold in hardware shops. And how do
you expect the general public to know if they’ve bought something
that’s going to require an export license.55
At the end of the 2004 negotiations, each of the delegations was able to re-
turn to their capitals saying that they had achieved their goals in relation to fo-
cal plane arrays. The anomaly—uncontrolled amorphous silicon microbolome-
ter focal plane arrays—had been resolved by removing 6.A.2.a.3.‘Note 2’.a,
through a process of monster-adjustment. In the process, however, significant
concessions were made on other parts of the list, most notably the decontrol
54Interview with British Wassenaar Industry Consultant C for thermal sensing technology,
5 June 2008.
55Interview with British Former Government Official, 8 March 2007.
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notes for 6.A.3.b.4, which were examples of actors within the hierarchical fram-
ing employing the exception-barring strategy to define more narrowly the scope
of controls. The definition of a focal plane array and an imaging camera was
shifted. The Dual-Use List as a construct—an ordered classification system—
was severely tested. One delegation spent its time in the EG largely making
sure that the logic of the control text was maintained.56 Perhaps the most
significant outcome from this process was the breakdown of trust among Par-
ticipating States that had been slowly developing, which I will address in the
next chapter. “That’s right. Politics came into the Expert Group. It shouldn’t
happen but it does on occasion, and this was one of those occasions.”57
Was this contention necessary? Many states think that it was not. Even
a member of the US delegation said, “In the intervening two years [between
the French and US proposals], the right advice wasn’t sought, and/or it wasn’t
followed. So it was really a mishmash, and unnecessary battles were picked.
Unnecessary battles were fought [laugh], and the US was really chasing its tail
in a circle.”58 However, this case is an extreme example of the types of events
that continually occur within the Wassenaar Expert Group in defining what is
a dual-use technology.59 Many of the list modifications require discussions on
56Interview with German Government Official, 28 March 2007.
57Interview with British Former Government Official, 8 March 2007.
58Interview with US Defense Department Official A & US Defense Department Official B,
5 February 2007.
59There is another case, discussed at length in Mastanduno (1992), of the US Department
of Defense trying to establish an ultimatum which other delegations—and indeed the rest of
the US delegation—must accept. It is worth quoting at length here, as the resemblance to
the focal plane array debate is striking:
US officials, primarily those in the DoD, were perceived by their CoCom coun-
terparts as arrogant, condescending, and unwilling to listen to or accommodate
the views of others. Attempts by defense officials to dictate policy in a context
in which compromise and consensus building had been the historical norm led
to incoherence in US negotiating strategy as well as conflict in CoCom.
The most well known incident involved negotiations in the critical area of com-
puter controls. The inability to resolve intra-alliance disputes had plagued
CoCom since 1979, but negotiations in 1982 and 1983 eventually narrowed the
gap between the more restrictive stance of the United States and the more lib-
eral one of other members. A final compromise was planned for October 1983.
On the eve of the meeting, however, Defense officials informed their State De-
partment counterparts that no compromise was acceptable and that the United
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parameter choice and the value of that parameter. Negotiating the choice and
value of parameters, as we have seen, is done through an inseparable mix of
politics, interpersonal relations, and concerns for national economies as well as
the more obvious security concerns and engineering choices.
Both the quantum cryptography and the focal plane array cases resulted
in an anomaly being resolved, though with differing amounts of uncomfortable
knowledge. The next case analyses a list modification where the hierarchical
framing tried to find a controllable parameter for computers and failed on suc-
cessive occasions. Each time, a redefinition of the technology occurred through
a process of exception-barring, but in employing this strategy, actors within the
hierarchical framing acknowledged that technologies which should be controlled
were not, thus creating uncomfortable knowledge.
6.3 Computers
In 2005, the Wassenaar Arrangement modified the definition of dual-use high-
performance computers by shifting the emphasis for control from processing
speed to the software needed to run them. In this section, I analyse the debate
that occurred within and around the Arrangement about whether processing
speed is a useful metric in defining computers subject to export controls. The
2005 modification, I argue, represented an exception-barring strategy that re-
sulted in uncomfortable knowledge for actors trying to strengthen the hierar-
chical framing. Processing speed, while an important factor in a computer’s
military relevance, was no longer seen as an adequate parameter for preventing
an end-user acquiring high-performance computing capabilities. I begin the
section with a description of the development of high-performance computers,
States would not deviate from its initial 1982 position. Defense added that in
any event, CoCom was not an appropriate forum in which to negotiate com-
puter control and that the negotiations should take place in an unspecified
forum with a senior defense official representing the United States[. . . ] The
computer stalemate was resolved only in the summer of 1984, when DoD re-
lented and compromised.
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from the early days in the 1960s through the development of cluster computing.
I then turn to the development and use of MTOPS as a metric of computer
performance, followed by a discussion of the debate within Wassenaar to do
away with MTOPS in 1999–2005.
The development of high-performance computers
Early physical forms of modern digital computers took shape before and during
World War II (Hennessy & Patterson, 1998).60 These included the Colossus,
developed by the British and used at Bletchley Park during the War to crack
the German Enigma code (Copeland, 2006); the Z-series calculators, developed
by Konrad Zuse in Germany (Zuse, 1993); and the ENIAC, designed and built
in the US to compute ballistic missile trajectories (Randell, 1973).
Ever since that time, computing power has been continuously pushed for-
ward through developments in architecture, processor, memory, and software
design. One of the significant characteristics of digital computers in relation
to export controls is that they closely resemble a ‘universal Turing machine’,
which means that, given enough time and storage, and the proper program-
ming, any one of them can solve the same computational problem that any
other of them can solve.61 By increasing the processing power and memory
capacity, reducing the energy and time used to move data from the processor
and memory, and optimising the software employed, engineers and program-
mers have been able to reduce the overall time that calculations require. This
reduction in time, usually stated as an ‘increase in performance’, has followed
an exponential curve since the 1950s, as shown in Figure 6.14.62 This curve is
often related to ‘Moore’s Law’, an observation that the number of transistors
that can be placed on an integrated circuit has doubled roughly every two years
since the integrated circuit was first invented in 1958 (Moore, 1965).
60There were earlier attempts at digital computers, most notably the work of Charles
Babbage (Babbage, 1889), but these are largely disassociated from modern developments.
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tor system demonstrated that many scientific applications can benefit greatly from
other computer architectures. At the same time there is renewed broad interest in
the scientific HPC community for new hardware architectures and new program-
ming paradigms. The IBM BlueGene/L system is one early example of a shifting de-
sign focus for large-scale system. The DARPA HPCS program has the declared goal
of building a Petaflops computer system by the end of the decade.
2. A short history of supercomputers until 2000
In the second half of the seventies the introduction of vector computer systems
marked the beginning of modern Supercomputing. These systems offered a perfor-
mance advantage of at least one order of magnitude over conventional systems of
that time. Raw performance was the main if not the only selling argument. In the
first half of the eighties the integration of vector system in conventional computing
environments became more important. Only the manufacturers which provided stan-
dard programming environments, operating systems and key applications were suc-
cessful in getting industrial customers and survived. Performance was mainly
increased by improved chip technologies and by producing shared memory multi-
processor systems.
Fostered by several Government programs massive parallel computing with scal-
able systems using distributed memory became the center of interest at the end of the
eighties. Overcoming the hardware scalability limitations of shared memory systems
was the main goal for their development. The increased performance of standard
microprocessors after the RISC revolution together with the cost advantage of
large-scale productions formed the basis for the ‘‘Attack of the Killer Micros’’.
Moore's Law
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Fig. 1. Performance of the fastest computer systems for the last six decades compared to Moore!s Law.
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Figure 6.14: Development of high-performance computational power, 1950-2005
(Strohmaier et al., 2005)
Ma y different ar hitectures ave been used in m int ining this gr wth rate
over five decades.63 I should note, however, that defining what counts as a par-
ticular architec ure is ambiguous wi hin the community of computer engineers.
The terms I use here—and the way in whi h I use them—ar largely based
on the work of Dongarra, Sterling, Si on & Strohmaier (2005), particularly
because of their reflexive take on terminology:
Terminology and taxonomies are subjective. No absolute truths ex-
ist ( xcept that no absolute truths exist), and common usage dic-
tates practical utility, even when self-contradictory or incomplete in
meaning. Yet, in spite of its imperfections, technical nomenclature
can be a powerful tool for describing, distinguishing, and delineat-
ing among related concepts, enti ies, a d processes (Dongarra et al.,
2005, p. 51).
To understand how the definition of a ‘high-performance computer’ has be-
come blurred over time, we can begin by thinking of a ‘computer’ as a processor,
connected to a memory, which interacts with data in the memory through a
See Randell (1973).
61This is the Church-Turing thesis (Kleene, 1952).
62Exponential curves are shown as straight lines when graphed on a logarithmic scale.
63For this history of high-performance computing, I have drawn from Bell & Gray (2002);
Dongarra et al. (2005); Kuzmin (2003); Strohmaier et al. (2005); Woodward (1996).
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set of algorithms (the ‘software’). A ‘high-performance’ computer is one that is
considered (for our purposes, by the export control community) to be in the top
range of currently available computers. The first high-performance computers
employed single scalar processors, which could only perform one operation on
a single piece of data at a time. The Control Data Corporation’s (CDC) Star
high-performance computer in 1974 introduced the vector processor design,
which performed an operation on an array of data in a single cycle. This de-
sign is also referred to as ‘single instruction, multiple data’ (SIMD) processing.
SIMD processing allowed the computer to process rapidly batches of data, but
only if the exact same operation needed to be done on each piece of data. There
was therefore much work that programmers needed to do to organise the data
to take advantage of the vector processor’s capabilities, and it is important to
note that not all computational problems can be solved more quickly with a
vector processor, but that they are particularly well-suited for computing two-
and three-dimensional graphics. Vector processors formed the bulk of super-
computer designs for much of the 1970s and 1980s, led by companies such as
Cray Research.
Computer performance continued to increase through more processors being
placed in a single computer, all of which used a common memory. This is
called symmetric multiprocessing (SMP) and has the advantage of allowing
any processor to work on any piece of data in the memory. SMP is a form of
parallel processing, where multiple operations are carried out simultaneously
on multiple pieces of data.64 These operations can be carried out on a set of
either vector or scalar processors, or a combination of the two. Many computers
today, from consumer models to the highest end computers, employ some form
of SMP.
With a computer based on SMP, we can begin to see a blurring of the
definition of a ‘computer’ that I set out above. There are multiple processors,
and each processor can run its own software. We might hesitate to call it
64This is also called ‘multiple instruction, multiple data’ (MIMD) processing.
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‘multiple computers’, because all of the processors are connected to a single
memory. But systems with multiple memories began to be developed in the
1980s. Called ‘massively parallel processing’ (MPP) computers, they further
blurred the line between what is and is not a ‘computer’. An MPP computer is
a set of processors, each with its own memory and stored software, connected
together by a ‘interconnect’. We can think of an MPP computer as a series
of parts which are specially designed to work together. As such, members of
the export control community could still classify it as a single computer, even
though it does not have a single processor, a single memory, or a single set of
software.
But what if all of the parts were not specially designed to work together?
This is the problem that was raised within the Wassenaar Arrangement in the
late 1990s. At that time, many of the world’s fastest ‘computers’ were actually
groups of commercially available desktop computers (which could be bought
by individual families and persons), connected together with standardised net-
work connections. This shift in high-performance computer design was aided
in 1994 by a NASA call to produce a computer capable of 1 billion floating
point operations per second (1 gigaFLOPS) for under $50,000. Donald Becker
and Thomas Sterling responded to the call and produced the ‘Beowulf cluster’,
which combined 16 commercially available DX4 computers with a 10Mb/s eth-
ernet, also commercially available.65 Beowulf clusters quickly became popular
with communities who wanted high-performance computing at a third or a
tenth of the price. These clusters are capable of solving very complex problems
in much less time than the vector computers or MPP computers that came
before. Also, they are extremely scalable; adding a few hundred or thousand
more desktop computers can be as simple as just plugging in network cables
and turning them on. The high-performance computer engineering community
recognised that the concept of ‘a computer’ was no longer useful in discussing
65The idea of clustering many microprocessor computers together was discussed in the
high-perfomance community from at least the early 1980s (see Bell & Gray, 2002).
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‘high-performance computing ’, and therefore referred to these groups as ‘dis-
tributed computing systems’. What defines these systems is not that they can
be considered as a ‘single computer’ but rather that they are working together
to produce a single output. The rise of the prominence of cluster computing
is clearly shown if we graph (Figure 6.15) the rankings of different types of
high-performance computers on the Top500.org website, which uses the widely
accepted (within industry) Linpack benchmark to determine the amount of
floating point operations per second (FLOPS) that each system can sustain.
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Figure 6.15: Percentage of top500 spots occupied by various computer architec-
tures from 1993–2008 (data source: http://top500.org)
The reason this final shift caused significant tension within the Wassenaar
Arrangement is that the classification system in use depended on defining the
performance of a single computer, or failing that, defining the performance
of a single group of computers. It assumed that computer performance was a
controllable parameter. But when it becomes relatively easy to increase per-
formance by buying a commercially available computer and adding it to the
system, such a metric loses most of its use in controlling who has access to this
technology. It is important to note, however, that the control still does serve a
use; it still makes it more difficult for a person or group to acquire a computer
over a certain performance because they cannot, for instance, ask for it in a
single order.
We turn now to how the performance parameter changed over the course
of CoCom and Wassenaar to see how its adequacy was undermined by a mix
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of opposing arguments and technological development.
From megabits per second to MTOPS
Until the 1969 CoCom lists, all ‘digital computers’ were controlled. In one of
the more interesting classification schemes used in these lists, item 1565 “Elec-
tronic computers and related equipment, not elsewhere specified, as follows”
specified parameters for controlling digital computers based on memory (sub-
item (d)) and operation temperature (e). But then it also controlled “(g) digi-
tal computers and digital differential analyzers (incremental computers) other
than those in (d), (e), and (f) above” (British Government, 1966, p. xi). This
is effectively a catch-all clause, and meant that any computer being exported
needed a license. This way of generating the list was most likely in place to
differentiate controls on embargoed items versus items which would likely get
a license, as shown in ‘Note 1’ of the 1966 version of item 1565 :
The [British] Export Licensing Branch will consider applications
for licenses for the export to the Sino-Soviet Bloc of (i) comput-
ers covered by sub-items (c) and (g); and (ii) specialized parts,
components, sub-assemblies and accessories therefor, not elsewhere
specified, covered by sub-item (h), subject to certain conditions.
The principle conditions are[. . . ]”
In 1969, the catch-all phrase that was 1569(g) was removed and several
more parameters for control were put in, including: whether the computer
could perform ‘floating point operations’ (d)(1); its ‘total effective bit transfer
rate’ (d)(2); the type of display it used (d)(5); and whether it could accept,
process, store, and output data using a stored sequence of operations that were
‘modifiable by means other than a physical change in memory’ (f)(1)–(4). In
addition to this change, the note at the end of 1565 —which outlined param-
eters which, if the technology met them, might result in a successful license
application—was the first instance of the performance parameter for comput-
ers, as shown in Figure 6.16.
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Figure 6.16: Decontrol note for Item 1565 from 1969 CoCom List. (British Gov-
ernment, 1969, p. xii)
The performance parameter can be seen in (d)(2), which defines the param-
eter as “processing data rate”. While “processing data rate” is in quotes, it is
not actually defined in the 1969 list, nor in any of the lists until 1985, when it
was relabelled “total processing data rate”. Instead, there is a note at the end
of the text for 1565 that says “Interpretive definitions of the terminology used
such as ‘CPU bus rate’, ‘average seek time’, etc. will be provided, if required,
on application to the Export Licensing Branch.” This is most likely because
the processing data rate is a complex parameter to calculate, as shown when
its definition was finally included in the list in 1985 and totalled 9 pages.
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Initially, processing data rates of less than 8 million bits per second (Mbps)
were likely to receive favourable review. This parameter stayed constant un-
til 1985, when it was relaxed to 28 Mbps for “any one ‘embedded’” digital
computer and “the sum of the ‘total data processing rate’ of each ‘embedded’
‘digital computer’ does not exceed 50 million bits per second”, but was tight-
ened to 5 Mbps for “incorporated” digital computers and 2 Mbps for digital
computers “shipped as complete systems” (British Government, 1985, p. 37).
According to The Wall Street Journal (1984), this translated into allowing the
export of most microprocessor computers that were marketed at individuals
and families, such as the Apple II and Hewlett-Packard’s HP 140. Companies
selling some more powerful mainframe computers, like IBM’s VAX 11/782, were
allowed at least to apply for licenses. But it is very important to note here that
none of these computers was named in the CoCom lists. Nor was ‘processing
data rate’ a standard measurement often used in industry. Officials from the
US Commerce Department went on record shortly after the list modification
was announced, complaining of the monumental complexity of the changes and
predicting that it would “probably take us years to figure out what they say. I
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mean that” (Mann, 1984).66
According to Mastanduno (1992, p. 181), the fact that the controls did
not change for sixteen years did not mean that there was no earlier push for a
change. Even by 1978, “other CoCom members pressed for relaxation of control
parameters on computers, while the United States proposed even higher levels
of restriction. The need for liberalization was suggested by the fact that the
majority of CoCom exception requests involved computers.”67 The US push
for more restriction, however, was paradoxically combined with the highest
number of license requests. The debate in the 1982–1984 list review process is
also well described by Mastanduno (1992, p. 269):
The U.S. Defense Department urged comprehensive controls, even
on personal computers, which Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard
Perle claimed were used by the United States—and could be used by
66This article in Aviation Week & Space Technology provides a rare look at—albeit only
one government’s view of—the internal debates that occurred within CoCom. I quote it here
at length to show the complexity of translating the parameters of control into measures that
industry can understand:
Another Commerce Department official warned that a great deal of analysis
of the agreement would be necessary and that “anybody who says that they
can articulate what the hell we agreed to without really thinking it through is
crazy.”
But he said mainframe manufacturers “clearly are going to be better off” and
“small personal computer manufacturers are going to be much better off. For
smaller stuff there’s no CoCom review, it’s national discretion.”
[Chairman of the Department of Commerce’s Computer Systems Technical
Advisory Committee Donavan W.] Pederson said, after being briefed by the
Defense Department officials, that it was his understanding that all eight-bit
systems, except those that can be networked, and 16-bit machines, except high-
speed ones, would be decontrolled.
Both Defense and Commerce officials described the agreement as a series of
compromises containing “something for everybody.” The two departments had
fought at length over how restrictive the new CoCom guidelines should be.
“We tried to get at the things that can potentially do the most harm to us
and really insist on controls there,” [deputy assistant secretary of Defense and
architect and negotiator of the modifications Stephen D.] Bryen said, “and to
mix it up where we thought we could make compromises that would accomplish
major objectives. In the small computers we have a big compromise on the
whole, because it’s practical, it has a chance to be enforced, and that’s key to
us. We bled over a few of those, for sure.”
67See also US Office of Technology Assessment (1979, p. 158–159).
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the Soviets—to target nuclear weapons in the European theater.68
Western Europe and Japan resisted, pointing to widespread foreign
availability.
The feud between US and European counterparts over whether a tightening
or relaxation of controls was needed, as we can see, was alive and well in the
1980s just as it was in the focal plane array debate in the last section. The
Wall Street Journal referred to it thus:
The Europeans want a broad economic relationship with the Soviet
bloc; they think the link adds to European security. The Pen-
tagon brands that attitude as naive. “The fundamental problem is
that the American concept of security is overwhelmingly military
in nature,” says Karl Kaiser, director of Bonn’s Foreign Policy In-
stitute. “That espoused by Europeans is equally economic.” Those
philosophical and economic differences give rise to trench warfare
in negotiating sessions. Paul Freedenberg, a U.S. Senate aide who
recently visited Cocom, complains about “the device of prolonged
debate or endless haggling about the meaning of words to stretch
discussions into years of debate” (Kempe & Lachia, 1984).
This ‘meaning of words’ debate (also referred to in the press as ‘horse-
trading’ (Buchan, 1984)) resulted in the increase of the processing data rate
parameter on the list (meaning the controls were relaxed) but at the same time
implemented controls on the export of knowledge of how to make computers.
This was shown by the new section 1565(j), shown in Figure 6.17. This was
one of the first implementations of controls on ‘intangible technology’, which
we will cover in detail in the next chapter.
In 1987, the “embedded” digital computer performance parameter was re-
laxed again to 43 Mbps for any one computer, and a sum less than 100 Mbps,
15 Mbps for “incorporated” digital computers, and 6.5 Mbps for complete sys-
tems. There were also complicated decontrol parameters specifically for China
beginning in the 1987 lists.
68Mastanduno cites Perle’s statement as coming from “U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Transfers of Technol-
ogy, hearings, 98th Cong., 2d sess., April 2, 3, 11–12, 1984, p. 158–64”. See also Marsh &
Buchan (1984).
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Figure 6.17: 1565(j), which shows the new controls on intangible technology for
computers (British Government, 1985)
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In the 1989 list entry for 1565, “total data processing rate” appeared in
seventeen places, and had ten different values, from 6.5 Mbps for complete
systems to 285 Mbps for “the sum of the ‘total data processing rate’ of all
embargoed ‘digital computers’ directly connected to a ‘local area network’”
(1565.Note.9(b)(7)(vi)). At the low end, this decontrolled computers such as
the IBM PC-Junior, but it also decontrolled the fast-growing markets of the
IBM-AT 80286. The complexity of the computer controls at this period of
time shows the extent to which the balance of economic and security interests
was becoming more and more difficult. There was much internal debate within
the US during this time, primarily between the Departments of Defense and
Commerce, about liberalising the computer controls, but spurred on by a Presi-
dential Directive NSD-39, the US did agree to further relaxation of the controls.
In the March 1991 lists, 1565 only had five references to “total data processing
rate”, ranging from 275 Mbps for complete systems to 1,000 Mbps for “central
processing unit - ‘main storage’ combinations.” According to later testimony
of Paul Freedenberg, former Under-Secretary of Commerce, this came “as such
a surprise to the business community. Overnight, the decontrol level for com-
puters jumped to a PDR of 275 Mbps, which encompassed all of the 80386
microprocessor-driven microcomputers, many of the minicomputers of the Dig-
ital Equipment Company’s VAX line, and a number of the slower mainframes
of IBM, Unisys, and Control Data as well” (Freedenberg, 1995).
We can see here a relaxing of controls, but also a shift in what the controls
were there to do. Since the Soviet Union had crumbled, there was no need for
the value of the performance parameter to be based on what the Soviets could
develop themselves. Instead, as global trade routes opened up, the value of
the parameter became based on which computers were considered ‘commodity
level’, or ‘commercially available’, i.e. those that could be bought in stores for
households or businesses.
This important shift in the political and economic environment had a di-
rect impact on the definition of a dual-use high-performance computer. We
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can see this shift by looking at the Core List review process of 1991, which I
discussed in the previous chapter. ‘Total data processing rate’ was replaced
in the September 1991 lists with ‘composite theoretical performance’, which
was measured in millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS). The
shift from the ‘processing data rate’ (PDR) metric to ‘composite theoretical
performance’ (CTP) was seen by members of CoCom as needed because PDR
was not applicable to certain computer architectures such as vector proces-
sors, massively parallel processors, and array processors. CTP, on the other
hand, was able to account for both floating and non-floating point operations,
as well as variations in word length, number of processors, and whether the
computer used shared or distributed memory (Goodman et al., 1998). The
need to incorporate more factors into determining what constituted a dual-use
computer makes sense if the goal of CoCom was to balance military security
with economic competitiveness, i.e. the hierarchical framing with the compet-
itive framing of the problem of dual-use technology. This shift, however, was
unwelcome for many in industry, as a prominent member of that community
noted:
What the [US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Export Ad-
ministration] is worried about is getting a new, single-value metric
to measure supercomputer performance. The current metric, pro-
cessor data rate (PDR), is actually OK, if one is fixed on getting
just one number that signifies the ability to do 64-bit arithmetic
computation. A footnote is needed, however, that says that a ma-
chine actually has to be capable of delivering the PDR on a test
program that the formula gives. On the other hand, the proposed
new metric, composite theoretical performance (CTP), is a bureau-
crat’s delight and was probably cooked up by a former high-level
Internal Revenue Service form and instruction designer who wanted
to harass the computer industry[. . . ] CTP bears no relationship to
a computer or its performance on any program or work load (Bell,
1991).
We now turn to an analysis of the use of CTP as a parameter to define a
dual-use computer. Just as the move from PDR to CTP happened concomi-
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tantly with a shift in the political, economic, and technological environments,
so shall we see that the abandoning of the CTP metric was also a result of a
mix of political, economic, and technological shifts.
From MTOPS to software
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Figure 6.18: The value of the CTP control parameter, 1991–2004
In 1991, the control threshold for the composite theoretical performance of
computers was set at 12.5 MTOPS (British Government, 1991a, Item 4.A.3.c.).
Said another way, a dual-use computer was defined as a computer which was
able to perform at or above 12.5 MTOPS. Over the course of its thirteen year
existence, the CTP parameter increased exponentially almost every year, as
shown in Figure 6.18. Constantly changing the value of the parameter was not
in itself a problem for the Arrangement,69 but recognising that modifications
to the lists can take two years or more from the time they are proposed, and
taking into account that computing power was doubling every 18–24 months,
it became a bit of a game with many of the delegations to guess how high the
parameter would go.70
69Interview with German Government Official, 28 March 2007.
70Interview with British Former Government Official, 8 November 2007. Most of the
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There were technological reasons why the composite theoretical perfor-
mance became problematic; it was argued that the hardware needed to develop
a high-performance computer became uncontrollable. John Gage, then Direc-
tor of the Science Office at Sun Microsystems Laboratories, explained to the
US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that, in 1993 when
the CTP was set at 12.5 MTOPS, one could easily get around the controls
by buying an uncontrolled computer and replacing the parts in it with more
sophisticated parts from foreign suppliers to achieve a computer that could
perform well above 12.5 MTOPS (US Congress, 1993). In his closing remarks
at the same hearing, Tim Dwyer, vice president and general manager of In-
tercontinental Operations at Sun Microsystems Inc., plainly gave his views of
export controls on computers. “Ultimately, the workstation and PC industry
is going to multiprocessor systems. Frankly, they are reproducing like rabbits
and trying to control the export of such prolific commercial technology just
forces manufacturing and jobs overseas. It is just simply absurd.” Here we see
how closely tied are the technological and economic arguments for changing
the definition—or in this case actually abolishing the definition—of dual-use
computers.
The development of clustering computers also caused problems for main-
taining the CTP parameter. For many years, one of the primary difficulties in
taking advantage of clusters of commodity-level computers was not that such
clusters were difficult to build; several books had been published about how
to construct a cluster out of non-export-controlled technology (e.g. Ford, 2002;
Sterling, 2002). It was that special software was needed to take advantage of
the cluster’s combined resources (Kuzmin, 2003, p. 11). This software needed
to be specially written using code that is unfamiliar to those outside of the high-
performance computing community.71 However, since at least the early 2000s,
debates over the value of the parameter were between the US and Japan, as they had the
most advanced technology in this area.
71Though it is freely available. See, for instance, the webpage on the US Department of
Energy’s website: http://www-unix.mcs.anl.gov/mpi/
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software such as OpenMosix72 and OpenSSI73 has allowed more mainstream
programmes to benefit from the resources of clustered computers. It has also
meant that these systems could reach MTOPS levels well above the threshold
simply by adding more computers to the cluster. Since high-performance com-
puters became so nebulous in their configuration, with parts from one supplier
coupled with parts from another, and all of the parts available in stores to be
bought by anyone, it became much more difficult for Wassenaar Participating
States to argue that the items were controllable, one of the key criteria for
defining technology as ‘dual-use’.
The economic arguments were significant as well. In the 1990s, manufactur-
ing technology for computers was being developed in non-Participating States
which could produce systems of comparable speed and price to those in the US
or Japan. They became much cheaper, however, when one added on the cost of
complying with export control regulations. Examples of regulations imposed
by the US included having guards continuously monitor exported technology,
and placing it in secure facilities. There were also significant amounts of pa-
perwork that had to be completed, and often delays of three months to years
to process the applications. These extra costs in time and money meant that
customers were less likely in general to buy from CoCom suppliers if they could
get comparable goods from non-CoCom countries (see remarks by Hughes and
Manzullo in US Congress, 1993, p. 29).
In one case, the delay in sending a Cray computer from the US to India
resulted in India developing their own version of the system themselves (Wol-
cott et al., 1998). This example highlights the economic loss from a failed
sale, the further loss from a new competitor who does not have to comply
with CoCom restrictions, and the security concern of having a foreign source
of controlled technology. It is a classic example of the difficulty of controlling
72http://openmosix.sourceforge.net/
73http://openssi.org
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the international distribution of computer technology, and it highlights the for-
eign availability of the technology, which is another criterion used to define the
technology as ‘dual-use’.
There were also political concerns. The US had a tendency to argue for
a very low level of MTOPS within Wassenaar, but then grant general open
licenses up to a much higher MTOPS level. This greatly angered European
Participating States, because their licensing procedures were governed by Eu-
ropean regulations, which were directly adopted from the Wassenaar lists. This
in effect meant that the US had a comparative advantage—inadvertently or
not—over other Wassenaar Participating States in selling computer technology
on the open market. As one member of a national delegation put it in one
of my interviews74, the definitions of technology on the Dual-Use List “can be
used as a trade measure within the regime! I wouldn’t argue that the US was so
well versed in European Union politics at that point in time that they realised
what they were doing. But it had this consequence, which I think, when they
did it for the third time, they were starting to clue in.”
This action on the part of the US highlighted one of the problems that
critics have often levelled at the Arrangement’s structure. They argue that one
Participating State can use the Dual-Use List to gain a comparative advantage
in trade over other Participating States, in this case by providing a loophole
in one state’s national legislation that other states were unable to match. This
problem, critics argue, will constantly recur unless there is an agreement be-
tween States not to engage in such practice. Such an agreement does exist,
however.75 It is one of the few Non-Disclosed Statements of Understanding,
which are not made publicly available, and it states that no Participating State
should unilaterally raise controls based on the way they make their licensing
procedures. It was likely not made public because it could at the time be seen
74This quote is provided on condition of anonymity.
75This information comes from two members of different Participating State delegations
to Wassenaar.
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as being directed solely at the US.
Given the political, economic, and technological difficulties of using the
CTP parameter, it is not surprising that there was a great deal of discussion
around changing not only the value of the MTOPS controlled, but also the
parameter itself. Composite theoretical performance was no longer seen as a
useful parameter to describe dual-use computers by many of the members of
national delegations to Wassenaar. There was discussion early on to maintain
a Cold War style control threshold, because even basic computing power allows
for many military applications: the US, for instance, developed the first atomic
bomb without a computer at all, and went to the moon using a computer less
powerful than today’s calculators or mobile phones.
In a US Government Accounting Office (GAO, 2000) report to the US Sen-
ate, ten alternatives to using CTP to define a dual-use computer were collected
from various US departments as well as experts in industry and academia.76
They included: counting processors instead of using MTOPS; measuring power
dissipation; indexing control thresholds to a common benchmark; tagging and
remote monitoring of exported technology; assessing end-user attainable per-
formance; raising export control thresholds to the level obtained by clustering;
controlling software applications; controlling technology used for interconnec-
tion; controlling computer systems based on bandwidth; and implementing
countermeasures to military advantages gained by countries of concern from
more advanced computer exports. The GAO noted, however, that “these ideas
have not been assessed for their feasibility to replace the current export control
mechanism; moreover, most of them do not address the challenge created by
advances in clustering technology” (p. 28).
Two US Department of Defense officials, commenting on the uselessness
of controlling computers based on their performance, clearly state that “the
original intent of the MTOPS-based policy was to restrict exports of high-
performance computers, otherwise known as supercomputers” (Etter et al.,
76See also McLoughlin & Fergusson (2005).
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2001, p. 25). Such controls, they argue, are “no longer feasible” and they sug-
gest that, instead, the government should focus on “protecting our software
used specifically for national security applications.” A report by James Lewis
(2001) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies also proposed abol-
ishing all controls on computer hardware and focusing on software instead.
In 2002, The Arrangement agreed to add more text to the ‘Software’ and
‘Technology’ subcategories of Category 4, specifically sub-items 4.D.1.b and
4.E.1.b, shown in Figure 6.19.77 In 2002, the CTP (4.A.3.b) was raised to
190,000 MTOPS, but software and ‘technology’ (i.e. knowledge) to develop,
produce, or aggregate computers was controlled if it was specially designed for
computers above 28,000 MTOPS (which was the old level of 4.A.3.b). In 2004,
the CTP threshold in 4.D.1.b and 4.E.1.b was raised to 75,000 MTOPS.
This emphasis on controlling the software and ‘technology’ necessary to
develop, produce, and aggregate computers was a preamble to the 2005 list re-
view process, where it was eventually decided to drop the composite theoretical
parameter. In its place they substituted ‘adjusted peak performance’ (APP),
measured in trillions of floating point operations per second (teraFLOPS), but
the APP parameter serves a very different purpose than the CTP does. The
Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement tried to make CTP be a
single metric to cover all possible computers that might be militarily signif-
icant. APP, on the other hand, is only meant to prevent the most blatant
attempts of non-Participating States to acquire high-performance computing
systems. There was recognition within Wassenaar that the hardware needed
to cluster computers together to achieve a system with an APP above the con-
trol threshold (0.75 teraFLOPS) was widely available from non-Participating
States, and there was little that Wassenaar could do to prevent an individual
or group from acquiring all of the parts individually. All that was left was to
77This text is actually from the 2003 list, as the 2002 list was unavailable. There was no
change in this section of text between these two years.
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Figure 6.19: 4.D. ‘Software’ and 4.E ‘Technology’ sections of Category 4 - Com-
puters (Wassenaar Arrangement, 2003)
(a) control what still could be controlled, i.e. custom-built systems over the
control threshold, and (b) control the software and ‘technology’.
It was very hard to let go of the CTP parameter and accept the uncontrol-
lability of computers, as elaborated in one of my interviews:
Interviewee: Once it becomes a mass market good, once everyone’s
got one in their pocket, once- I mean we saw that with computers.
SE: Yeah, like the playstation
Interviewee: exactly. It met the definition of the supercomputer in
1996.
SE: Well certainly when the Apple came out with their new G4
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Interviewee: Yeah, that’s right. As soon as everybody’s got one,
or as soon as they’re cheap, it’s very hard to control. And that’s
why stuff has to come off the lists and stuff has to go on the lists.
And I think that probably when you put everything together and
you want to come up with why does stuff come off the lists, it’s
going to be because it gets cheap. That’s not with everything,
because there are some real cheap components that remain on the
lists, but you don’t see them- because everybody doesn’t have one
in their pocket. Uh, analogue digital converters. Pretty cheap, but
you’re not going to go to the supplier and say, I want a thousand
of those, put them in your pocket, and go someplace, because they
do nothing for you. And once they’re attached to a board, they are
no longer a component.
SE: Yeah, but again, in determining-
Interviewee: That’s not a control criteria, I’m just saying that when
you do your research and you find out why the stuff falls off the list,
it’s going to be in relation to price.
SE: But, is that a consideration that might be taken into account in
determining things? For instance, you’re saying, “I have a feeling
that this technology may not be really effective to be controlled,
maybe we shouldn’t control it anymore. How do we figure that
out? Well, let’s do a thumbnail sketch, a back of the envelope
sketch. Let’s go and see how cheap one of these things is, and how
expensive it is, and then-”
Interviewee: Comes up all the time.
SE: I guess what I’m interested in is saying- if I could see what
people do on their back of the envelope sketch, and say, “What are
the factors that you see as important in making that back of the
envelop calculation.” Because with that I can then say, “Well, ok,
it seems here that the important aspects of the technology that you
are focusing on are ones of economy or ones of interpretability or
ones of- or what are the factors that you see-”
Interviewee: They’re all there. And the price curve follows- the
price and costs curves are identical, almost. And that’s also the
maturity curve for the technology. As it becomes more mature it
becomes cheaper to make. They don’t have to do a lot of brainwork
anymore, they just turn on a machine and it punches them out. So
that’s an indicator. So if you were to look at- most of the end
items that are controlled are more expensive than the ones that
aren’t. Most. And there are exceptions to everything, but I’m
saying that’s one of the things that you’re going to come up with
in your research, if you look at technologies. And you’ll find that
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they tend to become decontrolled as soon as they begin to cross a
threshold of concern, and that just make sense.78
The decontrol of computer hardware represents a case of exception-barring,
but one where the exceptions do more to undermine controls than strengthen
them. There are clear military uses for the technology, and yet technological,
political, and economic arguments were made that controlling the technology
did more harm than good. Even though computers are something that actors
trying to strengthen the hierarchical framing would very much like to control,
they are unable to do so while still remaining a legitimate member of the
overall debate. If actors expressing the hierarchical framing had continued
to flaunt the competitive framing for much longer and insisted that they had
their way, the ramifications to the institutional structure of the Wassenaar
Arrangement would have likely been much greater than they were for the focal
plane array case. Computer exports, in contrast to thermal imaging exports,
make up a significant portion of several Participating States’ overall exports per
year. If controls were seen as too stringent, actors employing the competitive
framing would feel that their concerns were not adequately addressed, and
having exhausted the ‘voice’ option of Hirschman’s (1970) framework, they
would be less inclined to maintain their loyalty and would have more incentive
to exit from the institution altogether and not be bothered with export controls
at all. Judging the alternative to be too costly a gamble, actors favouring the
hierarchical framing decided that they were not going to win this battle to
institutionalise further their form of organisation. That is the essence of an
an exception-barring generating uncomfortable knowledge. This case created
uncomfortable knowledge for the hierarchical framing because the recognition
that there is something which should be controlled but cannot be controlled
undermines the assumption that control is possible.
While there was exception-barring in one area (computer hardware), there
was also a seeming monster-adjustment of the anomaly into the software and
78Interview with US Defense Department Official A, 8 August 2006.
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‘technology’ sections of Category 4. But is it really possible to control intangible
technology, such as software and knowledge? The Participating States of the
Wassenaar Arrangement believe that it is possible, but as we have already
seen above, the programming code needed to aggregate computers into large
clusters is already in the open-source community, publicly available to anyone
in the world via the internet. Whether or not the Arrangement is capable
of controlling intangible technology given its current institutional form, is the
topic of the next chapter.
6.4 The Wassenaar Arrangement as an incom-
pletely theorised agreement
“Of course a completely theorized agreement would have many virtues if it is correct. But at
any particular moment in time, this is an unlikely prospect for human beings”
— Cass Sunstein (1996)
There is much evidence in the cases analysed above to suggest that the
Wassenaar Arrangement is an ‘incompletely theorised agreement’. Recall from
Chapter 3 that Sunstein (1996) describes three forms of incompletely theorised
agreements. The first form of is agreement on a general principle, where “peo-
ple who accept the principle need not agree on what it entails in particular
cases” (p. 35). Thus, people may agree on principles such as ‘murder is wrong’,
‘racial equality’, or in our case, ‘dual-use technology should be controlled’,
without agreeing on what that means in particular cases. The second form is
where agreement is reached on a mid-level principle, but disagreements remain
on both general theory and particular cases. The third form is an agreement on
particular outcomes and the low-level principles that accompany them, with
disagreements remaining about higher-level principles. There does not have
to be agreement on all three levels in order for a social system to function.
Agreements are reached where and when it is possible. Sometimes this in-
volves consciously avoiding topics that are contentious, sometimes it involves
transforming the topic into one that is more likely to reach agreement.
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In this chapter, we have looked at three agreements on particular outcomes,
by which I mean the modification of the lists. Each of the cases showed agree-
ment on modifying the text of the lists, even though there were often different
interpretations of what that text meant. For some, it satisfied the need to be
seen to be controlling the technology. Such was the case for the US Defense
Department in the focal plane array case, or the maintenance of controls on
computers after 2005. For others, it carved out an exception for the transfer
of their particular technology. The decontrols for night vision cameras in au-
tomobiles and car ferries are a good example of this, as is the mass market
cryptography decontrol note. For still others, the agreement avoided having
to undergo discussions on a more politically sensitive topic. A prime example
of this is the discussion on quantum cryptography, where too detailed a dis-
cussion about the technology may have resulted in other governments within
the Arrangement acquiring the ability to produce it, which was not likely the
desire of the countries who already knew how to do so.
While striving for complete theorisation in agreements may “reveal bias,
confusion, or inconsistency,” (p. 38) and therefore serve a useful purpose in
developing institutions, Sunstein discusses several advantages incurred from
allowing agreements to remain incompletely theorised. One is the constructive
use of silence that they allow. “Silence—on something that may prove false, ob-
tuse, or excessively contentious—can help minimize conflict, allow the present
to learn from the future, and save a great deal of time and expense” (p. 39).
We can see an obvious use of silence in the achieving of consensus within the
Wassenaar Arrangement. As one national delegation member noted:
I have chaired multilateral meetings where someone made an ‘I
just think this is a bad idea’ statement, and my sense was that he
was making a statement for the record and was not trying to break
consensus. So we get to the point where we have to decide and I say,
“Here’s what I think we’ve agreed to do, do we have agreement?”
and I look at this guy, and he’s just looking at me stone-faced. His
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answer is yes but he won’t nod. If he disagreed he would turn up
his flag.79
Another advantage of an incompletely theorised agreement is that it allows
the parties to the agreement to show one another “a high degree of mutual
respect” (Sunstein, 1996, p. 40). If two Participating States disagree strongly
on an issue, for instance capital punishment, they may agree not to discuss
that issue at the Wassenaar table, “as a way of deferring to each other’s strong
convictions and showing a measure of reciprocity and respect (even if they do
not at all respect the particular conviction that is at stake)” (p. 40). Such a
discussion, some might say, is outside the bounds of the Wassenaar Arrange-
ment, but that is exactly my point. Whether to control the technologies to
perform lethal injection, electrocution, or other methods of enforcing capital
punishment is a topic of debate within Wassenaar, but the Arrangement has
been designed such that there is a minimum amount of necessary contention
between opposing views.
Incompletely theorised agreements are continually re-agreed, thereby “re-
ducing the political costs of enduring disagreements” (p. 41). An example of
this occurring is the validity note placed on the focal plane array list modifi-
cation, where the changes could be revisited after two years. If Participating
States disagree on more abstract theories—such as the appropriate balance be-
tween security and economy—particular decisions about list modifications do
not directly undermine those abstract theories. If a decision were taken to de-
control one item, there would likely be other decisions to strengthen controls in
another area. Seeing the text of the Arrangement as a continual process rather
than, say, a treaty that is signed and put away, allows the States to continue
to negotiate, winning some debates and losing others, but always keeping their
voice in play.
Incompletely theorised agreements are pragmatic, and “may be the best
approach that is available for people of limited time and capacities” (p. 42).
79Interview with US State Department Official A, 28 September 2006.
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By seeing the Wassenaar Arrangement as a series of small agreements rather
than a take-it-or-leave-it single agreement, Participating States can focus on a
restricted area of the lists or a particular agreement within the General Working
Group without having continually to ask themselves whether such an agreement
makes the Arrangement as a whole more coherent—a question that would take
far more time than most States have to devote to the affairs of Wassenaar.
There are other points about incompletely theorised agreements raised by
Sunstein which I will address in the next chapter. My final point about these
agreements here is that Sunstein bases his exposition of incompletely theorised
agreements on the assumption that “human morality recognizes irreducibly di-
verse goods, which cannot be subsumed under a single ‘master’ value” (p. 43).
This commitment to pluralism leads him to argue for the applicability of an
incompletely theorised agreement for obtaining “a consensus on concrete out-
comes among people who do not want to decide questions of political philos-
ophy” (p. 47), which is mostly the type of people who make up the national
delegations to the Wassenaar Arrangement.
By viewing the Wassenaar Arrangement as an incompletely theorised agree-
ment, we can see the benefits of this approach to addressing the wicked problem
of dual-use technology. However, the idea of incompletely theorised agreements
has little to say about how agreement, particularly around contentious issues,
is reached. The way that most agreements are reached with an incompletely
theorised agreement seems to be through what Steven Ney calls strategic delib-
eration, “where policy actors interact in order to more effectively pursue their
divergent policy goals,” and in so doing do not bring into play their fundamen-
tal principles (Ney, 2006, p. 323). But when fundamental principles do come
into play, Ney suggests that in order for the deliberation to be successful it
must become more reflexive. In a reflexive deliberation, policy actors critically
reflect on both what they are trying to achieve (the general principle, or the
form of social organisation) and how they are going to achieve it (the particular
outcomes).
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We saw a conflict between both general principles and specific outcomes
of two difference framings in the computer debate. The imperatives of the
market and the need for decontrol were raised by the competitive framing,
while the imperatives of security and the need for control were taken up by the
hierarchical framing. The quality of the deliberation between the two could not
remain strategic because the outcomes each wanted were diametrically opposed
and neither was willing to compromise on their general principle. Thus, the
debate became more reflexive, and the switch to focusing on software controls
was created as an acceptable outcome for both framings.
In the case of the controls of intangible transfers of technology that we
look at in the next chapter, however, there is a third framing with which the
other two must contend. That framing, employed largely by the academic
community, argues for a more egalitarian form of social organisation.
6.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter, I have gone into significant depth about three areas of the
Wassenaar Arrangement Dual-Use List in order to show the anomaly-handling
strategies employed by actors expressing the hierarchical framing. Each of the
cases we examined produced increasing amounts of uncomfortable knowledge
for the hierarchical framing.
Where contention was least—in the quantum cryptography case—the anomaly
was quickly resolved by an expansion of the list, a monster-adjustment strat-
egy. Cryptography is seen as a key part of national security as it helps secure
critical information, but that also makes it key for commercial, and especially
banking, transactions. This is doubly true with the rise of the internet. Quan-
tum cryptography tries to get around one of the most difficult questions in
cryptography, key distribution, by employing the theory of quantum mechan-
ics to ensure that any interception of the key in transit can be detected. If
there has been no interception, the key is secure and uncrackable—that is, at
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least in theory. The proposal process began with a discussion on what the
technology was and whether it was anomalous. In the case of quantum cryp-
tography, the relevant (i.e. controllable) characteristic of the cryptographic
system for the hierarchical framing was the key generation rather than the en-
cryption/decryption algorithm (the one-time pad), as the algorithm is simple
and widely known, and therefore not controllable. In inscribing the technol-
ogy on the Dual-Use List, the Participating States made decisions about how
specified, and how ambiguous, the technology should be.
This was a case of monster-adjustment. The technology was seen as relevant
and controllable, and not under control. Control was possible by expanding the
classification system already in place. The text added, however, needed to be
ambiguous enough not to provide knowledge on how to make the technology,
while being specific enough so that licensing and enforcement officers could
identify it in actual export control cases. The text, then, was purposefully
designed to include some communities of practice (licensing and enforcement
officers, Participating States), and exclude others (companies/governments try-
ing to invent the technology).
The case of focal plane arrays was very different than quantum cryptogra-
phy, though both ended with the resolution of the anomaly. Focal plane arrays
provide a detectable change in electric properties due to absorbed thermal ra-
diation, and are a key element in many thermal imaging systems. Night vision
technology has always been very important for the hierarchical framing and
has also been difficult to classify. It is important because it provides a key mil-
itary advantage over those who do not have it. It has been difficult to classify
because different technologies have provided this ability over the history of ex-
port controls. One source of contention in the list modification process within
Wassenaar was that commercial applications of focal plane arrays were devel-
oped and a market was generated before controls were changed to include them.
A source of ambiguity on the classification of focal plane arrays, particularly
α-Si microbolometers, was that the technology needed to produce them was
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the same as that needed to produce integrated circuits used in computer pro-
cessors, and was therefore widely available around the world. Another source
of ambiguity was that it became difficult to distinguish between a sensor and
a camera, two separate areas of the Dual-Use List.
The focal plane array case required actors upholding the hierarchical fram-
ing to employ both monster-adjustment and exception-barring anomaly-handling
strategies. One of the most detrimental parts of the focal plane array debate
was the unwillingness of the US delegation—which was employing a polarised
hierarchical framing—to accommodate or even acknowledge alternative fram-
ings of the technology. Monster-adjustment occurred by removing the decon-
trol note for silicon and adding 6.A.2.a.3.f to cover α-Si microbolometers.
Exception-barring occurred through the extensive concessions made in decon-
trols for cameras with particular uses, such as people counters and night-vision
systems in passenger vehicles. This case was an extreme example of the types
of events that continually occur within the Wassenaar Arrangement Expert
Group debates.
In the third case, we saw a similar straining of tensions between the hier-
archical and competitive framings, but this time actors expressing the hierar-
chical framing found that actors expressing the competitive framing were in a
stronger position, and therefore the hierarchical framing was forced to make
exceptions to the controls even though the decontrolled technology was still
considered relevant. High-performance computers have gone through a series
of developments that have made them increasingly difficult to control. Much of
this is a result of the ambiguity of what constitutes a single computer, i.e. the
defining characteristic that is both essential and controllable. This resulted in
the almost complete barring of the controls on computer performance. Initial
controls covered all digital computers, but gradually parameters were added
which defined performance parameters, specifically total processing data rate.
This was a parameter that was invented by CoCom in order to have a definable
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and controllable parameter. This parameter was continually increased (mean-
ing that lower-performance computers were not controlled) until the rate of
increase exceeded the time taken to amend the definitions on the list. It was
then barred as a useful parameter, and replaced by the ‘composite theoretical
performance’ (CTP), another CoCom-created parameter.
The impact that the political and economic environment had on the defi-
nition of a dual-use computer was clearly shown in the modifications made to
the definition after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the definition’s focus
shifted from controlling what the Soviets needed, to not controlling commodity-
level computers. This was a shift in the balance between the hierarchical and
competitive framings of the technology, with the competitive framing gaining
strength by institutionalising its rhetoric in the relaxed controls. Actors ex-
pressing the competitive framing pointed out that the CTP parameter was not
an adequate control parameter because it could easily be circumvented. In
making this argument, however, these actors were not suggesting that the pa-
rameter be replaced by something else, but rather that controls be abolished
altogether. This was therefore an example of the actors wishing to strengthen
the competitive framing using rhetoric stolen from the hierarchical framing in
order to undermine the hierarchical framing’s preferred form of organisation.
As actors trying to support the hierarchical framing came to accept that CTP
was not a useful parameter of control, they found themselves in a situation of
increasing amounts of uncomfortable knowledge.
The development of cluster computing produced further difficulties for the
CTP parameter because what made these computers work as a high perfor-
mance computer was not a specially designed component, but the software
to interconnect multiple computers to aggregate performance. Control was
shifted once more, but this time to an industry standard parameter, ‘adjusted
peak performance’ (APP). This shift was another shift in the purpose of the
controls. CTP meant to cover all possible computers of military significance,
whereas APP only meant to prevent the most blatant acquisition attempts by
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non-Participating States. This shift was complemented by a new control on
the software needed for a functioning high-performance computer, even though
such software was made publicly available shortly afterwards. The exception-
barring strategy employed by actors trying to strengthen the hierarchical fram-
ing in the computer case therefore did more to undermine than to strengthen
controls.
In each of these cases, we can see evidence for the maintenance of Co-
Com and Wassenaar as incompletely theorised agreements. Each of these cases
represents an agreement on a particular outcome, where different actors were
usually able to maintain their own views on the more general principles that
would lead them to agree to that outcome. These agreements are seen more as
milestones than ultimatums, and can be re-negotiated when they are no longer
useful. This allows each of the framings of the problem of dual-use technology
to know that if they lose one battle, they are still able to come back to it at
some point in the future.
We now turn to look at controls on intangible technology to see how ade-
quate the Arrangement’s current institutional form is for addressing the likely
future types of debates that will arise, and the difference between debates on
tangible vs intangible technology.
You can release the equipment, but if you release
the technology, then there’s really no need to con-
trol anything anymore, because it’s gone. It’s gone
forever.
—Interview with Former British Government
Official, 8 November 2007
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So far in this thesis, I have shown how the problem of dual-use technol-
ogy addressed by the Wassenaar Arrangement is intractable, insoluble, persis-
tent, multiply defined, and characterised by ‘contradictory certitudes’, i.e. it
is ‘wicked’. Using a set of case studies from recent Wassenaar negotiations, I
then showed how Participating States go about trying to address this problem
through their efforts to maintain the List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.
We saw how some members of national delegations preferred to hierarchically
frame the problem as one of control, while others preferred a competitive fram-
ing. Since the hierarchical framing has been hegemonic within the Wassenaar
Arrangement, we focused on how those seeking to strengthen this framing re-
spond to anomalous technologies. We saw that some anomalies were easily
resolved, while others have generated significant amounts of uncomfortable
knowledge for this framing.
In this chapter, we explore whether or not the problem of dual-use technol-
ogy shows signs of shifting from being a simple wicked problem, where debate
is between two framings, to being a complex wicked problem, where at least
three framings are involved. As an example case, we will use the development
of controls on intangible aspects of technology and controls on the intangible
transfer of dual-use technology. While the lists started off only controlling the
transfer of the tangible aspects of technology, they have since the 1980s also
controlled intangible aspects, and since the early 2000s have also controlled the
intangible transfer of technologies. Has this shift in the controls also seen a shift
in the relative strength of framings on the problem of dual-use technology?
The first section provides an overview of the difference between tangible and
intangible aspects of technology, as well as tangible and intangible transfers of
technology. I outline the development of controls on the intangible aspects of
technology in the 1980s and their current status on the Wassenaar lists. I also
outline the development process for the Best Practices document on intangible
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transfers of technology, and the trouble that one country—the United States—
has had in trying to implement controls on intangible transfers. The second
section provides an analysis of why the controls were sought and some possible
implications for the future of the export control system.
7.1 Intangible aspects of technology & intan-
gible transfers
For the purposes of this thesis, I provided a working definition of ‘technology’ in
Section 2.1 as a human construction coupled with the practices and knowledge
of how to engage that construction toward a particular end. This definition
does not define whether the technology has a material component, i.e whether
or not it is tangible. A technology, according to this usage, could as easily be a
computer as it could be a language, a mathematical equation, or a particular
skill. The Wassenaar Arrangement, and most other bodies in the history of
export controls, have been concerned only with the tangible subset of technol-
ogy.1 All tangible technology, however, includes intangible aspects as well. A
watch, for instance, may seem like a wholly tangible technology, but if someone
does not know how to read time, it is of little use to that person as a watch, if
we define ‘watch’ as something which tells time. The Wassenaar Arrangement
has always been concerned only about technology with tangible aspects, but as
we will see below, it has been concerned about both the tangible and intangible
aspects of that technology.
The Wassenaar Arrangement distinguishes between tangible and intangible
transfers of technology, although the distinction between these types of trans-
fers is not clear from the documents the Arrangement has produced. In the
1There are several possible reasons for this, which are beyond the scope of this thesis to
address. Likely reasons include: that they only controlled what it was possible to control,
and knowledge was too ephemeral; that knowledge of how to produce weapons was widely
spread, and there was little difference in the manufacturing techniques of enemies; and/or
that transnational flows of knowledge about how to develop, produce, and use controlled
technology were rare because the people who held the knowledge were unlikely to travel or
communicate with foreign nationals.
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Best Practices document analysed below, examples given of intangible trans-
fers include phone, fax, and electronic transfers. Broadly speaking, tangible
aspects of a technology can only be transferred by tangible means, while intan-
gible aspects of a technology may be transferred by either tangible or intangible
means. I will occasionally speak of ‘intangible technology transfers’, which is
a shorthand to cover both the tangible and intangible transfers of intangible
aspects of technology. We begin this section with a history of the distinction
between tangible and intangible aspects of technology, followed by a history of
the development of controls on the intangible transfer of dual-use technology.
Within this history, we are looking for clues as to whether a new framing of
the problem of dual-use technology is developing. The theory of sociocultural
viability suggests that there is a likely third framing, based on an egalitarian
solidarity, that favours tightly bound groups with minimal structure. Actors
expressing this framing would prefer the distribution of knowledge to be based
on the principle of parity, where all have access to it. They are likely to have a
long-term perspective on the problem of dual-use technology, which they frame
as a problem of equality. Has the discourse on dual-use technology, while
addressing the issue of intangible technology transfers, encountered this third
framing? If so, has it been incorporated into the discourse?
Development of controls on intangible aspects of tangible
technology
Over the course of the history of export controls, there have been two significant
shifts in the types of things that were put onto the control lists. The first was
the elimination of ‘unmanufactured’ items from control, and the second was
the addition of controls on intangible aspects of technology. In this subsection
I show this shift, in order to place in context the reason why it seemed logical
at the time.
We begin with the early lists of controlled items, when export controls
were generally seen as a tool to ensure domestic supply of war materials for
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a nation’s military. This was a common view of export controls from at least
the 17th Century through to the development of CoCom. Looking back at the
list of ‘conditional contraband’ in the 1909 Declaration concerning the Laws of
Naval War (Table 5.1, page 166), we can clearly see the equal weight given to
items that we would generally not consider to be technology (in the sense that
they involve human construction) as to items we would think of as technology.
The list had food, grain, and gold sitting alongside vehicles, explosives, and
horseshoes. Similarly, during World War II, Britain maintained a document
called the Control of Export: list of goods prohibited to be exported from the
United Kingdom. The first of these lists, published on 25 September 1939, was
divided into three sections that clearly show control of both technology and
other things:
I – Food, Drink and Tobacco
II – Raw materials and articles mainly unmanufactured
III – Articles wholly or mainly manufactured
With the use of the word ‘mainly’, however, we can see that the line between
‘unmanufactured’, and ‘manufactured’ was blurred. Put in the terms I used
to define technology, there was a recognised ambiguity between things that do
not involve human construction and things that do. The definitions of what
was raw and manufactured, though, were still very much human constructions.
This British classification system, however, only lasted a few months, after
which items were separated into thirteen unnamed groups, which were not
wholly dissimilar to the Groups found in the first published CoCom lists.2
Within the CoCom lists, most non-technology items have been collected within
2See the 15 January 1940 Control of Export document for the first occurrence of the
new classification. Other versions published throughout the War were: 15 April 1940; 15
November 1940; 15 May 1941; 1 December 1941; 15 July 1942; 15 January 1943; 15 January
1944; 15 January 1945.
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the group labelled ‘Metals, Minerals, and their Manufactures’.3 That this group
covered non-technology items is made clear by a note at the beginning:
(1) RAW MATERIALS Where raw materials are covered by a
definition the intent is to cover all materials from which can
be usefully extracted, i.e. ores, concentrates, matte, regulus,
residues, and dross (ashes).
This group remained until the 1991 Core List review, when it was scrapped.
From 1991 on, ‘materials’ were still covered in Section C of each Category, but
none of them refer to materials in their naturally occurring (i.e. non-human
constructed) form. This shift away from controlling non-technology items did
not mean that such items were no longer controlled at all in international trade.
There were, and are, myriad forms of control for the shipment of food, animals,
and other non-technology items (e.g. quarantine laws and regulations on health
and safety of food). By removing these items from the CoCom lists, however,
CoCom members were saying that such items no longer need to be controlled
for their military significance.
This gradual shift away from controlling non-technology items was matched
by a corresponding shift in establishing controls on the intangible as well as
tangible aspects of technology. Recognition of the importance of the intangible
aspects of technology were first noted, at least in Britain, in the preamble to
the 1966 lists:
Manufacturers are reminded that the purpose of these strategic con-
trols will be defeated if technical information or technical know-how
concerning embargoed equipment is revealed to the above countries.
This preamble remained on the lists until the Core List Review. The first
actual text controlling intangible technology appeared in the 1985 CoCom list
in the controls on computers (1565 ) and software (1566 ) (British Government,
1985), as shown above in Figure 6.17.
3This was Groups H in the 1958 list, J in the 1960 list, and H again from 1966 until 1991.
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With the Core List Review, we saw the first introduction of an entire section
of each category devoted to ‘technology’, here meaning intangible aspects of
technology. Also with this newly formatted list, we find the first definition of
the intangible aspects of technology (Figures 5.6, page 189) which consisted of
“specific information necessary for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of a
product.”
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
DUAL-USE LIST 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Note Terms in "quotations" are defined terms.  Refer to 'Definitions of Terms used in these 
Lists' annexed to this List. 
 
 
 
GENERAL TECHNOLOGY NOTE 
 
 
The export of "technology" which is "required" for the "development", "production" or "use" 
of items controlled in the Dual-Use List is controlled according to the provisions in each 
Category.  This "technology" remains under control even when applicable to any 
uncontrolled item. 
 
Controls do not apply to that "technology" which is the minimum necessary for the 
installation, operation, maintenance (checking) and repair of those items which are not 
controlled or whose export has been authorised. 
 
Note This does not release such "technology" controlled in entries 1.E.2.e. & 1.E.2.f. and 
8.E.2.a. & 8.E.2.b. 
 
Controls do not apply to "technology" "in the public domain", to "basic scientific research" or 
to the minimum necessary information for patent applications. 
 
 
GENERAL SOFTWARE NOTE 
 
 
The Lists do not control "software" which is either: 
 
1. Generally available to the public by being: 
 
 a. Sold from stock at retail selling points without restriction, by means of: 
  1. Over-the-counter transactions; 
  2. Mail order transactions; 
  3. Electronic transactions; or
  4. Telephone call transactions; and
 
 b. Designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by the 
supplier; or 
 
Note Entry 1 of the General Software Note does not release "software" controlled by 
Category 5 - Part 2 ("Information Security"). 
 
2. "In the public domain". 
   WA-LIST (07) 2 
 06-12-2007 - 3 - 
Figure 7.1: Definition of the intangible aspects of dual-use technology (Wassenaar
Arrangement, 2007b)
The intangible aspects of controlled technology are defined by the General
Technology Note, shown in Figure 7.1, which deserves closer inspection here.
An intangible aspect of a con rolled technology is controlled if it is “‘required’
for the ‘development’, ‘production’ or ‘use’ of items controlled in the Dual-Use
List according to the provisions in each Category. This ‘technology’ remains
under control even when applicable to any uncontroll d item.” ‘Required’ tech-
nology is defined in the Definitions section of the Dual-Use List, and shown in
Figure 7.2. Note that ‘required’ ‘technology’ may be “shared by different prod-
ucts,” and that those products may be uncontrolled items, but the ‘technology’
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will still be controlled. This provides the broad scope of the intangible aspects
of technology that Wassenaar controls.
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
DEFINITIONS 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
   WA-LIST (07) 2 
 06-12-2007 - 199 - 
 
Cat 6 "Radar spread spectrum" 
  Any modulation technique for spreading energy originating from a signal 
with a relatively narrow frequency band, over a much wider band of 
frequencies, by using random or pseudo-random coding. 
 
 
Cat 7 "Repeatability" 
  The closeness of agreement among repeated measurements of the same 
variable under the same operating conditions when changes in conditions or 
non-operating periods occur between measurements. (Reference: IEEE STD 
528-2001 (one sigma standard deviation)) 
 
 
Cat 3 "Real-time bandwidth" 
  For "dynamic signal analysers", the widest frequency range which the 
analyser can output to display or mass storage without causing any 
discontinuity in the analysis of the input data.  For analysers with more than 
one channel, the channel configuration yielding the widest "real-time 
bandwidth" shall be used to make the calculation. 
 
 
Cat 2,  "Real time processing" 
Cat 6 & 7 Th  processing of data by a computer system providing a required level of 
service, as a function of available resources, within a guaranteed response 
ime, regardless of the load of the system, when stimulated by an external 
event. 
 
Cat 5 "Required" 
Cat 6, 9 As applied to "technology", refers to only that portion of "technology" 
GTN which is peculiarly responsible for achieving or exceeding the controlled 
ML 22 performance levels, characteristics or functions.  Such "required" 
"technology" may be shared by different products. 
 
Cat 2 "Resolution" 
  The least increment of a measuring device; on digital instruments, the least 
significant bit. (Reference: ANSI B-89.1.12) 
 
Cat 1 "Riot control agents" 
ML 7 Substances which, under the expected conditions of use for riot control 
purposes, produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical 
effects which disappear within a short time following termination of 
exposure.  (Tear gases are a subset of "riot control agents".) 
Figure 7.2: Definition of ‘required’ (Wass naar Arrangement, 2007b)
There are two caveats on the controls, however. The first is that the Dual-
Use List does not control an intangible aspect of a technology “which is the
minimum necessary for the installation, operation, maintenance (checking) and
repair of those items which are not controlled or whose export has been ap-
proved.” Also, the final paragraph of the General Technology Note states that
the list does not control intangible aspects of technology ‘in the public domain’,
nor does it apply to ‘basic scientific research’ or “the minimum necessary for
patent applications.” This is a very complicated statement of control, and I
have graphically represented it in Figure 7.3.
When controls were only (or mainly) about the tangible aspects of tech-
nology, the primary way to resolve anomalies in the classification system was
to make the list more defined by adding more parameters of the technology
through a process of monster-adjustment, and specifying what is not controlled
through a process of exception-barring. When addressing the intangible as-
pects, however, there is a limit to how defined one can get on the list. To
make the tangible aspect of the technology requires access to the resources, the
equipment needed to manipulate the resources into the final product, and the
knowledge of how to design and produce the technology. The list does not pro-
vide the resources nor the equipment needed to make the tangible aspects of a
technology, but it does give information about the parameters of that technol-
ogy that members of Wassenaar believe are militarily significant. If a person or
7.1 Intangible aspects of technology & intangible transfers 287
'Technology' 'required' for
 the 'development', 'production' 
or 'use' of a controlled item 
'Technology' 'required' for
 the 'development', 'production' 
or 'use' of an uncontrolled item 
'Technology' not minimum 
necessary for the  installation, 
operation, maintenance
(checking) and repair
of uncontrolled item
Controlled 'technology'
Uncontrolled
'technology'
`technology' 
'in the public 
domain''basic 
scientific 
research'
`technology' 
necessary 
for patent 
applications
Figure 7.3: Graphical representation of intangible technology controlled by the
Wassenaar Arrangement
group had access to resources and equipment (or even just resources), the lists
may provide them with enough knowledge to create the technology themselves.
The lists, therefore, are themselves intangible aspects of the technologies they
control.
A very rudimentary example may help the reader understand how the line
is drawn on controlled technology. Say it is the year 2007 and you are in a
company that is within a Wassenaar Participating State and is exporting three
computers to three different customers, one rated with an Adjusted Peak Per-
formance of 0.01 Weighted TeraFLOPS (WT), one with 0.1 WT, and the other
with 1.0 WT, but in other respects they are identical. Dual-use computers
were defined in 2007 as “exceeding 0.75 Weighted TeraFLOPS” (Wassenaar
Arrangement, 2007b, p. 66). The ‘technology’ associated with computers, how-
ever, is controlled if it can be used to ‘develop’ or ‘produce’ a computer with
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0.04 WT, and is controlled on the Sensitive List if it can be used to ‘develop’
or ‘produce’ a computer capable of 0.1 WT.
You are allowed (subject to national discretion to export the tangible aspect
of the 1.0 WT computer) to provide all customers with information (‘intangible
aspects of the technology’) about how to install, operate, maintain, and repair
their computer. You are also allowed to share with the customer receiving the
0.01 WT (uncontrolled) computer information on how to develop and produce
that uncontrolled computer, but only if that information is different than the
information needed to produce either the 0.1 or the 1.0 WT computer. You
are not allowed to provide similar information to the customer receiving the
0.1 WT computer without an export license, even though the export of the
tangible aspect of the technology is not controlled.
If the only physical difference between the two computers is, say, an extra
processor and the connection of that processor to the others, there is essentially
no difference in the intangible aspects of the technologies. One can then argue
which pieces of intangible technology are ‘required’, i.e. “peculiarly respon-
sible,” (see Figure 7.2) for achieving or exceeding the controlled performance
level. All the time, of course, keeping in mind that there may be other aspects
of the technology that a government may not wish to be exported, but could
not put on the lists without giving the aspect away. Thus we see a key differ-
ence between trying to define tangible and intangible aspects of technology. In
a much stronger sense than with the tangible aspects, the text of the definitions
of intangible aspects actually constitutes the technology itself. The technology
here is embodied in the text.
Another difficulty in defining the intangible aspects of technology in order
to control them is that this implies that knowledge is divisible. It is a matter
of asking, “Without which part will the whole not work?” This question as-
sumes that intangible aspects of technology—the practices and knowledge of
interacting with human constructions—are discrete entities, and that you can
break them into bits. Both of these difficulties arise because the hierarchical
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framing provides the institutional context for the controls. This framing fo-
cuses on the need to find ways of making technologies controllable. Both of the
difficulties noted above hint at a different way of understanding technology; a
way that emphasises how the interconnectedness of knowledge is a desirable
aspect rather than a troubling one.
I argue below that a hierarchical framing of intangible aspects of technol-
ogy provides a false sense of assurance that the assumptions used to control
the tangible aspects of technology are adequate for controlling the intangible
aspects as well. First, however, we turn to the development of the controls on
transferring intangible aspects of tangible technology.
Development of controls on intangible transfers of tech-
nology
While the Wassenaar Arrangement controls intangible aspects of technology,
agreement on how to implement controls on the intangible transfers of the
intangible aspects has been very hard to reach. A primary reason for this, as
I show in this section, is that several Participating States’ have argued that
their internal legislation does not distinguish between in-country transfers and
freedom of speech. This debate occurred mainly within the General Working
Group rather than the Expert Group, which is where the changes were made
to control the intangible aspects of technology discussed above.
The tangible aspects of tangible technologies can be transferred only by
tangible means. This may seem obvious on the outset, but it is important to
note that, if one is only trying to control the tangible aspects of technology,
one need only control the things one can see and touch. Intangible aspects
of tangible technology, however, can be transferred by tangible or intangible
means. The difference between a tangible and intangible transfer has not been
fully agreed by Wassenaar Participating States.
The first statement of the control of intangible transfers was in the 1966
British version of the CoCom lists (British Government, 1966). Following the
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statement, which we looked at on page 173, about how the purpose of the
controls would be defeated if technical information or ‘know-how’ were revealed
to controlled destinations, the preamble continues, “[a] particular danger arises
when technicians or students from these countries are visiting or are being
trained at British factories.” More of a warning than an actual attempt to
control, this preamble existed on all lists until the 1991 Core List revision.
With the advent of an entire section of each category devoted to ‘technol-
ogy’ controls after the Core List review, apparently little need was seen for a
statement that the items were controlled regardless of the way they were trans-
ferred. As CoCom disbanded and the New Forum evolved into the Wassenaar
Arrangement, a Statement of Understanding (SOU) was appended to the Gen-
eral Technology Note, shown in Figure 7.4. It states that governments are to
control the intangible transfer of intangible aspects of tangible technology “as
far as the scope of their legislation will allow.”
Figure 7.4: Statement of Understanding on intangible technology (Wassenaar
Arrangement, 1996)
Most of the arguments for taking a stronger stance on controls over intan-
gible transfers came from the American delegation. However, other delegations
were also very supportive of making such controls explicit (e.g. Bohm et al.,
1999). During the New Forum negotiations, one delegation, in a proposal4
for much stricter controls on the intangible aspects of technology related to
‘production’ and ‘development’, argued that
a release of production or development technology could signifi-
cantly undermine the New Forum’s ability to control future exports
of these strategic dual-use goods. In some instances, this type of
4This proposal was given to me on condition of anonymity.
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technology transfer could provide indigenous production and de-
velopment, which would be tantamount to foreign availability, and
potentially cause the removal of the goods from the Basic List.
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Statements of Understanding and Validity Notes 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
WA-LIST (99) 1 
- 186 - 03-12-99 
STATEMENTS OF UNDERSTANDING AND VALIDITY NOTES 
 
 
Intangible Transfers* of Software and Technology (WA-PLM (99) DE 1 Revised)
1
 
 
Participating States recognise that it is important to have comprehensive controls on listed 
“software” and “technology”, including controls on intangible transfers.  Participating States 
also recognise that it is important to continue deepening WA understanding of how and how 
much to control those transfers.  Those countries currently not having legislation to permit 
control should consider whatever action is necessary to address this issue. 
 
* Transfer in this context is understood in the sense of the Initial Elements. 
 
 
MUNITIONS LIST 
 
 
ML 10 (NF (95) WG2/2) 
 
Absence of items from the Munitions List and absence of configuration for military use 
would mean that an aircraft would not be considered military. 
 
 
DUAL-USE LIST OF GOODS AND TECHNOLOGIES 
 
 
General Technology Note  (NF (95) CA WP 1) 
 
Governments agree that the transfer of "technology" according to the General Technology 
Note, for "production" or "development" of items on this list shall be treated with vigilance in 
accordance with national policies and the aims of this regime.  
 
 
General Technology Note (WG2 GTN TWG/WP1 Revised 2) 
 
It is understood that Member Governments are expected to exercise controls on intangible 
"technology" as far as the scope of their legislation will allow. 
 
 
General Software Note (NF (95) CA WP 1) 
 
Governments agree that the transfer of "software", for "production" or "development" of 
items on this list shall be treated with vigilance in accordance with national policies and the 
aims of this regime.  
 
 
Statement of Understanding - medical equipment (NF (96) DG PL/WP1) 
 
Participating countries agree that equipment specially designed for medical end-use that 
incorporates an item controlled in the Dual-Use List is not controlled. 
                                                
1
 Corrigendum  (WA-EG (00) SEC 9) 
Figure 7.5: Statement of Understanding on intangible technology (Wassenaar
Arrangement, 1999)
Continued persistence from several delegations led, in 1999, to the adoption
of a more elaborated SOU, shown in Figure 7.5. This SOU, which sat above
the earlier one, shows two things. First, that there is a need to “continue deep-
ening WA understanding of how and how much to control” intangible transfers
suggests that current understanding is not adequate to manage effective con-
trols. Second, it shows that many Participating States do not have “legislation
to permit control.” It is clear, then, that several Participating States made a
distinction between tangible and intangible transfers of techn logy.
The SOU was further elaborated in 2003, as shown in Figure 7.6. Here we
see much stronger language, stating that “legislation should permit controls of
listed ‘software’ and ‘te hn ogy’ irresp ctive of the way in which the transfer
takes place.” As with many definitions, the note that defines the minimum
types of intan ible transfers to be controlled is perhaps more illuminating in
what it leaves off than in what it includes. By delimiting transfers “by electronic
media, fax, or telephone,” the definition explicitly does not include face-to-face
interactions.
Many countries controlled (and still control) the transfer of knowledge
through a verbal dialogue, different from the transfer of knowledge through
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Figure 7.6: Statement of Understanding on intangible technology (Wassenaar
Arrangement, 2003)
textbooks or blueprints, though both represent intangible aspects of technol-
ogy. Countries also had different controls for transfers to foreign nationals that
occurred within the borders of a country versus across the border. For some
Participating States, no export license was required for the transfer of intangi-
ble aspects of controlled technology by, for instance, verbal means to a foreign
national within their borders. Such a transfer, called an ‘in-country transfer’
or a ‘deemed export’, is still causing significant contention within and between
many Participating States.
The US continued to strive for stronger controls within Wassenaar on in-
tangible aspects of technology
because while the General Technology Note on the Dual-Use List
specified that Participating States are committed to controlling
technology as well as the tangible manifestations of that technology
(and in certain cases the machines and materials needed, etc), it was
clear that not all were doing so and there were wide discrepancies
among the practices of those who were.5
Work on developing controls on intangible transfers continued between 2003
and 2006, resulting in a document entitled Best Practices for Implementing
5Interview with US State Department Official A, 7 February 2009.
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Intangible Transfer of Technology Controls, shown in Appendix I. In the two-
page document, which outlines broadly how countries can develop controls on
intangible transfers, we can see a significant shift in the tone of the controls.
Controlling intangible transfers is no longer just “important”, but now “critical
to the credibility and effectiveness of [a Participating State’s] domestic export
control regime.” At the same time, there is an explicit statement that there
are “inherent complexities of export control regulation for ITT.” The Best
Practices document does not try to define in any detail what constitutes an
intangible transfer, or when such a transfer occurs, but instead states that
Participating States “support” designing national laws and regulations which
define what intangible transfers are and when they occur.
Perhaps most significantly, the Best Practice document also includes a sec-
tion “recognizing that national export control authorities benefit from the co-
operation of industry, academia, and individuals in the regulation of ITT.” In
this section, the Arrangement specifically supports “promoting self-regulation
by industry and academic institutions that possess controlled technology.” This
is the first instance of recognition on the part of a multilateral export control
regime that controlling intangible transfers cannot be wholly achieved by the
government alone, and is a shift that I discuss in the analysis below.
What is it about intangible transfers of dual-use technology that make them
difficult to control? Commenting on this during an interview, a member of a
national delegation pointed out that
One country raised the point that, yes, it’s important, but it’s also
very very problematic. An intangible transfer goes to first amend-
ment rights and everything else. It’s freedom of speech. It’s violat-
ing. . . but at the same time, you don’t want sensitive information
being transferred. But you know what? It’s a larger issue than
export controls. It doesn’t live in the export control arena.6
Many reports point out that the advancement of communications technol-
ogy, particularly the internet, has allowed for global technology development,
6Interview with US Commerce Department Official B, 29 January 2007.
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within or across companies, and that this situation strains current export con-
trol frameworks (Fischer, 2005; Fisher, 2001; Gahlaut et al., 2004). Another
critique of the current system of controls on intangible aspects of technol-
ogy is that it stifles the innovation process by e.g. adding excessive delays to
visa applications and maintaining controls on more than only the most mil-
itarily significant technology, especially controls on the intangible aspects of
those technology (Committee on a New Government-University Partnership
for Science and Security, 2007; Committee on Science, Security, and Prosperity
et al., 2009; Deemed Export Advisory Committee, 2007). Knowledge flourishes
through interaction, these reports argue, and the US and other Wassenaar Par-
ticipating States are no longer the only leaders in developing areas of controlled
technology.
While exports are supposed to be controlled regardless of the means of
transfer, even the United States—the government pushing the hardest for in-
tangible transfers controls at Wassenaar—has had a difficult time controlling
tangible and intangible transfers similarly (National Academy of Sciences et al.,
1987). For instance:
[the Department of] Commerce’s and [the Department of] State’s
export control requirements and processes provide physical check-
points on the means and methods companies use to export-controlled
goods [i.e. the tangible aspects of technology] to help them ensure
such exports are made under license terms, but the agencies cannot
easily apply these same requirements and processes to exports of
controlled information [i.e. the intangible aspects] (GAO, 2006a,
p. 3).
We now turn to some of the reasons instituting controls on intangible transfers
has been difficult in the United States to see if it may be the case that there is
an egalitarian framing emerging in the discourse on dual-use technology.
DEAC & ETRAC: US attempts to include a new framing
In the US, the major shift towards controlling intangible transfers happened as
a result of a 1976 report by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Export of
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U.S. Technology, known as “The Bucy Report” after the name of its Chairman.
The first finding of the report was that “design and manufacturing know-how
are the principal elements of strategic technology control.” The Report iden-
tifies three levels of technology transfer. The least significant transfer is of the
tangible aspects of a technology along with “extensive operating information,
application information, or sophisticated maintenance procedures.” This infor-
mation is mainly related to the particular configuration of a technology, and
therefore the likelihood that it could result in the transfer of production and
development capabilities is limited. Mid-level transfers involve the tangible as-
pects of technology needed to manufacture controlled technology, along with
“the necessary ‘point design’ information.” While providing the recipient with
the ability to make controlled technology, the transfer does not necessarily pro-
vide the recipient with the ability to develop the technology further. The most
significant level of transfer is the “export of an array of design and manufac-
turing information plus significant teaching assistance which provides technical
capability to design, optimize, and produce a broad spectrum of products in
a technical field.” Moreover, transfer is much more likely to be successful, the
Report found, if there is “an iterative process: the receiver requests specific
information, applies it, develops new findings, and then requests further infor-
mation. This process is normally continued for several years, until the receiver
demonstrates the desired capability.” This prolonged, iterative interaction be-
tween sender and recipient is one of the key differences between intangible and
tangible transfers of technology. We will return to this point in the next section.
The US formally controlled in-country intangible transfers (i.e. ‘deemed
exports’) from 1979 through the Export Administration Act, which is enforced
through the Department of Commerce’s Export Administration Regulations
(EAR). Deemed exports are transfers within a country between a citizen of
that country and a foreign national. Many concerns about the extent of these
controls7 were alleviated in 1985 with the issuing of the National Security Deci-
7These concerns were expressed in the “Corson Report” on Scientific Communication and
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sion Directive (NSDD) 189, which decontrolled ‘fundamental research’, defined
as
basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of
which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the sci-
entific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and
from industrial development, design, production, and product uti-
lization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary
or national security reasons.
Because of NSDD 189, any area of science that could be classified as ‘funda-
mental research’ was generally considered to be exempt from export controls.
In 2004, however, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of
Commerce recommended expanding the control of these deemed exports by
changing a single word in the definition of information for the ‘use’ of con-
trolled technology within the EAR. This is the same definition of ‘use’ that is
found in the Wassenaar Arrangement control lists. The definition comprises
six components (operation, installation, maintenance, repair, overhaul, refur-
bishing) which are connected by an ‘and’ conjunction.8 The Inspector General
recommended changing this to an ‘and/or’ conjunction. Such a change would
cause a dramatic shift in the license exceptions for ‘use’ of controlled tech-
nology, and an export license would be required for the in-country transfer of
information (the intangible aspects of the technology) connected with any of
the six components of ‘use’, instead of only information pertinent to all six
components. A company or academic institution engaged in fundamental re-
search with foreign nationals, and using export controlled equipment, would
then be required to obtain an export license for every foreign national working
on any piece of equipment if that foreign national’s work satisfied any of the
‘use’ criterion, instead of all of them. The justification of such a change was
simply to close a loophole in the control system:
National Security (Panel on Scientific Communication & National Security Committee on
Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, 1982). The report suggested a graduated approach
to controlling university research depending on how militarily significant it was.
815 CFR 772
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Other academic representatives we met with contend that in the
context of fundamental research, technology relating to the ‘use’ of
controlled equipment is also exempt under the EAR fundamental
research exemption. However, according to BIS, technology relat-
ing to controlled equipment—regardless of how ‘use’ is defined—is
subject to the deemed export provisions even if the research be-
ing conducted with that equipment is fundamental (Office of the
Inspector General, 2004, p. 15).
In addition to modifying the definition, the Inspector General said that indus-
try and academic institutions should only be notified after the modification had
taken place. The Department of Commerce, however, decided to solicit com-
ments on the recommendation9 before it was implemented, as is common policy
when the Department believes these communities might be significantly affected
by the change.10 There was significant outcry from the academic and industrial
communities, with the Department receiving 310 replies (Cook, 2005),11 mostly
pointing out that “the ‘or’ interpretation would capture too many routine op-
erations carried out by foreign national students and employees, and that the
proposed rules would constitute a large (and, it was asserted, generally unneces-
sary) compliance burden on affected organizations” (Deemed Export Advisory
Committee, 2007, p. 41–42).
The strongest arguments were often about the need for research to be open,
both in its generation and in its communication. This was succinctly stated in a
section entitled “The underlying issue: the importance of openness” in a White
Paper by the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Commission on
Scientific Communication and National Security, composed of, inter alia, Nobel
Laureates, former senior civil servants (Secretary of Defense, Attorney General,
heads of NASA centres, etc.), and heads of universities and research centres
within industry:
9Federal Register: March 28, 2005 (Volume 70, Number 58), Proposed Rules, Page 15607-
15609, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html.
10Email conversation with US Commerce Department Official C, 18–19 May 2009.
11Replies are available to view on BIS’s electronic Freedom of Information web-
page: http://efoia.bis.doc.gov/pubcomm/revision-to-the-deemed-export-regs-2005/final-
document.pdf
298 Intangible technology transfers & the shift to a complex wicked problem
When research and education are not free to draw on the world’s
brightest minds, to invite any and all to critique and validate re-
search results, and to foster the dynamic and often serendipitous
interactions from which successive innovations can arise, excellence
will suffer. Practices that limit the open interchange of ideas or
open participation in research and educational activities—in other
words, policies that compartmentalize ideas, findings, or research
approaches and limit their access to certain categories of student or
researcher—will limit the effectiveness of our research and educa-
tional system, impairing its ability to serve national needs (Cook,
2005, p. 1155).12
The proposed changes to the control of intangible transfers of dual-use tech-
nology were seen to have several adverse consequences, including: only modest
security benefits; the hindrance of important discoveries; lost research talent;
and a reduction of contact with cutting edge science (Cook, 2005, p. 1163–5).
It is important to point out here that this is a very different argument than any
that we have so far seen in this thesis. The problem of dual-use technology is
here seen not as a problem of controlling access or use, nor as a problem of al-
lowing competition between companies for the non-military applications of the
technology. Rather, it is a problem of maintaining the openness of research, of
preventing the division of knowledge into categories of access. This is a strong
expression of an egalitarian framing of the problem of dual-use technology, with
its emphasis on equality of access. In the analysis below, we will see just how
different this framing of the problem of dual-use technology is from that of the
control or competitive framing.
That the academic and industrial communities were even able to find out
about such proposed changes before they occurred, and, more importantly, that
they were able to comment on these changes means that there exists the space,
if only in principle, for these framings to be heard. This fact alone represents
one of the most important steps in the whole deliberation process, because it
gives non-governmental viewpoints a seat at the table. However, allowing for
12Also published independently through the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(Commission on Scientific Communication and National Security, 2005, p. 2).
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these framings to be expressed does not mean that they have to be listened to,
or that their views need to be incorporated into the policy system.
The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry & Security actually
worked through these comments and decided on two courses of action. The
first was not to adopt the recommendation of the Inspector General, a move
that demonstrated that not only were these framings heard but they were
also responded to. The second was to establish the Deemed Export Advisory
Committee (DEAC) in May 2006 in order to come up with recommendations
on how to improve the regulations on deemed exports (Secretary of Commerce,
2006).
This happened at the same time as a more general raising of awareness
among the academic community about the role that it might play in addressing
the problem of dual-use technology. For instance, a statement issued by a group
of editors and authors of top academic journals acknowledged that there were
possible security concerns from publishing some research openly, but there were
also significant benefits:
Fundamental is a view, shared by nearly all, that there is informa-
tion that, although we cannot now capture it with lists or defini-
tions, presents enough risk of use by terrorists that it should not be
published. How and by what processes it might be identified will
continue to challenge us, because—as all present acknowledged—it
is also true that open publication brings benefits not only to public
health but also to efforts to combat terrorism (Journal Editors and
Authors Group, 2003).
Proposed solutions to this framing of the problem of dual-use technology,
particularly in the area of biotechnology, have been to strengthen further the
self-governance systems already in place within the scientific communities, and
to supplement further them with some (but not too much) regulatory oversight
(National Research Council (U.S.), 2004, 2005).
The DEAC was composed of a dozen high-ranking members of academia
and industry and published its findings in a 2007 report called The deemed
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export rule in an era of globalization (the “DEAC Report”). The main finding
(p. 14) of the Report was that
the erection of high “walls” around large segments of the nation’s
science and engineering knowledge base has become not only in-
creasingly impracticable, but that attempts to build such walls are
likely to prove counterproductive—not only to America’s commer-
cial prowess but also, in balance, to America’s ability to defend
itself. Again, the latter is the case because (1) the lack of access
to much of the world’s scientific and technologic knowledge reduces
America’s ability to maintain a modern defense establishment, and
(2) a substantially weakened domestic economy diminishes the na-
tion’s ability to devote financial resources to national security.
The Report cited nine factors (p. 11–14)—each of which are also mentioned
in at least one of the other reports cited above—that have changed in the com-
mercial and national security environments since Deemed Export regulations
were established:
1. Threats were identifiable, geographic, “self-isolated nations subject to de-
terrence through the threat of destruction.” Today, threats are geograph-
ically diverse, non-governmental, and often suicidal (thus not subject to
deterrence).
2. While the US was the primary leader in science and engineering in the
latter half of the 20th Century, today it competes with other countries
in most areas. “Any nation today seeking to remain at the forefront of
science and technology must be an active participant in the global science
and technology community if it is to be successful.”
3. If the US denies access to knowledge, it can be obtained from other
sources.
4. Knowledge is no longer predominantly created in self-contained units,
but often the result of “multi-dimensional, often informal networks of
individuals residing around the globe.”
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5. Knowledge in some spheres, such as computer chip manufacturing, is
extremely perishable, having a useful life of often less than a year.
6. “Today’s United States research enterprise would barely function without
the foreign-born individuals, including foreign nationals, who contribute
to it.”
7. Instead of precluding the sales of a few technologies by a few companies
to a few nations, controls now function more as a deterrent to foreign
nationals engaging in partnerships with the US, thus assigning the US “to
the fringes of the world’s creative enterprise—with adverse consequences
for both the nation’s economy and national security” (emphasis original).
8. While leading-edge technology was often of military origin, it is now de-
veloped largely within academia and businesses.
9. Information cannot be nearly as easily controlled today because political
borders are extremely porous, for both the movement of people and ideas.
As a result of this changed environment, the DEAC Report suggested
replacing the current deemed export approval process with a new one that
was more simplified and would “both enhance national/homeland security and
strengthen America’s economic competitiveness” (p. 24).
Heartened by the government’s request for industry and academic input
on the problem of intangible transfers of technology, these groups petitioned
the government to set up a more permanent body to incorporate their in-
put into this area of export control policy development. The government re-
sponded by creating the Emerging Technology and Research Advisory Com-
mittee (ETRAC), which had its first meeting on 23 September 2008.13 The
primary duties of the ETRAC are to consult with the Department of Com-
merce regarding questions on “(a) the identification of emerging technologies
13Minutes of the meeting can be found on the BIS site: http://tac.bis.doc.gov/
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and research and development activities that may be of interest from a dual-use
perspective; (b) the prioritization of new and existing controls to determine
which are of greatest consequence to national security; (c) the potential im-
pact of dual-use export control requirements on research activities; and (d) the
threat to national security posed by the unauthorized exports of technologies”
(US Department of Commerce, 2008).
With the advent of this body, there is a presence of an egalitarian framing
of the problem of dual-use technology within the discourse. While there is
clearly a desire for ETRAC to take on the rhetoric of a hierarchical rather than
egalitarian framing, as shown by the desire to look at emerging technology
“from a dual-use perspective” and a focus on prioritising controls, there is
also room for a more egalitarian framing. In particular, by giving voice to the
potential impact of export controls on research activities, ETRAC members can
expound the benefits of allowing open access to the knowledge that underpins
technological development.
Having provided an overview of the development of controls on the intangi-
ble aspects and intangible transfers of dual-use technology, we can now turn to
analysing the impact of these developments on the overall wicked problem of
dual-use technology and the viability of the institutions that claim to address
it.
7.2 Dual-use technology: a shifting discourse
What does the development of controls on intangible technology transfers mean
for the overall development of the international export control system? In this
section, I break this question into several smaller questions, each of which
is more generalised than the previous one. Why were controls on intangible
technology transfers sought? Why were they difficult to develop? Why has the
current export control system provided a space for a framing of the problem of
dual-use technology that undermines its current institutional structure? How
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might the discourse on dual-use technology be further improved within the
US? Is it likely that there will need to be a similar shift in the international
development of the discourse on dual-use technology? Each subsection deals
with a specific question.
We begin by looking at the question of why controls on intangible technology
transfers were sought. When the issues of intangible transfers of technology
came up at the Wassenaar Arrangement, it was clear that many states had
interpreted the control lists to mean that only tangible transfers (of either
tangible or intangible aspects) of technology were subject to export control. For
those people who wanted to strengthen the framing of the problem of dual-use
technology as one of control, this was a source of uncomfortable knowledge. Not
only were intangible transfers not controlled, if knowledge of how to develop,
produce, and use controlled technology was exported, controlling the tangible
aspects of the technology would become pointless. This was stated succinctly
by one of the government officials I interviewed: “fundamentally, if you control
the transfer of a fish to someone, failing to control teaching him to fish is a
fundamental failure.”14
Lack of controls on intangible transfers very much undermined all of the
other efforts of control. This point came to the fore after the rise of the in-
ternet and the concurrent Wassenaar debate on encryption controls in the late
1990s (Muldonian, 2005).15 All officials I interviewed about intangible trans-
fers recognised that implementation of controls was very difficult—for political,
cultural, and institutional reasons as well as technical—but that such controls
were central to an effective export control system. Some of those interviewed
stated that a government can employ the same mechanisms for controlling in-
tangible transfers as it can for controlling tangible transfers. A US Commerce
Department official made this point clearly in an interview:
14US State Department Official A, 7 February 2009.
15See also The Monitor, Vol. 6 No. 3.
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I remember one of the first [Wassenaar Arrangement Licensing and
Enforcement Officers Meeting] presentations, everyone was saying,
“Well, we have stuff that goes in the air, it’s gone! How can you
enforce that?” It’s basic. The same old way you do it for other
things. Hard work and informants.16
These mechanisms have seemed to help with the technical aspects of control.
Another US Official pointed out that companies often already have control sys-
tems in place to monitor the transfer of trade secrets, and this can be naturally
extended to include export controlled technology as well.17 There is also the
argument put forward by several researchers (McLeish & Nightingale, 2007;
Reppy, 1999) that the transfer of the skills, or ‘tacit knowledge’, of how to
employ controlled technology is often a prolonged effort, which means that it
may be easier to detect.
But is it all just business as usual in extending controls to cover intangible
transfers of technology? We already saw some of the new issues that the US
has addressed with the development of the DEAC and ETRAC. There appears
to be a new balance that must be struck between the old framings of the
problem of dual-use technology as one of control or competition (security or
economy) and the new framing of the problem as one of maintaining open
access to research. We turn now to an exposition of how the assumptions that
underlie the problem of open access are counterpoised with the assumptions
that underlie the other problem framings. In doing so, we can see whether the
inclusion of this new framing is likely to unsettle the institutionalisation of the
control and competition framings.
A difference of assumptions
Earlier in this thesis (Section 4.1) I outlined three framings of the problem
of dual-use technology that the theory of sociocultural viability suggests may
be present in any debate about the issue. Throughout this thesis, we have
16Interview with US Commerce Department Official B, 29 January 2007.
17Interview with US State Department Official A, January 19, 2007.
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seen a continual interplay between two of these framings. One of them, the
hierarchical framing, sees the problem as one of controlling the access to and use
of dual-use technology, and therefore rests on the assumption that it is possible
to define and enforce an adequate level of control. The other, competitive,
framing sees the problem as the marketability of technology. Being labelled
as ‘dual-use’ makes technology more difficult to export, and therefore more
difficult for companies to compete in a global market.
Hierarchical
myth of control
Competitive
myth of the market
Egalitarian
myth of equality
historical discourse on 
the problem of dual-use
technology
goods are
excludable
goods are
non-excludable
Figure 7.7: Historical discourse of dual-use technology
Both of these framings share a common assumption that has largely gone
unacknowledged within the discourse on dual-use technology: they both assume
that technology is an excludable good. In Figure 7.7, I have overlaid this point on
the 2-dimensional map of social solidarity underlying human values preferences
(Figure 2.4, page 65). Economists traditionally distinguish between excludable
goods, the distribution of which is controllable, and non-excludable goods,
which are freely available. A shop keeper generally thinks that the things
he sells are excludable, i.e. they will be his until he sells them, at which
point they become the buyer’s. He owns the good and the buyer does not,
until a transaction is made, usually involving money. Thus, excludability is
the basis of the concept of property, of ownership. Non-excludable goods, in
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contrast, are generally considered to be things like air or language or public
roads. Controlling access to such things is not thought to be possible and/or
desired.
Both the hierarchical and competitive framings benefit from goods being
excludable. From within the hierarchical framing, being able to govern the
distribution of goods allows for that distribution to be “allocated in accor-
dance with an administrative determination of rank, contribution or need”
(Rayner, 1999). This is called the principle of proportionality, which is one
of the ways to provide a fair allocation of resources outlined by Young (1994)
and adapted for the theory of sociocultural viability by Thompson & Rayner
(1998). In the case of export controls, the access to a dual-use technology that
a foreign national can expect is proportional to the relationship between that
person/organisation/country and the exporting country.
This is contrasted with the competitive framing, in which the excludability
of goods allows them to be distributed based on the principle of priority, where
the first in line is the first to be served. The excludability of a good is the basis
of a market economy. If a company has control over a particular technology,
say because they have some kind of intellectual property claim, they control
the market for it.
But it is also possible for us to view technology as a non-excludable good.
The guiding principle behind this view is that there should be an equal dis-
tribution of, or at least access to, the good for all. The good, in other words,
should be free. We are all free to use public roads, for instance, or public
libraries. This equality is a mark of the egalitarian framing, which views the
problem of dual-use technology in a much more holistic way than either the
hierarchical or competitive framings do. The problem is not one of control
or ensuring a competitive environment, but rather one of the need for a more
fundamental change in the way goods are valued in society. Both the hier-
archical and competitive framings only value excludable goods, and therefore
all goods of value—in order to have a place within the classification system
7.2 Dual-use technology: a shifting discourse 307
of these framings—must be seen to be excludable. But there are some very
important goods, according to the egalitarian framing, that are not excludable
and derive their value from being so. Some, like air, water, or food, are not
generally seen as ‘technologies’,18 but others, such as encryption algorithms on
the internet, and even the internet itself, are very much human constructions.
Seeing something as a technology, actors expressing this framing argue, does
not mean that it is de facto excludable. We can see this framing appearing
in the dual-use discourse through the argument from academic establishments
that basic scientific knowledge is a non-excludable good that should be freely
available to anyone and not placed under export controls.
The theory of sociocultural viability asserts that people who take up the
rhetoric of the egalitarian framing will also seek to institutionalise a form of
organisation that is tightly bounded but loosely structured (and likewise, people
who find themselves in such an institutional structure are likely to adopt an
egalitarian rhetorical style). The academic community, as it has so far been
constructed within the dual-use discourse, has been doing just this.
The community of academics is a community of equals, this argument goes,
who share a common plight—the infringement of export controls on their abil-
ity to produce (and have access to) the knowledge and tools needed to advance
the state of the art in their field. The open access of research holds an almost
sacred position within the academic community, and anything which threat-
ens it is seen to threaten the community as a whole. While this argument is
pervasive in arguing for the value of government funding for science and pre-
vent government control of science, there have been strong critiques of viewing
science as a public good. Callon (1994), for instance, argues that it takes a
great deal of effort for scientific research to be mobilised such that it is open
18Whether air, water, or food are either excludable or technologies is a moot point in this
case. Much of the air in office buildings is recycled, and only by passing through a series of
devices is it deemed to be of an acceptable quality to be re-circulated. The oxygen in the air
on submarines is actually generated from the surrounding sea-water. What constitutes an
acceptable level of cleanliness for air, water, or food (e.g. organic, non-genetically modified)
is a matter of culture and preference. See Douglas et al. (1998).
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to all. Moreover, there is significant value to privatising science, e.g. through
patenting. The point here, though, is that arguments were presented in favour
of viewing basic scientific research as a non-excludable good within the context
of export controls. There is another discourse, on intellectual property, that
shares remarkable similarities with the discourse on dual-use technology.
The relationship between intangible technology transfers and TRIPS
The Wassenaar Arrangement is not the only international arrangement trying
to control the international distribution of intangible aspects of technology.
The other major player in this field is the World Trade Organization’s (WTO)
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
Unlike the rest of the WTO, which focuses on liberalising trade among its
members, TRIPS is focused on “establishing rules for the appropriation of
intellectual assets and the control over the production and trade of the products
derived therefrom” (Correa, 2007, preface). Defining intellectual property, like
defining dual-use technology, is not a process of creating new knowledge as
it is a process of recognising “conflicting rights and attempting to find a just
solution in light of the values and interests at stake” (Hilgartner, 2002, p. 945).
TRIPS, like the Wassenaar Arrangement, is based on the idea that goods are
excludable and that rights can be conferred on those who have the goods such
that others may not have them except through a legitimate transaction. While
the effects of intellectual property rights on basic scientific research are still not
clear (Murray & Stern, 2007; Walsh et al., 2003), there are certainly calls for
the need to understand that intellectual property is not the only way to provide
a strong market, just as export controls are not the only way to prevent the
malicious use of technology. Speaking specifically on the topic of intellectual
property, James Boyle (2008, p. xv) argues “we need a movement. . . to preserve
the public domain.”
Both TRIPS and Wassenaar assume that the goods to be controlled, either
to aid the market or to aid security, are excludable. TRIPS has already received
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significant attention for this view, and analysing the similarities between TRIPS
and Wassenaar is likely to be a very fruitful line of future research.
While the egalitarian framing may be dominant within the academic com-
munity involved in the dual-use discourse, this community, like all others, is
likely to be a mix of the different framings. The academic community also needs
to adopt at least some aspects of a hierarchical rhetoric to be able to engage
in the current dual-use discourse, as the hierarchical framing is hegemonic. We
can see these points within the US, where there is recognition within the aca-
demic community that a balance is necessary between security and openness
(Journal Editors and Authors Group, 2003).
Having to contend with the argument that the technologies that govern-
ments and companies are trying to control should in fact be non-excludable
public goods undermines not only the hierarchical and competitive framings of
the problem of dual-use technology, but also the balance that has been achieved
between those two framings. This is a significant reason why it has been so dif-
ficult for these framings to develop controls on intangible technology transfers.
There has been no space in the discourse to date to question whether or not
the goods should be controlled at all, only whether they should be controlled
for economic or security reasons.
To the degree to which the egalitarian framing is able to guide the discourse
on dual-use technology, the debate will switch from being about an adequate
level of control to one about carving out entire areas of technology that are
not to be controlled at all. But why would an export control system that has
existed for many decades want to include such a disruptive framing?
Why allow a space for other framings?
One reason why a discourse between two framings might specifically make space
for a framing that could undermine them both is suggested by Christopher
Hood and Henry Rothstein, who have explored this facet of public organisations
through their work on blame and accountability (Hood, 2002, 2007; Hood &
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Rothstein, 2001; Hood et al., 2001). Hood & Rothstein look at risk regulation
regimes (RRRs) that are under pressure to have increased openness, where
increased openness consists of three elements: “(a) greater transparency in
organizational procedure; (b) wider participation in some or all elements of an
RRR; and (c) heightened accountability in the sense of increased obligations
on the part of those responsible for regulating and managing risks to explain
and justify their behavior to others” (Hood & Rothstein, 2001, p. 22). We
can see at least the last two of these elements in the intangible transfers issue
within the US export control system. Calls for wider participation in making
decisions on the scope and structure of export controls were the reasons the
DEAC was set up. Moreover, Wassenaar has in the past felt the need to explain
and justify the control system in place through its two outreach seminars in
2003 and 2004. Calls for greater transparency in organisational procedures
have been made informally by companies and academics either effected by or
studying the export control system, but there has also been a general drive
in the US, Britain, and Wassenaar to make their operating procedures more
transparent.
The drive for increased openness often involves accusation of blame for
why the RRR is not as open as it should be. One option for responding to
these accusations is simply to ignore them, but openness and transparency in
regulation systems is generally thought to increase the legitimacy of the sys-
tem (Bentham et al., 1931, 1983; Brin, 1998). Hood & Rothstein suggest that
institutional responses to calls for increased openness take on various ‘blame
prevention re-engineering’ strategies, which seek “to transfer or dissipate the
increased blame or liability that increased transparency or new information
requirements might bring” (p. 40). If one believes that the institution is mo-
tivated to act through the avoidance of blame, the initial strategy that was
employed was a ‘protocolization’ of accepting input from the public, i.e. the
original notice for comments on the Inspector General’s report in the Federal
Register. When that resulted in an extensive set of comments, the government
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shifted strategies and initiated an ‘organisational reorientation’ by appointing
the DEAC, thereby placing some of the responsibility for coming up with a
workable solution on the shoulders of the academic and business communities.
This shared responsibility was further institutionalised with the creation of the
ETRAC. It should be noted, however, that neither the DEAC nor the ETRAC
have authority to make any decisions for the government. If the government
were not to accept the recommendation of these bodies, it would be held solely
to blame.
Another reason to allow space for other framings is to allow for what Sun-
stein (1996) calls ‘moral evolution over time’. He argues that completely the-
orised agreements are “unable to accommodate changes in facts or values”
(p. 41). While he did not go into great detail about what this means, I sug-
gest that complete theorisation means an agreement contains a coherent and
rigid set of facts and values, and is temporally locked. Any future decision,
regardless of a change in circumstances, must adhere to the prior agreement.
Incomplete theorisation, on the other hand, serves to temporally unlock the
agreement, focusing on it not as an event, a list, a document, but as a pro-
cess. This serves the Wassenaar Arrangement very well when trying to develop
consensus on control over something that none of the Participating states has
an effective way of controlling, such as intangible transfers of technology. At
the moment, for example, there is agreement to treat tangible transfers and in-
tangible transfers similarly. As more discussions take place within Wassenaar
and more attempts are made within Participating States to develop control
mechanisms, that agreement may shift. That said, however, the Wassenaar
Arrangement, like an incompletely theorised agreement, is “well-adapted to a
system that should or must take precedents as fixed points” (p. 42). That
the Participating States agreed to decontrol computers, for instance, does not
necessarily mean that they must also decontrol other things.
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Creating a clumsy solution space for dual-use technology
Regardless of the reasons for reaching agreement on intangible technology trans-
fers, the current state of the development in this area is one that has at least
begun to co-opt the other framings into the discourse. In doing so, it displays
some key characteristics of a type of settlement (6, 2007), called a ‘clumsy
solution’, between the different framings.
Characteristics of a clumsy solution
A ‘clumsy solution’ is a term used within the theory of sociocultural viability
to describe a solution where each of the active framings is heard and responded
to by all the others (Verweij et al., 2006a). This does not mean that actors
have made compromises. Clumsy solutions have two key features. The first is
that the policy system must be accessible to each of the framings that cultural
theory articulates. The more framings that are included in the generation of
a solution to a problem, the more likely that solution will be able to adjust to
the inevitable changes in the future environment in which it will sit. This is
because each of the framings provides a compelling and coherent, but incom-
plete, picture of the issue and what should be done about it. There needs to
be space for contradictory value systems and forms of organisation to come up
against one another. Following Ney (2006, p. 326), we can divide the accessi-
bility into three levels based on the number of framings that are represented in
the discourse: monocentric, bi-polar, and triangular.
Throughout this thesis I have documented the long-standing bi-polar inter-
play between the hierarchical framing, driving for developing adequate levels of
control for dual-use technology, and the competitive framing, driving for the de-
velopment of a vibrant market for the non-military uses of dual-use technology.
With the efforts of the United States in the last decade to solicit the opinion
of the academic community on the topic of intangible technology transfers, we
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can see at least initial attempts to include the egalitarian framing within a now
triangular discourse on dual-use technology.
The second key feature of clumsy solutions is that they depend on high
quality deliberation between each of the actors. When the quality of delibera-
tion is low, it is likely that positions will become or remain polarised, creating a
deadlock where no agreement is possible. Clumsy solutions must emerge from
the deliberative process; they cannot be formulated ahead of time in their com-
plete form. But how likely is a clumsy solution to emerge within the discourse
on dual-use technology?
When a clumsy solution is likely to emerge
Lach, Ingram & Rayner (2006, p. 236–238) suggest there are at least four
conditions that are conducive to a clumsy solution emerging from a deliberative
process, each of which I explore below.
The first is that there are accumulating problems; a situation I liken to the
abundance of uncomfortable knowledge for each of the framings. Each actor
recognises that the current or proposed future environment will likely further
undermine its framing of the problem. This is certainly the case with the intan-
gible transfer of technology issue. Uncomfortable knowledge for the hierarchical
framing began when anomalies in the classification system—restructured at the
end of World War II—concerning the intangible aspects of technology had to
be continually resolved into the classification system through equating it with
the tangible aspects of technology. This was (and still is) a continual prac-
tice of conferring sameness (Douglas, 1986) that institutionalises the place of
intangible aspects of technology within the overall system. The anomaly has
resurfaced many times, and has needed frequent re-resolution, either by stip-
ulating that intangible transfers are controlled in the preamble to the list, by
creating an entire section of every Category dedicated to intangible aspects of
technology, or by generating documents stating the importance of the control
of intangible aspects of technology.
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These re-resolutions, however, have been achieved by reiterating the orig-
inal assumption of sameness between the tangible and intangible aspects of
technology. One could say that at each iteration the export control system has
come closer actually to controlling the technology. This may be true, but as the
DEAC Report pointed out, by controlling the transfer of intangible aspects of
dual-use technology, export controls may actually undermine the security that
they are supposed to be strengthening.
This is a significant piece of uncomfortable knowledge for the hierarchical
framing, which has dominated the construction of the current institutional
framework for export controls. Moreover, exception-barring does not seem like
a viable strategy here, as it has been clearly stated on many occasions that “you
can release the equipment, but if you release the technology, then there’s really
no need to control anything anymore, because it’s gone. It’s gone forever.”19
The control of the intangible aspects of technology, particularly those aspects
needed for the design and production of the tangible aspects, is a fundamental
aspect of the entire export control system. Undermining the ability to control
the intangible aspects is tantamount to undermining the entire system, both
from the view of the hierarchical framing and from the view of the others.
The hierarchical framing is not the only one with uncomfortable knowledge,
however. The competitive framing and egalitarian framing both have much to
lose if the hierarchical framing decides to resolve the anomaly by including
elements of basic research in the definition of intangible aspects of controlled
technology. The competitive framing would lose the ability to compete on the
global market, and the egalitarian framing would lose the ability to benefit
from collaborations with other researchers in the global scientific community.
The second condition is that each of the actors has more to lose by inaction
than they do by acting. I believe I have made the plight of the hierarchical
framing clear above. If those espousing it do not act on controlling intangible
19Interview with Former British Government Official, 8 November 2007.
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transfers, the very foundations of the export control system may be under-
mined. Similarly, the competitive and egalitarian framings would be much
worse off if actors espousing the hierarchical framing decided to control intan-
gible transfers in an overly restrictive fashion.
Precedence is a very strong tool in creating clumsy solutions, and an actor’s
prior experience in creating clumsy solutions in other policy areas makes it more
likely that one will emerge on the topic of dual-use technology. While there
is some history in the US of collaborations on export control policy framing
between the hierarchical (government) and competitive (industry) framings,
such as the Department of Commerce’s Technical Advisory Committees, there
is little experience in including the egalitarian (academic) framing. Such ex-
perience, while not necessary for the emergence of a clumsy solution, certainly
can aid the development of a reflexive deliberation space, keeping actors from
polarising into their preferred framings rather than developing common under-
standings. This is where the concept of an ‘incompletely theorised agreement’
is useful. By generating shared consensus on particular outcomes, even without
breaching the topic of conflicting general principles, mutual trust is built up
between the framings that can then be capitalised upon when general principles
do come into debate.
The factor most likely to prevent a clumsy solution from emerging on the
topic of dual-use technology is the lack of a willingness of leadership to act:
The kind of leadership needed to craft clumsy solutions is differ-
ent from that usually found in bureaucracies. What characterizes
‘clumsy’ leaders is not their roles, positions or access to resources,
but their willingness to take risks that appear to challenge alter-
native perspectives. The motivations for risk-taking are hard to
generalize, as they arise out of particular contexts. . . In face-to-face
encounters they hear other values articulated and realize that their
own answers are not satisfactory to their collaborators (Lach et al.,
2006, p. 238).
It is not clear whether or not such leadership exists within the US or at the
Wassenaar Arrangement at the moment. However, the keenness of the Depart-
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ment of Commerce to create a substantive input body for emerging technology
and research, and the Outreach Seminars at Wassenaar in 2003-2004, suggest
that there may be someone working there to draw together genuinely the in-
commensurable value sets that characterise the difference framings.
Shifting the discourse
A clumsy solution to the wicked problem of dual-use technology depends on
high quality deliberation among the different framings of the wicked problem.
Ney (2006, p. 323–324 & Appendix F) divides deliberation quality into three
types of increasing merit: assertive, strategic, and reflexive. Assertive delib-
erations are ones where there is little sensitivity to finding areas of mutual
agreement between framings. Instead, focus is placed on emphasising the ar-
eas of intractable disagreement. Strategic deliberations are where the people
or organisations representing each framing constructively interact to find areas
of mutual agreement while not addressing each framing’s value system. This
is similar to Sunstein’s (1996) notion of an incompletely theorised agreement
where general principles are set aside and the focus is on finding agreement on
particular outcomes, or mid-level policies. Each actor may pursue the policy
objective for a particular framing while agreeing with the other actors on com-
mon means to reach those different objectives. Reflexive deliberation occurs
when each actor is cognisant of its own preferred framing and the debate is
about both the means to achieve a particular objective and a balance between
the different objectives as well.
CoCom and the Wassenaar Arrangement have vacillated between assertive,
strategic, and reflexive deliberative styles in a bi-polar discursive space. With
the possible exception of the debate on encryption controls in the late 1990s,
neither organisation has ever come across an actor that espoused an egalitarian
framing. At times, the hegemonic hierarchical framing would assert its domi-
nance in controlling both the acceptable goals to be reached and the means to
reach them. In such assertive deliberations, no room is made for alternative
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goals (it is all about control, not creating markets for technology). Most of
the time, however, decisions on maintaining the Dual-Use List have been made
through a discussion on the means of control rather than by asking if control is
a thing to be desired. As such, this allows for both the hierarchical and com-
petitive framings to be engaged in a technical exercise while avoiding difficult
normative questions. There have been some rare examples of reflexive deliber-
ation; the two most striking are the Core List review and the discussions in the
New Forum before Wassenaar began. In both of these cases, there were admis-
sions that controlling the export of dual-use technology and creating markets
for non-military use were policy objectives that needed to be balanced.
With the emergence of an egalitarian framing within the academic commu-
nity and its institutionalisation in the US through the DEAC and ETRAC,
I propose that there needs to be an institutionalised ability for the discourse
on dual-use technology to occur on both the strategic and reflexive levels of
deliberative quality within a triangular rather than bi-polar discursive space.
In much of the work needed to maintain a list of dual-use technology, there
does not necessarily need to be explicit deliberation on the divergent goals
that the actors involved are likely to have. Some will be there because they
are seeking an adequate level of control, some to try to develop market incen-
tives for non-military use of technology, and some to advocate for the non-
excludability of certain types of technology. Neither these different reasons for
being there, nor the difference in underlying preferences they represent, should
prevent them from agreeing on particular outcomes for many of the definitions
of technology on the Dual-Use List. The Wassenaar Arrangement, and the
internal national processes used to generate list-modifications, should therefore
continue to strengthen this ‘incompletely theorised agreement’ between differ-
ent actors who hold different framings of the problem of dual-use technology.
While this means creating a space for input from an egalitarian framing, it
can be done in much the same way as space was created for the competitive
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framing, because technical expertise, rather than policy goals, are the focus in
these deliberations.
As we have seen many times, it is often difficult for experts to find a common
ground on which to agree on an adequate definition of a dual-use technology.
What often happens is that deliberations break down because the divergent
goals that different actors are trying to achieve dictate different values for the
same parameter. Sometimes, such as in the case of computers, the discourse
moves from one parameter to another, from processors to memory to inter-
connects to software. This hopping between parameters is likely to become
exponentially more difficult as a third framing becomes more involved in de-
bate, particularly because actors espousing the egalitarian framing are likely to
argue for the importance of seeing technology as a non-excludable good, and
therefore no parameter would be an adequate one for control.
Where strategic deliberation is not possible, there needs to be an institution-
alised ability to deliberate reflexively on the balance between the policy goals of
each actor. This has happened in an ad hoc fashion in the past when two fram-
ings were present, but nevertheless resulted in drastic changes to the system of
control. With three framings present, conflict between them is likely to become
endemic as each can undermine assumptions that the other two make, thereby
making space where all three can agree much more constrained than the space
where only two of them agree. When only two framings were present, getting
into the solution space was easy and much of the deliberative effort could be
spent on settling the particular outcome rather than on the balance of general
principles. When three framings are present, however, the solution space is
so small that much of the deliberative effort will be spent getting into that
space. This means that it is likely the Wassenaar Arrangement (and national
efforts at modifying the Dual-Use List) will in the future spend more time try-
ing to balance different policy goals before they are able to deliberate specific
outcomes.
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In order to effectively deliberate a balance of policy goals, the dual-use
discourse as a whole must be able to pursue each of those goals, be they de-
veloping adequate levels of control (hierarchical), market incentives for non-
military uses of technology (competitive), or creating barriers around areas of
technology deemed to be non-excludable (egalitarian). This will likely mean
that the hierarchical framing will need to relinquish some of its hegemonic
status within the discourse, which correlates with export controls being seen
on a more equal footing with market incentives and the preservation of open
access to basic scientific research. Rather than destroying the export control
system, this shift will actually make it more likely that the system will survive
at all. Were the hierarchical framing to try to maintain its hegemonic status
in a triangular policy space (a complex wicked problem), it would necessarily
resort to an assertive deliberative style, becoming uncompromising in its views
and, in time, losing its legitimacy from the perspective of the other framings.
With loss of legitimacy comes loss of participation, and without participation
by actors taking up egalitarian or competitive framings—which are the actors
who own or create nearly all dual-use technology—control is no longer possible.
The export control system would therefore collapse.
Recognition that there is a triangular policy space, that the problem to be
addressed is a complex wicked problem, is the first step towards the creation of
a clumsy solution space. It is a step that at least one country, the United States,
has taken, and the sooner that other countries and the Wassenaar Arrangement
do the same, the more likely that the export control system as a whole will
survive and continue to fulfil its vital role of helping to prevent the malicious
use to technology.
7.3 Conclusion
The problem of dual-use technology does show signs of shifting from a simple to
a complex wicked problem. In this chapter, we have explored this shift through
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an analysis of the development of controls on intangible technology transfers,
both within the Wassenaar Arrangement and within the United States.
For centuries, the apparatus of export controls has turned on the point of
a list. In addition to the lists, the basis of export controls rests on controlling
the transfer of the items on the lists. The most important aspects of the items
to control are the intangible aspects—the information and knowledge—related
to the development, production, and use of the items.
Export controls have always focused on technologies with tangible aspects,
but increasingly they have been concerned with both the tangible and intan-
gible aspects of those technologies. I provided a history of the development of
controls on both the tangible and intangible transfers of the intangible aspects
of technology. I showed how, over the course of the history of export controls,
there have been two significant shifts in the types of things that were put on
the control lists: the first being a shift away from ‘unmanufactured’ items; and
the second a shift towards intangible aspects of technology.
Including intangible aspects of technology on the control lists was seen
as necessary because the intangible aspects, namely the knowledge and skills
needed to produce the technology, were (and still are) seen as most vital to the
viability of the export control system as a whole. There are several problems
that CoCom and the Wassenaar Arrangement came across when trying to de-
fine the intangible aspects of technology on the Dual-Use List. One of these
problems was that any text that they put down would itself be an export of
the technology, as the lists are publicly available. Another problem was that,
in order to define the intangible aspects of technology, they need to be treated
as discrete entities.
Controlling the intangible transfers of the intangible aspects of technology
was more effort to develop, because several Participating States argued that
their internal legislation does not distinguish between in-country transfers and
freedom of speech. Controls developed gradually, from a short Statement of
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Understanding to longer ones, and finally to a Best Practices document on
implementing intangible transfer of technology controls.
I provided a case study on the development of intangible technology trans-
fer controls within the US to show one way countries may be able to address
the development of a third framing of the problem of dual-use technology.
The US ran into difficulty in creating and strengthening its in-country trans-
fer controls, called ‘deemed exports’, because members of the academic and
industrial research communities believed the controls would significantly affect
their capacity to advance research in their fields. This led to the development
of the Deemed Export Advisory Committee and, following on from that, the
Emerging Technology and Research Advisory Committee.
The problem is still very much present, however, and I argued that one
reason for this is the emergence of a new framing of the problem of dual-use
technology; an egalitarian framing that sees the problem as one of ensuring
that export controls are aware that there are types of technology that are not
controllable because they are non-excludable goods, i.e. the control of them
is neither desirable nor possible. The egalitarian framing has been adopted
by the academic community, and was likely allowed into the debate through a
blame avoidance strategy of the hegemonic hierarchical framing.
Regardless of how the egalitarian framing got into the discourse on dual-use
technology, that it is there suggests that the problem has shifted from being
a simple to a complex wicked problem. As such it is now possible for the US,
as well as the Wassenaar Arrangement, to develop a ‘clumsy solution space’
within which the different framings of the problem can agree on particular
outcomes, be they list modifications, the development of market incentives, or
the recognition of certain types of technology as being non-excludable goods.
Clumsy solutions are emergent phenomena wherein all of the framings that
the theory of sociocultural viability stipulates should be present are present
and responded to by the others. This requires high quality deliberation among
different actors, both at the strategic level, where agreements are incompletely
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theorised agreements on particular outcomes, and at the reflexive level, where
the deliberation is about the balance of the different policy goals of each of the
framings rather than a particular outcome.
The DEAC Report discussed above points out that “resolving the problems
associated within the Deemed Export regime will have only limited impact
absent an effort to address the shortcomings of the overall export regulatory
system in today’s technical and geopolitical environment” (p. 24). Similarly,
speaking about the difficulties of deemed exports, one US official said, “It’s a
larger issue than export controls. It doesn’t live in the export control arena.”20
The environment in which export controls sit has changed, but the control sys-
tem itself has not been modified sufficiently, according to those who actually
want the controls. These arguments, save a few, are not for the entire disband-
ment of export controls on the intangible aspects of technology, but rather for
a reshaping of the institutional structure for a changed environment.
Creating a triangular discursive space that is able to address the complex
wicked problem of dual-use technology through strategic and reflexive deliber-
ation will likely require significant shifts in the current export control system.
The US has already begun some of these shifts, and other countries as well
as the Wassenaar Arrangement should seriously consider the need to make
this shift as well. However, I should note, along with a recent National Re-
search Council Report, that “[a]n important caveat attaches to any discussion
of changes in the current system of export controls: there is no ‘risk free’ so-
lution. Today’s system is not risk-free either; in fact, it is arguably becoming
more and more dangerous because the inclination to equate control with safety
gives a false sense of security” (Committee on Science, Security, and Prosper-
ity et al., 2009, p. 4). I am not suggesting that this shift in the export control
system will make the problem of dual-use technology any easier to deal with.
I am suggesting, however, that such a shift will make the continuance of the
export control system more likely.
20Interview with US Commerce Department Official B, 29 January 2007.
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Conclusions
Throughout this thesis, I have asked three primary questions:
• How are dual-use technologies defined?
• What is the Wassenaar Arrangement trying to do?
• How is the Wassenaar Arrangement trying to achieve its goals?
A brief answer to the first question is that the definitions of dual-use technolo-
gies that are inscribed on the Wassenaar Arrangement Dual-Use List emerge
from a discourse among different framings of the problem of dual-use tech-
nology. The hierarchical framing has been hegemonic throughout the lifetime
of both CoCom and Wassenaar, but for the entire history of export controls,
competitive framings of the problem have always been part of the discourse as
well. The problem of dual-use technology, therefore, has always been a wicked
problem. To answer the second question, I have argued that the Arrangement,
in framing the problem as one of control, has sought to maintain a classification
system for dual-use technology. This process—indeed, it is a process and not
a one-off occurrence—involves continually resolving anomalies. While some of
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the anomalies occur as a normal part of making a well-defined list, others have
been shaped by alternative framings and have the propensity to undermine the
hierarchical framing’s preferred form of organisation. In response to the third
question, I have argued that the Wassenaar Arrangement has maintained a
discourse between hierarchical and competitive framings by remaining an in-
completely theorised agreement, where emphasis has been placed on reaching
agreements on particular outcomes rather than general principles. With calls
to strengthen controls on intangible technology transfers, the Arrangement is
likely to see the rise of a third, egalitarian, framing of the problem of dual-use
technology like that already taking place within the United States. By incor-
porating this third framing, the Arrangement will acknowledge that the wicked
problem is actually a complex wicked problem that does not sit solely within
the field of export controls. In so doing, it can also create a clumsy solution
space where each of the framings has a voice and is responded to by the others.
In this concluding chapter, I review each of these arguments in detail.
Multiple framings of the wicked problem of dual-use tech-
nology
To answer the first question, I drew upon more general arguments within the
field of Science & Technology Studies (STS) to show how dual-use technology
is defined through its enactment in various communities of practice. The final
text on the Wassenaar Arrangement Dual-Use List for something like a focal
plane array is the outcome of a long series of negotiations between alternative
framings of the technology. The text is the result of the political, economic,
and social contexts in which it was created as much as the technical contexts.
We saw this first with the history of the term ‘dual-use’. There are multiple
ways that the term is understood, and these relate to which technologies get
defined as dual-use. The term is employed differently by academics and by
practitioners. It has different connotations in WMD contexts from those it has
in conventional contexts. It can be understood either in terms of ‘spin-off’, if
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the military is seen as having technology with non-military uses, or ‘spin-on’ if
the opposite is thought to be the case. Within export controls, the term has
a historical grounding in the term ‘contraband’, which was used to describe
controlled items in trade as early as the 16th Century. Different perceptions of
dual-use technologies see them as only being of concern when they are in certain
contexts, or used by certain users. . . though some also contend that dual-use is
an inherent characteristic of technology. The Wassenaar Arrangement has no
official definition of the term ‘dual-use’ and I argue that this is to its advantage,
because it allows significant degrees of interpretative flexibility in enacting the
term. This interpretive flexibility is necessary when trying to create a text that
is acceptable to a wide variety of communities of practice, from industries to
militaries to political bodies.
To speak of ‘a’ dual-use technology, is to become embedded in a set of social
and technical relations. Thus there is the corporate engineer who sees a focal
plane array as a tool to measure pedestrian traffic in a supermarket versus
the military engineer who sees a focal plane array as a critical component
in night vision systems versus the company executive who sees a focal plane
array as a closed path of development because of export restrictions. Each
of these actors, however, is enacting different characteristics within an ever-
changing definition a focal plane array. While a single artefact may take on the
form of an immutable mobile, most of the time discussions over the tangible
aspects of technology do not have the artefact present, and rightly so, if the
goal is to be able to cover a range of artefacts when companies apply for export
licenses. There is no objective technology which people within the Wassenaar
Arrangement can look at and say “Yes, that’s dual-use.” That is not to say
that there are never occurrences of someone bringing an artefact into a meeting
and demonstrating its military significance. Rather, the point I made was that
the definition on the Dual-Use List will cover many more artefacts than just
the one shown in the meeting, and the goal of the Arrangement is to constrain
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the ambiguity of the definition enough to satisfy those who wish to control the
technology while leaving it open enough for those who do not wish for control.
When controlling technology transfers, it is useful to divide the technology
into two parts, the items that are transferred, and the definitions of those items
on the Dual-Use List. The items that are transferred can be thought of as “rel-
atively robust pockets of interpretation in a sea of interpretively flexible texts”
(Woolgar, 1991, p. 39). In enforcing export controls, licensing and enforcement
officers must make a determination as to whether the items transferred should
or should not be classified as dual-use technology. The question asked in this
environment is, “Is this item an example of a dual-use technology?” In order
to ask this question, however, there must be a definition of dual-use technology
to which the item can be compared. Such a definition comes about by asking a
very different question: “How can we resolve/maintain the ambiguities around
the definition of dual-use technology?”
Whereas the first question takes an item and tries to find a classification
for it, the second develops a classification in order to include (and exclude)
a certain range of items. In doing so, it also includes and excludes certain
framings of the problem of dual-use technology. This second question is what
occupies most of the Wassenaar Arrangement’s time.
In focusing my research on this question, Woolgar’s (1991) phrase of viewing
‘technology as text’ takes on a literal meaning—the technologies, for the pur-
poses of my analysis, are texts. One of the reasons I take this view is to show
that technologies, like languages, evolve over time based on the things that we
try to make them do. What constitutes a dual-use technology is very different
from what it was fifty years ago, and will likely be very different from what it
will be fifty years from now. This does not happen because the technology is
continually advancing, but rather because people are trying to make the clas-
sification do different things. Mastanduno gave much weight to the argument
that CoCom shifted between periods of using the Industrial List for strategic
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embargo, for economic containment, and for cooperation. The Wassenaar Ar-
rangement has not so far been characterised by such over-arching motivations
for modifying its lists. The text of the Dual-Use List reflects this by sometimes
controlling more technology, sometimes letting more go.
For most of the history of export controls, dual-use technology has been
defined through a discourse between two framings of the problem. Within
the hierarchical framing, the problem is constructed as one of control, which
can be resolved by systematically developing a classification of technology as
either military, dual-use, or neither, and then employing a set of routines and
procedures to ensure that technology which should be controlled, is controlled.
This framing rests on three assumptions, which form its ‘myth of control’: that
it is possible to control the flow of dual-use technology; that it is possible to
know from whom dual-use technology should be kept; and that it is possible to
define what is and is not dual-use technology. These are the assumptions upon
which modern export control systems are based.
The alternative framing, however, views the problem not as one of control,
but as one of competition and the marketability of technology. When address-
ing the problem of dual-use technology, the myth of the competitive framing
is that a market exists and that, if you meet or develop a new need in the
market with a technology, that technology will be taken up, as long as it is
priced appropriately and is perceived as better than any competitors. Within
the Wassenaar Arrangement, the hierarchical framing has hegemonic status,
and actors expressing other framings of the problem of dual-use technology
must employ the rhetoric of the hierarchical framing in order to engage in the
discourse.
Having two framings within the discourse on dual-use technology suggests
that it is a simple wicked problem. It is a persistent problem that is multiply
framed, and each framing has its own solution which is often in contradiction
to solutions offered by other framings. The problem of dual-use technology is
itself a symptom of other wicked problems, such as those of creating a vibrant
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economy and ensuring national security. While each of these framings has
a partial view on the problem of dual-use technology, neither of them has a
complete view. Too much institutionalisation of either of these framings has
led in the past either to increased propensity of wars to break out because of
the increased access to militarily significant technology, or to too much control
resulting in the stifling of the economy of exporting countries.
Anomaly-handling & uncomfortable knowledge
Through an extensive review of the history and structure of the Wassenaar Ar-
rangement, we saw how the hierarchical framing became hegemonic with the
development of CoCom and has remained so within Wassenaar. While mod-
ifying the Dual-Use List, Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement
may argue that a definition of a technology should be modified because of (a)
foreign availability; (b) it lacks a clear and objective definition; (c) it lacks
military significance; (d) it is controlled by another regime; or (e) it is un-
controllable. Each of these arguments creates an anomaly for the hierarchical
framing, and actors trying to maintain this framing’s hegemonic status engage
in two types of anomaly-handling strategies to resolve anomalies into (or out
of) the classification system: monster-adjustment and exception-barring. Oc-
casionally, these strategies are unsuccessful, in which case the anomaly works
to undermine the form of organisation upon which the framing is based, cre-
ating ‘uncomfortable knowledge’. For the hierarchical framing, uncomfortable
knowledge is knowledge that technologies which should be controlled cannot
be controlled.
The case studies I have used in this thesis demonstrate the varying de-
grees to which actors expressing the hierarchical framing are successful in car-
rying out these anomaly-handling strategies. Quantum cryptography was a
case of monster-adjustment where the anomaly was quickly resolved through
normal bureaucratic procedures. The focal plane array case saw the anomaly
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resolved as well, though with a much higher degree of contention. The monster-
adjustment and exception-barring strategies were both employed, though in
some cases the result was not to control some technology that actors—taking a
polarised hierarchical view on the issue—thought should be controlled, thereby
creating uncomfortable knowledge for those actors. In the case of computers,
the hierarchical framing used exception-barring to narrow the scope of the con-
trol list from controlling hardware to primarily controlling software. This was a
case where actors expressing the competitive framing were very effectively able
to ‘steal the rhetoric’ of the hierarchical framing to show how computers were
not controllable by the hierarchical framing’s own metrics, and therefore that
they should be decontrolled, regardless of their perceived military significance.
Incomplete theorisation & shifting to a clumsy solution
space
By focusing on maintaining the List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies,
the Wassenaar Arrangement functions as an incompletely theorised agreement,
where effort is made to reach particular outcomes—the list modifications—
thereby allowing a space for actors with widely different assumptions on what
aspects of technology are important or what to do with that technology. There
are many positive features of incompletely theorised agreements. Reaching
agreement when and where the Arrangement can allows for decisions to be
made which can then be referred back to in subsequent rounds. Without such
decisions, no precedent is created and no institutionalisation takes place. With
such decisions, however, future discussions can have a common starting ground
for arguing for or against an issue.
These agreements may be small, such as one involving a single change on
the Dual-Use List, but the smallness is also a virtue in that it reduces the cost
of political disagreement. If a Participating State does not want a particular
list modification to go through, it may accept it anyway if it looks like that
will also mean another modification that it wants will go through. Agreements
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can become more political within Wassenaar, as shown in the focal plane array
case. When they do, however, positions tend to become more polarised, making
the costs of disagreeing higher, but at the same time possibly creating a more
significant change in the lists. Such change, however, due to its dominance of
a single framing, is likely to have less legitimacy with the other framing, as we
saw with the loss of trust that came out of the focal plane array case. There
will also be more susceptibility to surprise from changes in the environment.
This situation arose during the discussion on computer controls, and rather
than continually pushing for greater control, those espousing the hierarchical
framing agreed with those espousing the competitive framing that controls on
hardware were no longer practical.
Such a debate can only happen in an arena that allows for multiple framings
of a common wicked problem. The decision gave something to each of the
framings, but neither framing got all that it wanted. By viewing it as a single
decision in a long process of decision-making, each of the framings knew that
they would have an opportunity again in the future to try and strengthen their
form of organisation through future decisions.
The debates on computers and focal plane arrays, along with almost all
of the earlier debates on list modifications, only involved two framings of the
wicked problem. In contrast, discussions on intangible transfers of technology
have included a third, egalitarian framing. We explored this shift through an
analysis of the development of controls on intangible technology transfers, both
within the Wassenaar Arrangement and within the United States. Controls on
intangible technology transfers have only begun to be institutionalised in the
last few decades, and many countries have encountered difficulties in develop-
ing controls because actors expressing both the hierarchical and competitive
framings have come up against a framing that questions the assumption of
technology upon which both of these framings are based: that technology, and
knowledge of how to design, produce, and use that technology, is an excludable
good which cannot be clearly differentiated.
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Both the hierarchical and competitive framings benefit from technology
being excludable. The hierarchical framing is able to define technology in need
of control and establish routines and procedures to control that technology. The
excludability of a technology is the basis of a market economy. If a company
has control over a particular technology, say because they have some kind of
intellectual property claim, they control the market for it.
But it is also possible for us to view technology as a non-excludable good.
The guiding principle behind this view is that there should be an equal distri-
bution of, or at least access to, the good for all. The problem is neither one
of control nor of ensuring a competitive environment, but rather concerns the
need for a more fundamental change in the way goods are valued in society.
This egalitarian framing of dual-use technology has been expressed by academic
establishments within the United State, which argue that basic scientific knowl-
edge is a non-excludable good that should be freely available to anyone and not
placed under export controls. This community has found a voice within the
discourse on dual-use technology through the Deemed Export Advisory Com-
mittee and the Emerging Technology Research Advisory Committee within the
Department of Commerce.
With the emergence of the egalitarian framing, the problem of dual-use
technology has shifted to being a complex wicked problem. In this situation,
agreement on particular outcomes (list modifications) is likely to be more con-
tentious as actors expressing the egalitarian framing are likely to see the whole
idea of list-maintenance as anathema. It will therefore become increasingly
difficult to avoid discussions on the values that underlie each of the framings.
As such, I have argued that efforts to created a ‘clumsy solution space’ where
actors supporting each of the framings can debate both particular outcomes
and general principles. There is a possibility that this will result in the desta-
bilisation of the hierarchical framing’s hegemonic status, but at the same time
it is more likely to make the international export control system as a whole
more legitimate as the egalitarian framing continues to gain strength.
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Future areas of research & practice
There are several areas of future research worth noting in concluding this thesis.
One of the most interesting is the relationship between international efforts to
control intellectual property rights and the development of export controls on
intangible technology transfers. Like the Wassenaar Arrangement, the TRIPS
agreement tries to control the production and trade of products produced by
employing certain knowledge. While TRIPS and Wassenaar differ on what
constitutes important knowledge for control, they are likely to encounter similar
problems in doing so. In particular, TRIPS already has an established history
in dealing with egalitarian framings of the problem of intellectual property,
raised for several communities of practice, including academic communities
and proponents of sustainable development practices. In interviews that I
conducted, I found that Wassenaar participants had little knowledge of the
TRIPS agreement, and had not thought about the relationship between TRIPS
and intangible technology transfer controls.
Another approach to the Wassenaar Arrangement that is very similar to
the one I have taken would be to place an explicit emphasis on the role of
technical expertise. The Arrangement is specifically divided into a General
Working Group and an Expert Group, and I have shown how this distinction
is blurred (a standard argument within Science & Technology Studies (STS))
but also how it is useful, as long as the participants acknowledge that the line
between technical and political is socially constructed and constantly moving.
The Wassenaar Arrangement draws a line between social and technical not to
create a rigid categorisation, but rather to provide a framework within which
to discuss and move that line. Might the Arrangement benefit from not only
experts in the technologies under discussion, but also experts on analysing the
integration of social and technical landscapes?
This question points to my desire to make scholars employing STS and the
theory of sociocultural viability active participants in the topics they analyse.
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These scholars will be the first to accept that they do not have the solutions
to the problems they analyse, but the benefit of both STS and the theory of
sociocultural viability is that they can help actors understand the assumptions
on which their decision-making is based. These theories thereby allow for
critical reflection on whether those assumptions are the ones that the actor
actually wants to hold on the issue under concern.
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A
List of acronyms
ACF Advocacy Coalition Framework
AG Australia Group
ANT Actor-Network Theory
APP adjusted peak performance:
used to measure computer
performance in post-2005
Wassenaar lists; measured in
weighted TeraFLOPS.
BWC Biological Weapons
Convention
BST barium strontium titanate
CDC Control Data Corporation
CESG British Communications
Electronic Security Group, part
of GCHQ
CITS Center for International Trade
and Security at the University
of Georgia
CoCom Coordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls
CTP composite theoretical
performance: used as a metric
for measuring computer
performance in post-1991
CoCom and pre-2005 Wassenaar
lists; measured in MTOPS
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338 List of acronyms
CWC Chemical Weapons
Convention
DARPA US Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency
DEAC Deemed Export Advisory
Committee
DSTO Australian Ministry of
Defence
EAR US Department of Commerce’s
Export Administration
Regulations
EG Wassenaar Arrangement Expert
Group
ETRAC Emerging Technology
Research Advisory Committee
EU European Union
FLOPS floating point operations
per second
GaAs Gallium Arsenide
GCHQ British Government
Communications Headquarters
GWG Wassenaar Arrangement
General Working Group
HIDAD high-density array
development, a project by
DARPA to develop uncooled
focal plane arrays
HLM CoCom High Level Meeting
HPC high-performance computer
IAEA International Atomic Energy
Agency
IBM International Business
Machines
ICD International Classification of
Disease
IL CoCom Industrial List
LEOM Wassenaar Arrangement
Licensing and Enforcement
Officers Meeting
MANPADS Man-Portable Air
Defence Systems
Mbps millions of bits per second
MECRs Multilateral Export
Control Regimes
MPP massively parallel processing
MTCR Missile Technology Control
Regime
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MTOPS millions of theoretical
operations per second
NASA US National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty
Organization
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty
NGO non-governmental organisation
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NVESD US Army Night Vision and
Electronic Sensors Directorate
OSCE Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe
PDR processing data rate: used as a
metric of computer performance
in CoCom lists until 1991
QKD quantum key distribution
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs
SALW Small Arms and Light
Weapons
SCOT social construction of
technology
SIMD single instruction, multiple
data
SIPRI Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute
SL Wassenaar Arrangement Sensitive
List
SMP symmetric multiprocessing
SOU Statement of Understanding
SST social shaping of technology
STS Science & Technology Studies
or Science, Technology &
Society
TeraFLOPS trillions of FLOPS
TRIPS Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights
TWG Wassenaar Arrangement
Technical Working Group
UAV unmanned (or uninhabited)
aerial vehicle
UN United Nations
US United States of America
VOx vanadium oxide
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VPoCs Wassenaar Arrangement
Vienna Points of Contact
VSL Wassenaar Arrangement Very
Sensitive List
WHO World Health Organization
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WT Weighted TeraFLOPS
WTO World Trade Organization
WWI, WWII World War I, World
War II
ZC Zangger Committee
Redacted at request of the British 
Government
B
Public Documents & Structure of the
Dual-Use List of the Wassenaar
Arrangement
This Appendix is meant as a quick reference for documents produced by the
Wassenaar Arrangement.
B.1 Dual-Use List structure
Below is the outline of the structure of the Dual-Use List as of 2007.
When citing the List in the text, I use the form 6.A.2.b, where 6 refers
to the Category (in this case, Sensors and “Lasers”), A refers to the Section
(Systems, Equipment, and Components), 2 refers to the subsection (Optical
Sensors), and anything after refers to a part of the subsection. Where Notes
are referenced, I append ‘Note 1’ or ‘Technical Note 2’ or ‘N.B.’ to the end of
the reference to denote this.
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Public Documents & Structure of the Dual-Use List of the Wassenaar
Arrangement
Table B.1: Categories of the Dual-Use List
Category 1 – Advanced Materials
Category 2 – Materials Processing
Category 3 – Electronics
Category 4 – Computers
Category 5 – Part 1 – Telecommunications
Category 5 – Part 2 – “Information Security”
Category 6 – Sensors and “Lasers”
Category 7 – Navigation and Avionics
Category 8 – Marine
Cateogry 9 – Aerospace and Propulsion
Table B.2: Sections of the Dual-Use List Categories
A – Systems, Equipment, and Components
B – Test, Inspection, and Production Equipment
C – Materials
D – Software
E – Technology
B.2 Publicly available documents
These documents are available on the Wassenaar website: http://www.wassenaar.org.
Here, they are ordered chronologically.
Table B.3: Publicly Available Documents of the Wassenaar Arrangement
Year Document
1995 December 1995, Declaration at the Peace Palace, The Hague
Lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List
1996 Press Statement, 12 July, 1996
Press Statement, 13 December, 1996
Lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List
1997 Public Statement, 10 December, 1997
Lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List
Continued on Next Page. . .
B.2 Publicly available documents 343
Table B.3 – Continued
Year Document
1998 What is the Wassenaar Arrangement?
Genesis of the Wassenaar Arrangement
Elements for Objective Analysis and Advice Concerning Potentially
Destabilising Accumulations of Conventional Weapons
Public Statement, 3 December, 1998
Lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List
1999 Public Statement, 3 December, 1999
Lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List
2000 Best Practices for Disposal of Surplus/Demilitarised Military Equip-
ment
Extreme Vigilance: Sub-set of Tier 2 (VSL)items - ‘Best Practices’
Best Practices for Effective Enforcement
Elements for Export Controls of MANPADS
Lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List
2001 Statement of Understanding on Intangible Transfers of Software and
Technology
Public Statement, 7 December, 2001
Lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List
2002 Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons
(SALW)
Statement of Understanding on Arms Brokerage
Public Statement, 12 December, 2002
Lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List
2003 Elements for Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems
(MANPADS) (This document is a revision of “Elements for Export
Controls of MANPADS” adopted in December 2000)
Statement of Understanding on Control of Non-Listed Dual-Use Items
List of Advisory Questions for Industry
Elements for Effective Legislation on Arms Brokering
Ministerial Statement (December 2003)
Public Statement, 12 December, 2003
Lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List
2004 Press Statement from Outreach Seminar 2004
Public Statement, 09 December, 2004
Lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table B.3 – Continued
Year Document
2005 New Participating States - Statement by the Plenary Chair of the
Wassenaar Arrangement, 29 June, 2005
End-User Assurances commonly used - Consolidated Indicative List
(This document is a revision of “End User Assurances commonly used
- Indicative List” adopted in 1999)
Control Lists – Criteria (This document is a revision of the Control
Lists’ Criteria adopted in 2004)
Lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List
Summary of Changes – Lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and
Munitions List
Corrigendum to the 2005 Lists
Press Statement from Outreach Seminar, October 2005
Public Statement, 13 December, 2005
2006 Public Statement, 6 December, 2006
Best Practices for Implementing Intangible Transfer of Technology Con-
trols
Best Practice Guidelines for the Licensing of Items on the Basic List
and Sensitive List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies
Press Release from 10th Anniversary Event
Ministerial Statement (December 2006)
Lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List
Summary of Changes – Lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and
Munitions List
2007 Public Statement, 6 December, 2007
Updated Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light
Weapons (SALW) (This document is a revision of the Best Practice
Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)
adopted in 2002)
Updated Elements for Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defence
Systems (MANPADS) (This document is a revision of the Elements for
Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS)
adopted in 2000 and amended in 2003.)
Best Practices to Prevent Destabilising Transfers of Small Arms and
Light Weapons (SALW) through Air Transport
Statement of Understanding on Implementation of End-Use Controls
for Dual-Use Items
Lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List
Summary of Changes – Lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and
Munitions List
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table B.3 – Continued
Year Document
2008 Public Statement, 3 December, 2008
Summary of Changes - List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and
Munitions List
List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and Munitions List
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C
Cross Reference Index
The Cross Reference Index was compiled by Britain to aid exporters in finding
controlled technology on the newly structured CoCom lists in September 1991.
It is an invaluable tool in tracing the transition from the old lists to the new
ones.
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Cross Reference Index
"Old" IL Item to "New" Category
~~sg..(;l'05s-refeFei1€e--listsare provided on an advisory basis only. They give an approximate indication of how the scope of the controls
translates between the "old" and "new" Industrial Lists.
Note: Exporters are reminded that the requirement for an export licence is determined in law by the current Export of Goods(Control) Order, not by
this booklet which lists the controls on exports to the proscribed destinations. Goods may require an export licence even if they arefree from embargo.
"Old" IL Item "New" Category "Old" IL Item "New" Category "Old" IL Item "New" Category
number/sub-item & clause number/sub-item & clause number/sub-item & clause
1001(a(1),b(1» no entry 1355 ete 3.E.1,2 1416(h)( 4) 8.A.2.k
no entry 2.E.3.a no entry 6.BA 1416(h)(5) 8.A.2.n
1001 (a(2-4),b) 2.E.3.b 1357 1.B.1 a-e 1416(h)(6-9) 8.A.2.o.2
1080 9.D.l,2 1357 1.D 1416(h)(10) 8.A.2.l
1080 ete 9.E.1,2 1357 ete 5.D.1.a 1416(h)(11) 8.A.2.p
1080 2.E.3.e 1358(a) no entry 1417(a) no entry
1080(1)(a,f,g) no entry 1358(b) 4.B.l 1417(b) 8.A.2.b
1080(1)(b-e ,k) 9.B.1.a-e 1358(e) 4.B.2,3 1417(e) 8.A.2.d
1080(I)(h-j) 9.B.1.d-h 1358 4.E.l 1417(d) 8.A.2.i
1080(1)(e,e,h-k) 9.D.l no entry 9.B.8 1417(e) 8.A.2.e,f
1080(1)(d) 9.DA.e 1361 (a-c) no entry 1417(£) 8.A.2.g.1
1080(1)(i) 9.B.9 1361 (d) 9.B.2,5 1417(g) no entry
1080(1) 9.DA.f 1361 (g) 9.B.3 1417(h)(1-3) 8.A.2.j
1080(II) no entry 1361 (e) 9.E.3.b.l 1417(h)(4) no entry
1080 ete 9.E.1,2 1361 ete 9.E.1 no entry 8.A.1.b.1,2
1081 1.B.3 1361 9.D.l no entry 8.A.1.e
1081 1.D 1362 (a) 9.DA.a no entry 8.A.2.g.2
1081 2.E.3.e 1361 (d) 9.DA.b 1417 ete 8.A.2.o.3
1086(a,b(3,4),e) no entry 1362(b) 9.B.6 1417 ete 8.E.2
1086(b) 9.BA 1362 ete 9.D.l 1417 8.E.l
1086(b) 9.E.2 1362 ete 9.E.l 1417 8.D.l
1086 ete 9.D.l,2 1363 8.B 1417 ete 8.D.2
1088 2.B.3 1363 8.D.l 1418(a) 8.A.l.a,e-e
1088 2.D.1 1364 8.A.2 1418(a) 8.A.2.a.l,2
1091 2.D.l 1370 2.D.l 1418(a)(3) 8.A.2.e
1091 2.D.2.b 1370(a,b) 2.B.2 no entry 8.A.1.b.l,2
1091 (a,b) 2.B.1 1370(a,b) 6.E.3.d 1418(b) 8.A.1.b.3
1091 (d,e) 2.B.8,9 1370(e,d) 2.B.2.a 1431 9.A.2
1091 (c) 2.E.l,2,3.a 1370(e,d) 2.B.8 1460(a) no entry
1099(a) no entry 1371 2.A.1-4 1460(d) 9.A.l
1099(b-d) 2.D.l no entry 2.A.5,6 1460(e) 9.A.3
1099(b-d) 2.B.6.a,b,e 1371 2.E.l,2 1460 7.D.3.d
no entry 2.B.6.d 1385(a) 7.B.2 1460 ete 9.E.1,2
1131 no entry 1385(b) 7.B.3 1460 9.E.3.a,e,d
1205(a) 3.A.1.e.1 1388(a-£) 2.B.5.a-f 1460 9.E.3.b.2
1205(a)(1) no entry no entry 2.B.5.g 1460 7.EA.b,e
1205(a)(2,3) 3.A.1.e.1.a,b 1388 2.D.l 1460 9.D.3
1205(a)(4) no entry 1389 2.E.3.d 1460 9.DA.e,d
1205(b(1-3)) 6.A.2.a.3 1389 6.D.3 1465 9.AA-l1
1205(b)(4) 3.A.1.e.1.e 1389 ete 6.E.l,2 1465 ete 9.B.7
1205(e) no entry 1389 6.E.3.d 1465 ete 9.E.1,2
1301 1.B.2 1391 2.D.l 1485 7.D.l,2
1310 1.B.2 1391(a(4,10)) 8.A.2.h 1485 7.D.3.a,b
1312 2.BA 1391 (a,b) 2.B.7 1485 7.E.3
1312 2.D.l 1391 (a)(4) no entry 1485 7.EA.a
1353(a-e) 5.B.1.a.2 1401 9.E.3.e 1485(a) no entry
1353(d) 5.B.1.a 1416 8.D.l 1485(b,e) 7.A.3
1355 3.B.1,6 1416(a-e) 8.A.1.f-i 1485(e) 7.AA
1355(b) 3.B.7.b 1416(d) no entry 1485(f,h) 7.A.l
1355(b)(2) 3.B.7.a 1416(e,£) 8.A.2.o.2 1485(g) 7.A.2
1355(b)(2) 3.B.8 1416(£)(1,3) 8.A.2.o.1 14850) 7.B.l
1355(b)(7) 3.B.9.a-e 1416(£)(4) 8.A.2.p 1485 ete 7.E.1
1355(b) (9) 3.B.9.d 1416(g) no entry 1501 (b)(1)(C) 7.A.6
1355 ete 3.D.l,2 1416(h)(1) no entry 1501 (b)(4,5) 7.A.5
1355 ete 3.D.3 1416(h)(2) 8.A.2.m 1501(e) 6.A.8
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number/sub-item & clause number/sub-item & clause number/sub-item & clause
1501(e) 6.B.8 1529(e) 3.A.2.d 1567(a) 5.A.Lc.8
1501 (c) 6.D.l,2,3 1529(£) 3.A.2.f no entry 5.A.Le.9
1501 ete 7.E.2 1529(g) no entry 1567(b)(2) 5.A.l.e.l,3
1502 6.A.2.b,e,d 1529(h) no entry 1567(b)(4) 5.A.Le.2
1502 ete 6.e.4.a-f 1529(i) 5.B.Lb.l,2 1567(b) 5.A.Le.7
no entry 6.CA.g 1529G) 3.A.2.f,h 1567(b) 5.A.Le.l1
1502 N 4 5.A.Lb.ll 1529 3.D.l 1567(b) 5.A.l.d
1510(a) 6.A.l.a 1531 ete 5.D.Le.2 1567 5.A.Le.l0
1510(a) 6.D.3.a 1531 ete 5.E.Lb.7 1567 ete 5.A.2.f
151O(b) 6.A.Lb 1531 (a) 3.A.2.g 1567 ete 5.B.La
no entry 6.A.l.e 1531(b-d) 3.A.2.b 1567 ete 5.D.La,b
1516(a) 5.A.Lb.9 1533(a) 3.A.2.e.l 1567 ete 5.D.Le.l
1516(b) 5.A.Lb.8 1533(b) 3.A.2.e.2 1567 ete 5.E.La
1516(b) 5.A.2.e 1533(e,d) 5.B.La 1567 5.E.l.bA,5
1516 ete 5.E.l.a 1533(d) 3.A.2.e 1567 ete 5.E.l.b.6
1517 5.A.Lb.7 1534 no entry 1567(b) ete 5.E.Lb.8
1517(e) 5.A.Lb.8 1537(a,£) 3.A.Lb.6,7 1568(a,b) 4.A.3.b
1517(e) 5.A.2.e 1537(d) 5.A.1.f 1568(a,b) 4.A.3J
1517 ete 5.E.La 1537(f,h) 3.A.Lb.2 1568(e) 4.A.2.b
1518 no entry 1537(g) 3.A.Lb.5 1568(d) 3.A.1.f
1519 ete 5.B.La 1537(h) 3.A.LbA 1568(e) no entry
1519 ete S.D. La 1545 3.A.Lb.3 1571(a,b) 6.A.6.a-d
1519 5.D.Le.3 1548(b-d) 6.A.2.a no entry 6.A.6.e, f
1519 5.E.Lb.l 1548(d) 6.A.2.b 1571 (c) 6.A.6.g
1519(a) 5.A.Lb.1-3 no entry 6.A.2.a.l 1571(e) 6.D.3.f
1519(a) 5.A.Le.ll 1548 ete 6.D.2 no entry 6.E.3.f
1519(b) 5.A.l.bA.a-d 1549 6.A.2.a.2 1572(a) 3.A.2.a
1519(e) S.B.La 1553 a 3.A.Le.5 1572(d) no entry
1519(e) 5.B.Lb.l 1555(a) 6.A.2.a.2 1573(a,b) 3.A.Le.3
1519 ete 5.E.La 1556(a-e) 6.A.2.a.2 1574(b) 3.A.Ld,eA
1520(a) 5.A.Lb.5 1556(d) no entry 1574 3.E.2.e
1520(a) (2)(C) 5.A.Lb.6 no entry 6.AA.a-e 1574 6.A.6.h
1520(a,b) 5.B.l.a,b 1556 6.E.3 1585(a-e,gj) 6.A.3.a
1520(e) 5.B.Lb.3 1558 3.A.Lb.l 1585(i) no entry
1520 ete S.D. La 1560 3.A.Le.2 1586 3.A.Le
1520 ete 5.E.La 1561 Le.La 1586(e) 3.A.l.e.3
1522 ete 5.E.Lb.2 no entry Le.Lb 1588 4.E.l
1522 6.A.5 1564 3.A.La 1595 6.A.7
no entry 6.A.5.a.2.d 1564(a)(13) 3.A.1.b.2 1595 6.B.7
no entry 6.A.5.a.5.e.2 1565(d)(2,3) 4.A.2 1602 ete 4.C
no entry 6.A.5.f 1565(£)(1) 4.A.La.l 161O(a) Le.2.a.2
no entry 6.A.5.g 1565(£)(2,5) 4.A.Lb 1610(b,e) Le.2.b,e
1522 6.B.5 1565(£)(2) 5.A.2.d 1610 Le.2.a,b
1522 6.e.5.a 1565(£)(3) 5.A.La.1,2 1610 LCA
no entry 6.e.5.b 1565(£)(3) 4.A.La.2 1631 Le.3
1522 6.D.1 1565(£)(5) 5.A.2.f 1648 Le.3
no entry 6.E.3.e.1,2 1565(h)(1,2) 4.A.3 1661 1.e.3
1526(b)(1,3,4) 5.A.Le 1565(h)(1) 4.AA 1672 Le.2.a.1
1526(b)(2) no entry 1565 ete 4.E.1 1675 Le.5
1526(b)(5) 5.A.La.l,2 1565G) 4.E.2 1702 Le.6.a.1,2
1526(d) 5.A.2.g 1565(h)(2)(£) 5.A.1.b.3.e 1710(a-e) Le.6.a-e
1526 ete 5.B.La 1565(h) 5.A.Lb.10 1710(d) no entry
1526 ete 5.E.Lb.3 1565(h)(2)(F) 5.A.Lc.8 1715(a) no entry
1526(e) 6.A.2.d.3 1565 ete 5.E.Lb.6 1715(b) Le.7.a,b,d
no entry 6.AA.f 1566(b)(5) 2.D.2.a 1733 Le.7
1526(a) ete 8.A.2.a.3 1566 4.E.1 . 1733 1.E.2.e
1527 5.A.2.a-e 1566 4.D.1,2 1746(a) 1.E.2
1527 5.A.2.e no entry 4.D.3.a 1746(d,i) 1.E.2.a
1527 5.B.2.a,b 1566(b)(4,5) 4.D.3.b-f 1746 LA.3
1527 5.D.2.a-e 1566 ete S.D. LeA 1746 Le.8
1527 5.E.2 1566 5.D.Le.5 1746 ete LE.1
1527 ete 5.E.La 1566(a)(5) 5.D.2.a 1746 (c) - ---.----J.-:- . .
1529 ete 5.B.La 1566(a(2,4)) 5.D.2.a-e.2 no entry LE.2.e,f
1529 5.A.La.3 1566 6.D.3 1754(a) Le.9
1529(b) no entry 1566 ete 7.D.3.e 1754(a) 1.E.2.b
1529(e,d) 3.A.2.g 1567(a) 5.A.LeA-6 1754(a)(3) no entry
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"Old" IL Item "New" Category "New" Category "Old" IL Item "New" Category "Old" IL Item
number/sub-item & clause & clause number/sub-item & clause number/sub-item
1754(b(l,4)) no entry 2.B.l 1091 (a,b) no entry 1529(g)
1754(b(2,3)) 1.A.l.a,b 2.B.2 1370(a,b) no entry 1529(h)
1754 2 _l.A.l.a,e 2.B.2.a 1370(e,d) 3.B.l,6 1355
1755 LC.6.b.2 2.B.3 1088 3.B.7.a 1355(b) (2)
1757(a,b,e,e-i,k) no entry 2.B.4 1312 3.B.7.b 1355(b)
1757(e) 6.C.2.a,b no entry 1131 3.B.8 1355(b)(2)
1759 8.C 2.B.5.a·-f 1388 (a-£) 3.B.9.a-e 1355(b)(7)
1763(d) I.A.2 2.B.5.g no entry 3.B.9.d 1355(b)(9)
1763 LB.1.f no entry 1099(a) no entry 1757(a,b,e,e-i,k)
1763 LC.l0 2.B.6.a,b,e 1099(b-d) 3.D.l 1529
1767 5.C.l 2.B.6.d no entry 3.D.l,2 1355 ete
1767 6.C.2.e 2.B.7 1391(a,b) 3.D.3 1355 ete
1781(a) no entry 2.B.8 1370(e,d) 3.E.l,2 1355 ete
1781(b) 1.C.6.b.l 2.B.8,9 1091 (d,e) 3.E.2.e 1574
2.D.l 1088 4.A.La.l 1565(£)(1)
"New"Category to 2.D.l 1091 4.A.La.2 1565(£)(3)
"Old" IL Item 2.D.l 1099(b-d) 4.A.Lb 1565(£)(2,5)
2.0.1 1312 4.A.2 1565(d)(2,3)
"New" Category "Old" IL Item 2.D.1 1370 4.A.2.b 1568(e)
& clause number/sub-item 2.0.1 1388 4.A.3 1565(h)(1,2)
2.D.1 1391 4.A.3.b 1568(a,b)
no entry 1754(b(1,4)) 2.D.2.a 1566(b)(5) 4.A.3J 1568(a,b)
1.A.1.a,b 1754(b(2,3)) 2.D.2.b 1091 4.AA 1565(h)(1)
1.A.l.a,e 1754(b)(2) 2.E.1,2 1371 4.B.1 1358(b)
1.A.2 1763(d) 2.E.1,2,3.a 1091(e) 4.B.2,3 1358(e)
1.A.3 1746 2.E.3.a no entry no entry 1358(a)
LB.La-e 1357 no entry 1001 (a(l),b(l)) 4.C 1602 ete
LB.1.f 1763 2.E.3.b 1001 (a(2-4),b) 4.D.1,2 1566
LB.2 1301 2.E.3.e 1080 4.D.3.a no entry
LB.2 1310 2.E.3.e 1081 4.D.3.b-f 1566(b)(4,5)
LB.3 1081 2.E.3.d 1389 4.E.1 1358
LC.La 1561 3.A.La 1564 4.E.1 1565 ete
LC.Lb no entry 3.A.Lb.l 1558 4.E.1 1566
LC.2.a,b 1610 3.A.Lb.2 1537(f,h) 4.E.1 1588
LC.2.a.1 1672 3.A.Lb.2 1564(a)(13) 4.E.2 1565G)
LC.2.a.2 1610(a) 3.A.Lb.3 1545 5.A.La.l,2 1526(b)(5)
LC.2.b,e 1610(b,e) 3.A.LbA 1537(h) 5.A.La.1,2 1565(£)(3)
LC.3 1631 3.A.Lb.5 1537(g) 5.A.l.a.3 1529
LC.3 1648 3.A.Lb.6,7 1537(a,£) 5.A.Lb.1-3 1519(a)
LC.3 1661 3.A.Le 1586 5.A.Lb.3.e 1565(h)(2)(£)
LCA 1610 3.A.Le.3 1586(e) 5.A.LbA.a-d 1519(b)
LC.5 1675 3.A.l.d,eA 1574(b) 5.A.1.b.5 1520(a)
LC.6.a-e 1710(a-e) 3.A.Le.l 1205(a) 5.A.Lb.6 1520(a) (2)(C)
no entry 1710(d) 3.A.Le.La,b 1205(a)(2,3) 5.A.Lb.7 1517
LC.6.a.1,2 1702 3.A.Le.Le 1205(b)(4) 5.A.Lb.8 1516(b)
LC.6.b.1 1781(b) 3.A.Le.2 1560(a,b) 5.A.Lb.8 1517(e)
no entry 1781 (a) 3.A.Le.3 1573(a,b) 5.A.Lb.9 1516(a)
LC.6.b.2 1755 3.A.Le.5 1553(a) 5.A.Lb.10 1565(h)
LC.7 1733 3.A.1.f 1568(d) 5.A.Lb.11 1502 N 4
no entry 1715(a) no entry 1205(a)(4) 5.A.Le.1,3 1567(b)(2)
LC.7.a,b,d 1715(b) no entry 1205(e) 5.A.Le.2 1567(b)(4)
1.C.8 1746 no entry 1205(a)(1) 5.A.l.eA-6 1567(a)
LC.9 1754(a) no entry 1568(e) 5.A.Le.7 1567(b)
no entry 1754(a)(3) no entry 1572(d) 5.A.Lc.8 1565(h)(2)(F)
LC.10 1763 3.A.2.a 1572(a) 5.A.Lc.8 1567(a)
LD 1081 3.A.2.b 1531 (b-d) 5.A.Le.9 no entry
LD 1357 3.A.2.e.1 1533(a) 5.A.Le.l0 1567
LE.1 1746 ete 3.A.2.e.2 1533(b) 5.A.Le.11 1519(a) ete
LE.2 1746(a) 3.A.2.d 1529(e) 5.A.Le.l1 1567(b)
LE.2.a 1746(d,i) 3.A.2.e 1533(d) 5.A.Ld 1567(b)
LE.2.b 1754(a) 3.A.2.f 1529(£) 5.A.Le 1526(b)(l,3,4)
LE.2.e 1733 3.A.2.g 1529(e,d) no entry 1526(b)(2)
1.E.2.d 1746(e) 3.A.2.g 1531(a) 5.A.1.f 1537(d)
LE.2.e,f no entry 3.A.2.f,h 1529G) 5.A.2.a-e 1527
2.A.1-4 1371 no entry 1529(b) 5.A.2.d 1565(£)(2)
2.A.5,6 no entry 5.A.2.e 1516(b)
84 Security Export Control September 1991
"New" Category "Old" IL Item "New" Category "Old" IL Item "New" Category "Old" IL Item
& clause number/sub-item & clause number/sub-item & clause number/sub-item
5.A.2.e 1517(e) 6.A.5.g no entry 8.A.2.j 1417(h)(1-3)
5.A.2.e 1527 6.A.6.a-d 1571(a,b) 8.A.2.k 1416(h)(4)
5.A.2.f 1565(£)(5) 6.A.6.e,f no entry 8.A.2.l 1416(h)(10)
5.A.2.f 1567 ete 6.A.6.g 1571(e) 8.A.2.m 1416(h)(2)
5.A.2.g 1526(d) 6.A.6.h 1574 8.A.2.n 1416(h)(5)
5.B.1.a 1353(d) 6.A.7 1595 8.A.2.o.1 1416(£)(1,3)
5.B.l.a 1519(e) 6.A.8 1501(e) 8.A.2.o.2 1416(e,£)
5.B.1.a 1519 ete 6.BA no entry 8.A.2.o.2 1416(h)(6-9)
5.B.1.a 1526 ete 6.B.5 1522 8.A.2.o.3 1417 ete
5.B.1.a 1529 ete 6.B.7 1595 8.A.2.p 1416(£)(4)
5.B.1.a 1533(e,d) 6.B.8 1501 (c) 8.A.2.p 1416(h)(11)
5.B.1.a 1567 ete 6.C.2.a,b 1757(e) 8.B 1363
5.B.1.a,b 1520(a,b) 6.C.2.e 1767 8.C 1759
5.B.1.a.2 1353(a-e) 6.CA.a-f 1502 ete 8.D.l 1363
5.B.1.b.l 1519(e) 6.CA.g 8.D.l 1416no entry
5.B.1.b.l,2 1529(i) 6.C.5.a 1522 8.D.l 1417
8.D.2 1417 ete5.B.1.b.3 1520(e) 6.C.5.b no entry
8.E.l 1417
5.B.2.a,b 1527 6.D.l 1522
8.E.2 1417 ete5.C.l 1767 6.0.1,2,3 1501(e) 1086(a,b(3,4),e)
5.D.1.a 1357 ete 6.D.2 1548 ete
no entry
5.D.1.a 1519 ete 6.D.3 1389
no entry 1460(a)
9.A.l 1460(d)5.D.1.a 1520 ete 6.D.3 1566 9.A.2 1431
5.D.1.a,b 1567 ete 6.D.3.a 1510(a) 9.A.3 1460(e)
5.D.1.e.l 1567 ete 6.D.3.f 1571 (c) 9.AA-ll 1465
5.D.1.e.2 1531 ete 6.E.l,2 1389 ete 9.B.1.a-e 1080(1)(b-e,k)
5.D.1.e.3 1519 6.E.3 1556 9.B.1.d-h 1080(1)(h-j)
5.D.1.eA 1566 ete 6.E.3.d 1370(a,b) no entry 1361(a-e)
5.D.l.e.5 1566 ete 6.E.3.d 1389 9.B.2,5 1361 (d)
5.D.2.a 1566(a)(5) 6.E.3.e.l,2 no entry 9.B.3 1361 (g)
5.D.2.a-e 1527 6.E.3.f no entry 9.BA 1086(b)
5.D.2.a-e.2 1566(a(2,4)) no entry 1518 9.B.6 1362(b)
5.E.1.a 1516 ete 7.A.l 1485 (f,h) 9.B.7 1465 ete
5.E.1.a 1517 ete 7.A.2 1485(g) 9.B.8 no entry
5.E.l.a 1519 ete 7.A.3 1485(b,e) 9.B.9 1080(1)(i)
5.E.1.a 1520 ete 7.AA 1485(e) 9.D.l 1080(1) (e,e,h-k)
5.E.l.a 1527 ete 7.A.5 1501 (b)(4,5) 9.D.l 1361
5.E.1.a 1567 ete 7.A.6 1501 (b)(1)(C) 9.D.l 1362 ete
5.E.1.b.l 1519 7.B.l 14850) 9.D.l,2 1080
5.E.1.b.2 1522 ete 7.B.2 1385(a) 9.D.l,2 1086 ete
5.E.1.b.3 1526 ete 7.B.3 1385(b) no entry 1080(1)(a,f,g)
5.E.1.bA,5 1567 7.D.l,2 1485 9.D.3 1460
5.E.1.b.6 1565 ete 7.D.3.a,b 1485 9.DA.a 1362(a)
5.E.1.b.6 1567 ete 7.D.3.e 1566 ete 9.DA.b 1361 (d)
5.E.1.b.7 1531 ete 7.D.3.d 1460 9.DA.e,d 1460
5.E.1.b.8 1567(b) ete 7.E.l 1485 ete 9.DA.e 1080(I) (d)
5.E.2 1527 7.E.2 1501 ete 9.DA.f 1080(I)
6.A.l.a 1510(a) 7.E.3 1485 9.E.l 1361 ete
6.A.1.b 1510(b) 7.EA.a 1485 9.E.l 1362 ete
6.A.l.e no entry 7.EA.b,e 1460 9.E.l,2 1080 ete
6.A.2.a.l,3 1548(b-d) 8.A.l.a,e-e 1418(a) 9.E.l,2 1460 ete
6.A.2.a.2 1555 8.A.1.b.l,2 no entry 9.E.l,2 1465 ete
6.A.2.a.2 1556(a-e) 8.A.1.b.3 1418(b) 9.E.2 1086(b)
6.A.2.a.2 1549 8.A.1.e no entry
no entry 1080(II)
6.A.2.a.3 1205(b(1-3)) 8.A.1.f-i 1416(a-e)
9.E.3.a,e,d 1460
9.E.3.b.l 1361 (e)
6.A.2.b 1548(d) 8.A.2 1364 9.E.3.b.2 1460
6.A.2.b,e,d 1502 no entry 1391 (a)'(4) 9.E.3.e 1401
6.A.2.d.3 1526(e) 8.A.2.a.l,2 1418(a) 1416(d)
6.A.3.a 1585(a-e,gj) 8.A.2.a.3 1526(a) ete
no entry
no entry 1416(g)
no entry 1585(i) 8.A.2.b 1417(b) no entry 1416(h)(1)
no entry 1556(d) 8.A.2.e 1418(a)(3) no entry 1417(a)
6.AA.a-e no entry 8.A.2.d 1417(e) no entry 1417(g)
6.AA.f no entry 8.A.2.e,f 1417(e) no entry 1417(h)(4)
6.A.5 1522 8.A.2.g.1 1417(£) no entry 1485(a)
6.A.5.a.2.d no entry 8.A.2.g.2 no entry no entry 1534
6.A.5.a.5.e.2 no entry 8.A.2.h 1391(a(4,10))
6.A.5.f no entry 8.A.2.i 1417(d)
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D
Category 5 – Part 2 “Information
Security”
On the following pages is the text of the 2004 Category 5 – Part 2 “Information
Security” section of the Wassenaar Arrangement’s Dual-Use List. This was the
List as it existed the year of the debate about quantum cryptography.
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DUAL-USE LIST - CATEGORY 5 - PART 2 - "INFORMATION SECURITY" 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
   WA-LIST (04) 2 
 03-06-2005 - 79 - 
Part 2 - "INFORMATION SECURITY" 
 
Note 1 The control status of "information security" equipment, "software", systems, 
application specific "electronic assemblies", modules, integrated circuits, 
components or functions is determined in Category 5, Part 2 even if they are 
components or "electronic assemblies" of other equipment. 
 
Note 2 Category 5 – Part 2 does not control products when accompanying their user for 
the user's personal use. 
 
Note 3 Cryptography Note 
 
5.A.2. and 5.D.2. do not control items that meet all of the following: 
a. Generally available to the public by being sold, without restriction, from 
stock at retail selling points by means of any of the following: 
1. Over-the-counter transactions; 
2. Mail order transactions; 
3. Electronic transactions; or 
4. Telephone call transactions; 
b. The cryptographic functionality cannot easily be changed by the user; 
c. Designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by 
the supplier; and 
d. Deleted; 
e. When necessary, details of the items are accessible and will be provided, upon 
request, to the appropriate authority in the exporter's country in order to 
ascertain compliance with conditions described in paragraphs a. to c. above. 
 
Technical Note 
In Category 5 - Part 2, parity bits are not included in the key length. 
 
 
5. A. 2. SYSTEMS, EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS 
 
   a. Systems, equipment, application specific "electronic assemblies", modules 
and integrated circuits for "information security", as follows, and other 
specially designed components therefor: 
 
N.B. For the control of global navigation satellite systems receiving 
equipment containing or employing decryption (i.e. GPS or 
GLONASS), see 7.A.5. 
 
5. A. 2. a. 1. Designed or modified to use "cryptography" employing digital 
techniques performing any cryptographic function other than 
authentication or digital signature having any of the following: 
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Technical Notes 
1. Authentication and digital signature functions include their 
associated key management function. 
2. Authentication includes all aspects of access control where there 
is no encryption of files or text except as directly related to the 
protection of passwords, Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) 
or similar data to prevent unauthorised access. 
3. "Cryptography" does not include "fixed" data compression or 
coding techniques. 
 
Note 5.A.2.a.1. includes equipment designed or modified to use 
"cryptography" employing analogue principles when 
implemented with digital techniques. 
 
5. A. 2. a. 1. a. A "symmetric algorithm" employing a key length in excess of 
56 bits; or 
b. An "asymmetric algorithm" where the security of the algorithm is 
based on any of the following: 
1. Factorisation of integers in excess of 512 bits (e.g., RSA); 
2. Computation of discrete logarithms in a multiplicative group 
of a finite field of size greater than 512 bits (e.g., Diffie-
Hellman over Z/pZ); or 
3. Discrete logarithms in a group other than mentioned in 
5.A.2.a.1.b.2. in excess of 112 bits (e.g., Diffie-Hellman 
over an elliptic curve); 
 
    2. Designed or modified to perform cryptanalytic functions;  
 
    3. Deleted; 
 
    4. Specially designed or modified to reduce the compromising 
emanations of information-bearing signals beyond what is necessary 
for health, safety or electromagnetic interference standards; 
 
    5. Designed or modified to use cryptographic techniques to generate the 
spreading code for "spread spectrum" systems, including the hopping 
code for "frequency hopping" systems; 
 
    6. Designed or modified to use cryptographic techniques to generate 
channelizing or scrambling codes for "time-modulated ultra-
wideband" systems; 
 
    7. Deleted 
 
    8. Communications cable systems designed or modified using 
mechanical, electrical or electronic means to detect surreptitious 
intrusion. 
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Note 5.A.2. does not control: 
a. "Personalised smart cards": 
1. Where the cryptographic capability is restricted for use in 
equipment or systems excluded from control under entries b. 
to f. of this Note; or 
2. For general public-use applications where the cryptographic 
capability is not user-accessible and it is specially designed and 
limited to allow protection of personal data stored within. 
N.B. If a "personalised smart card" has multiple functions, the 
control status of each function is assessed individually.  
 
b. Receiving equipment for radio broadcast, pay television or similar 
restricted audience broadcast of the consumer type, without digital 
encryption except that exclusively used for sending the billing or 
programme-related information back to the broadcast providers. 
 
c. Equipment where the cryptographic capability is not user-
accessible and which is specially designed and limited to allow 
any of the following: 
1. Execution of copy-protected software; 
2. Access to any of the following: 
a. Copy-protected contents stored on read-only media; or 
b. Information stored in encrypted form on media (e.g. in 
connection with the protection of intellectual property 
rights) when the media is offered for sale in identical sets 
to the public; or 
3. Copying control of copyright protected audio/video data. 
 
d. Cryptographic equipment specially designed and limited for 
banking use or money transactions. 
Technical Note 
'Money transactions' in 5.A.2. Note d. includes the collection and 
settlement of fares or credit functions. 
 
e. Portable or mobile radiotelephones for civil use (e.g., for use with 
commercial civil cellular radiocommunications systems) that are 
not capable of end-to-end encryption. 
 
f. Cordless telephone equipment not capable of end-to-end encryption 
where the maximum effective range of unboosted cordless operation 
(i.e., a single, unrelayed hop between terminal and home basestation) 
is less than 400 metres according to the manufacturer's 
specifications. 
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5. B. 2. TEST, INSPECTION AND PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT 
 
   a. Equipment specially designed for: 
    1. The "development" of equipment or functions controlled by 
Category 5 - Part 2, including measuring or test equipment; 
    2. The "production" of equipment or functions controlled by   
Category 5 - Part 2, including measuring, test, repair or production 
equipment. 
 
   b. Measuring equipment specially designed to evaluate and validate the 
"information security" functions controlled by 5.A.2. or 5.D.2. 
 
 
5. C. 2. MATERIALS - None 
 
 
5. D. 2. SOFTWARE 
 
   a. "Software" specially designed or modified for the "development", 
"production" or "use" of equipment or "software" controlled by 
Category 5 - Part 2; 
   b. "Software" specially designed or modified to support "technology" 
controlled by 5.E.2.; 
   c. Specific "software", as follows: 
    1. "Software" having the characteristics, or performing or simulating the 
functions of the equipment controlled by 5.A.2. or 5.B.2.; 
    2. "Software" to certify "software" controlled by 5.D.2.c.1. 
 
Note 5.D.2. does not control: 
a. "Software" required for the "use" of equipment excluded from 
control under the Note to 5.A.2.; 
b. "Software" providing any of the functions of equipment excluded 
from control under the Note to 5.A.2. 
 
 
5. E. 2. TECHNOLOGY 
 
   a. "Technology" according to the General Technology Note for the 
"development", "production" or "use" of equipment or "software" 
controlled by Category 5 - Part 2. 
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E
Interviews conducted
Interviews for this thesis occurred over three and a half years between Septem-
ber 2005 and May 2009 and took place in Oxford, London, Vienna, Brussels,
and Washington, DC. Interviews were conducted in person and not recorded
unless otherwise noted. They are listed here in chronological order.
2005
1. Cevasco, Frank (26 September) Independent consultant.
2. British Government Official C (2 December) Foreign and Commonwealth
Office.
2006
3. Export Control Lawyer, Bryan Cave and former Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Commerce, US Department of Commerce (5 January).
4. Swedish Former Government Official (6 January) Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Recorded.
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5. British Government Official A & British Government Official B (9 Febru-
ary) Ministry of Defence and Department of Trade & Industry. Recorded.
6. Wassenaar Secretariat Official A & Wassenaar Secretariat Official B (1
March)
7. EU Export Control Official (22 March) Office of the Personal Representa-
tive of the High Representative on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Council of the European Union.
8. EU Export Control Official (20 April) Office of the Personal Representa-
tive of the High Representative on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, Council of the European Union.
9. British Government Official B (29 June) Department of Trade & Industry.
Recorded.
10. Swedish Former Government Official (19 July) Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs.
11. Former Assistant Director for Nonproliferation and Regional Arms Con-
trol of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) (2 Au-
gust).
12. US Defense Department Official A (8 August) Defense Technology Secu-
rity Administration. Recorded.
13. US State Department Official A & US State Department Official B (11
September) Recorded.
14. Swedish Former Government Official (14 September) Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
15. Senior Analyst at the Center for Defense Information (19 September).
16. Senior Research Analyst, Institute for Defense Analyses (25 September).
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17. Research Director, Arms Control Association (27 September).
18. Senior Project Director, National Academy of Sciences (US) (27 Septem-
ber).
19. US State Department Official A (28 September) Recorded.
20. British Government Official B (21 December) Department of Trade &
Industry.
2007
21. US State Department Official A (9 January) Recorded.
22. Export Control Lawyer, Powell & Goldstein (10 January).
23. US State Department Official B (19 January) Recorded.
24. US State Department Official A (19 January) Recorded.
25. US State Department Official C (19 January)
26. US Commerce Department Official B (29 January) Recorded.
27. US State Department Official D (29 January)
28. Sensors and Instrumentation Technical Advisory Committee (30 January)
Department of Commerce meeting with Industry.
29. Senior Research Analyst, Institute for Defense Analyses (30 January).
30. Swedish Former Government Official (30 January) Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Recorded.
31. US Defense Department Official A & US Defense Department Official B
(5 February) Defense Technology Security Administration. Recorded.
32. Senior Consultant, Institute for Defense Analyses (6 February).
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33. Swedish Former Government Official (6 February) Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
34. US State Department Official E (7 February)
35. US Commerce Department Official C (8 February) Person responsible for
translating the Wassenaar Lists into the US control lists.
36. British Government Official B (22 February) Department of Trade & In-
dustry. Recorded.
37. British Government Official B, British Government Official E, & British
Government Official F (22 February) Department of Trade & Industry
and Ministry of Defence.
38. British Former Government Official (8 March) Ministry of Defence. Recorded.
39. British Former Government Official (22 March) Ministry of Defence.
40. (22 March) British conference organised by Barry Fletcher and David
Hayes for Industry concerned with export controls.
41. (26 March) Dinner with the British delegation to the Wassenaar Experts
Group.
42. German Government Official (27 March) Federal Office of Economics and
Export Control, BAFA.
43. Swedish Government Official (27 March) Inspectorate of Strategic Prod-
ucts.
44. German Government Official (28 March) Federal Office of Economics and
Export Control, BAFA.
45. Russian Government Official & British Government Official F (28 March)
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and British Department of Trade and
Industry.
363
46. Wassenaar Secretariat Official D (28 March)
47. British Wassenaar Industry Consultant A for low-light sensing technology
(28 March) Project Manager, e2v.
48. British Former Government Official (4 June) Ministry of Defence.
49. Wassenaar Secretariat Official C (13 June)
50. (13 June) Dinner with US delegation to Wassenaar Expert Group.
51. Canadian Government Official A & Canadian Government Official B (15
June) Export Controls Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and In-
ternational Trade.
52. British Wassenaar Industry Consultants A & B for low-light sensing tech-
nology (17 June) e2v and Andor Technology.
53. Japanese Government Official (19 June) Permanent Mission of Japan to
the International Organizations in Vienna.
54. Swedish Former Government Official (10 July) Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs. Video conference.
55. British Former Government Official (13 July) Ministry of Defence. Phone
meeting.
56. Swedish Former Government Official (10 August) Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Video conference.
57. US State Department Official A (22 August) Phone meeting.
58. British Government Official B (15 October) Department of Trade and
Industry. Phone Meeting.
59. British Former Government Official (8 November) Ministry of Defence.
60. US State Department Official B (13 December)
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61. US State Department Official A (13 December)
2008
62. British Former Government Official (19 March) Ministry of Defence.
Phone meeting.
63. British Former Government Official (20 March) Ministry of Defence.
Email correspondence.
64. Senior Consultant, Institute for Defense Analyses (24 March - 1 April).
Phone and Email Correspondence.
65. British Wassenaar Industry Consultant A for low-light sensing technology
(14 May) Project Manager, e2v. Phone Meeting.
66. British Former Government Official (3 June) Ministry of Defence.
67. British Wassenaar Industry Consultant C for thermal sensing technol-
ogy (5 June) Chief Engineer, InfraRed Intergrated Systems Ltd (British).
Recorded.
68. US Emerging technology and research advisory committee (23 Sept) De-
partment of Commerce. Teleconference.
2009
69. US Emerging technology and research advisory committee (6 April) De-
partment of Commerce. Teleconference.
70. Email exchange with US Commerce Department Official C (18–19 May)
F
Membership in Wassenaar & other
multilateral export control
arrangements
This appendix serves as a reference for when countries became members of
Wassenaar. It also contains a chart from Anthony & Bauer (2006, p. 776),
citing the membership in each of the Multilateral Export Control Regimes as
of 1 January 2006. For a graphical representation of the Participating States
of the Wassenaar Arrangement, please see Figure 4.1 on page 143.
In the table below, the dates in parentheses are the dates when the State
joined the New Forum, and the States in italics were CoCom members. For
the date of formation, I take the date of the first Plenary meeting of the oper-
ational Arrangement (i.e. after the ‘Initial Elements’ had been agreed), 12–13
December 1996. For a discussion of the progression of dates from the New
Forum to Wassenaar, see Wassenaar Arrangement (2008b).
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Table F.1: Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement and when they
joined
Date Joined Participating State Date Joined New Forum
12–13 December 1996 Argentina (2–3 April 1996)
Australia
Austria (31 March 1994)
Belgium
Bulgaria (11–12 July 1996)
Canada
Czech Republic (11–12 September 1995)
Denmark
Finland (31 March 1994)
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary (11–12 September 1995)
Ireland (31 March 1994)
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Norway
Poland (11–12 September 1995)
Portugal
New Zealand (31 March 1994)
Republic of Korea (2–3 April 1996)
Romania (2–3 April 1996)
Russian Federation (11–12 September 1995)
Slovak Republic (11–12 September 1995)
Spain
Sweden (31 March 1994)
Switzerland (31 March 1994)
Turkey
Ukraine (11–12 July 1996)
United Kingdom
United States
9–10 December 2004 Slovenia
April–June 2005 Croatia
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Malta
13–14 December 2005 South Africa
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Figure F.1: Multilateral Export Control Regime membership (Anthony & Bauer,
2006)
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Guidelines for the Drafting of Lists
The Guidelines for the Drafting of Lists was a document produced by the
Drafting Group of the New Forum, as an aid to those who maintained the lists.
While it was used, it was never formally adopted by the Arrangement. It is
reproduced in full here. This is an exact copy of the Guidelines. In 2007–2008,
it was revised and formally adopted. The revised Guidelines appear second.
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GUIDELINES FOR THE DRAFTING OF LISTS 
 
TO: DRAFTING GROUP MEMBERS 
 
These Guidelines have been developed with the Dual-use List in mind. Not all sections of 
these Guidelines will necessarily apply to the drafting of the munitions List. 
 
VINCE HATHWAY 
Chairman Drafting Group. 
12th February 1996 
 
GUIDELINES FOR THE DRAFTING OF LISTS 
GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1. Introduction 
 
To ensure consistency in the format, wording and interpretation of the entries in the 
Lists. The entries will follow a. common layout as far as possible. This should assist 
in the clarity and transparency of the entries, as well as assisting licensing officials 
and enforcement officials in Participating Countries in thee uniform application of 
export controls. The objectives of the Drafting Group are reproduced in Annex 1 in 
draft form only. 
 
All entries should be generated using the following framework specification: 
 
2. Entry Structure 
 
Each entry should comprise al1 or some of the following elements, as required:  
a. Chapeau (or head) - identifies the broad types or ranges of items to be 
controlled; 
   
b. Characteristics or 
Specifications 
- introduces where there is a need to identify that only a 
subset of the items in the chapeau are controlled (e.g., 
particular types exceeding specified performance 
levels or having certain listed characteristics); 
c. Notes - used to exclude items from control (e.g. where a 
particular type of item should not be controlled); 
 - also used to clarify the scope of the control of the 
entry and provide additional information regarding 
the intent where this may not be clear. 
 - written in italics so as to stand out from the main 
entry text. 
 - within definitions, N.B. is used in preference to Notes. 
   
d. Technical Note - used to provide additional or detailed technical 
information, specifications, test conditions and 
methods, etc. Also used for local definitions within 
entry, see 12.b.  Written in italics so as to stand out 
from the main entry text. 2nd and subsequent lines of 
text are left justified under ‘T’ of ‘Technical Note’. 
   
e. N.B. - used when a ‘Note’ is a required within a 'Note' or 
'Technical Note’ within a definition, or to cross-refer 
to associated entries. Written in italics so as to stand 
out from the main entry text 
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3. Chapeau 
 
The Chapeau sets the scope of the entry. Where it is intended to cover all types of the 
item(s) identified, it should stand alone as the full extent of the control text 
The chapeau may contain one general limiting characteristic; any more may lead to 
ambiguity in the intended scope of the entry. 
 
4. Cascading Lists 
 
Note  Refer also to Section 13. for a summary of the entry structure. 
 
 a.1. Where it is necessary for an entry to comprise more than one of the elements 
in Section 2., then, as appropriate, the text of the Chapeau plus Characteristics 
or Specifications or exceptions should read through as a single sentence or 
paragraph in all cases by using semicolons, colons and full-stops as 
appropriate to separate the items in the List 
 
2. Thus each of the elements 2.a. or 2.b. should read through as a single sentence 
with each element, or each item within each element, being terminated by a 
semi-colon with the final element being terminated by a full-stop.  
 
3. Elements 2.c., 2.d. or 2.e. should always be terminated by a full-stop. 
 
b.  Paragraph numbering and indenting should follow the rules specified in 
Section 5. 
 
c.  It is essential that if any item is intended to be controlled it must first be 
identified in the Chapeau. The Chapeau is to: first 'controlled/not controlled 
check' that has to be gone through in order for am item to be controlled. Listed 
specifications or characteristics are the second 'controlled/not controlled 
check', exceptions the third, and so on. 
 
d.  Where an entry consists of a list of several items, characteristics or 
specifications, in order to simplify the entry, the Chapeau should introduce the 
List by words such as ''… as follows:” or '' ...designed to have all/any of the 
following:'' or some variation of these. Thus, an item identified in the Chapeau 
will only be controlled if it is of a type listed after the chapeau and exceeds 
the listed specifications or has the listed attributes. 
 
e.  Conversely, any text in a Chapeau after a list has been introduced (e.g., text 
following ''as follows”) will have the effect of controlling any items described 
by that text without need for the described items to be separately listed. 
 A good example of this is where a Chapeau reads '' ...as follows, and specially 
designed components therefor:''. This indicates that any component specially 
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designed for the items in the list is also controlled, even though such 
components are not on the list following the Chapeau. 
 
 
f.  Where a list of items is first identified in the Chapeau, (before ''as follows:” 
for example), an “and” -list of construction should be used. The understanding 
of our ''and''-list construction is that ''a1l or any of'' the items listed are in the 
scope of the chapeau. 
 
 e.g., Optical fibre communication cable, optical fibres and accessories, as 
follows: 
 
 For the use of the comma in such cases, refer to section 8. 
 
5. Sub-entry References 
 
Presentationally, the standardised layout is that each of the elements required should 
start on a new line, with indenting and numbering as shown below. 
After the entry reference, levels of cascading should alternate between alpha and 
numeric characters as shown below, starting with an alpha character. 
Each new line should commence with an upper case letter as shown below. 
 
e.g., a. Upper case  
1. Upper case ...; 
2. Upper case ...; 
 a.    Upper case...;  
  1. Upper case...; etc., 
 
6. Lists of Characteristics/Specifications 
 
Cascading characteristics or specifications should be linked with an explicit 'and' or 
‘or’ before the last entry in the list, in order to clarify the intent of the entry. 
(Lists without 'and' or ‘or’ can be ambiguous.) 
 
7. Lists of Items 
 
Cascading Lists of items do not need to be linked by an 'and' or ‘or’, as the intent of 
the control is clear. 
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8. Use of the Comma in Lists 
 
In a list of three or more items such as:  
a, b, c, d, e and f. 
the normal way of punctuating such a list is shown above with the commas between 
''a and b'', ''b and c'', “c and d” and “d and e''' taking the place of ''and'' There is no 
comma after ''e'' because, with ''and'', it would normally serve no practical purpose, 
unless a comma is necessary in the particular context to make it clear that ''e'' and ''f'' 
are separate words and not a phrase. Thus where any ambiguity is possible the 
comma should be inserted. 
 
Similarly with an 'or':  
a, b, c, d, e or f. 
 
9. Use of Illustrative Lists 
 
The use of illustrative lists, typically headed by ''e.g.'', “including'', “includes'', ''such 
as'', etc.. in an entry should be avoided, and should be replaced by a more explicit 
entry. The long-term aim should be to replace illustrative lifts as far as possible, 
either by using exhaustive lists in an entry. or by clarifying the intent of the control 
text. Where an illustrative list is to occur, ''e.g.'' is preferred. 
 
NOTE:  Where an ''e.g. '' occurs the ''e.g. '' and its related tax: shall be enclosed 
within parentheses, this is to clearly identify what: text relates to the ''e.g. 
''. Parentheses should also be used fn similar circumstances. 
 
10.  Positioning of ''Notes'' ''Technical Notes'' and ''N B.'' 
 
The positioning of the above elements in an entry is particularly important and should 
be left-justified with the left-hand edge of the entry to which the element applies, and 
for ''Notes'' should contain a specific reference to the entry or sub- entry to which it is 
related.  A specific reference is only recommended for ''Technical Notes'' and ''N.B.'' 
if clarity is required. 
 
11.  Us: of the Singular/plural 
 
It is generally accepted that the singular implies the plural, and the plural implies the 
singular.  However, where the context results in the entry being open to alternative 
interpretations, the entry text should be explicit. 
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12. Definitions 
 
Two types of definitions are used, either global or specific to a particular entry. 
 
a.  Some words and terms are defied for use throughout the Lists, all uses of a 
defined word will be used with that definition. As an assistance to the reader 
double quotes ('') will be used throughout the Lists to enclose words or phrases 
which have an associated definition. Such definition will be listed in the section 
of the Lists entitled ''Definition of Terms Used in These lists. 
 
b.  For definitions specific to a particular entry, single quotes (') will be used to 
enclose words or phrases used as a defined term within the entry, and such 
definitions will be included within a ''Technical Note'' to that entry. 
 
 NOTE: It is important that defined terms should never be used in their 
undefined form. (i.e. without use of double quotes). 
 
13. Summary of Entry Structure 
 
a.  The general structure of an entry using ''as follows'' in the chapeau will be:  
 
 <item/sub-item descriptions>, <cone general limiting characteristics>. 
 <general extensions of the control1>, <as follows> 
  <general extensions of the control2>. 
<N.B.>. 
<Notes>. 
a.  <item 1>; 
b.  <item 2>; 
c.  <item 3>. 
<Notes>. 
< Technical Note>. 
 
Where; 
<item/sub-item description> 
means:  equipment system, components, material, etc., separated by '','' 
with an “and” between the last two items. 
 
<one general limiting characteristic>| 
means:   “specially designed for...”, etc. 
 
<general extensions of the control1> 
means:   “and components therefor”, etc., the specific components 
under control being specifically listed after the “as follows”. 
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<as follows> 
means:  indication that a list of items will follow. 
 
 
<general extensions of the control2> 
 
means.  “and components therefor”, etc.. indicating that any 
components for the items described before the “as follows” are 
controlled even though not included or specified in the list 
following the ''as follows”. 
 <N.B.>. 
 
means:  Cross reference to related entry, Section 2.e. refers. 
 
<Notes >. 
means:  Sections 2.c. and 2.e. refer. 
 
< Technical Note >. 
means.  Sections 2.d. and 2.e. refer. 
 
NOTE   Items, (e.g., <item 1>) may also it structured in line with 13.a. (except that 
''Notes'' and “Technical Notes” should be positioned after the sub-entry or 
specific text to which they apply). 
 
 
   
b.  The general structure of an entry when “as follows'' is not used in the chapeau 
will be:  
 
<items/sub-items descriptions>, <one general limiting characteristic>, <general 
extensions of the control>, <having all/any of the following characteristics> 
<N.B.>. 
<Notes> 
a.  <attribute 1>; 
b.  <attribute 2>; and/or  
c.  <attribute 3>. 
 
<Notes>. 
< Technical Note>. 
 
where: 
<item/sub-item description> 
means:  equipment, system, components, material, etc., separated by '','' 
with “and” between the last two items. 
 
<one general limiting characteristic>  
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means:  ''designed for use “…”, etc. 
 
<general extensions of the control> 
means:  ''and” components therefor”, etc., indicating that any 
components for the items described are controlled. 
 
<having all/any of the following attributes> 
 means:  words that link the item to the attributes that follow. 
 
<N.B.>. 
means.  Cross reference to related entry. Section 2.e. refers,  
 
< Notes >. 
means:  Sections 2.c. and 2.e. refer. 
 
<Attributes> 
means:  any characteristic, function or feature, etc. 
 
< Technical Note>. 
means:  Sections 2.d. and 2.e. refer. 
 
14. System of Units 
 
a.  The Lists will use the International System of Units (SI) in all cases, exception 
will be avoided if at all possible. The defining source for the appropriate SI unit 
will be ISO 31 of 1992 all parts (i.e. parts 0 to 13). A list of commonly used SI 
units is reproduced in annex 2.  
 
b.  Where an item is commonly sold using another measurement unit or is 
commonly used in commerce in some supplier countries, a second 
measurement unit may be given in parentheses after the SI quantity. In all cases 
the physical quantity defined in S1 units will be considered the official 
recommended control value, and accuracy values will be derived from the SI 
units  
 
c.  Temperatures will be defined in Kelvin (K) with the value in degrees Celsius 
(0C) following in parentheses (e.g., 1573 K (130O0C)). 
 
d.  Angular measurements will be defined in degrees (0). 
 
e.  ln all cases where percentages are given, the intended denomination (weight, 
volume, etc.,) will also be specified. 
   (e.g., …made from more than 50% by weight of any of...). 
 
f.  Where a unit abbreviation appearing in text could cause confusion, the unit 
shall be spelt out. 
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EXAMPLE LIST OF 
COMMONLY USED SI AND DERIVED SI UNITS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
A - Ampere(s) - Electric current 
oC - Degree(s) Celsius - Temperature 
cm3 - Cubic centimeter(s) - Volume (solids) 
o - Degree(s) - Angle 
dB - decibel(s) - Sound or Power Ratio 
dBm - decibel referred to 1 milliwatt - Sound or Power Ratio 
g - grams(s) - Mass 
 - Acceleration of gravity (9.8 m/s2) - Acceleration 
GBq - gigabecquerels(s) - Activity (radioactive) 
GHz - gigahertz - Frequency 
Gy - gray(s) - Absorbed ionising radiation 
h - hour - Time 
J - joule(s) - Energy, work, heat 
keV - kiloelectron volt(s) - Energy, electrical 
kg - kilogram - Mass 
kHz - kilohertz - Frequency 
kN - kilonewton(s) - Force 
kPa - kilopascal(s) - Pressure 
kT - kilotesla(s) - Magnetic flux density 
kW - kilowatt(s) - Power 
K - kelvin - Thermodynamic temperature 
L - litre(s) - Volume (liquids) 
m - metre(s) - Length 
m2 - square metres - Area 
mA - millamp(s) - Electric current 
min - minute(s) - Time 
ml - milliletre(s) - Volume (liquids) 
MeV - million electron volt(s) - Energy, electrical 
MHz - megahertz - Frequency 
MPa - megapascal(s) - Pressure 
MW - megawatt(s) - Power 
µF - microfarad(s) - Electric capacitance 
µm - micrometer(s) - Length 
µs - microsecond(s) - Time 
mm - millimeter(s) - Length 
N - newton(s) - Force 
nm - nanometer(s) - Length 
ns - nanosecond(s) - Time 
nH - nanohenry(s) - Electrical inductance 
Ω - ohm(s) - Electric resistance 
ps - picosecond(s) - Time 
r - rad - Radian 
rpm - revolution per minute - Angular velocity 
rms - root mean square - Square root of the time average or the square 
of the quantity 
“ - second of arc - Angle 
V - volt(s) - Electrical potential 
W - watt(s) - Power 
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Annex 3 
 
TERMINOLOGY - DRAFTING USAGE 
 
Item: Means anything which may be presented for export. 
  
Entry: Means referenced portion of text in a List. 
  
Specially Designed for:  
 
Means any object whose design includes particular features to 
achieve some particular purpose. This will typically involve 
extensive research and development activity. 
  
Designed for: Means any object whose design is general in nature to achieve 
some particular purpose. Typically extensive research and 
development will not be involved 
  
Controlled: Means any item within the intended control scope of a List. 
  
Described: 
 
Means any item in a List but which may or may riot be within the 
intended control scope of the List. 
  
Component: 
 
Means any physical item below the system or equipment level. 
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On the following pages is the 2007 version of the Guidelines for Drafting
the Lists.
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H
Correspondence List
The Correspondence List is a list of items on the Dual-Use List and the Muni-
tions List with similar functionality. It further shows the shading between what
is and is not a dual-use technology. The 1997 version of the List is included on
the following pages.1
1While it says “The text that differs from that in the List of Dual-Use Goods and Tech-
nologies is shaded,” there is no shaded text in the document. I believe this may be due to how
the document was reformatted when I received it. Originally a Microsoft Word document, I
received it as a series of images.
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400 Correspondence List
I
Best Practices for Implementing ITT
Controls
The Best Practices for Implementing Intangible Transfer of Technology Con-
trols was agreed at the 2006 Wassenaar Arrangement Plenary meeting, and
signifies the most recent step of the Arrangement to harmonise efforts to con-
trol the intangible transfer of technology. This version is taken from Wassenaar
Arrangement (2008a).
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BEST PRACTICES FOR IMPLEMENTING 
INTANGIBLE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY CONTROLS 
 
(Agreed at the 2006 Plenary) 
 
Ensuring that control is exercised over intangible transfers of both dual-use and 
conventional weapons technology1 (ITT) and is recognized by Participating States of 
the Wassenaar Arrangement as critical to the credibility and effectiveness of their 
domestic export control regime.  As clear and precise control requirements facilitate 
effective export control implementation, the Participating States have adopted the 
following “best practices” for the implementation of export controls over intangible 
transfers of WA-controlled technology. 
 
A. Recognizing the inherent complexities of export control regulation for ITT, 
Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement support: 
 
1. Designing national laws and regulations with clear definitions of ITT via both 
oral and electronic means of transmission; including, 
 
a) Determination of what constitutes an ITT export; and, 
b) Determination of when an ITT export occurs; 
 
2. Specifying in national laws and regulations the intangible technology transfers 
which are subject to export control; 
 
3. Specifying in national laws and regulations that controls on transfers do not 
apply to information in the public domain or to basic scientific research; and, 
 
B. Recognizing that national export control authorities benefit from the cooperation of 
industry, academia, and individuals in the regulation of ITT, Participating States of 
the Wassenaar Arrangement support: 
 
1. Promoting awareness of ITT controls by such means as publication of regulatory 
handbooks and other guidance material, posting such items on the internet, and 
by arranging or taking part in seminars to inform industry and academia; 
 
2. Identifying industry, academic institutions, and individuals in possession of 
controlled technology for targeted outreach efforts and, 
 
                                                 
1 “Technology” 
Specific information necessary for the “development,” “production” or “use” of a product.  The 
information takes the form of technical data or technical assistance.  Controlled “technology” for 
the Dual-Use List is defined in the General Technology Note and in the Dual-Use List.  
Controlled “technology” for the Munitions List is specified in ML22. 
 
Technical Notes 
1. ‘Technical data’ may take forms such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models, 
formulae, tables, engineering designs and specifications, manuals and instructions 
written or recorded on other media or devices such as disk, tape, read-only 
memories. 
2. ‘Technical assistance’ may take forms such as instruction, skills, training, working 
knowledge, consulting services.  ‘Technical assistance’ may involved transfer of 
‘technical data.’ 
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3. Promoting self-regulation by industry and academic institutions that possess 
controlled technology, including by assisting them in designing and 
implementing internal compliance programs and encouraging them to appoint 
export control officers. 
 
C. Recognizing the importance of post-export monitoring and proportionate and 
dissuasive penalties to deter non-compliance with national ITT laws and regulations, 
Participating States support: 
 
1. The imposition of a requirement on industry, academia, and individuals to keep 
records, for an appropriate period of time, that clearly identify all controlled 
technology transferred, the dates between which it was transferred, and the 
identity of the end-user of all intangible transfers of technology for which 
licenses have been issued that may be inspected by, or otherwise provided to, 
export control authorities upon request; 
 
2. Regular compliance checks of those that transfer controlled technology by 
intangible means and, 
 
3. The provision of training to export control enforcement authorities on 
appropriate investigative techniques to uncover violations of national controls on 
ITT exports or access to such specialist expertise;  
 
4. Appropriate surveillance or monitoring, pursuant to national laws and 
regulations, of entities that are suspected by national export control or other 
relevant national government authorities of making unauthorized intangible 
transfers of controlled technology. 
 
5. The sanctioning by national authorities of those under their jurisdiction that have 
transferred controlled technology by intangible means in violation of export 
controls. 
 
D. Participating States also support: 
 
1. The exchange of information on a voluntary basis concerning suspicious 
attempts to acquire controlled technologies, with appropriate authorities in other 
Participating States. 
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